METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY

R. F. PIPER

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THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

by

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THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY

IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

. . . . . .

PART I. CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF PERSONALITY.

A. INTRODUCTION:

A logical classification of typical views is an appropriate and valuable introduction to a metaphysical study of personality because it brings to light questions of principle, and saves one, by its comprehensiveness, from the prevalent fault of settling in a too limited or abstract theory. The process also reveals fundamental problems, and, by suggesting valid elements in many conceptions, prepares the way for as complete an exhibition of the nature of personality as present insight permits. Further, a classification of personality-theories tends to disclose their important dependence upon certain methodological principles and assumptions which are in great need of explication.

1. Some reasons for classification.

2. Some possible principles of classification:

Numerous principles for such a logical division may be and have been proposed. The most common method of ordering theories of personality is to do so according to the general character of the metaphysical systems of which they are components. J. H. Witte carries out this procedure in a thorough-going manner by putting all types of historical views of the soul under the following headings: materialism, skepticism, positivism, Kantian criticism, idealism, and realism. (1) J. Royce suggests the use of such a principle, (2) and H. Lotze thinks that there are three possible views of the soul: the spiritualistic, the materialistic, and a kind of Spinozistic union of the two. (3) G. Kafka uses, very imperfectly, a somewhat similar scheme in studying current conceptions of the self, (4) and also, C. Jeanmaire. (5) The chief objection to this principle of division is that it is too broad, and leads one too far away from the main question.

a. Metaphysical systems.

b. Method of approach.

The same objection holds against attempts to classify views of personality according to the methods of approach adopted; for example, according to scientific observation, mystical intuition, rational inference, practical living, etc. An additional defect in the latter procedure is the obvious overlapping which would result so far as the nature of personality itself is concerned. Let us search for a principle that is more immediate in its application.

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(1) Das Wesen der Seele.

(2) The World and the Individual, vol. II, page 282.

(3) Medicinische Psychologie, section 43. Compare also, B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics, pages 300, and 331 ff.

(4) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen über das Ichproblem, Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, bd. XIX, 1910.

(5) L'idée de la personnalité dans la psychologie moderne.

c. Consciousness and experience.

A very suggestive principle, that of the relation of the self to consciousness, is used quite successfully by A. Drews in his criticism of about a dozen typical theories. (1) According to him the ego may in general be regarded as either a form of consciousness, the content of consciousness, or something conscious. In consideration of the widespread presumption that consciousness is ambiguous, and in view of Drews' doubtful hypothesis of an unconscious ego, we may improve perhaps upon this valuable classification by making human experience the center of reference, and by determining the main subdivisions according to the Kantian distinction between the immanent and the transcendent. Then the most important groups of immanent theories may be subdivided by reference to the distinction in experience between subject and object. The justification of this scheme will appear in the fruitfulness of its development, and if it should be successful, there would be an appropriate place for any well-defined theory.

3. Inherent limitations of a detailed classification.

Several qualifications of this plan of classification need to be noted. It is concerned with general principles, and involves a minimum of assumptions; and its usefulness is widened because it lacks detailed definitions. The following brief elaboration of it in topical form is not intended to indicate any order or judgment of worth among the theories included, nor to exhibit all of their possible or historical permutations and combinations. Great American thinkers certainly cannot be found to represent all of the types recognized. The idea of experience will be considered only from the human or finite point of view.

A special limitation of a detailed classification is that historical justice can be done to few theories, for it happens as a rule that only certain restricted aspects or selected expositions of actual complex theories may be considered if they are to be fitted into the pigeonholes of a logical scheme which rests upon distinctions of which the thinkers concerned were not perhaps themselves cognizant. In proportion as one takes account of the concrete and historical details in comparing theories of the self, one must simplify his plan of classification, until in the end the point of making the classification has largely disappeared. Another kind of difficulty is met in attempting to classify views of the self which have not been systematically or critically worked out, such as that found in new realism. If, however, one subordinates his interest in historical completeness and recognizes clearly the historically inadequate representation of many of the theories included in a specific classification, he is justified in undertaking the latter for the sake of the logical values mentioned in the first paragraph above.

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(1) Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.

B. THE PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION.

1. Transcendent theories--personality regarded as something transcending experience:

a. Materialistic theories--the soul a physical thing or function (materialism, naturalism, impersonal monism).

1'. Corporeal theories--the soul regarded as a kind of body:

a'. Somatic theories ("lower" materialism), where the soul is considered to be purely material or corporeal. It was L. Feuerbach, for example, who said that, "man is what he eats"; (1) and who taught that the spirit or ego is as much an object of the senses as the flesh is. (2) While T. Hobbes asserts in some of his writings, that the spirit is so refined that it escapes observation of the senses, yet it is physical body; an incorporeal spirit does not exist. (3)

The contemporary thinker, R. Willy, a friend and disciple of R. Avenarius, affirms, "This is what we understand by a human individual: a composition out of components of our own body and those dependent things which belong with it, a composition which constitutes itself a whole and a relative unity, just as any body in the environment composed of many parts." (4) H. Kröll similarly asserts that, "Everything which we call soul is traced back to reflex processes in the nerve paths." (5)

b'. "Psychoplasmic" theories ("higher" materialism), where the material substratum is regarded as intrinsically sensitive, or where one of its attributes is "psychic". E. Haeckel is a well-known representative of this theory; he maintains that, "We have given to that part of the protoplasm which seems to be the indispensable substratum of psychic life the name of psychoplasm (the 'soul-substance,' in the monistic sense); in other words, we do not attribute any peculiar 'essence' to it, but we consider the psyche to be merely a collective idea of all the psychic functions of protoplasm. In this sense the 'soul' is merely a physiological abstraction like 'assimilation' or 'generation'." (6)

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(1) W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, page 641.

(2) Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, page 1849, sections 40, 42; summarized by F. A. Lange, History of Materialism, vol. II, pages 246-56.

(3) F. Thilly, History of Philosophy, pages 267-8.

(4) Das erkenntnisstheoretische Ich und der natürliche Weltbegriff, Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1894, page 9.

(5) Der Aufbau der menschlichen Seele, page 340; see also, pages 288, 389.

(6) The Riddle of the Universe, page 109.

2'. Energetic theories--the soul a form of energy: W. Ostwald, for example, maintains that mental or spiritual energy is born of, or is a transformation of, chemical energy in the brain under determinate conditions, and that the energy of consciousness is the loftiest and rarest form of energy known to us. (1) This conception has striking similarities to numerous pre-critical views in ancient philosophy. D. von Holbach, too, believed that the activities of the soul are brain movements, and as such are only a special case of bodily motions. (2)

3'. Coordinatory theories--personality a physical coordination: For example, H. S. Jennings says, "When the set of phenomena we call matter reaches a certain complexity, it gives rise to this particular manifestation that we call personality." (3)

4'. Functional theories--where the soul is regarded as a function, product, accident, or result of living matter or bodily changes. F. J. V. Broussais held this view. (4) Some of the most radical of the older materialists viewed the soul as a secretion of the brain, just as gall is a secretion of the liver. Thinkers of this type usually consider that the brain is the particular part of the body which produces the soul.

b. Vitalistic, animistic, mystical theories--the soul regarded as an organizing principle of life. According to this group of theories, the soul is distinct from the body, perhaps even separable from it, but in any case it interacts with the body. Among the modern biological vitalists belong especially H Driesch; also, H. Bergson, J. A. Thomson, and J. S. Haldane. (5) Wm. McDougall is a noted representative of animism from the psychological side. (6) K. DuPrel is an excellent example of one who holds a mystical view of the soul, where the latter is primarily a principle of life beyond consciousness. (7)

Since, in views of this type, the soul regularly has a conscious aspect in addition to its organic agency which works beyond the limits of the individual's consciousness, they belong strictly in the third class of theories, in which the soul is regarded as being at once immanent and

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(1) Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, pages 394 and 398. See also, Individuality and Immortality, page 7; and articles in Annalen der Naturphilosophie.

(2) F. A. Lange, History of Materialism, vol. II, pages 99-100. See the whole of chapter III, section 4, of this work, where the author summarizes the work of Holbach entitled, Système de la Nature, etc., 1770.

(3) Life and Matter, page 18.

(4) W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, page 634.

(5) See these names in bibliography at end.

(6) Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism.

(7) Die Philosophie der Mystik.

transcendent. (1) But so far as exponents of these vitalistic conceptions consider consciousness to be a narrow or superficial reflection of a much vaster and richer life beyond consciousness, this point of emphasis warrants us in placing their theories, with the qualifications noted, in the transcendent class. DuPrel, for example, speaks of "the objective mode--the organic personality," and finds the ultimate reality or being of the soul in an inscrutable, trans-conscious, organic subject, termed sometimes "the unconscious," which is "simultaneous" rather than "continuous" with the conscious subject. (2)

c. Realistic theories:

1'. Older realistic theories, in which the soul is regarded as a substantial substratum, supersensuous or unconscious real, a thing-in-itself, the unknowable, etc. The theory of A. Drews, an admirer of Schopenhauer and an enthusiastic disciple of E. von Hartmann, is a striking recent example of an attempt to explain personality in terms of an unconscious, real being. He asserts that, "the predicate of reality belongs to the latter because it alone is a genuinely independent and original being with reference to which conscious being is dependent and conditioned, both in its content and in its form." (3) He summarizes his view as follows: "The soul is the living system of unconscious will-acts of the absolute substance whose external appearance fashions our body and whose inner appearance fashions the totality of our conscious psychic functions." (4)

2'. Neo-realistic theories, where the mind or the self is regarded as a certain grouping of neutral elements, i.e., elements which are neither physical nor mental. The view of R. B. Perry (5) may be treated as an example of this type if one considers that the emphatic feature of his theory is that the entities which compose the relational complex called consciousness exist independently of consciousness. (6) Since, however, mind or consciousness, when they are actual, lie in the "open field of experience," the view in question belongs with greater appropriateness among the immanent theories of the objective type. (7)

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(1) See below, pages 8-11.

(2) The Philosophy of Mysticism, translated by C. C. Massey; see prefaces by DuPrel and by Massey, especially pages ix-xi, and xxiv-xxvi.

(3) Zur Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich, Archiv für systematische Philosophie, vol. VIII, page 199.

(4) Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik, page 301.

(5) This view is described fully below, pages 87-122.

(6) See below, page 102.

(7) See below, pages 97-8.

2. Immanent theories--personality regarded as immanent in experience:

d. Objectivistic or phenomenalistic theories, where the self is viewed as an object of experience, i. e., an empirical ego, in the usual sense. Here belong all theories in which the attempt is made to explain the self in terms of psychic phenomena alone, (empirical psychology become philosophic, empiricism, positivism, and some forms of new realism). These objectivistic endeavors lead to exceedingly unstable results, and it is very difficult to find pure examples of these theories; the subject of experience is always lurking in the background. The subdivisions of this class correspond, respectively, to the traditional tripartite divisions of the mind.

1'. Facultative theories--attempts to reduce personality to a single group of mental processes, or to ground the self in some "primary" faculty of the mind:

a'. Intellectualistic or rationalistic theories, where the self is regarded as a mere idea, concept, or memory. Richet's view is essentially intellectualistic, for he maintains that, "the consciousness of personality is a phenomenon of memory. It is the conscious memory of ourselves, of that which we are, of our age, our nationality, of the place where we live, the feelings which we are accustomed to have, our social, physical, and psychic situation. It is a memory phenomenon." (1) He says further, "If the memory with reference to our personality ceases, the consciousness of our person vanishes. . . There are ideas in us which play an overruling part. They are the ideas with reference to our ego." (2) Any strictly nominalistic theory of the self which might be found would belong in this class. P. Lapie asserts that the will is a mode of the understanding. (3)

b'. Emotionalistic or hedonistic theories--personality regarded as essentially emotion or feelings. E. M. Weyer, for example, emphasizes the doctrine that "the feelings constitute the warp and woof of personality, . . . and are alone qualified to span the chasm to another sphere, to maintain the thread of personal identity. . . Our personality can thus persist without the artificial aid of memory, which is the frailest of our faculties. . . In the realm of

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(1) Revue Philosophique, vol. XV, pages 227, 232.

(2) L'homme et l'intelligence, page 247, quoted by K. Oesterreich, Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen, pages 308-309.

(3) Logique de la volonté.

feeling each personality is a law to himself." (1)

c'. Voluntaristic theories--personality as primarily will.

d'. Various combinations of the last three subdivisions.

2'. Collectional theories--personality as the totality of the mental processes of an individual, that is, a collection or succession of conscious states. David Hume is the father of this large family of theories. On the whole, the view of Wm. James belongs in this class. Some of the new realists may be included here. This is the most appropriate place, on the whole, to put the view of R. B. Perry. (2) When B. Russell speaks of the self as "the whole assemblage of things that would necessarily cease to exist if our lives came to an end," (3) he is describing a view which stands close to this type of conception.

A striking example of this kind of theory is to be found in the thought of A. Spir, who asserts that, "To our ego, to our own being, therefore, we can reckon only those contents of perception which we can and must know as our own. If we investigate this content, it will be found that it consists of feelings (pain and pleasure), thoughts, wishes, memories, hopes, and similar mental phenomena. Our ego or self, is, therefore, in truth, a complex of these phenomena." Again, he says, "The unity of our ego is much more inner and real than the unity of an organic body, but nevertheless we are composite." (4)

e. Subjectivistic theories--personality considered as subject of experience;

1'. Transcendental theories--self as logical or pure ego or mere knower; for example, the mere subject of the "I think" which Kant develops in his Critique of Pure Reason. (5) In general the theories of the self presented in neo-kantian and neo-hegelian philosophies illustrate this type of theory. An example of this primarily epistemological conception of the self is found in G. Kafka's "attempt to present a critical representation of the more recent views of the problem of the ego." He describes the latter as the subject of

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(1) International Journal of Ethics, vol. XVII, page 239, etc.

(2) See below, pages 100-101.

(3) Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy.

(4) Gesam. Werke, Band I, Buch II, 1. Kap., pages 452, 450.

(5) See W. Schmidt, Der Begriff der Persönlichkeit bei Kant, chapter III, pages 25-48, for an excellent summary of Kant's conception of personality as set forth in the Critique of Pure Reason.

consciousness and in no sense an object of consciousness. It is not "found" or "experienced," but must be assumed to exist; it is perfectly empty, and has no predicates. (1)

2'. Activistic theories--personality as active subject, moral agent, subject of rights and duties, etc. Here belongs Kant's view of moral personality which may be defined as the autonomous moral being or the subject of the moral law.(5) Berkeley's view of the spirit as unitary and active being which cannot be perceived probably is properly included in this class.

f. Subjectivistic-objectivistic theories--personality regarded as subject of experience, but as something which may, in certain ways, make its experiences objects of knowledge: in general, the theories of the self found in personalistic philosophies illustrate this class:

1'. Personality viewed as a mental complex or whole organized around the immediate experience of the self as subject. Miss M. W. Calkins' conception of the self represents this type, for while she stoutly maintains that the self is a unique subject of consciousness, it is also a "relatively persistent, yet changing, complex, related being." (2)

2'. Personality regarded as developing, active agent which knows itself through its activities. B. P. Bowne (3) and James Ward (4), for example, hold that the self is a feeling and acting being or subject which can know itself indirectly through the results of its activities.

g. Absolutistic theories: for example, that of J. G. Fichte; these are omitted from consideration for the reason that this classification is concerned only with types of human personality.

3. Immanent-transcendent theories--personality regarded as something both immanent in and transcending human experience.

The subdivision and delimitation of the theories of this third main group are most difficult to carry out because of the variety of the factors and points of view involved. It is probable that most conceptions of personality belong in this third class, since nearly all of them are both immanent and transcendent in some sense, except, notably, those found in the "immanent philosophy" of W. Schuppe and J. Rehmke and others.

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(1) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen über das Ichproblem, Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, vol. XIX (1910), pages 1-241; see especially pages, 192-6, 225, 233.

(2) The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th ed., pages 407-8.

(3) See the whole account of Bowne below, pages 122-152.

(4) Psychological Principles.

(5) See W. Schmidt, Der Begriff der Persönlichkeit bei Kant, chapters 4 and 5, pages 49-82, where this view is well summarized.

Two qualifications need to be attached to this assertion. First, it does not require necessarily that the immanent and transcendent factors be made equally important in the conception of personality. It seems to be true, on the whole, that the immanent factor is predominant in the most adequate theories, and that the transcendent views tend, under criticism, to fall primarily within the circle of the immanent ones.

Secondly, the affirmation in question depends upon reading a broad meaning into transcendent. The theories of those who recognize the efficacy in personal experience of influences which are not consciously present at the time of their operation, (1) or who do not find the meaning of personality exhausted in any actual, momentary experiences, (2) or who seek to discover the significance of personality in the structures of knowledge and institution which are the products of its activities,--all these theories involve transcendent factors, if this term is not restricted to what is supposed to lie beyond all possible experience or knowledge.

Hence, the main problem in fixing the limits of this class is to determine whether or not particular thinkers have recognized a transcendent aspect of personality with some degree of clearness. It is beyond the purpose of this classification to elaborate the possible meanings of transcendent so as to include surely all historical types of theory which might be placed in the third main class, for this would really involve writing a history of the concept of personality. (3)

Wherever, therefore, an empirical factor is assumed or recognized in a theory of personality which is primarily transcendent, or wherever some kind of transcendent factor is assumed or recognized in a theory that is primarily immanent, - one will find a view of the third, comprehensive type, namely, the immanent-transcendent class. It is evident that many such combinations are possible. Only some of the more striking examples will be noted.

h. Neo-realistic theories of the self. These are especially difficult to classify because they have not been definitely and thoroughly elaborated. It has been noted that they belong primarily in the second general group of theories. But, since, in the case of R. B. Perry at least, consciousness, and therefore the self, is composed of elements which in themselves are "other-than-mind," we have found reason for putting the neo-realistic view in the first division too. Logically, therefore, it must be included also in the third combined class. In this connection the self means a certain grouping of neutral elements; these elements exist independently of mind, for the most part; their grouping is due to the selective behavior of an interested organism.

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(1) See, e.g., the view of F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, and its Survival after bodily Death; also, S. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams; and, E. B. Holt, The Freudian Wish.

(2) See, e.g., A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 3d edition, page 342.

(3) See, at the end below, the special bibliography concerning the history of the concept of personality. No adequate history of this idea has been written. G. H. Schubert wrote two volumes on Die Geschichte der Seele, but this work lacks metaphysical definiteness.

i. The Kantian view. According to Kant, personality has both an immanent (transcendental and practical) and a transcendent (noumenal) aspect. The soul for him is in part an idea or postulate of reason, and is transcendent in the sense that we cannot have a theoretical knowledge of its noumenal being. However, we can know the self as phenomenal, that is, as manifested in its synthesizing activities in the construction of the experienced object and as performing acts of volition. Personality is immanent in experience, then, in the sense, first, that the transcendental subject is the condition of all experience and knowledge, and, secondly, that it performs acts of volition or realizes ends.

j. In the mystical conception of DuPrel (1) one finds a striking dualistic theory of the self which intimately combines immanent and transcendent factors. In each human individual there is, he says, a "simultaneity of two persons in one subject." (2) The movable "threshold of sensibility" is the dividing line between the two phases or halves of personality. Above this threshold is the conscious life of thought and sensation, and below it is the "inner working of our mystical, intelligible subject," which is a kind of organizing, vital principle. (2) The conscious self is only an imperfect reflection of a more real life behind or beyond conscious phenomena, which are coexistent with it. In other words, the total life of the self at any moment has a much larger circumference than the field of consciousness.

k. The monadic theory of the self, in either of two forms, belongs in this third type. The dualistic monadism described by F. H. Bradley (3) illustrates well how immanent and transcendent theories of the self may be combined. According to this unusual type of monadic explanation, the self is a kind of simple being which stands in intimate relation with the successive changes of the conscious life without itself undergoing change, or suffering internal variations.

The conception of the soul-monad set forth by Leibniz belongs here, namely, the view that the activity of the soul continues even in states of unconsciousness; in other words, not all of the activities of the soul are sufficiently distinct to appear in consciousness. (4)

l. In absolutistic theories it is common to explain personality as a meaning which, though present in human experience, finds its whole significance only in the experience of an Absolute which transcends present human experience.

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(1) See above, pages 4 and 5.

(2) The Philosophy of Mysticism, translated by C. C. Massey, pages xxiv-xxv.

(3) Appearance and Reality, 2d edition, pages 86-87.

(4) See his Nouveaux Essais, preface.

J. Royce, for example speaks of the self as "a Meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within the unity of the Absolute life." (1) According to F. H. Bradley, the experience of the self, whatever finite individuals may consider it to be, must somehow be transmuted before it becomes real in the experience of the Absolute.

C. CONCLUSION.

1. Types of theory to be discussed in the following investigation.

It is beyond the scope of the following inquiry to discuss representatives of all types of view listed above. It is probable that there are only three or four basic ones, so far as fundamental differences of principle are concerned. J. Royce thinks there are "three different kinds of conception," the empirical, the realistic, and the idealistic. (2) This division is objectionable because certainly the meanings of the empirical and the idealistic views overlap to a considerable extent.

The second part of this investigation will be confined to a criticism of leading representatives of three important movements in contemporary American philosophy: pragmatism, new realism, and personal idealism. The study of these will disclose no doubt the issues which are of fundamental importance in solving the problem of personality, and will prepare for and contribute to the constructive goal of this investigation. The conceptions of the self found in all three belong primarily in the second or immanent class of theories. Lack of time and space forbid the introduction, save incidentally, of a study of representatives of naturalism and absolute idealism. A type of naturalistic conception, namely the energetic view, included above among the transcendent theories, will be examined in connection with the introduction to the study of mental activity. The absolutist view of F. H. Bradley will be treated very briefly in connection with the definition of the reality of personality. (3)

In connection with these two discussions, as well as with the criticism of new realism, the relation of the immanent to the alleged transcendent phases of personality will be considered. The adverse criticism of many of the transcendent theories has been in general so abundant and effective that one seems warranted in expecting that they must somehow be transformed or expanded into immanent theories if they are to be regarded as valid. A metaphysical system which fails to offer an adequate treatment of the all-important problem of personality is, therefore, condemned, so that this problem constitutes one valuable touchstone of the worth of philosophical systems.

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(1) The World and the Individual, volume II, page 268; see also pages 269-277.

(2) Ibid., pages 256-7, 266-9.

(3) See below, pages 343-44.

1. Types of theory to be discussed in the following investigation.

7. Hope, for example speaks of the self as "a fleeting embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within the unity of the Absolute life." (1) According to P. B. Bradley the experience of the self, whatever finite individuals may consider it to be, must somehow be transmuted before it becomes real in the experience of the Absolute.

8. CONCLUSION.

It is beyond the scope of the following inquiry to discuss these representatives of all types of view listed above. It is possible that there are only three or four basic ones, so far as fundamental differences of principle are concerned. C. Hope states there are "three different kinds of conception," the empirical, the realistic, and the idealistic. (2) This division is objectionable because confusingly the meanings of the empirical and the idealistic views overlap to a considerable extent.

The second part of this investigation will be confined to a criticism of leading representatives of three important movements in contemporary American philosophy: new realism, and personal idealism. The study of these will discuss the issues which are of fundamental importance in solving the problem of personality, and will prepare for and contribute to the constructive goal of this investigation. The conception of the self found in all three belong primarily in the second or immanent class of theories. Each of them open fresh the introduction, more incidentally, of a study of representative of interaction and absolute idealism. A type of neurealistic conception, namely the energetic view, included above among the transcendent theories, will be examined in connection with the introduction to the study of mental activity. The absolutist view of P. B. Bradley will be treated very briefly in connection with the definition of the reality of personality. (3)

In connection with these two discussions, as well as with the criticism of new realism, the relation of the immanent to the alleged transcendent phases of personality will be considered. The adverse criticism of many of the transcendent theories has been in general as abundant and effective that one seems warranted in expecting that they must somehow be transformed or expanded into immanent theories if they are to be regarded as valid. A metaphysical system which fails to offer an adequate treatment of the all-important problem of personality is, therefore, condemned, so that this problem constitutes one valuable touchstone of the worth of philosophical systems.

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(1) The World and the Individual, volume II, page 208; see also pages 209-217.

(2) Intro., pages 256-7, 264-9.

(3) See below, pages 313-44.

2. This classification of personality-theories suggests numerous questions as to method of approach.

Reflection on the above classification of personality-theories gives rise to important questions not only concerning what is the reality of personality, but also concerning what are the best methods of gaining knowledge of it. Indeed, corresponding to each of the main types of view listed above, one or more questions of method may be propounded. Some of these follow:

a. Can one adequately explain or describe personality from the physical or mechanical point of view, and if this is attempted, what untried assumptions concerning personality are made?
b. How shall we grasp or interpret the meaning of life or soul when they are regarded as existing apart from our human consciousness?
c. Is personality merely a postulate of reason, and how do some reach the conclusion that its reality lies in some kind of substratum beyond our immediate experience?
d. Can personality be adequately or scientifically described as an object of experience? Is the attempt to find personality primarily in one type of mental process a correct approach to the problem?
e. If personality is only the subject of experience, how can it possess any concrete meaning, content, or individuality, and how is it known? What is the function or significance of intuition and self-consciousness in the search for real personality?
f. If personality is at once subject and object, what is the relation of the categories to personality? and how is the objective phase of personality related to its subjective one?
g. By what method of testing or comparison is it inferred that finite personality is a mere appearance or phenomenon? By what method of reasoning do some reach the conclusion that the Absolute alone possesses a true self, and others that the Absolute is not a self at all?
h-l. How conceive the relation of that aspect of personality which is regarded as being within experience to those aspects or conditions which are regarded as transcending it, if they exist?

These questions of method seem to be of such prime importance in a metaphysical study of personality that they should be kept in the foreground in the critical examination of the views of certain American thinkers which is now to follow.

a. This classification of personality-theories raises many questions as to method of approach.

PART II.

CRITICISM OF CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONALITY SELECTED FROM AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY.

Introduction: purpose and method of investigating current theories.

Three theories of personality selected from current American philosophy will now be reviewed and criticized. We shall inquire how far each view clarifies the problems at issue and to what extent it is one-sided or incomplete. A question of special interest will be to ascertain whether any inadequacy present is due to the exigencies of the method of procedure or metaphysical system involved.

In the third part of the thesis an attempt will be made to further clarify the concept of personality, and to reach, if possible, a more satisfactory idea of it. In this endeavor any positive contributions discovered in the course of the critical survey of the second part will be appropriated. The latter will be concluded with a summary of the leading movements in the theory of personality.

The three representative thinkers to be considered are William James, Ralph Barton Perry, and Borden Parker Bowne. The first two are treated in the order named because it is the order of their historical connections. It would be reversed, however, if all three views were presented in the order of their estimated worth or success in dealing with the problem that is before us. In the study of each representative, the following order of topics will be observed: (1) statement of the theory with some reference to its historical connections; (2) method used and metaphysical system involved; (3) criticism; and (4) positive contributions.

A. THE SELF IN THE PRAGMATISM OF WILLIAM JAMES. (1)

Introduction;

The first philosophical movement to be examined in its bearing upon the theory of personality is pragmatism. This includes a characteristic doctrine of the self, although it is neither logically necessary nor fully developed as yet. As the representative of this movement for the purposes of this investigation, I have selected the illustrious William James, because of the actual fruitfulness and influence of his thought, and especially for the reason that the nature of the human mind was his most fundamental interest.

The pragmatism of Wm. James concerns personality.

In the teaching of James, pragmatism has an important bearing upon the problem of personality. In the autobiographical confessions of his book, A Pluralistic Universe, especially in chapter five, his philosophy may be seen reshaping itself amid painful struggles with absolutism and its intellectualistic logic. The firm foundation upon which he persistently rests his case are the facts of psychology and practical life. In the effort to escape the contradictions and dissatisfactions resulting from the conflict between

(1) For the chief sources concerning James' view of the self, see the general bibliography below.

these facts and the absolutistic dialectic, he finds himself in an intolerable "trilemma." One horn of this, he thinks, requires the reinstatement of the traditional doctrine of the soul in the sense of a spiritual substance distinct from mental processes. He refuses, however, to "forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian education had committed me." (1) His grounds for this decision are pragmatic, but he confesses at the same time that some future metaphysical champion may succeed sometime, in virtue of having discovered some hitherto unrevealed pragmatic insight, in giving the soul its "innings again in philosophy." (2) James himself, however, experienced for thirty years a pragmatic repugnance against admitting the common-sense and scholastic soul into his system of thought, and yet he has a very interesting pragmatic substitute for it. Let us, then, try to understand his pragmatism in its relation to the theory of personality. The first task is to set forth in a summary way the relevant principles of pragmatism as expounded by James. This exposition will be followed by a statement of his views of the self, and a criticism of them.

1. The essential doctrines of pragmatism.

a. General characteristics of pragmatism.

Beginning with the general characteristics of the pragmatism of James, we notice that it is primarily a doctrine of method, which, developed in opposition to intellectualism, seeks truth in the practical value or consequences of ideas rather than in their logical interrelations. (3) James wants logic "to take its rightful and respectable place in the world of simple human practice." (4) The methodology of pragmatism involves a psychological doctrine which strongly emphasizes the non-intellectual features of personality, or, in other words, gives a central place to the conative phases of consciousness. In metaphysics pragmatism tends to pluralism by reason of its insistent recognition of the independent worth of human centers of experience. These are the outstanding features of the pragmatic attitude. The more detailed description of it which follows is a free and incomplete rendering.

b. The pragmatic method and its application.

1'. General statement of the "pragmatic rule."

James' last statement of his main doctrine is found in "the pragmatic rule" of his book, Some Problems of Philosophy. The principle of this rule "is that the meaning of a concept may always be found, if not in some sensible particular which it directly designates, then in some particular difference in the course of human experience which its being true will make. . . . If, questioning whether a certain concept be true or false, you can think of absolutely nothing that would practically differ in the two cases, you may assume that the alternative is meaningless and that your concept is no distinct idea. . . This rule applies to concepts of every order of complexity." In other words, "If you claim that

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 208.

(2) Ibid., page 210.

(3) For summary accounts of pragmatism, see R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Part IV and Appendix; and, E. G. Spaulding, The New Rationalism, chapter XXX.

(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page 214.

any idea is true, assign at the same time some difference that its being true will make in some possible person's history, and we shall know not only just what you are really claiming, but also how important an issue it is, and how to go to work to verify the claim." (1)

This "pragmatic test" tries to reduce the meaning of a concept "to its positive experienceable operation." (2) Ideas that are called true must work in the sense of making factual differences in some one's particular or concrete experience. (3) Concepts which make no such differences are indistinct, meaningless, unimportant, or redundant. The pragmatic method, therefore, is useful in separating what is essential from what is superficial, especially among long-standing metaphysical disputes. (4) It is a very literal and persistent application of the law of parsimony in thinking. "All that the pragmatic method implies then is that truths should have practical consequences," (5) whether in the way of thinking or of acting. (6) In short, in the practical functioning of ideas the pragmatist tries to find the criterion and the nature of truth. (7)

2'. The nature and importance of experiential verification (mediate knowledge).

But in what way, according to James, can the differences which concepts make be determined? The positive answer to this question is much more difficult than a negative one, for it takes no extraordinary insight to assert that ideas that make no differences are not distinct or important. The reply of James is: by constant and direct appeal to experiential verification, to experience in the old sense of trial and testing. If one wishes to be convinced of the truth or falsity of a conception, one should believe in it as an hypothesis and follow the plan of action or reflection which it indicates. In the active or sensory process of verification, significant or insignificant differences will be found, and truth or falsity will happen to the idea, for truth is a process of growth rather than a product.

Verification will consist in the satisfying progress and termination of the leading suggested by the idea. The latter is verified in its successful and concrete working, in bringing us into satisfying relations with the objects or goals to which the idea points.(8) If an object comes to enjoy perceptual immediacy by reason of an idea pointing to it, we attain that satisfying harmony

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(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 61 ff. Further references concerning this rule, in chronological order, are: Reflex Action and Theism, in The Will to Believe, etc., page 124; Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 444-5; Pragmatism, chapters II and VII; Meaning of Truth, Preface; the latter contains an excellent summary.

(2) Meaning of Truth, page x. (3) Ibid., page xiv.

(4) Pragmatism, page 45; Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 443-4.

(5) Meaning of Truth, page 52.

(6) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 60. (7) Ibid., page 62.

(8) "On a very Prevalent Abuse of Abstraction, Popular Science Monthly, vol. LXXIV (1909), pages 490-3; other references in this connection are: Pragmatism, pages 58, 68, 76, 200 ff; Meaning of Truth, pages 105ff., 43ff.

between thought and things in which one chief kind of pragmatic truth consists. Further, ideas arise because of our practical needs, and they are true when they regulate our conduct so as to remove or to satisfy those needs. "I define the true as that which gives the maximal combination of satisfactions, and say that satisfaction is a many-dimensional term that can be realized in various ways." (1)

Several important facts about this doctrine of verification are noticeable. One is that James emphasizes the prospective or purposive function of ideas, and finds their meaning in a concrete course of action which terminates in the object meant. James denies that there is an absolute standard of truth, but thinks that the ideal of truth is gradually reached in the course of a dynamic development of human experience. This first fact exhibits the characteristic pragmatic subordination of intellect to action. It is noticeable also that in this exaltation of verification James elevates to the position of a general philosophic method one aspect of traditional inductive logic. (2) This is probably the source of the affinities of pragmatism with naturalism and positivism; another reason for its kinship with the latter is the aversion of the pragmatist to substances as principles of explanation. James thinks that philosophy has no method peculiar to itself, but is "characterized by conservative assertions and careful verification." (3)

a'. Conative satisfactions are important in pragmatic verification.

The point of emphasis which gives any novelty and peculiarity to the pragmatic method that it possesses is to be found in the practical and vital character of the experiences which mark the completion of the verifying process. These experiences are primarily volitional and emotional satisfactions connected with consistent reasoning, the discovery of percepts, deliverance from obstacles, achievement of ambitions, and in general with successful attempts to fulfil our human interests. The kind of satisfaction present is determined by the character of the interest or the purpose of the idea concerned, for every idea is satisfactory for a certain purpose and under specific circumstances. The difference, then, which true ideas make should be expressed as soon as possible in particular or concrete experience. In the thought of James the more usual meaning of <u>practical</u> is <u>particular</u> or <u>factual</u>, (4) in contrast to <u>abstract</u> and <u>universal</u>. The significant differences among ideas are those which are realizable in the immediacy of experience, for here we meet reality in its most genuine form.

Emphasis upon value in pragmatism.

In view of these facts we can hardly expect to separate the logical from the psychological factors in the pragmatic theory of knowing. The psychology of will and purpose, of interest and desire, of belief and activity, becomes a significant chapter in pragmatic epistemology because the latter is primarily a study of the values of ideas in practical life. When it is maintained that the true is the satisfying, and when it is assumed that what is valuable is

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 260.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 26.
(3) Ibid., page 15.
(4) The Meaning of Truth, page 40.

real, the nature of value becomes an important problem. This emphasis upon value is at once a contribution of pragmatism and a peril, for it involves a subjective or individualistic tendency which the movement has not succeeded, on the whole, in overcoming, and which in fact has stimulated the neo-realistic reaction.

c. The problem of immediate knowledge or of "acquaintance" with reality.

If James had been asked in his later years for a justification of the pragmatic method and its application as these have been described freely in the preceding paragraphs, he might have replied that his sufficient reason for adopting it was its success in making us acquainted with the essential nature of reality, for evidently he regards such success as the basic criterion of a philosophic method. (1) His view of this problem of direct acquaintance with reality, or "knowledge of acquaintance" as he calls it, needs to be examined now so that we may understand his conception of our apprehension of personality. This immediate, perceptual, or intuitive knowledge is very different from the mediate or conceptual kind, where ideas <u>of</u> things are entertained and verified, which occupied our attention in the previous section. (2) In that account, however, the importance of particular experiences in the process of validation was also evident. The same fact may be expressed by saying that any significance which mediate knowledge, or "knowledge about," may possess is derived from or rooted in the more comprehensive immediate knowledge, in which we become conscious of the "face value" of things. Theoretical knowledge "touches only the outer surface of reality." (3)

1'. Two kinds of knowledge.

2'. Inadequacy of conceptual knowledge.

James regarded conceptual knowledge as a borrowed function which offers a very inadequate transcription of reality. This low estimate follows from the merely instrumental function of ideas in leading to valuable particular experiences. (4) He tries to prove "the insuperability of sensation" by showing: "1. that concepts are secondary formations, inadequate, and only ministerial; and 2. that they falsify as well as omit, and make the flux impossible to understand." (5) Since concepts are static, fixed, partial, and retrospective, they cannot, he thinks, give us genuine knowledge of the flowing, growing whole of present experiences from which they abstract.

The details of his estimate of conceptual knowledge cannot be set forth here. (6) A few leading passages which summarize his view of it may be noted without the introduction of particular evidence. "The sole thing that is certain in the midst of it all is that Bergson is absolutely right in contending that the whole life of activity and change is inwardly impenetrable to conceptual treatment, and that it opens itself only to sympathetic apprehension at

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(1) Compare, A Pluralistic Universe, page 212.

(2) On this distinction between two kinds of knowledge, see Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 221-2; The Meaning of Truth, page 43.

(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 249.

(4) For the present purposes, we assume that James uses <u>concepts</u> and <u>ideas</u> synonomously; compare page 60 with page 61 in Some Problems of Philosophy.

(5) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 79.

(6) For important discussions, see, A Pluralistic Universe, Lecture VI; Some Problems of Philosophy, IV-VI.

the hands of immediate feeling." (1) "Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it." (2) Conception may tell much "about . . such realities as the ether, God, souls, or what not," but "it sheds no ray of light into their interior." Indeed, the more complete our definitions of them, "the less . . . intelligible do they appear to us." (1)

The activity of the real world escapes conceptual formulation.

It is the temporal or durational character of reality, its fascinating mutations and its incessant transitions, which especially resist interpretation in terms of "timeless" concepts. "The real world is the world of causal and dynamic relations, of activity and history." (3) "What really exists is not things made but things in the making." (4) "Experience and reality come to the same thing." (5) "By reality here I mean where things happen, all temporal reality without exception." (6) But "intellectualism draws the dynamic continuity out of nature as you draw the thread out of a string of beads." (7)

A warped view of reality results, then, from a dogged conceptualism. "Our whole intuition of activity gets branded as illusory because you cannot possibly reproduce its flowing substance by juxtaposing the discrete." (7) He gives a list of "examples of puzzles introduced by conceptual translation: . . . activity and causation are incomprehensible; personal identity is conceptually impossible," etc. (8) "That inner dimension of reality is occupied by the activities that keep it going, but the intellect, speaking through Hume, Kant & Co., finds itself obliged to deny, and persists in denying, that activities have any intelligible existence." (9)

a' The restricted value of conception.

Concepts possess, however, a restricted value in the economy of human life. (10) They are useful in "orienting ourselves"; they enable us in various ways to make more successful adaptations to the world. (a) Their service of guidance in empirical verification and in facilitating acquaintance with the particular bits of the perceptual world has been noted already. (b) In plans of action they perform an indispensable service by enabling us to predict, to a considerable extent, the course of future experience. (c) Further, a conceptual map of experience makes it more articulate and brings its general features into perspective or relief; conception makes possible a "synoptic treatment" (11) of phenomena occupying time and space which immensely surpasses immediate experience. (d) By functioning as substitutes for percepts, concepts help us to act with reference to a very much greater environment than would be possible

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 342.
(2) Ibid., page 212. (3) Ibid., page 340.
(4) Ibid., page 263.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 39.
(6) A Pluralistic Universe, page 213.
(7) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 86.
(8) Ibid., pages 85 and 87.
(9) A Pluralistic Universe, page 250.
(10) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 73-4.
(11) A Pluralistic Universe, page 251.

if we had percepts alone. And finally (e) we can often greatly economize our efforts in knowing and dominating reality by relying upon second-hand verifications, the immediacies of others, for concepts serve as mediums of exchange in commerce with reality. (1)

In view of these facts James' condemnation of conception is far from being so absolute as it at first appears to be. They warrent him in regarding concepts as belonging to a realm possessing peculiar reality of its own. Concepts give us real knowledge of its kind, however inadequate it is to the fulness of reality. James, therefore, is not an absolute perceptualist (2), although he shows great sympathy with a limited form of the intuitive method of Bergson. (3) In his last book he acknowledges his acceptance of a logical realism. (4)

But since, for James, all value is determined by its relation to the will (5), theoretical reason does not lose its subordination to practical reason. After all "concepts signify consequences." (6) Their worth is borrowed from and ultimately is guaranteed by the perceptual world from which they arise and to which they lead back. "Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are thus complementary of each other; each remedies the other's defects." (7) "Perception gives 'intension', conception gives 'extension' to our knowledge." (8)

3'. The fundamental importance of perceptual or intuitive knowledge.

The real ground for James' relative anti-intellectualism lies in his conviction that there is a non-intellectual form of knowledge which is deeper and wider than intellection, and which, in pragmatic phraseology, makes the greater difference to life as a whole. This fundamental and royal road to reality in its native fulness is perceptual or intuitive (9) acquaintance. This is the more reliable means of knowing because "percepts are primordial and concepts are of secondary origin." (10) "If, as metaphysicians, we are more curious about the inner nature of reality or about what really makes it go, we must turn our backs upon our winged concepts altogether, and bury ourselves in the thickness of those passing moments over the surface of which they fly, and on particular points of which they occasionally rest and perch." (11) "All the whats as well as the thats of reality, relational as well as terminal, are in the end contents of immediate concrete preception." (12) What is real is determined by the pragmatic rule: "Anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged to take account in any way." (13) "In the relative sense . . , reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life. In this sense whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real." (14)

a'. Superiority of percepts over concepts in apprehending reality.

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(1) See The Meaning of Truth, pages 110 ff.; 156.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 78-9; 100; 73-4.
(3) See below, pages 19-20.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 98, 74.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 341.
(6) The Meaning of Truth, page 275.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 251.
(8) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 82; see further, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 221-2.
(9) The Meaning of Truth, page 43.
(10) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 98.
(11) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 251-2.
(12) Ibid., page 342.
(13) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 101.
(14) Compare further, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 295.

b'. Nature of knowledge of acquaintance.

James gives us only scattered and general suggestions as to the exact nature of this immediate perception or "knowledge of acquaintance" which he believes is so fundamental in the apprehension of reality. (1) It must be fitted of course to grasp the dynamic character of reality.(2) It must help us to put ourselves "at the point of view of the thing's interior doing." (3) What we need is "insight" which will "connect us with the inner life of the flux" of things. (4) He struggles to find phrases and metaphors to describe this insight, "that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess." (5) He asserts that (6) "In its inner nature . . the sense of reality is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else." It is essentially a "living or sympathetic acquaintance" with things as distinguished from "knowledge about" them. (7) "The only way in which to apprehend reality's thickness is either to experience it directly by being a part of reality one's self or to evoke it in imagination by sympathetically divining some one else's inner life." (8)

The difference between those states of mind "that are mere 'acquaintance' and those that are 'knowledges-about' is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence or psychic fringes or overtones" which make us "aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived." "Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations; acquaintance with it is limited to the bare impression which it makes." (9) Sometimes he speaks of this immediacy as sensation or perception, sometimes as a feeling of life or activity, sometimes as a concrete divination. (10) "The concept, 'reality', which we restore to immediate perception, is no new conceptual creation, but only a kind of practical relation to our Will, perceptively experienced." (11) "The percepts, these termini, these sensible things, these mere matters-of-acquaintance are the only realities we ever directly know." (12) "Knowledge of acquaintance" does not mean intuition, says H. M. Kallen (13), in the sense of the identification of the self or mind with the object, but means an immediate apprehension of the individual object in its uniqueness, its wholeness, its flux.

4'. Knowledge of human personality.

All that has been said about the method of knowing applies to our grasping of human personality. The difficulty of conceiving the dynamic character of reality (14) holds good of that personal

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(1) The most important passages are to be found in A Pluralistic Universe, especially pages 246-64 and 338-43.
(2) On the nature of reality, see above, pages 18-19.
(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 262. (4) Ibid., page 246.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 297.
(6) Ibid., page 283.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 249. (8) Ibid., pages 250-1.
(9) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 258-9.
(10) A Pluralistic Universe, page 251.
(11) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 111.
(12) The Meaning of Truth, page 59.
(13) William James and Henri Bergson, page 82.
(14) See above, pages 17-18.

flux of experience in which reality appears in its most solid form. According to James, (1) no conceptual construction can furnish an adequate knowledge of such an active and unique entity as human personality is. Concepts cannot "reveal" personality to any one who has not felt it, but having experienced it, he may be led by them to where it is operative. (2) Any conception of personality, therefore, which the intellect formulates will not reproduce its reality, but will serve only the practical purposes of action and thought.

To really grasp personality requires a supreme act of what James calls "intuitive sympathy" (3) with life as it is being lived out by us human beings in its fulness and concreteness; it calls for acquaintance with "the active sense of living which we all enjoy." (4) "Get at the expanding centre of a human character, the élan vital of a man, as Bergson calls it, by living sympathy, and at a stroke you see how it makes those who see it from without interpret it in such diverse ways." (5)

In his psychological study of mind, as distinguished from his metaphysical, James uses the method of "introspective observation," which means "looking into our minds and reporting what we there discover." (6) We meet great difficulties, however, when we try to introspect the "transitive" or rapidly moving portions of the stream of consciousness. (7) "The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks." (8) In his The Principles of Psychology James endeavors, nevertheless, to carry the analysis of "personal selfhood" as far as he can, as well as to state its general characteristics. (9)

These various references exhaust, so far as I know, what James says about the particular problem of the method of knowing human personality.

d. "Radical empiricism" and Pluralism.

"Radical empiricism".

In concluding the exposition of the pragmatic method, we ought to notice briefly the bearing of "radical empiricism" upon the problem of personality. Although James declares "that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism . . and 'radical empiricism'" (10), there is actually in his thought a very intimate one, and he speaks definitely in at least one place as if the pragmatic method were one of the principles included in radical empiricism. (11)

Radical empiricism in general means, says James, the method of building wholes out of perceptual parts. (12) It takes account of everything that is directly experienced and nothing else. (13)

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(1) See above, pages 17-18.
(2) Compare Some Problems of Philosophy, page 82.
(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 263.
(4) Ibid., page 347; Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 50.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 262.
(6) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 185.
(7) Compare Ibid., pages 243-4.
(8) Ibid., page 244.
(9) Ibid., page 227.
(10) Essays in Radical Empiricism, Preface, page iv.
(11) A Pluralistic Universe page 372.
(12) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 98.
(13) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 42.

It is characterized by verifying ideas in the immediate experience of some "experient" and by limiting genuine knowledge to what is presented. "Everything real must be experienceable somewhere," in some one's particular experience. (1) "The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience." (2) He maintains that reality is an "experience-continuum." (3) Hence, Perry affirms that , "Empiricism in this sense is the characteristic of James' philosophy as a whole." (4)

One of the component doctrines of radical empiricism that is important for our purposes is that all relations, "conjunctive as well as disjunctive," are matters of experienced contents. (5) By this tenet James thinks he overcomes the atomistic sensationalism of Hume without admitting any "higher unifying agency" or lower solidifying substance. This is an explicit and intentional exclusion of the idealistic doctrine of a unifying subject of consciousness or experience. For James, experience itself "is self-containing and leans on nothing." (6) In the end, consciousness itself comes, in the philosophy of James, to lose its existence and become merely a relation among experienced entities. "In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real." (7) We shall indicate below (9) how James' progressive championship of "radical empiricism" carries with it a progressive degeneration in the conception of personality.

Pluralism and personality.

Another phase of the thought of James which bears upon the question of personality is his pluralism. This is a logical consequence of his "radical empiricism" just so far as he emphasizes in it the particular experiences of "the individual," (8) but how it can be reconciled with his doctrine of "pure experience" (10) is difficult to make out. Pluralism is a logical implication of the pragmatic theory of knowledge according to which we find the way to reality in the particular experiences of finite individuals. From this it follows that these individuals and their experiences do not depend for their reality upon belonging to any larger whole, such as that of the Absolute. Within certain limits they can live out their lives in separateness; this is a relative pluralism.

Now it is clear that a systematic development of pluralism requires a thorough-going exposition of the nature of those individuals or persons who constitute the pluralistic democracy. James has not worked out this system in his essays dealing with pluralism. Whether he intended that his psychological doctrine of the self

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 160. Compare page vii of R. B. Perry's introduction to these Essays.

(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 100 and 97.

(3) The Meaning of Truth, page 152; A Pluralistic Universe, Lectures V-VI.

(4) Editor's Preface to Essays in Radical Empiricism, page viii.

(5) The Meaning of Truth, pages xii-xiii; Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 42-52, 185, etc.; The Will to Believe, page 278; A Pluralistic Universe, page 280.

(6) The Meaning of Truth, page 124; for a supplementary account of experience, see below, page

(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 372.

(8) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 41.

(9) See below, pages 30-31, 68-73. (10) See below, pages 28-32.

might serve as a substitute to fill in his pluralistic metaphysics we can only surmise. We guess that he so purposed because of his confident belief in the pragmatic sufficiency of his psychological description of the self. (1) Now that the essential principles of pragmatism are before us, we may turn next to James' application of those principles to the problem of the self.

2. James' conception of the self in relation to his pragmatism.

No single theory of personality is, on the whole, required apparently by the logic of pragmatism, although a certain view is somewhat characteristic of it James uses the pragmatic rule, so far as the self comes in question, chiefly in a negative way, namely, to prune out of philosophy and cast aside unfruitful metaphysical notions of it. In place of these he offers in his Principles of Psychology a positive conception which, he thinks, satisfies the tests of the pragmatic method. If his psychological self can do all the work required of a self, he will be troubled so much the less by metaphysical problems. His unsystematic habits make it difficult to determine how much of his psychological doctrine should be regarded as essential to supplement the meager treatment of the self in his strictly pragmatic writings. This supplementation may be quite consistently carried out because of the primarily empirical character of both his view of the self and his pragmatic method.

a. The bearing of pragmatism upon the self.

1'. The self of James' psychology fills a gap in his pragmatism.

The psychological doctrine of the self well fills the gap in his pragmatism also because there is in pragmatism a strongly positivistic trend, and a tendency to avoid metaphysical complications whenever phenomenal explanations will pass pragmatic muster. James, however, does not maintain that psychology necessarily furnishes a complete solution of the problem of the self; rather he recognizes that psychology properly leaves untouched the metaphysical question concerning the ontological status and nature of the self. (2) He is not averse to any search for the rational ground of mental and physical correlations which we experience (3), provided the intellectual result of the inquiry makes some important difference in life.

2'. The pragmatic demand with reference to the self.

How, then, does the pragmatist state the problem of the self or personality? He demands, of course, a view that will make significant differences in practical life. (4) A satisfactory theory must explain all relevant facts of personal experience and do so without smuggling in anysuperfluous or useless postulations. The search should always be for what is important and what is essential, and for what can be empirically verified. "What practical difference ought it to make if, instead of saying naïvely that 'I' am active now in delivering this address, I say that a wider thinker is active, or that certain ideas are active, or that certain nerve-cells are active, in producing the result? This would be the pragmatic meaning of the three hypotheses." (5) The fundamental question,then, is not so much what personality is, but how it works; how does it act or operate?

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(1) See below, pages 44-6.
(2) Compare Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 182, 401.
(3) Ibid., page 350.
(4) Compare,Some Problemsof Philosophy, page 59.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 384; see also pages 386, 388, 390.

In setting forth the view of the self held by James, we shall follow in general his own order of exposition, namely: first, summarize his psychological doctrine of the self; secondly, give his reasons for rejecting certain metaphysical theories of it; and, thirdly, notice the place of the psychological doctrine in his pragmatism.

b. James' theory of consciousness.

James' conception of the self may well be approached by way of its foundation in his theory of consciousness, which fits the flowing character of reality. He describes consciousness as a "stream of thought," where thought means "every form of consciousness indiscriminately." (1) He thinks that "the only true manner of regarding the mind's changes" is a "concrete and total manner." (2) The outstanding characters of consciousness are as follows: (3)

1'. The general characters of consciousness.

a'. It is changing,

In the first place, consciousness is not static, but is "always changing." (4) He emphasizes in most varied ways that it is in constant flux. This is "the fundamental fact about our experience." (5) "No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before," (6) although its object may do so. (7) Our mental states never recur because the passing of every one leaves us more or less different. "Experience is remoulding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date." (8) "Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced. 'Change' in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition." (9)

b'. and is sensibly continuous.

Felt continuity is the second mark of consciousness. (10) It is "sensibly continuous" in spite of the variety and complexity of its contents. One's experiences pass into others that are oncoming in a way which he describes as a "co-conscious transition" within each of our personal histories; and the objects, interests, and purposes "are continuous or may be continuous." (11) "Continuity here is a definite sort of experience." It stands in strong contrast to the discontinuity felt in passing from my experience to my conception of another's experience (12), "whereas in passing from one of my own moments to another the sameness of object and interest is unbroken, and both the earlier and the later experience are of things directly lived." (13) "Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle. . . In this line we live prospectively as well as retrospectively." (14)

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 224, 239.
(2) Ibid., page 235. (of Philosophy, p.49-51.
(3) See ibid., page 225, for summary; also, Some Problems
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 229-37.
(5) The Meaning of Truth, page 89.
(6) Princ. of Psych., I, 230, 233. (7) Ibid., 231. (8) Ibid., 234.
(9) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 48.
(10) Princ. of Psych. I, 237-71; A Plur. Universe, Lecture VII.
(11) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 47-8.
(12) Ibid., page 49. (13) Ibid., page 49.
(14) Ibid., page 87.

These two characteristics of consciousness disprove two chief aspects of traditional associationalism, namely, that (a) consciousness is a sucession of atomistic units (b) which retain a permanent or self-identical nature. (1)

c' Consciousness is also cognitive,

Next, consciousness "always appears to deal with objects independent of itself." (2) The sense of self, however, is something in addition to the awareness of objects, altho the former may be lost in objective contemplation. James thinks it is "a perfectly wanton assumption" that "the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought. . . I may have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about, an object O without thinking about myself at all. . If, in addition to thinking O, I also think that I exist and that I know O, well and good; I then know one more thing, a fact about O, of which I previously was unmindful." (3)

d'. And selective or interested.

In the fourth place, consciousness "is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects--chooses from among them, in a word--all the while." (4) This "choosing" is present in all of our mental operations, notably in "selective attention and deliberation" and conduct, but also in sensation, perception, and reasoning. Not only do "we emphasize things, and unite some, and keep others apart," but "we actually ignore most of the things before us." (5) Things themselves are only "special groups of qualities, which happen practically or aesthetically to interest us." (6)

"Looking back, then, over this review, we see that the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention." (7) "It is by the interest and importance that experiences have for us, by the emotions they excite, and the purposes they subserve, by their affective values, in short, that their consecution in our several conscious streams, as 'thoughts' of ours , is mainly ruled." (8)

e'. Consciousness is personal.

The most important characteristic of consciousness for our purposes, and the first one discussed by James (9), is that all of "the thoughts which psychology studies do continually tend to appear as parts of personal selves," (10) or "of a personal consciousness." (11) "The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you's. . . It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or this thought or that thought, but

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 230, 236-7; see further below, pages 43-4.
(2) Ibid., pages 271-83.
(3) Ibid., page 274.
(4) Ibid., page 225; 284-91.
(5) Ibid., page 284.
(6) Ibid., page 285.
(7) Ibid., page 288.
(8) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 151.
(9) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, 225-9.
(10) Ibid., page 227.
(11) Ibid., page 225.

my thought, every thought being owned. . . . On these terms the personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology," (that is, if these terms are not taken to imply any particular theory regarding the nature of the self). "The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.' No psychology, at any rate, can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth." (1) This is a very striking and important passage.

1". Consciousness is personal even after time-gaps and divided consciousness.

Human consciousness preserves a personal character even amid very radical disruptions and transformations. "Even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same self." (2) "This community of self is what the time-gap cannot break in twain." (3) Even when a group of thoughts "split off from the main consciousness, the form of it tends to personality," (4) and these thoughts "are still organized selves with a memory, habits, and sense of their own identity." (5) "After sleeping, my retrospection is as perfect as it is between two successive waking moments of my time." (6) Thus, the presence of split and alternating personalities does not destroy the personal character of the consciousness that is present.

2". The personal bond has "warmth and intimacy;"

Now the various portions of consciousness are "inwardly connected," and belong together as "parts of a common whole," which is naturally named, "myself, I, or me." (7) The general characteristics of this bond which unifies the personal community or individuality are "warmth and intimacy and immediacy." (3) These qualities "suffuse" my present states of consciousness and my remembrance of my past states as they do not suffuse the mere conception of objects or of others' states of mind. In this respect the knowledge which I have by "direct feeling" of my mental processes is entirely different from the indirect knowledge which I have of my neighbor's mental life. "If the thinking be our thinking, it must be suffused through all its parts with that peculiar warmth and intimacy that make it come as ours." (8) It will be noted below (9) how this "warmth and intimacy" is nothing "more than the feeling of the same old body always there." (8) By warmth he says he means a certain "group of feelings ('interest' aroused, 'attention' turned, 'eyes' employed, etc.)" that are closely connected with some object. (10)

3" And gives unity to consciousness.

Now the various phases of the stream of thought "form conscious unities" and "cohere mutually" (11) because of this common bond of "warmth and intimacy." James accepts the account of this unity

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 226.
(2) Ibid., page 237.
(3) Ibid., page 239.
(4) Ibid., page 227.
(5) Ibid., page 229.
(6) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 135.
(7) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 238.
(8) Ibid., page 242.
(9) See below, page 35.
(10) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 129.
(11) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, 225.

which is given by the Reverend James Wills when the latter says, "Our mental states have always an essential unity such that each state of apprehension, however variously compounded, is a single whole, of which every component is, therefore, strictly apprehended (so far as it is apprehended) as a part. Such is the elementary basis from which all our intellectual operations commence." (1)

James is opposed only to the "non-sensical . . . and unnecessary" notion that consciousness is a compound of distinct psychic units. However complex the stream of consciousness may be, "our higher fields of consciousness" are always felt as novel wholes. (2) He affirms that, "Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind". (3) "The ego . . . most form a liaison between all the things of which we become successively aware." (4)

4". Personality is the most perfect reality according to The Varieties of Religious Experience.

In these facts is seen the justification for Miss M. W. Calkins' classification of James as a "pluralistic personalistic." (5) He clearly asserts that this unsharable personal feeling is the most solid and the fullest measure of reality which is accessible to us. His very important statement in The Varieties of Religious Experience deserves to be quoted at length. (6) It will summarize well his general description of consciousness:

"The inner state is our very experience itself; its reality and that of our experience are one. A conscious field plus its object as felt or thought of plus an attitude towards the object plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs--such a concrete bit of personal experience may be a small bit, but it is a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a mere abstract element of experience, such as the 'object' is when taken all alone. It is a full fact, even though it be an insignificant fact; it is of the kind to which all realities whatsoever must belong; the motor currents of the world run through the like of it; it is on the line connecting real events with real events. That unsharable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, may be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up.

"If this be true, it is absurd for science to say that the egotistic elements of experience should be suppressed. The axis of reality runs solely through the egotistic places. . . Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. . . The 'original' of the notion of causation is in our inner personal experience, and only there can causes in the old-fashioned sense

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 241, note.
(2) See A Pluralistic Universe, lecture V, especially pp. 194-5; 205-6. Note partial withdrawal of this view on page 338.
(3) Principles of Psych, vol. 8, p. 278. (4) Ibid., page 242.
(5) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3d edition, page 558.
(6) Pages 499-502, including note 1 on page 502.

be directly observed and described."

The self is the type of all reality according to one passage in the Principles of Psychology.

In The Principles of Psychology (1) James also refers to the self as the type of the real. "The fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves. . . As thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL. These are our living realities. . . Reality, starting from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point to point--first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in them, and next, upon the objects most continuously related with these. . . We reach thus the important conclusion that our own reality, that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief. 'As sure as I exist!'--this is our uttermost warrant for the being of all other things.

"As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the cogito go bail for the reality of all that the cogito involved, so we all of us, feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all but equal degree of reality, first to whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of personal need, and second, to whatever farther things continuously belong with these.

"The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term. That is the hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute support. . . . Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt."

2' The place of consciousness in his philosophy of pure experience.

James does not consistently maintain the personalistic position implied in these striking passages quoted in the preceding paragraphs. In his Principles of Psychology he holds, for the most part, to the idea of a duplicity between mental content and mental activity as a fundamental fact. (2) According to this doctrine, we feel our life flowing within us in distinct contrast to the objects in which we are interested. He asserts, for example, (3) "All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves thinking, and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activity or passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal. I regard this belief as the most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology." Again he says, "We can feel, alongside of the thing known, the thought of it going on as an altogether separate act and operation in the mind. This subjective life of ours" is "distinguished as such . . clearly from the objects known by its means. (4)

a'. Consciousness regarded as a nonentity.

Only two years, however, after writing the above paragraph, quoted from The Varieties of Religious Experience, James published for the first time (5) his famous essay called "Does Consciousness Exist?" in which consciousness loses its personal and dual character. It "does not denote a special stuff or mode of being". (6) It becomes a nonentity, and he champions instead a relational or

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(1) Vol. II, pages 296-8.
(2) See above, page 28.
(3) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 185.
(4) Ibid., page 297; see also The Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 498-9.
(5) Journal of Philosophy, etc., vol. I, 1904, reprinted as the first chapter in Essays in Radical Empiricism.
(6) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 25.

functional theory of consciousness, and emphasizes the "neutral and non-committal" character of what he calls "pure experience." (1) Later, James says, "The total process of experience, another name for all that is in fact," stands in distinct contrast"with the personal and individualized self." (2)

b'. The nature of "pure experience."

What James means by "pure experience" is most fully set forth in his Essays in Radical Empiricism. "'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material of our later reflection with its conceptual categories." (3) "Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation." (4) "The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 'pure' experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being it is plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that. In this naïf immediacy it is of course valid; it is there, we act upon it; and the doubling of it in retrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended thereby, is just one of the acts. . . The immediate experience in its passing is always 'truth', practical truth, something to act on, at its own movement." (5) "Experience as a whole is a process in time." (6) The totality of experience "is a that, an Absolute, a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing." (7)

1". How the distinction of subject and object arises within pure experience.

If, then, experience is pure in its primordial state, how does the distinction between subject and object arise within it? That pure experience itself has any "inner duplicity" James firmly denies. "Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity." (8) "Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e. talked-of, twice, considered along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a new retrospective experience," etc. (9) It is "the self-same piece of pure experience taken twice over, that serves now as thought and now as thing." (10) "Thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are." (11)

c'. An hypothesis as to the probable development of James' philosophy of pure experience.

Let us try to understand the probable development of James' philosophy of pure experience. He confesses that for twenty years he has "mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity." (12) From a hint in his Principles of Psychology (13) we may surmise that his thought developed in some such manner as follows. It is suggested in the pages referred to that both the self and the not-self are objects; that, therefore, all that one ever experiences is"objective;" and that the subjective condition need not be consciously present at all, and could be regarded as a "logical postulate" rather than as an inner perception. If, now, he should neglect this postulate, as he does, and direct his attention to the experienced contents,

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(1) See R. B. Perry's somewhat biased interpretation of "James' Philosophy of Mind," Appendix of the former's Present Philos. Tendencies.
(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 380.
(3) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 93.
(4). Ibid., page 94. (5) Ibid., pages 23-4.
(6) Ibid., page 62. (7) Ibid., page 134.
(8) Ibid., page 9. (9) Ibid., page 23.
(10) Ibid., page 27. (11) Ibid., page 37.
(12) Ibid., page 3.
(13) Pages 304-5, volume I.

we have reached that world of pure experience in which the duality of subject and object supposedly has disappeared as an essential structure or condition of experience itself. In consequence, consciousness ceases to be an active entity, and comes to be merely one kind of relation among the various neutral things, the stuff of "pure experience," of which everything is composed. (1) This is his position in the Essays in Radical Empiricism, notably in the first one, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" Of course the relation itself which constitutes consciousness is a part of pure experience; one of the "terms" of the latter becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower; the other becomes the object known. (1)

The dialectic of the thought of James may be stated in another way. In his Principles of Psychology he maintains that relations are given as facts of sensibility. (2) This is the central doctrine of "radical empiricism." (4) In his book, A Pluralistic Universe, he asserts that "relations of every sort are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are." (3) Hence, the relation between the subject and object must become an experienced content and take its place in "the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream." (5) He plainly says in the Essays in Radical Empiricism (6) and in The Meaning of Truth (7) that the "conscious" quality is best explained by relations which themselves are part of the experienced content. This development of his thought is very interesting indeed.

d'. The disappearance of personal consciousness.

In the later metaphysical writings of James, therefore, personal, active consciousness, as something distinct from the concrete flux of the stream of experience, has vanished. If one adopts his point of view and looks consciousness squarely in the face, he finds nothing but identifiable, observable contents. When a perception appears in experience, feelings and conation may appear also, but they are not essentially different from perceived content. Only imperfect analysis leads one to suppose that they are different. If one should search for the thinking subject, one could only find the sense data which come from contact with the air and from muscular movements.

"The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments, etc., of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and these increase the assets of 'consciousness,' so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit,' breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 4 and 26.
(2) Pages 244-8, 269-71 of vol. I; A Pluralistic Universe, p. 349.
(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 279. (4) See above, pages 21-2.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 349.
(6) Page 25; compare the whole essay, pages 1-38.
(7) Page 126.

the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are." (1)

e' Positive description of consciousness as a functional relation.

James' more constructive or positive description of consciousness may be noted now. Its meaning is to be found in a certain relationship or grouping of the elements of pure experience, of which the mental world is one and the physical world is another arrangement, the relations "themselves being experiences." (2) "One undivided portion of experience" plays the part of a knower in one context of associations, and of a thing or object in another. (3) The same original terms, the same bit of experience, may occupy different groups at the same or successive times, or may be at once subjective and objective. (4)

In other words, consciousness is a complex of pure experiences which are susceptible of various arrangements. It is a "kind of external relation" between experiential terms. (5) The subject and object do not represent ontological distinctions, but are merely different functional contexts of the same ultimate stuff of pure experience. "'Consciousness' has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity." (6) "The acquisition of conscious quality on the part of an experience depends upon a context coming to it." (7) In another place James asserts that, "I tried to show that thoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material, and that their opposition is only one of relation and of function. . . The same identical piece of 'pure experience' (which was the name I gave to the materia prima of everything) can stand alternately for a 'fact of consciousness' or for a physical reality, according as it is taken in one context or in another." (8) "'Outer' and 'inner' are names for two groups into which we sort experiences according to the way in which they act upon their neighbors. Any one 'content' . . . can be assigned to either group. . The basis of the two groups respectively is the different type of interrelation, the mutual impenetrability, on the one hand, and the lack of physical interference and interaction on the other." (9)

In this argument it is interesting to notice that "we sort experiences," and that it is we who classify things in different ways according to "our temporary purposes," (10), or according to our "practical or intellectual ends." (11) In another book consciousness appears to possess a dynamic character for which the relational theory does not provide, namely, when James puts forward the "notion of a permanent obstruction to the transmission of

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 37. Contrast this statement with Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 297.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 25.
(3) Ibid., pages 9-10.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 322-3; Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 10, 15, 140, and especially, 112-114.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 3, 25, 80, 125.
(6) Ibid., page 2.
(7) Ibid., page 134.
(8) Ibid., pages 137-8.
(9) Ibid., pages 139-40.
(10) Ibid., page 141.
(11) Ibid., page 148.

consciousness, which obstacle may in our brains grow alternately greater or less." (1)

f'. Summary of James' view of consciousness.

In concluding this description of consciousness, we may fairly say that James believes that he has robbed consciousness of its power. "'Consciousness' . . . has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity." (2) "It is the name of a nonentity and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy." (2) "The personal form and activity," which in classical philosophy attached to the spiritual principle of consciousness, "pass over to the content." (3) He tries to find, "in the realities of experience," a "pragmatic equivalent" for this principle, or some kind of substitute for it. (4)

Where, then, is the self in this philosophy of pure experience? The doctrine "solves the problem of the self by saying it consists of certain transitional experiences." (5) These flowing or transitional experiences do not depend upon the ego, but are a part of the world of pure experience; it alone is real. No self or personality is required to sustain it, for "experience leans on nothing." Personality has lost its autonomy, and has been deprived of that unique possession of reality which James represented it has having in religious experience. (6)

c. James' doctrine of the self.

1'. Introduction.

The bearing of pragmatism upon the problem of the self and James' theory of consciousness have now been set forth. Let us return to his classical exposition of the nature of the self in The Principles of Psychology. He here emphasizes the existence of the personal element in the stream of consciousness, but many disputes are waged, he says, with reference to its exact definition. "To give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of philosophic tasks." (7) Is personality or the self the whole or a part of the stream of thought? and what is its fundamental nature? He points out that, of course, we may say that "our full self is the whole field" of present consciousness, "the concrete stream of my thought in its entirety," (8) "with all its indefinitely radiating possibilities of increase," but "what we conceptually identify ourselves with, and say we are thinking of at any time, is the center." (9) We are here primarily interested in the essential character of this innermost or central self.

a'. Question as to the nature of the personal factor.

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(1) Human Immortality, page 24.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 2.
(3) Ibid., pages 2 and 6.
(4) Ibid., page 3.
(5) J. A. Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, second edition, page 456.
(6) See above, pages 27-28.
(7) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 225.
(8) Ibid., page 319.
(9) A Pluralistic Universe, page 289.

b' A general survey of the conception of the self in The Principles of Psychology of James.

A general preliminary survey of James' plan of describing the self will furnish good guidance in the exposition that is to follow. Every one, he says, divides the world into two parts. In one part he takes an "altogether unique kind of interest," and calls it "me"; it is the empirical self. (1) All else is "not-me"--the world of experienceable objects, in which may be included those in which I am actually interested but which I do not call mine. The empirical self has three constituents, the material, the social, and the spiritual selves, and corresponding to each of these there are many emotions and special forms of activity. The fundamental question for us is whether there is some empirical or transempirical principle, such as the "pure ego" or soul, which unifies this whole process in time, and which has permanence amid change? James' own view is that the principle is an empirical fact, and he calls it "the passing thought." All phases of the empirical self get value and unity because this thought "cares" for them.



Diagram to illustrate James' abstract view of the empirical self.

The several selves of James' abstract analysis and their relations may be symbolized, I think, by the accompanying diagram, composed of a series of concentric circles. This series is intended to represent a cross-section of an individual's present stream of consciousness. The circle with the solid line represents the distinction between the "me" and the "not-me." The inner circle with the radius, x, marks the field of the empirical self with its several overlapping constituents. The size of the spaces symbolizing these constituents should be imagined as varying from moment to moment according to the character of the interest and attention which are present. Because of the intimate connection between the material and spiritual selves, (2) they are very appropriately represented in the diagram as adjacent. The outer circles, with the indefinite radius, y, are meant to include the indefinite number of experienced and experienceable objects which the individual concerned does not regard as a part of himself. All parts of the diagram must be thought of not only as elongated in the third dimension, to illustrate the temporal flow of consciousness, but also as changing their relative positions and importance with kaleidoscopic swiftness.

(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 289, 291.
(2) See below, page 35.



The situation may be outlined as follows:

Universe of experienced or experienceable objects.	1. Not-me.		The passing thought, being the principle of unity and continuity.
	2. Me, or the empirical self.	a. The material self. b. The social self. c. The spiritual self.	

2'. The constituents of the empirical self.

Since our primary concern is with matters of principle, our interest in this scheme centers in the nature of the "spiritual self" and of the "passing thought." Besides the spiritual self, the total empirical self includes the material self, of which the "body is the innermost part" (1), and a"man's social self," which "is the recognition which he gets from his mates." (2) The latter, especially in the form of the ideal social self, is a very dynamic and effective factor in determining what one shall seek as his "true . . , ultimate, and permanent Me," and also in realizing that which at first is only potential or possible. These important facts lead James in one place to speak of the social self as "the innermost of the empirical selves of a man." (3)

a'. The material self.

b'. The social self.

c'. The spiritual self;

1". The common description of it.

But in addition to these two aspects of the stream of consciousness, we may abstract from it another, a central or innermost portion, with which we ordinarily identify ourselves in "an altogether peculiar degree." (4) Compared with this spiritual self, other elements of the conscious flux are transient and even may be disowned by it. "What is this self of all the other selves?" (5) Up to a certain point, everyone describes it in very much the same way, namely, as "the active element in all consciousness," or as "a spiritual something" which welcomes and rejects objects, which is the "source of effort and attention," and "the home of interest." (6) The effort, however, to reach a more accurate definition of this element leads to a great diversity of opinions. These may be lined up between the two extremes of a simple, active substance or soul and "a fiction, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun, I." (7)

2". James' account of it in the abstract,

James presents both an abstract and a concrete account of what he thinks the spiritual self is. He points out that in every self we may distinguish"between the immediate and actual, and the remote and potential, between the narrower and the wider view." (8) According to the latter standpoint or the abstract method, James describes it in terms of dispositions, which are conceptually distinguished from other elements in the stream of consciousness, and which are regarded as having a longer temporal reach than the concrete feelings of the present moment. He affirms that, "By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely: not the bare principle of personal Unity, or 'pure' Ego, which remains still to be discussed. These psychic dispositions are the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be." (9)

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, pages 292-3; 319-23, vol. I.
(2) Ibid., pages 293-6; 308-24.
(3) Ibid., pages 315-16.
(4) Ibid., page 297.
(5) Ibid., page 297.
(6) Ibid., page 298.
(7) Ibid., page 298.
(8) Ibid., page 315.
(9) Ibid., page 296.

and in the concrete..

Since the spiritual self belongs to the "empirical me", it may be concretely felt as a section of the stream of consciousness. "It is something with which we also have direct sensible acquaintance, and which is as fully present at any moment of consciousness in which it is present, as in a whole life time of such moments." (1) The concrete question, then, is "how this central nucleus of the self may feel?" (2) "Can we tell more precisely in what the feeling of this central active self consists,-- not necessarily as yet what the active self is, as a being or principle, but what we feel when we become aware of its existence?" (3)

3". The spiritual self is primarily the feeling of bodily processes or activities.

James' general answer to this question is that the central self is an interplay of furtherances and hindrances in my desiring and thinking to which I react in a spontaneous way by welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning. "But when I forsake such general descriptions and grapple with particulars, coming to the closest possible quarters with the facts, it is difficult for me to detect in the activity any purely spiritual element at all. Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning around quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head." (4) Then he proceeds to describe the different bodily feelings that appear in various mental processes, such as attention, effort, memory, and reflection. (5)

His conclusion, therefore, is that "the sanctuary within the citadel of our personal life" which is most vividly felt is constituted of feelings of bodily processes or activities. (6) "The nuclear part of the self" turns out to be a "cohered" group of physiological acts of the class called "adjustments", which follow the reflex type of action, and are distinguished from "the rest of the mind's contents" by being constantly and incessantly repeated. (7) "The inner nucleus of my spiritual self" is a "collection of obscurely felt 'adjustments', plus perhaps that still more obscurely perceived subjectivity as such." (8) What this "feeling of something more" may be is left here as an open question. In a later place (9) James says, in speaking of his work in The Principles of Psychology, that "I sought to show that there is no direct evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent as such (I should now say the activity of 'consciousness' as such)."

d'. The fundamental emotions and instincts of the empirical selves.

James has, however, a principle which takes the place of this agent. Before considering what that is, we should note what are the fundamental emotions and instincts of the several empirical selves. Each of the three arouses various feelings of self-estimation which may be classed under the two general emotions of self-complacency and self-satisfaction. (10) James emphatically denies that any one is "animated by a direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence." (11) "The words ME

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 299.
(2) Ibid., page 298.
(3) Ibid., page 299.
(4) Ibid., pages 299-300.
(5) Ibid., pages 300-1.
(6) Compare Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 129.
(7) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 302.
(8) Ibid., page 319.
(9) A Pluralistic Universe, page 379, note.
(10) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 305-7.
(11) Ibid., pages 318, 323.

then and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness an excitement of a certain peculiar sort." (1)

Further, each of the three empirical selves includes a group of fundamental instinctive impulses which have the general character of self-seeking, and which fulfil the function of the self-preservation and promotion of the several selves. (2) One may find a complete tabular summary of both emotions and impulsive tendencies of the self on page 529 of the first volume of the Psychology.

e'. Rivalry and order of worth among the empirical selves.

These desires and impulsive tendencies are not only often inconsistent among themselves, but their realization is often greatly restricted by physical nature. In consequence, "rivalry and conflict among the different selves" arises, (3) and our thought must choose which of many possible or ideal selves shall become reality. (4) The question then appears as to which is the most real self, and what is the proper order of worthful subordination of the rest?

One can attain his life's purposes either by reducing them, as some of the Stoics proposed, or by realizing them. James gives an indirect hint that the most real self would be the one that most completely and actively identified itself with the meaning of the universe and with the highest wishes of mankind. (5) Various forces which determine the hierarchy of worth among our selves are: moral pressure, direct ethical judgments, and the acts and opinions of others. (6) The customary order of increasing worth is: material, social, and spiritual. James reverses this order of estimation because of the importance of the body for the earthly existence of the mind, and says, "Its own body then, first of all, its friends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions, MUST be the supremely interesting OBJECTS for each human mind." (7)

3'. "The pure ego" and "the passing thought."

Now does this empirical description exhaust the spiritual self, or is there something, for instance, a pure ego, different from anything in these empirical selves, which is the "medium" of their unification and which carries them through time? James believes that each passing thought, and not a pure ego, performs these functions. This concept is a very important one in James' psychology and in his doctrine of the self. It is essential to understand its significance. The nature of this Thought, written with a capital T, may be approached by considering one of its most important offices, namely, the preservation of one's personal identity.

a' Empirical description of personal identity.

We shall examine, therefore, his account of personal identity. It was noted above (8) that the unity and the "owned" character of one's thoughts is due to their having certain marks of "intimacy and warmth" which do not characterize the thoughts or mental processes of others. (9) Now it is distinctly noticeable that these

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 319.
(2) Ibid., pages 307-9.
(3) Ibid., pages 309, 313.
(4) Ibid., page 310.
(5) Ibid., page 313.
(6) Ibid., page 314.
(7) Ibid., page 323.
(8) See above, pages 26-7.
(9) Compare, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 331.

marks belong to certain "things thought about" (1); they are objective qualities because the present "self comes to its acquaintance or is actually felt with warmth and intimacy," (2) and "the character of 'warmth' . . . in the present self, reduces itself to either of two things,--something in the feeling which we have of the thought itself, as thinking, or else the feeling of the body's actual existence at the moment,--or finally to both. We cannot realize our present self without simultaneously feeling one or other of these two things." (2)

1" The nature of the judgment of personal identity.

But curiously "our remoter spiritual, material, and social selves, so far as they are realized, come also with a glow and a warmth." (2) Any "distant self which fulfils the conditions just mentioned "will be thought with such warmth and intimacy. It can do so, however, only because it possessed for us" these qualities when it was alive. In consequence, we become conscious of a resemblance or sameness, in respect to these qualities, between our past and present selves. And this sameness or identity can be felt (2) or perceived just as easily as the resemblance between other things which I successively observe and identify. "The intellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether I say 'I am the same' or whether I say 'the pen is the same, as yesterday.'" (3)

It is notable that the resemblance is perceived by thought and predicated of things thought about. The certainty of our judgment of sameness is greatly enhanced by the felt continuity between our present self and the less remote selves, "especially the felt continuity of our bodily feelings. (4) "The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared." (5) When these two forms of connection, resemblance with respect to warmth and that continuity of bodily feelings, are no longer felt, the sense of personal identity goes too. (6)

2" Some important features of this account of personal identity.

a". It is empirical;

In this description of personal identity, two important facts stand out. In the first place, this account is a purely empirical one. The "core of sameness running through the ingredients of the self exists even as a phenomenal thing" (2), and is "perfectly verifiable" (4) and real. "There is no other identity than this in the 'stream' of subjective consciousness." (4) "Experientially our personal identity consists . . . in nothing more than the functional and perceptible fact that our later states of mind continue and remember our earlier ones." (7) "There is no other nature, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self. And this whatness is real empirical 'content.' . . . Practically to experience one's personal continuum in this living way is to know the originals of the ideas of continuity and of sameness, . . . to own all that they can ever mean." (8) "But unions by continuous

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(1) Princ. of Psych., I, p. 332. (2) Ibid., page 333.
(3) Ibid., page 331. (4) Ibid., page 336.
(5) Ibid., page 334. (6) Ibid., pages 335-6.
(7) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 122. See above, page 24.
(8) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 50.

transition are the only ones we know of, . . . whether in personal identity, . . . or elsewhere." (1)

b". And the judging of the passing thought is important.

In the second place, this capacity of the present thought to know and to assimilate to itself a past thought is a very remarkable function. "My present Thought stands thus in the plenitude of ownership of the train of my past selves, is owner not only de facto but de jure, the most real owner there can be, and all without the supposition of any 'inexplicable tie,' but in a perfectly verifiable and phenomenal way." (2) No other unity is implied than that which is actually felt in this unbroken stream of personal consciousness.

b'. The passing thought.

Let us examine in a more specific way the nature of this all-important present or passing thought. The "vehicle of the judgment of identity" is a "pulse of thought." (3) It is "the real, present

1" General description.

onlooking, remembering, 'judging thought' or identifying 'section' of the stream. This is what collects,--'owns' some of the past facts which it surveys, and disowns the rest,--and so makes a unity that is actualized and anchored and does not merely float in the blue air of possibility. And the reality of such pulses of thought, with their function of knowing, it will be remembered that we did not seek to deduce or explain, but simply assumed them as the ultimate kind of fact that the psychologist must admit to exist." (4) It is this passing thought which in the last analysis is for James the essential and central self.

2". Its capacities.

This passing thought possesses numerous and interesting capacities. (a) One is knowing. Not only does it know present objects, but (b) it knows much about the contents of the past stream of consciousness of which it is the present section. The capacity of these "perishing pulses of thought" to "regret and know" what went before is their most striking power. Every new thought stands "as the representative of the entire past stream" of consciousness. (5) Every "nascent thought" thus performs the "trick" of "immediately taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it together with all of the remoter selves possessed by this expiring thought." (6) "Each later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle--and appropriating them is the final owner--of all that they contain and own." (7) Again, James says, this "actual focus of accretion" is "the hook from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which alone passes for real, and thus keeping the chain from being a purely ideal thing." (8) In this way "thought is perennially renewed in time, but always cognitive thereof." (9) It follows that the fullest self would be "the last and most complicated fruit" (10) of the stream of consciousness, the one, namely, which inherits the richest legacy of historic content.

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 59.
(2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 360.
(3) Ibid., page 337. (4) Ibid., page 338.
(5) Ibid., page 340. (6) Ibid., pages 339-40.
(7) Ibid., page 339. (8) Ibid., pages 340-1.
(9) Ibid., page 367. (10) Ibid., page 2.

(c) In these appropriations and repudiations thought acts as an agent, so "that thought is a vehicle of choice as well as of cognition." (1) For James, the genuine self is identical with this judging thought. All that is assumed in this scheme is a stream of perishing thoughts, endowed with the above functions, among others. (2)

3" The present thought as knowing subject.

According to the doctrine of James, the present but fleeting thought fulfils all the functions of the pure ego. The latter, consequently, must be regarded as a superfluous conception, as tested by the parsimonious rule of pragmatism. The present thought acts as the knowing subject. Taking the place of the pure ego, it is "merely the vehicle in which the estimation" and knowledge of empirical objects "is carried on." (3) "But all these things are objects, properly so called, to the subject which does the thinking." (4) Over and above the purely objective self and not-self "there is nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact of the stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of their being experienced at all. But this condition of the experience is not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It is only known in subsequent reflection." (5) The passing, judging thought, therefore, is "only aware of its 'pure' Self . . . in an abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way." (6) "The Thought never is an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself." (1) It is always the subject with reference to the objects appropriated. (7)

4". Knowledge of the passing thought.

How, then, can one know anything about this knowing subject at all? (a) Indeed, "nothing can be known about it till it be dead and gone." (8) In this sense the present thought "is the darkest in the whole series." (8) But when it has passed, then its successor can know about it, and appropriate what is interesting about it. We do possess the "mysterious" capacity "to think ourselves as thinkers" (9) in this retrospective way.

(b) But while the judging thought does not know about itself as an object, yet, in the present, as it lives, "it may feel its own immediate existence," (8) and this "knowledge of acquaintance" is of greater worth than any "knowledge-about." "The passing Thought then seems to be the Thinker; and though there may be another non-phenomenal Thinker behind that, so far we do not seem to need him to express the facts."(2)

5". Bodily feeling is the center of reference in the appropriations of the passing thought.

Since, therefore, the present but fleeting thought is not an object with reference to which it can appropriate its past selves, what is the center for its appropriations? "Its appropriations are . . . less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its present OBJECT, the body, and the central adjustments, which

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 340.
(2) Ibid., page 342; for a fuller account of the capacities of the passing thought, see below, pages 44-6.
(3) Ibid., page 328. (4) Ibid., page 325.
(5) Ibid., page 304.
(6) Ibid., page 304; this is a provisional formulation of James; see pages 304, bottom, and 305 of the Psychology.
(7) Compare with his idea of pure experience, above pp. 28-9.
(8) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 341.
(9) Ibid. , page 296.

accompany the act of thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity. . . They are the kernel to which the represented parts of the Self are assimilated, accreted, and knit on; . . . even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself in the act of thinking." (1) Thus, in our search for the pure ego, we are brought back to the normal bodily feelings as the important center of the self. (2)

A transitional note.

The exposition of James' doctrine of the self, with the exception of his theory of mental activity, has now been completed. Before presenting that theory and summarizing the fundamental characters of personality as set forth by James, we shall review briefly three historic conceptions of the self, which, if the hypothesis of the passing thought be accpted, may be cast aside as pragmatically superfluous. We shall supplement this review by noting how the passing thought is a pragmatic substitute for the self or soul. These are the topics for exposition before the criticism of James' theory will be presented.

d. Criticism of three objectionable theories of the self; there are three historical types of self-theory.

James believes that all authors, except himself, who deal with the self may be classified under three schools: substantialism, transcendentalism, and associationism. Only the last is an empirical theory; representatives of the other two hold to a trans-empirical or non-phenomenal principle which stands outside of the stream of consciousness. (James indeed recognizes that there are two other theories, but they are negligible: (a) the improbable material-monad theory, (3) and (b) the unintelligible mind-stuff theory. (4) These, however, are very similar in principle to the first one mentioned above, and have similar faults.)

1'. The spiritualistic theory: the substantial soul.

The most important of these traditional theories of the self is that of the substantial soul, which is held by commonsense, scholasticism, and spiritualistic philosophy. (5) According to this doctrine, there exists somehow, behind the phenomena present in an individual's consciousness, a simple, changeless, and immaterial substance or soul. This is required to be: the center of inherence for psychic faculties, the unifier of the discrete elements of consciousness, the abiding ground of personal identity, and the principle of individuality. (6) James, however, on his part, has "fought shy of admitting a self or soul or other agency of combination," (7) and rejects the hypothesis for the following reasons:

a'. Usual statement of this view.

b'. Objections to the soul-theory:

The first general objection to the soul-theory is that it is a pragmatic superfluity. It is "a complete superfluity so far as

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 341.
(2) See above, page 35.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 179-80.
(4) Ibid., chapter VI.
(5) Ibid., pages 342-350; 180-182.
(6) Ibid., compare pages, 1-3, 319, 338, 345. James gives an excellent summary of the usual arguments for the existence of such a soul in his Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 343.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 188.

1". It is a pragmatic superfluity.

accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes." (1) James admits that this and other reasonings do not, of course, prove the non-existence of the soul. (2) But "it is at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear." (3) If we should ask, with James, "What difference in practical experience is it supposed to make that we have each a personal substantial principle"? (4) we could reply with him that, "few things would seem to have fewer pragmatic consequences for us than substances, cut off as we are from every contact with them." (5) He praises Locke and Hume for pragmatically getting rid of soul-substance. (6)

To admit into our philosophy the soul principle which does no real work, or at least which does no work which the passing thought does not do, would be to violate the law of parsimony which the advocate of pragmatism must recognize as authoritative for him. "You see no deeper into the fact that a hundred sensations get compounded or known together by thinking that a 'soul' does the compounding than you see into a man's living eighty years by thinking of him as an octogenarian, or into our having five fingers by calling us pentadactyls. Souls have worn out both themselves and their welcome, that is the plain truth. Philosophy ought to get the manifolds of experience unified on principles less empty. Like the word 'cause,' the word 'soul' is but a theoretic stop-gap--it marks a place and claims it for a future explanation to occupy." (7)

2". It cannot be verified in experience.

The second serious objection to the soul, which also has a pragmatic tone, is that the soul cannot be empirically verified. "One can give no positive account" of what it is. (8) It is "inaccessible to direct knowledge." (9) Introspection is incompetent to lay hold of it, and can reach only the soul's phenomena. (9) The only way to get at it would be "by stepping outside of experience altogether," (10) but that would violate that part of the pragmatic method which requires empirical verification. It can neither be presented nor represented. (11) "The passing thought is the only verifiable thinker."

3". The soul-theory is based upon a false assumption.

The final objection to the soul-theory is that it is based upon a false assumption, due to an abstract psychology and an intellectualistic logic, the assumption, namely, that mental life is originally a succession of separate states or ideas. Having made this erroneous assumption, one seems compelled to invoke the soul to get this atomistic plurality together again into the unity which is an evident fact of consciousness. "Shocked at the discon-

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 348.
(2) Ibid., page 350. (3) Ibid., page 344.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 123.
(5) Pragmatism, page 88.
(6) Ibid., pages 90-92.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 209-210.
(8) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 330.
(9) Ibid., page 187.
(10) A Pluralistic Universe, page 267.
(11) Ibid., page 209.

tinuous character of their scheme, the spiritualists assume a 'soul' or 'ego' to melt the separate ideas into collective consciousness." (1)

The original supposition, however, is mistaken. Consciousness is not a collection but a continuity, and contains in itself manyness-in-oneness as a fact of immediate perception. (1) Besides, the soul itself is a "discrete concept, and therefore, as a matter of fact, lacks the unifying power it is supposed to possess." (1)

"My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it." (2) "The notion of the substantial soul has fallen upon such evil days, and has no prestige in the eyes of critical thinkers. It only shares the fate of other unrepresentable substances and principles." (3) It has no "advantage as a theory over the simple phenomenal notion of a stream of thought accompanying a stream of cerebral activity." (4)

c'. The positive values of the soul-theory.

James gives his reader permission, if he desires, to supplement the theory of the passing thought by the soul-hypothesis, provided he can offer metaphysical or pragmatic reasons for doing so. Until he explains his theory of the passing thought, he points out "the logical respectability of the spiritualistic position," and it seems to him "the line of least logical resistance." (5) He points out two of its advantages over the mind-stuff theory. The positive significance, in the first place, of the soul-hypothesis, is that it might mean that there is some ground in the nature of things for the possibility of thought, and for one's mental processes as they come into existence; it might represent a protest against supposing "that the bare existence of the phenomena is the total truth." (6) Secondly, the idea of "substance" may be regarded as "descriptive of the fact that certain specific and verifiable connections are found among the parts of the experimential flux." (7) If any soul-hypothesis is to be defended, however, James thinks that the conception of a world-soul is more promising than that of a lot of individual ones. (6)

2'. The transcendentalist theory;

a'. Its essential character.

Space forbids an extended account of the transcendentalist theory originated by Kant. (8) The essential point in the complicated argument seems to be that all consciousness implies the awareness that I think. This "original transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" is the condition of all connectedness which is essential to knowledge, and of the unification of the manifold. It is the bare and empty consciousness that accompanies all knowledge. Kant did not give it any positive attributes. It only tells us that we are, but gives us no positive theoretical knowledge of the soul. We can have knowledge only of the empirical ego. (9)

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(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 87.
(2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 350.
(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 209.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 343.
(5) Ibid., pages 181-2. (6) Ibid., pages 345-6.
(7) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 124.
(8) Compare, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 360-73.
(9) Compare above, page 10.

b'. Its defects.

The chief objections to this theory are as follows: (a) The fundamental objection, according to James, to the transcendental theory is that it is based upon an erroneous assumption. The chaotic manifold which the "I think" is supposed to synthesize is mythological. The relations among objects known, which the "I think" is assumed to condition, are themselves given in what is known and need not, therefore, be sought in any knower. E. N. Merrington reminds us (1) that relations, according to James, belong in the world of objects rather than on the subjective side. (2)

(b) A second objection to the transcendental ego is its abstract character, especially as it is developed in the thought of Kant's idealistic successors. In them it takes on an absolute and conceptual form which is foreign to human experience. This abstract awareness, in Kant's thought, does not explain, as well as does the passing thought, (3) how synthesis in the concrete actually comes to pass. To give it a cumbersome name does not fit it better to be a vehicle of knowing than the judging thought.

(c) Finally, the whole doctrine is ambiguous in Kant's thought. In the opinion of James, the transcendental ego is insignificant in Kant's thought, unless it be interpreted to mean the soul, and if this is done, it falls into all of the errors of the soul-doctrine. (4)

3'. The associational theory.

The associationists represent a third class of philosophers who have struggled to explain the facts of selfhood. (5) The basic tenets of their doctrine with respect to the self seem to be the following: There are given certain fixed and simple psychic units called sensations and ideas. They exist discretely and independently of each other. These units are compounded into consciousness according to the laws of association, and, when collected, retain their individual distinctness and numerical totality. The following errors in this doctrine are noted by James:

a'. Its basic elements.

b'. Errors in the associational doctrine.

(a) Here, as in the case of the other two theories, the fundamental assumption is wrong. The "manifold of co-existing ideas" is itself a "chimera." "A permanently existing 'idea' or 'Vorstellung' which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals, is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades." (6) Ideas do not, as a matter of fact, exist in this discrete way. To suppose that they do is to fall into the psychologist's fallacy, namely, of supposing that the ideas of objects exist separately just because their objects so exist. (7) In fact, thoughts appear as phases of a sensibly continuous stream which contains within itself at once diversity and unity.

(b) A second error lies in supposing that a bundle of ideas of itself could ever form a unity or a single pulse of thought. (8)

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(1) The Problem of Personality, page 15.
(2) See above, page 22; Princ. of Psychology, vol. I, p. 363.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 364.
(4) See above, pages 40-42.
(5) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 145-162.
(6) Ibid., page 236.
(7) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 231, 278.
(8) Ibid., page 277.

The associational party mistakenly confuse the idea of unity with the unity of ideas; here is another case of the psychologist's fallacy. The original assumption of diversity cannot be overcome by that diversity from within itself. (1) It is logically unintelligible to suppose that any number of entities, call them what one will, "can sum themselves together." (2) "Atoms of feeling cannot compose higher feelings any more than the atoms of matter can compose physical things." (3) In A Pluralistic Universe (4) he presents elaborate arguments to disprove the supposition that consciousness can become a whole as a result of self-compounding on the part of the associationist's units or of the intellectualist's concepts. As a matter of fact, the stream of thought carries its own unity with itself. Every pulse of thought is an indecomposable unity. (5) "The sum itself exists only for a bystander who happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such." (6)

(c) Finally, therefore, it is to be noted that the associationists smuggle in the "bystander," or "judging thought." They continually talk about what the mind does and what "we" do. Hume, for instance, uses the pronoun, I, even when he affirms that he cannot find any real "I."

James recognizes that the associational view has great simplicity, but he himself prefers the "vaguer conception of the stream of thought." (7) He has done a real service in demonstrating the inadequacy of the doctrine in question.

e. The pragmatic sufficiency of the passing thought.

This review of the three typical historical theories does not, James thinks, require a revision of his theoretical formulation of the stream of thought, nor does it reveal a more workable hypothesis than that of the passing thought. His general criticism of the historical views mentioned is that they fail in helping one to explain or understand the actual facts of consciousness. He thinks rather that "our'Thought'--a cognitive phenomenal event in time--is, if it exist at all, itself the only Thinker which the facts require." (8)

The passing thought does all the work of the self.

The judging thought fulfils all the functions--and that in a verifiable way--which are supposed to be performed by the substantial soul and the transcendental ego, and is certainly a great improvement upon the doctrine of associationism.

This explained in detail.

James explains in great detail how the passing thought does all the work of the self which he believes is required of the latter in the other theories referred to. The passing thought knows, conceives, distinguishes, identifies. (9) "In my PsychologyI have tried to show that we need no knower other than the 'passing thought.'" (10)

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 352.
(2) Ibid., page 158. (3) Ibid., page 161.
(4) See especially pages 201-8.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I,p. 371. (6) Ibid., p. 158.
(7) Talks to Teachers, page 21.
(8) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 369.
(9) Ibid., pages 331-2.
(10) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 4, note; James here refers the reader to Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 338 ff.

All kinds of relations are found by it in the stream of consciousness of which it is a part. (1) "Both connection and separation are ways in which the past thoughts appear to the present Thought." (2) Thus, in its immediate experience is solved the baffling problem of diversity in unity. (3) "Immediate feeling possesses a native wholeness" (4) in which distinctions and contrasts are nevertheless present.

Further, the passing thought is an agent of choice which appropriates and rejects objects in its own past and in the world that is presented to it. The thoughts that compose "mental-activity trains" do work on each other; "they check, sustain, and introduce. They do so when the activity is merely associational as well as when effort is there." (5)

Again, "It is impossible to discover any verifiable features in personal identity" which are not contained in the sketch of the passing thought. (6) These successive thoughts, too, are centers of feelings and desires as well as volitional agents. "Spontaneity is just as possible, to say the least, in a temporary spiritual agent like our 'Thought' as in a permanent one like the supposed Soul." (7) "The present Thought also has being, . . . and if there be no other Being in which it 'inheres,' it ought itself to be a 'substance.'" (8)

In short, "the unity, the identity, the individuality, and the immateriality that appear in the psychic life are thus accounted for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no need of reference to any more simple or substantial agent than the present Thought or 'section' of the stream." (9) "All the experiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of mind." (10)

The passing thought is pragmatically sufficient.

It is the passing thought, then, which, in the opinion of James, makes the most difference to us of any of the hypotheses concerning the nature of the mind. "Which of my spiritual selves do I really care for? My Soul-substance? my 'transcendental Ego' or Thinker? my pronoun I? my subjectivity as such? my nucleus of cephalic adjustments? or my more phenomenal and perishable powers, my loves and hates, willingnesses and sensibilities, and the like? Surely the latter." (11) And because the passing thought, with the capacities that have been enumerated, meets practical requirements, James concludes to its pragmatic sufficiency.

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 360.
(2) Ibid., page 353.
(3) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 260; 49-51; Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 345.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 92.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 390, note.
(6) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 340; compare also, pages 338-9, etc.
(7) Ibid., 346.
(8) Ibid., page 345.
(9) Ibid., page 344.
(10) Ibid., page 401.
(11) Ibid., page 323.

Evidence from James, quoted by Merrington.

E. N. Merrington quotes (1) an interesting note written by James himself which confirms this conclusion. The latter asserts that, "I have worked for so many years with the 'passing thot' formula which pragmatically does all the work of a Self, that the inability to define the Self except by its work makes me perhaps unduly hostile, not to the word, of course, but to the use of it as a fundamental term in philosophy. The 'train of experience' kind of self gets its unity after the facts only; but the 'unanalyzable principle' kind is anterior to the facts and seems to warrant their having unity. But if one makes for each stage of unity already achieved in fact, an active worker for more unity, with efficacy too, doesn't the warrant also seem to exist?"

Conclusion.

The conclusion, then, to which the thought of James leads, is that, since the passing thought does all the work which is historically and actually required of the self, the two are identical, except in words, and one may be substituted for the other. This substitution is only a particular application of the general pragmatic rule of identifying concepts which have the same practical consequences. (2) James himself, however, prefers the term, the passing thought. His pragmatic attitude to the traditional views of the self may be summed up by saying that the only use to which a transcendental ego, or any transempirical principle, could be put would be either to identify the empirical self, which already has been identified in our stream of consciousness, or to guide us in our future activities, for which purposes our knowledge of the empirical and passing thought is already sufficient. (3) Since the passing thought performs all the functions of the soul, James' psychology is without a soul in name only, and not in fact, so far as his own intentions are concerned.

f. The nature of activity, and the place of activity, will, purpose, and emotion in James' theory of the self.

James' account of "the experience of activity" (4) is so important in his theory of the self and also so illuminating in general that it calls for special consideration. He says that, in studying this experience, several points of view may be adopted, namely, that of metaphysics, logic (or epistemology), and psychology. This order of review will be followed.

Introduction.

1'. The experience of activity.

a'. Metaphysical account of it.

The metaphysical standpoint of James in his discussion of activity is that of "radical empiricism . . . with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience." (5) The pragmatic rule appears in the demand that an acceptable theory of activity must exhibit "pragmatic consequences," and make "assignable particular differences." (6) It must help us to control more intelligently and effectively our future operations. (7) Accordingly, he asks the metaphysical question about activity in regular pragmatic fashion: "Is there a fact of activity? and if so, what idea must we frame of it? What is it like, and what does it do, if it does anything?" (6) "The question Whose is the real activity, is thus tantamount to the question what will be the actual results?" (8)

1". The pragmatic and empirical points of view.

(1) The Problem of Personality, page vii.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 103-4; Will to Believe, 124.
(3) Compare, A Pluralistic Universe, page 392.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, Appendix B.
(5) Ibid., page 372. (6) Ibid., page 371.
(7) Ibid., page 392. (8) Ibid., page 386.

The theory of activity not only must meet the practical tests of pragmatism, but it must conform to the principles of radical empiricism: "Nothing shall be admitted as a fact, it says, except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient." (1) Hence, "if there be real creative activities in being, radical empiricism must say, somewhere they must be immediately lived. Somewhere the that of efficacious causing and the what of it must be experienced in one." (2) These are the main points in his approach to the problem. "It provides an empirical and relational version of 'activity,' and so distinguishes the author's voluntarism from a view with which it is easily confused--the view which upholds a pure or transcendental activity." (3)

a". Denial of trans-phenomenal or pure activity.

One more preliminary point should be noted. James himself does not accept any trans-phenomenal form of activity, or any activity-in-itself, which he regards as fictitious. He denies that he ever held to a metaphysical principle or transcendental agent behind our experienced activity which makes the latter go, (4) although he leaves open the possibility of there being such a principle. He retains the word, activity, however, and finds its positive significance in a certain experience-complex. Let us examine the nature of this.

b". Real activity exists in concrete experience.

James finds "the original type" of real activity in the concrete, identifiable experience of the individual, with his strivings and struggles. It is to this primary model that all ulterior judgments about activity must refer. (1) "The percipi in these originals of experience is the esse." (5) "I conclude, then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a 'category,' if you like, of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal. We have the whole butt and being of it in our hands." (6) "Relations of activity" tie "terms into series involving change, tendency, resistance, and the causal order generally." (7)

2". Failure of attempts to find real activity beyond present experience.

James is unable to discover any pragmatic worth in the past attempts of three types of philosophers to find the "real facts" of our activities beyond the passing concrete experience, whether in their "ultimate outcome" in the life of some "wider mind," such as the "Absolute thinker;" or in the narrow span of "the most previous agent ascertainable," such as brain cells; or in a struggle of "ideas." (8) These various conceptions "de-realize my activities," except that the wider consciousness, if I take it religiously and regard it as good, may corroborate their reality. (8) Especially, it has not been shown how nerve-cells or idea-entities guarantee in the future the fulfilment of my wishes and will. (9)

Here "is the old dispute come back! Materialism and teleology; elementary short-span actions summing themselves 'blindly,' or far foreseen ideals coming with effort into act." (10) But even

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, p. 372. (2) Ibid., page 389.
(3) So R. B. Perry, Editor's preface, page xi, of Essays in Radical Empiricism.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, p. 391. (5) Ibid., page 378.
(6).Ibid., page 392.
(7) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 44-5.
(8) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 384-5.
(9) Ibid., page 386. (10) Ibid., page 387.

if we could picture how these ulterior agents regulate our activities, we should nevertheless test the meaning and succession of their exertions practically and empirically. (1) In the details of actual fact we find the activities which make the real differences in human life. (1) The attempts, up to date, to explain how our activities might be linked with agents beyond the passing thought have not been successful. James, however, encourages the endeavor to connect up our activities with some larger historic or universal mind; this problem opens, he thinks, a promising field for metaphysical investigation. (2)

3". Summary of what action is.

James' concluding description of activity follows: "Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention--this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed. Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work. To treat this offhand as the bare illusory surface of a world whose real causality is an unimaginable ontological principle hidden in the cubic deeps, is, for the more empirical way of thinking, only animism in another shape. You explain your given fact by your 'principle,' but the principle itself, when you look clearly at it, turns out to be nothing but a previous little spiritual copy of the fact." (3) James avoids this latter circle of reasoning and considers real what are sometimes called appearances.

4". This is a pluralistic account of activity.

This account of activity fits well in a pluralistic philosophy and is consistent with personalism. He regards the activities of individual experiences as real in themselves as they appear without appealing to something beyond them as the source of their reality. "Each partial process, to him who lives through it, defines itself by its origin and its goal." (4) "The real activity . . . is the doing of the fact." (5)

b'. The epistemological question: how know activity?

The epistemological question, "Whence do we know activity?" has been answered already. The reply is: we know our activities by "living through" them. (6) They are "thus simply given." (7) James defines his position when he affirms that, "I try to defend" the recognition of the notion of activity "as a definite form of immediate experience against its rationalistic critics." (8)

c'. The psychological description of activity and its relation to the self.

From the standpoint of radical empiricism, psychology has a very intimate relation to metaphysics; indeed, it differs from the latter chiefly in that it provides more detailed descriptions of qualities and conditions of experience. The step from radical empiricism to psychologism seems very short indeed. Now it is the different forms of activity, and the relations of will, emotion, and interest to it, that especially concern psychology. The psychological question is: "Where in the stream of experience do we

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 387.
(2) Ibid., page 394.
(3) Ibid., pages 390-1.
(4) Ibid., page 382.
(5) Ibid., page 381.
(6) Ibid., page 377.
(7) Ibid., page 374.
(8) Ibid., page 338.

1". Close relation of psychology and metaphysics in radical empiricism.

seem to find what we speak of as activity?" And if we have perceptions of activity, what are their attributes, and their conditions of occurrence? (1)

2". Kinds of activity:

a". General activity.

First of all, the psychological field must be located by distinguishing three kinds of activity. "We are tempted to affirm activity wherever we find anything going on. Taken in the broadest sense, any apprehension of something doing, is an experience of activity. . The sense of activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest sense synonomous with the sense of 'life'." (2) "The basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our vitality which, because it is so perpetually present, remains in the background of our consciousness." (3) "The fact that something is going on, the bare fact of event or change," is, then, the most "elementary" and general kind of activity. (4) This variety of activity, however, may lack direction, agency and aim. (5)

General psychological description of activity-experience.

In our actual experience, however, activity comes usually with more specific characteristics, "with definite direction, with desire and sense of goal and resistance," etc., and as such has the form of a "conjunctive-series" or "experience train." (6) It is "a kind of synthetic object, or conjunctive relation experienced between bits of experience already made." (7) "The experiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up. . . He goes through all that ever can be imagined where activity is supposed. . The word 'activity' has no imaginable content whatever save these experiences of process, obstruction, striving, strain or release, ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us to be known." (8) This description "is clear to any one who has lived through the experience, but to no one else."

b". Nature of "my" activities, as distinguished from c", the activities of the not-self.

James, however, does not identify the activities which are peculiarly ours with the "total experience-process," but only with one phase of it. The general activity described above may be divided into two kinds, the activity of the not-self and of the self. What, then, is the nature of the activity which is "felt as ours?" (10) "My"activity is marked by the presence of certain affectional states connected with certain bodily movements.

Bodily movements are the focus of personality.

James offers the following striking description of personal activity: "So far as we are 'persons', and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment', movements in our body figure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense. . . The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field of consciousness') comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. ..

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 373; 371.
(2) Ibid., page 373.
(3) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 375.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 379; 373.
(5) Ibid., page 374. (6) Ibid., page 381.
(7) Ibid., page 381. (8) Ibid., pages 376-7.
(9) Ibid., page 378. (10) Ibid., page 379.

A focus of action and interest . . lies in the body. . The body is the storm centre, the origin of coordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I', then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here.' Activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis. . The 'my' of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perspective-interest in which they are dyed." (1)

We return here to that corporeal theory of the spiritual self which was noticed above (2), and according to which "the central part of the me is the feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the head; and in the feeling of the body should be included that of the general emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom these are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run." (3) "The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional connexion with the body's imminent or present acts." (4)

2'. Causation and free will.

Now "real activities" are always "efficacious;" they "make things be" which otherwise would not be. (5) Now this efficacy of our activities seems to include both causation and free will, as they are commonly called, which differ from activity by having the specific marks, respectively, of intended result or purpose and of novelty. Let us consider these briefly. (6)

a'. Nature of causation.

Causation "evidently . . is got in our own personal activity-situations." (7) "Real effectual causation . . is just that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal." (8) "Perceptually or concretely causation names the manner in which some fields of consciousness introduce other fields. It is but one of the forms in which experience appears as a continuous flow." (9) This peculiar conjunction of experience is present when "a previous field of 'consciousness,' containing . . the idea of a result, develops gradually into another field in which that result . . appears as accomplished, or else is prevented by obstacles against which we still feel ourselves to press," and the perceived result is called an effect because, in the new section of consciousness, it stands as the fulfilment of the purpose that was intended in the previous one, which, therefore, is called the cause. (10) James says that the cause contains the effect "by proposing it as the end pursued. Since the desire of that end is the efficient cause, we see that in the total fact of personal activity final and efficient causes coalesce. Yet the effect is oftenest contained aliquo modo only, and seldom explicitly foreseen. The activity sets up more effects than it proposes literally. The end is defined beforehand in most cases only as a general direction, along which all sorts of novelties and surprises lie in wait." (11) In The Principles of Psychology (12),

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 379-80, note.
(2) See above, pages 35, 39-40.
(3) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 371.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page 344.
(5) Ibid., pages 389; 393.
(6) See especially Some Problems of Philosophy, chaps., XII-XIII.
(7) Ibid., page 120.
(8) A Pluralistic Universe, page 392.
(9) Some Problems of Phil., pages 198-9; compare also the excellent description, page 211. (10) Ibid., pages 210-13.
(12) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 138-44.
(11) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 213.

he presents some facts to show "that consciousness has causal efficacy." If this is the type of actual causation, James sees himself led in the direction of a panpsychic philosophy. (1)

b'. Free will: metaphysical account.

The presence of free will in the stream of consciousness is marked by the "novelties" just referred to. "'Free will' means nothing but real novelty." (2) "The perceptual . . flux yields a perfect effervescence of novelty all the time." (3) James says, "As a matter of plain history, the only 'free will' I have ever thought of defending is the character of novelty in fresh activity-situations. If an activity-process is the form of a whole 'field of consciousness' and if each field of consciousness is not only in its totality unique (as is now commonly admitted), but has its elements unique, . . then novelty is perpetually entering the world and what happens there is not pure repetition. . Activity-situations come, in short, each with an original touch. A 'principle' of free will, if there were one, would doubtless manifest itself in such phenomena, but I never saw, nor do I now see what the principle could do except rehearse the phenomenon beforehand." (4) Free-will simply means, therefore, that the present is "an original starting-point of events, and not merely transmitting a push from elsewhere." (5) In this form pluralism and pragmatism accept the notion. "Free-will pragmatically means novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past." (6)

c'. Free will: psychological account.

In comparison with this metaphysical account of free will, James' psychological account of the two meanings of will is interesting: "The word 'will' can be used in a broader and in a narrower sense. In the broader sense it designates our entire capacities for impulsive and active life, including our instinctive reactions and those forms of behavior that have become secondarily automatic and semi-conscious through frequent repetition. In the narrower sense acts of will are such acts only as cannot be inattentively performed. A distinct idea of what they are, and a deliberate fiat on the mind's part, must precede their execution." (7)

d'. General account of volition.

The conception of volition held by James grows out of his affirmation of the essentially active character of consciousness. "Consciousness is in its very nature impulsive," although a certain degree of intensity in consciousness is required to overcome effectively the natural inertia of the motor processes. (8) However, "it is of the essence of all consciousness (or of the neural process which underlies it) to instigate movement of some sort." (9) "We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add

The impulsive character of consciousness.

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(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 218.
(2) Ibid., page 141. (3) Ibid., page 151.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 391-2, note.
(5) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 139.
(6) Pragmatism, pages 118-9.
(7) Talks to Teachers, page 169.
(8) The Principles of Psychology, vol, II, page 526.
(9) Ibid., page 551.

something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to instigate a movement." (1) "The impulsive quality of mental states is an attribute behind which we cannot go," (2) although the impulsive power of ideas varies greatly. (3)

Fiat in voluntary action.

The simple type of ideo-motor movement is sometimes complicated by the presence of "an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate." (4) James thinks "that the fiat, the element of consent or resolve that the act shall ensue . . constitutes the essence of the voluntariness of the act. . It is a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions alike." (5) Of what nature is this consent or fiat? It is that effort of attention which is required to enable one idea to prevail in the mind against all obstacles. "The steadfast occupancy of consciousness" is "the prime condition of impulsive power." (6) "Attention is the first and fundamental thing in volition." (7) Once the idea with its associates stably dominates attention, the willing terminates, and the movement follows as a matter of physiological course. (8) "The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat;" the physiological discharge is a mere incident. (9)

Volition and the self.

Consequently, "volition is primarily a relation, not between our Self and extra-mental matter (as many philosophers still maintain), but between our Self and our own states of mind." (10)

3'. Importance of purpose in consciousness.

a'. Purpose is essential to activity.

We have seen incidentally that the presence of an end is one factor in causality, as well as in other forms of activity. Let us consider the important and intimate place that purpose has in the activity-situation. In this situation the central place played by striving for and against has been indicated. Indeed, "One thought in every developed activity-series is a desire or thought of purpose." (11) "No matter what activities there may really be in this extraordinary universe of ours, it is impossible for us to conceive of any one of them being lived through or authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles and overcoming or being overcome." (12) Not only, therefore, is our stream of consciousness marked by activity, but this activity has direction, and an important characteristic of most if not all pulses of thought is their meaning, the conclusion to which they lead and which becomes one of the substan-

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 526.
(2) Ibid., page 551. (3) Ibid. page 535.
(4) Ibid., page 522. (5) Ibid., page 501.
(6) Ibid., page 559. (7) Ibid., page 568.
(8) Ibid., pages 559-60. (9) Ibid., page 561.
(10) Ibid., pages 567-68.
(11) A Pluralistic Universe, page 390.
(12) Ibid., pages 377-8.

tive phases of the stream which conception stabilizes. (1) James holds, in short, that "no actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind." (2)

b'. Consciousness is teleological.

Consciousness seems, therefore, to be essentially a "teleological function.(3) It is in intelligent consciousness that "real ends appear for the first time . . . upon the world's stage. Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all." (4) "The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon." (5)

1". Teleological character of thinking.

The teleological character of various mental processes should be exhibited in detail. (a) This mark is strikingly present in thinking. As early as 1881 James wrote (6): "The conceiving or theorizing faculty . . . functions exclusively for the sake of ends that do not exist at all in the world of impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity together." He concludes his chapter on "Conception" in the Principles of Psychology(7) by saying that, "This whole function of conceiving, of fixing, and holding fact to meanings, has no significance apart from the fact that the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private ends." Again he says, the "powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not." (4)

2". The primacy of practical reason.

From these facts it follows that James holds to the "primacy" of "practical reason." He asserts, "From its first dawn to its highest actual attainment we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element in an organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers--the powers of will." (8) "Man, whatever else he may be, is primarily a practical being whose mind is given him to aid in adapting him to this world's life." (9)

3". The religious life gets its unity from the presence of purpose.

The religious life, too, is a life of purpose and of faith; it consists of "the interest of the individual in his private personal destiny." It is only by the discovery and possession of some central and valuable aim or purpose that the religiously divided self regains its unity and happiness. The divided self arises when each of two different groups of aims come to struggle for dominion in consciousness. (10) "Let us hereafter, in speaking of the hot place in a man's consciousness, the group of ideas to which he devotes himself, and from which he works, call it the

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 259-261.
(2) Ibid., page 11.
(3) Ibid., page 14; Will to Believe, etc., page 117.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141.
(5) Ibid., page 8; compare also, pages 13 and 15.
(6) Will to Believe, page 117; compare, 119.
(7) Pages 482 ff. vol. I; compare page 459.
(8) Will to Believe, page 140.
(9) Talks to Teachers, page 25; for evidence, see pages 25-7.
(10) Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 193, 170-5, etc.

habitual centre of his personal energy. It makes a great difference to a man whether one set of his ideas, or another, be the centre of his energy." (1)

c'. Pragmatism and purpose.

James ought to point out--I do not know that he does--the logical connection between the pragmatic method and the important function of purpose in the life of the self. The application of that method requires purposive intelligence in order to see for what ideas are "useful" or to whom they are satisfying. Without such a "commanding intelligence," our reactions are neither hurtful nor useful at all. (2) Survival itself is "an hypothesis made by an onlooker, about the future." (3)

4'. Emotions and personality.

There remains now for discussion James' conception of the place of emotions or interests in the personal life. They play a very significant part indeed. We have already described in general the interested character of consciousness. (4) In fact, "consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency." It is constantly emphasizing and choosing something and "the item emphasized is always in close connection with some interest felt by consciousness to be paramount at the time." (5)

a'. Emotions and actions.

One's emotions and interests are intimately linked up with his active tendencies. In fact, James does not seem clearly and consistently to distinguish between emotions and instincts. In Talks to Teachers (6) he says he uses the term, action, in the broadest sense, to include not only bodily movements, but "tendencies" and "emotional determinations" in the future as well as the present. (7) On the whole we seem justified in asserting that for him emotions and activities are only two conceptually distinguishable aspects of a single concrete process. It looks as if the selective agency of consciousness were intended by James to cover both general activity and emotion. Unless our ideals have emotional "steam" back of them, they lack driving and creating power. (8) Actions, preferences, purposes are only distinguishable phases of a single experience-train which we call personality. "Personality, desire, and volition . . . are in short the centres of our dynamic energy," of our personal energy. (9) We are thus near the final synthetic summary of James' view of personality which we shall make in a moment. First, a few further points in connection with emotion should be noted.

b'. Emotions and purposes.

Purposes and interests are closely interrelated. On the one hand, one's interests determine what systems of ideas or purposes shall be central for the moment (10), but, on the other hand, when a purpose or desire has gained dominance in an activity-series, "all other thoughts acquire a feeling tone from their relation of

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(1) Varieties of Religious Experience, page 196.
(2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141.
(3) Ibid., page 141; compare above, pages 15-16.
(4) See above, page 25.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 139.
(6) Talks to Teachers, page 27.
(7) Compare Will to Believe, pages 117-8.
(8) Varieties of Religious Experience, page 264.
(9) Ibid., page 195.
(10) Ibid., page 194.

harmony or oppugnancy to this." (1) "Both thought and feeling are determinants of conduct and the same conduct may be determined either by feeling or by thought." (2)

c'. Interests are dynamic.

In concluding this discussion of emotion, we should notice two characteristics of interests. The first important fact about them seems to be their dynamic and selective character, and their power to transform experience. "Interest, . . . though its genesis is doubtless perfectly natural, makes experience more than it is made by it." Interest brings about rearrangements among the items of my experience and gives them "intelligible perspective." "My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos." (3) The "reactive spontaneity," therefore, which is present in "selective attention," and which transforms the face of experience, contradicts that view of experience in which it is regarded as "pure receptivity," as something which is simply "given." (4)

d'. Interests are the source of personal values and of individuality.

The second important characteristic of the interests which come into being with consciousness (5) is that they are the source of personal values and individuality. Man is distinguished by possessing many emotions. "Man's chief difference from the brutes lies in the exuberant existence of his subjective propensities--his preeminence over them simply and solely in the number and fantastic and unnecessary character of his wants, physical, moral, aesthetic, and intellectual. . . His wants are to be trusted. . . The uneasiness they occasion is the best guide of his life." (6)

The general teaching of The Varieties of Religious Experience is that personality centers in our emotional life. (7) "Individuality is founded in feeling." (8) It is from the "hot" places of our emotional life that our purposes and volitions make their sallies, and it is there that we find the center of our personal energy. (9) Radical changes in our emotional life bring radical changes in our sense of values as well as in our purposes and actions.

g. Summary of the characteristics of personality according to the thought of James.

An attempt will now be made to present a just and consistent summary of James' conception of personality. (10) Throughout the above exposition of James' theory of the self, it has been assumed that he would accept the opinion that his psychological description of the passing thought meets the metaphysical requirements of the pragmatic method so far as personality is concerned. To be sure, he recognizes explicitly the possibility of the existence of a transcendental ego (11), but his constant implied challenge is:

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 390.
(2) Varieties of Religious Experience, page 504.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 402-3. For an excellent account of the transformation of experience by our interests, especially the cognitive ones, see Will to Believe, pages 117-8.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 402. (5) Ibid., p.140.
(6) The Will to Believe, page 131.
(7) Compare, Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 150, 501.
(8) Ibid., page 501; see above, page 27.
(9) Ibid., page 195.
(10) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400-1; also, R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 355-6.
(11) See, e.g., Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 401.

1'. Introduction.

a'. James' own summary.

go find it and prove what practical differences it would make that are not made by the passing thought.

James himself says, "We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing subject Thought and recognized as continuing in time." (1) With this as a text we shall proceed now to state in an abstract way those phases or points of emphasis in the stream of consciousness which seem to be the most important elements in his conception of personality. The disturbing influence of his philosophy of pure experience upon the theory of personality, especially as it is set forth in his Principles of Psychology, will be omitted here but mentioned below. (2)

b'. His exclusion of a transphenomenal ego.

Returning to the above text, we notice that it refers to both an objective and a subjective factor in the concrete whole called personality. The subjective element, however, is not regarded as something transempirical or transcendental He asserts that the objective part, the "me, is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time.'" (3) We have reviewed his reasons (4) for rejecting all three of the typical formulations of the self which find its essence in something beyond the passing thought. No pure thinker, no substantial soul, no activity-in-itself, explains the facts any better than the passing thought. (5) "The only pathway that I can discover for bringing in a more transcendental thinker would be to deny that we have any direct knowledge of the thought as such." The existence and identity of the latter would be essentially a metaphysical question, and in its answer the psychological, the spiritualistic, and the transcendentalist solutions would alike deserve impartial consideration. (6)

Its possibility admitted.

c'. The importance of the empirical ego.

The subjective factor itself may be regarded as a fact of experience. It may be known in either of two ways. When it is past, it is known in a purely objective way; when it is present, it is known immediately through feeling. Indeed, the latter is the most adequate way of realizing the passing thought as it moves forward through time, the most complete method of apprehending personality in its wholeness and reality. (7)

d'. The most important elements of personality will be summarized now.

We shall abstract, now, and make a list of, the most important features of that section of the stream of consciousness called the passing thought, which is the central fact in personality in the teaching of James.

The first characteristic of personality is its constant change, its vital movement through time, its incessant activity. The present thought passes and its successor inherits all its personal and

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 371.
(2) See below, pages 68-73.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 400-1.
(4) See above, pages 40-44.
(5) See above, pages 44-46.
(6) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 401.
(7) See above, pages 19-21.

2'. Activity and its immediate reality.

real possessions. "On the principles which I am defending, a 'mind' or 'personal consciousness' is the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite transitions." (1) The later thought is uniquely different from its predecessors because of its variant environment and inheritance. The novelties that are perpetually occurring in this onward flux are called, collectively, free-will.

The activities which figure as distinctly our personal ones are movements in our bodies, for the body is the storm center of those various processes, strivings, resistances, releases, etc., which constitute human activity in its concreteness. "The nucleus of the 'me' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at the time." (2) It is these feelings of bodily processes, especially those originating in the head and throat, which introspectively compose that innermost of our selves called the spiritual self. Thus the material and the spiritual selves are, to a considerable extent, identical.

Now the activity of all these processes "is inseparable from their being." (3) Our perception of them is their reality, for, according to radical empiricism, "we are only as experients." (4) The present acting self is the real self. (5) "Our active propensities " are "our most intimate powers." (6) James, therefore, might modify the Cartesian dictum, as Caird suggests, and say, ago, ergo sum. James does not find any pragmatic value in the attempts up to date to locate the reality of activity elsewhere than in these concrete pulses of the individual consciousness.

3'. Cognition.

From the summary of James mentioned above (7) it is evident that a significant feature of the passing thought, perhaps its most important one, is its cognizing capacity. I am unable to decide whether this power to know or whether activity is, in the judgment of James, the more fundamental characteristic of personality. Cognition, in any case, is not the only feature. (8) The passing thought, in the first place, knows directly, and sometimes also indirectly, its own bodily feelings and activities, as well as its own past selves which it appropriates. In this cognition of its own past is found the chief mark of memory, which, according to James, has something of the nature of the [illegible] of sensation or perception. (9) We shall make a separate point of memory. In the second place, the passing thought is constantly dealing with objects which it does not own as part of itself.

4'. Memory.

A third important characteristic of the passing thought is its capacity to recognize its continuation in time and its past selves. The latter is made possible by the fact that these selves possess the same warmth as present experiences. Memory, or the recognition of certain experiences as one's past experiences, is the central

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 80.
(2) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400.
(3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 379. (4) Ibid., page 374.
(5) Compare Ibid., page 344.
(6) The Will to Believe, page 82; compare page 142.
(7) See above, page 56.
(8) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141.
(9) Ibid., page 223.

fact in personal identity. In speaking of personal identity, James says, "The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is the possession of the same memories." (1) The chief support or abiding backbone of memory is the felt, persistent sameness of the bodily sensibilities and motor impulses. Very serious interruptions of the unity and continuity of our personalities appear when we lose the sense of this continuity of our bodily feelings. (2) "The phenomenon of alternating personality in its simplest phases seems based on lapses of memory." (3)

5'. Purpose. Interwoven in every activity-complex is a purpose or desire. Consciousness is marked as a "fighter for ends." Human mentality is distinguished from animal mind by its capacities to adjust means to future ends. Whenever one section of consciousness develops into another because it was so purposed in the first, the relation of cause and effect is present.

Purposes play an especially important part in the development of the social self and in the ethical life. Moral purposes, of course, get their real significance when they are acted upon. "It is . . certain that a resolute moral energy, no matter how inert, or unequipped its owner may be, extorts from us a respect we should never pay were we not satisfied that the essential root of human personality lay here." (4) "Real transitions towards real goals are . . things given in experience, and among experience's most indefeasible parts." (5)

The capacity for entertaining purposes, or ideas of result, is a part of one's general intellectual and cognitive capacities. Purposing is present in thinking, and to make plans is essential to intelligent action. The fourth important characteristic of personality, then, is action with reference to ends which are more or less explicitly known.

6'. Interest. The smooth flow of the stream of consciousness is constantly interrupted by interests which not only introduce novel wants into the contents of the stream, but give the sense of value to those purposes which become effectual in the determination of action. The consciousness of self always involves a paramount emphasis upon and "care" (6) for certain objects and ideas, i. e. ideals. "Personality need not be determined intrinsically any further than is involved in the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition of our dispositions towards these things, the things themselves being all good and righteous things." (7) In searching for the similarities between men and God, James suggests that "The two are consanguineous at least in this: that both have purposes for which they care and each may hear the other's call." (8) To be interested, to have emotions and affective tones, is a fifth feature of concrete personality.

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 372.
(2) Ibid., pages 386-7. (3) Ibid., page 379.
(4) The Will to Believe, page 142.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 239.
(6) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400.
(7) The Will to Believe, page 122.
(8) Ibid., page 122.

7'. Unity.

We have completed our enumeration of the outstanding aspects of personality. It should be remembered, however, that all of the phases of the individual stream of consciousness which have been mentioned form or possess a peculiar unity due to the presence of a certain warmth and intimacy which have been described. (1)

8'. Final summary.

It seems, therefore, that, according to the teaching of James, purposive, active processes of consciousness, possessing affective tone or the feature of interest, together with cognition and memory, when all these factors are blended together into a unity by reason of the presence of a peculiar interpenetrating warnth, form that concrete experience-whole which is known as personality or the "individualized self." In other words, each passing thought as it comes into being in the conscious present is able to know and purpose, is the center of various emotions and volitions, and establishes the fact of its personal identity by appropriating the trains of its past selves. James speaks of "the organization of the self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfilments, or disappointments." (2)

9'. The subconscious self.

Our account of James' conception of personality is lacking in one respect yet because he thinks that "there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of." (3) While he offers reasons for rejecting ten alleged proofs for the existence of unconscious mental states (4), he finds some facts, especially in the study of religion, that lead him to postulate the existence of a subconscious self, which he regards as "nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity." (5) It is especially in religious experiences that we feel ourselves connected with a "more," and this "more" is on the hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life." (6)

If one has "a strongly developed ultra-marginal life of this sort," his "ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or inhibitions of action," etc. "Generalizing this phenomenon, Mr. Myers has given the name of automatism, sensory or motor, emotional or intellectual, to this whole sphere of effects, due to 'uprushes' into the ordinary consciousness of energies originating in the subliminal parts of the mind." (7) "Psychology, defining

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(1) See above, page 26.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 45.
(3) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 511.
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 162-176.
(5) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 511.
The chief references are: Ibid., pages 209-11; 233-236; 240-242; 483-4; 511-513;
The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 162-176; 199-213; 227-9; 239;
A Pluralistic Universe, page 307, etc.
(6) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 512.
(7) Ibid., page 234.

these forces as 'subconscious,' and speaking of their effects as due to 'incubation' or 'cerebration,' implies that they do not transcend the individual's personality." (1) "Where, on the contrary, the subconscious forces take the lead, it is more probably the better self in posse which directs the operation. Instead of being clumsily and vaguely aimed at from without, it is then itself the organizing centre." (2) James quotes with approval the following description of the subconscious self written by F. W. H. Myers: (3) "Each of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows--an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self manifests through the organism; but there is always some part of the Self unmanifested; and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve."

3. CRITICISM OF JAMES' PHILOSOPHIC METHOD WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SELF. (4)

a. Failure of James' pragmatic method.

The exposition of James' pragmatic method and of his conception of the self has now been completed. A criticism of both is next in order of consideration. We may begin with the former. In the widespread discussion which the promulgation of pragmatism has aroused, various shortcomings in it have been asserted from diverse points of view. Since, however, the standpoint in the following criticism is restricted by the bearing of pragmatism upon the problem of personality, no attempt will be made to take account of other criticisms of it which have been put forward from different points of view. (5)

1'. Three stages in James' pragmatism, with criticism of each.

There are really three stages in the development of pragmatism in the philosophy of William James. (a) The first is found in "The Will to Believe," (more exactly, "the right to believe"), the point of which is well expressed by J. B. Pratt: "When we are pressed with a forced option between two alternatives both of which are genuinely alive, but neither of which is demonstrable, then the course of wisdom is for us to choose tentatively that one which is in accord with our hopes rather than our fears, and to act as if it were true." (6)

a'. The right to believe; it is useful only in very rare instances.

This melioristic principle would enable one to make a decision if he should find two equally good theories of personality, but since this situation is likely to happen only in a very rare instance, the principle is of negligible value so far as our problem is concerned.

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(1) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 211.

(2) Ibid., page 209-10.

(3) Quoted in The Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 511-12, from Myers' essay on the "Subliminal Consciousness" in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, vol. VII, page 305.

(4) Compare above, pages 14-16.

(5) Note. I recognize that in some of the points of criticism which follow I am unable to make the acknowledgments which are probably due to many thinkers from whom I have learned.

(6) J. B. Pratt, Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1911, page 230.

b'. The pragmatic rule;

(b) The second stage is contained in the pragmatic rule, the pragmatic cure for disputes: no controversy is justified unless it has practical bearing upon our lives. This was the particular doctrine to which James originally attached the name of pragmatism. He represented it as a means of ending long-standing and stubborn metaphysical disputes by reducing them to consequences which were accepted as satisfying or were practically indifferent.

It is impractical.

This rule is practically useless, however, because there is no philosophical debate which has not seemed to have serious consequences to its participants, and that is especially true of the history of thought about personality. Some theories which seem most improbable to contemporary philosophers have appeared to their exponents to be indispensable in guaranteeing the preservation of certain great values, such, for example, as immortality, truth, or moral responsibility. Certain disputes are inconsequential and negligible, therefore, only from the point of view of those confirmed pragmatists who happen to be indifferent to them, and the pragmatic rule offers no solution of the disputes to those for whom they are important. But while this pragmatic panacea does not help to cure and settle controversial problems, it does tend to sharpen our desire for a theory of personality which shall do justice to the fulness of man's practical interests.

c'. The pragmatic theory of truth.

(c) The pragmatic rule expresses the demand that ideas make practical differences to men. The third stage of the pragmatism of James is the development of a theory of truth according to which any belief or idea is true which does make a difference to some one, in the sense of working for him or of bringing satisfaction to him. (1) This doctrine does not exclude the possibility that a belief which is true for me because it brings emotional satisfaction may contradict the accepted knowledge of my scientific neighbor; so that

1". It tends to be too individualistic.

a group of men might hold opinions which are inconsistent with one another and yet true for those who hold them. James admits this possibility, but asserts that such contradictions often lead most quickly to the truth. This assertion, however, does not relieve the subjectivistic and individualistic tendencies which lie at the

Ways of avoiding this individualistic tendency:

heart of his doctrine. Further, there appear to be many exceptions to the pragmatic theory because true ideas or real facts sometimes bring sorrow and suffering to pass and in their cases at any rate satisfaction cannot be used as a test of truth. The situation is an unsatisfactory one. In what way may the individualistic tendency in pragmatism be avoided? Several ways in which this may be done will be examined.

a". Admit contradictions, but this means philosophic despair.

(a) James himself admits the relativity of his theory, accepts outright contradictions in human life, and decides irrevocably to give up logic itself. (2) This choice is a confession of philosophic despair which only a few easy-going or intellectually exhausted philosophers would be willing to accept. For diametrically opposite propositions to be true at the same time for two neighbors seems to contradict the very notion of truth and to throw philosophy back to the age of the Sophists. We cannot give up our hopes of

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(1) See above, pages 15-16.
(2) See A Pluralistic Universe, pages 207-8.

philosophic progress by sacrificing the logic of consistency upon which that depends.

b". Make social reference,

(b) John Dewey attempts to escape from the slough of subjectivism by applying his social corrective, and by defending the idea that beliefs are true which, on the whole and in the long run, are satisfying. This same corrective is suggested by James' own work concerning The Varieties of Religious Experience. In the long run, indeed, it is probable that only genuinely true theories would survive among those which now seem to be true. In the end, then, the pragmatic account of truth might prove to be true.

but this is impractical; and, therefore,

This device, however, is a self-destructive reply, for to answer thus is to deprive us of the very thing we are seeking, namely, a present test for the truth that is applicable and useful. The situation reminds one of the procrastimating procedure of certain quack doctors. When their prescribed medicine does not cure according to expectations, they advise their patients to wait. Under those circumstances there are chances that nature herself will work the cure in spite of the medicine, and then, of course, the latter is given the credit. If we work and wait long enough, we may find the truth, but it is exceedingly doubtful whether pragmatism in the end can offer any more useful mode of testing the truth of ideas than it does now. To wait until the end of the long run is not satisfying to those who seek a present criterion of truth. W. Caldwell is of the opinion that the pragmatic doctrine of truth is "useless, seeing that omniscience alone could bring together in thought or in imagination all the consequences of an assertion." (1) It is impractical to wait indefinitely for the tree of truth to attain its full proportions.

The pragmatic theory of truth cannot stand its own test.

Suppose, however, that we endeavor to find now an answer to our quest. Then we shall have to determine what is most satisfying on the whole. This is the test of social reference, and requires us to go beyond our private satisfactions and to consider the judgments of others. With regard to this procedure we may object, first, that it is not a new test and does not deserve a new name. But our chief objection is that this on-the-whole test is very hard to use, and, therefore, fails to meet the requirements of the pragmatic standard itself. It is so hard to apply that in fact it is no test at all, but is only an expression of a general desire for the fulfilment of which pragmatism provides no criterion of such a character that we may know when that desire has been satisfied.

We conclude, therefore, by propounding a dilemma to the pragmatist: either he must rely upon private satisfactions as tests of truth and end in rank individualism, or he must take refuge in a test of social reference which is so broad and indefinite that it cannot be practically applied. If, as the pragmatists teach, a theory must work in order to be true, then the pragmatic theory itself is not true, for it does not work. The practical test of truth in pragmatism turns out to be so impractical that it is condemned by its own rule. The word, practical, refers to the content, rather than to the criterion, of truth.

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(1) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 127.

c". Construction of an objective system of values.

This is required by the variety of satisfactions.

(c) There is a third way, however, of avoiding the individualistic tendencies of pragmatism, namely, by constructing an objective system of values. But pragmatists have not worked out such a system. Their failure to do so is perhaps their most fundamental shortcoming. The need for such a system is great. It is obvious that ideas "work" in very different ways, and that there is a great variety of satisfactions, for example: the success of a scientific hypothesis in accounting for relevant facts, the hope resulting from a religious belief, the enjoyment of an artistic creation, the ease with which a new idea fits in with one's customary opinions, etc. When one kind of satisfaction conflicts with another, as is often the case in one's experience, or when one idea works for one person but annoys his neighbor, how shall one decide which is true? Ought one to prefer a temporary emotional satisfaction to the delight which comes from rational consistency? How shall one find the truth when an actual fact brings him very disturbing and unpleasant feelings? How practically decide the differences that are made by the assertion that the world is run by matter as contrasted with the one that it is guided by spirit, without some comparison of the relative worth of the human interests effected? The answer to such questions depends upon some scale or system of values in which each kind of satisfaction has a proper place and which will hold good for others as well as for oneself. The "face-value" of things cannot decide the ultimate and bitter conflicts of human ideals.

It is also required by the concept of the "useful."

James is fond of saying that true ideas are those that are useful. It is important to ask, Useful for what? That question locates the fatal weakness in the pragmatic doctrine. This doctrine asserts that the true is that which works, but does not say precisely for what anything should work. The condemning deficiency, therefore, of pragmatism is its subjective tendency, its failure to work out an objective system of values. It furnishes no practical or definite method of deciding in countless particular instances what is or what is not good or workable or satisfying. If one pins James down to a fine point and asks for an exact definition of practical, he will say that it really means particular, and stands for the facts of concrete experience. This reply leads one into the boundless world of experience, and one is farther than ever from a definite description of practical meaning. And we are obliged to conclude, again, that the pragmatic theory of truth does not work, that is to say, fails to meet its own test of truth. Its theory of truth is impractical without a system of objective values, but James and his pragmatic disciples have failed to provide this definite scale of values which is required to make their theory work.

The pragmatic theory of truth is impractical, and therefore self-contradictory, without such a system of values, but this system is lacking in it.

The pragmatist might object to the above arraignment by saying that the objective system of values referred to would be inconsistent with his pluralistic principle, namely, that every man is a maker of truth, and that that is true which works for each. But if pragmatism cannot succeed without such a system of values, as we have tried to show it cannot, and yet if it cannot harmonize such a system with its own principles, then its inherent weakness has been demonstrated.

The pragmatic theory of truth is marked by a serious incompleteness in that it lacks an elucidation of its presuppositions.

2'. Pragmatism fails to elucidate its presuppositions.

One of the most important of these is an active, remembering, intending verifier or interested thinker. Ideas clearly do not verify themselves. The pragmatist should give an account of how ideas in the pragmatic sense are ends or leadings whose cash-value is sought by a striving, intelligent, purposive personality. The pragmatist has explained to whom the satisfactions are present in an imperfect way, namely, by an indirect, implicit reference to the living organism. A much fuller and more explicit exposition is needed of that marvellous being for whom differences and practical consequences are significant, and who has the satisfactions which are so important in the pragmatic theory of truth.

Not only, therefore, has James failed to explain in a systematic way for what purposes or ends true ideas are useful, but also for whom. G. Papini has recognized the importance of both factors, for, according to James' interpretation of him (1), he says, in speaking of the value of philosophy, that, "philosophic thought will resolve itself into a comparative discussion of all the possible programs for man's life when man is once for all regarded as a creative being."

The list of unexplained presuppositions could be extended, for example: How can a concept or idea lead at all unless it already has some meaning; but if it has some meaning, we cannot expect to find its whole truth-significance in the satisfying consequences to which it leads; so that the theoretical process appears to be an important condition for the practical process of verification. Again, in the background of the pragmatic expositions lies the assumption that it is an universal and absolute theory which should be accepted by everyone, and yet, according to its own principles, truth is entirely relative.

3'. Summary of objections to the pragmatic method as applied to personality.

The following statements represent a rough summary of the objections to the pragmatic method as applied to personality: (a) The pragmatic method does not provide a criterion of truth nor a philosophic method which enables us either to discover or to determine the true theory of personality. (b) In trying to escape the individualism of pragmatism, its defenders take refuge in a social-reference test which is neither new nor practical, and which, therefore, represents a confession of weakness, and a self-contradiction in the theory itself. (c) Pragmatism has failed to carry out that development which is needed at once to complete its own theory and that of personality, namely, a systematization of the interests that "make a difference" in human life. This promise of pragmatism which is most important for a deeper understanding of personality has not been realized. (d) Pragmatism has failed to elucidate its presuppositions, one of the most important of which is an active, striving self.

The pragmatic account of mind is too biological.

(e) The pragmatic tendency to find the validity of ideas in the psychological conditions under which they arise has resulted, on the whole, in a too biological and utilitarian conception of mind. The pragmatist has been too much concerned with momentary wants and animal desires. There is no doubt that in the primitive stages of mental development consciousness was a valuable instrument for the protection and promotion of life, and that to-day con-

(1) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1906, page 340.

sciousness has biological or vital value, but it is a mistake either to suppose it has no other value, or to infer that its continued value for life is most important.

D. C. Macintosh asserts that, "Pragmatism, as instrumentalism, must remember that instead of consciousness and judgments being regarded as mere means for the promotion of the physical life, the physical life is now regarded, even by people of ordinary spirituality, as simply or chiefly instrumental in the promotion of the conscious life in its spiritual aspects. The ideal interests no longer exist for the sake of the physical, but the physical for the sake of the ideal. 'Man began to think in order that he might eat: he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may think.' (1) . . . Truth can be measured by a higher standard than its function in the struggle for bare existence, viz. by its function in the struggle for a better existence." (2) J. A. Leighton points out in an emphatic way how "the instrumentalist errs by taking one important function of conscious intelligence and making it the sole function." (3)

When personality has once attained an experience which is ideally valuable in independence of all biological usefulness and when it is concerned with interests which have no connection with the fate of the bodily organism, then principles other than biological ones must be found for the explanation of personality, and then animalistic interests should play a subordinate role. An instrumentalistic theory of personality might be acceptable provided that for which it is useful is a sufficiently exalted ideal and is not bare organic survival, but in that case some such word as purposive is preferable to the word, instrumental.

b. Criticism of the immediatism and anti-conceptualism of James.

The pragmatic theory which has just been examined is an attempt to explain mediate knowledge. Now some defects in James' theory of immediate knowledge will be pointed out and the success of his anti-conceptualism, considered. The following objections may be offered to his immediatism.

1'. Knowledge of acquaintance is an abstraction.

Bare knowledge of acquaintance is an abstraction. There appears to be no such thing in the adult experience in question in anytheory of knowledge. John Dewey is right in maintaining that there is "an element of mediation, that is of art, in all knowledge."(4) There is no doubt that some forms of knowledge contain more immediate factors than others, which are more abstract, but it seems impossible to exclude the conceptual factor altogether from any knowledge which has any meaning. Pure knowledge of acquaintance is no knowledge at all. It gets some value as knowledge in the philosophy of James because of the conceptual element which is smuggled in under such phrases as: "knowledge of acquaintance," "perceptual experience," "immediate knowledge;" and in such statements as this one: it is "impossible to understand" the flux of experience by means of concepts; (5) if immediate feeling can give

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(1) W. P. Montague, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. VI (1909), page 489.
(2) The Problem of Knowledge, page 433.
(3) The Field of Philosophy, 2d edition, pages 459-460.
(4) Influence of Darwin, etc., page 80.
(5) W. James, Some Problems of Philosophy, page 79.

us an "understanding" of experience, it has ceased to be immediate feeling. We shall try to show more fully below (1) that intuitive knowledge derives its value in part from conception. Further, it is notable that the verification of an idea in immediate experience is possible only if the verification is the termination of a conceptual leading. It seems impossible to eliminate all conceptual interpretation from immediate experience and to identify it as a fact by itself.

In his high estimate of immediate knowledge James falls into the usual mistake of the empiricist, namely, of finding the significance of knowledge exclusively in its origin. Even if it be true that "knowledge-about" is a development of immediate knowledge, yet it is a development, and it is hard to see how either kind of knowledge would amount to much without the help of the other. In short, to seek truth in either exclusively is to fall into a vicious fallacy of abstraction.

2'. James overestimates the worth of immediate feeling as compared with conception.

But if immediate knowledge, taken by itself, is not an abstraction or contradiction, then it is so poor in conscious meaning that it is of little significance. James prefers immediacy of feeling to the wholeness and breadth of conception. His preference no doubt is dictated by his empiricistic preoccupation with the given momentary experience, but if reality has a rational structure, certainly given experience needs to be fitted into a comprehensive whole by conceptual interpretation, and this whole would then be a "deeper" reality than merely perceptual experience. This need applies especially to the understanding of personality, which, we believe, cannot be explained alone in terms of the immediate pulse of experience. The fallacy of James, in contrast with the rationalists, consists in over-emphasizing the importance of knowledge of acquaintance.

James, however, in his later years, recognized (2) that conception gives a breadth of comprehension which immediate experience wholly lacks. He confesses that the trouble with aboriginal feeling is that there is too little of it; we want more. (3) And he says that instead of wading through the immediate experience of numberless perceivers, we can get the increase demanded by substituting conceptual systems. (4) He does not notice that the "wading" referred to would be itself useless without conceptual interpretation and preservation of experiences. Since memory and purpose are important phases of personality, concepts will be essential components of it.

For my part, therefore, I am unable at present to discover that the immediate flux of experience contains an "unlimited richness" apart from the work of intellect; it seems rather to contain a very limited vagueness and fragmentariness before intellect illuminates it. To take refuge in immediacy is to leave all the problems of analysis and synthesis unsolved James himself admits that the less we analyze a thing, the less we know about it. (5)

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(1) See below, pages 183-4.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy.
(3) Ibid., page 96. (4) Ibid., page 97.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 221.

The objection to the theory of James is that he altogether underestimates the importance of conceptual interpretation and exaggerates the importance of immediate feeling. How does he try to prove that concepts are inadequate to the fulness of reality? Certainly by means of conceptual comparison. Hence, the value of his affirmation that knowledge of acquaintance is the truer form of knowledge depends upon the validity of his conceptual interpretation of experience and knowledge.

The danger to be avoided is the fallacy of abstraction, whether it consists in supposing that either immediate feeling alone or concepts alone can give us an understanding of personality. We may expect that a satisfactory theory of personality will rest upon a fusion or interweaving of both kinds of knowledge.

3'. Concepts may refer to dynamic objects, as James fails to recognize.

James is mistaken apparently in asserting that concepts, supposed by him to be "static," cannot grasp changing reality. His thinking in this connection lacks the first degree of clearness. The function of a concept or idea, in his theory of truth, is to point or lead to an experience which is immediately satisfying. But may not a concept, however static it is, point to something which is changing as well as to something which is stationary? A concept cannot point successfuly to anything at all unless it has some permanence of meaning, and the more static its meaning, the more useful its meaning, and the more useful it is as an instrument for intellectual guidance and conservation. If meanings were subject to incessant change, the verification of an idea would be impossible, because pointings or leadings would not exist long enough for us to follow them out. Further, does not the awareness of change itself depend upon certain relatively permanent centers of meaningful reference? What these centers of reference may be is suggested by James himself when he says that the conceptual "notes" on the flux of reality are "taken by ourselves." (1)

It seems, then, that James is not justified in objecting to the static character of the meaning of a concept. Further, a concept, as mental event, exists as a part of the stream of consciousness, and as such, is not static. The moment, therefore, that one attempts to say in what sense a concept is static, James' objection evaporates into thin air.

4'. Other objections in brief.

Some other points of criticism may be noted. It was suggested in the last paragraph that his anti-conceptualism is inconsistent with a necessary presupposition of his pragmatic theory of verification. Again, his own splendid conceptual analysis of activity belies his assertion that activity is intellectually incomprehensible. (2) Further, his anti-conceptualism perhaps may be due in part to his confusing the fact that we lack definite concepts for the interpretation of all phases of reality and experience with the notion that concepts cannot grasp reality at all.

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 257.

(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 85.

4. Criticism of James' doctrine of the self.

We turn now to a criticism of James' doctrine of the self. His philosophy and psychology contain no single theory which is wholly self-consistent, but rather, two conceptions which in some respects are quite opposed to each other. In the above exposition no attempt was made to separate wholly the two currents of his thought. Rather his views were set forth in as systematic and complete a way as the facts would fairly warrant. A survey of this exposition suggests that perhaps it presents a more balanced and complete view than his writings justify. If this is the case, it may be explained by the fact that our own predilection as to what is important in a satisfactory view of personality has resulted in an emphasis upon some points which occupy a more or less incidental place in his own exposition. Many quotations from James' own writings have been introduced so as to minimize the improper modifications of his thought in the process of interpretation.

a. James' philosophy contains two doctrines of the self.

Of the two conceptions of the self found in the works of James, the weaker appears in his radical empiricism, and the more valuable one in his psychological and pragmatic writings. In the first context consciousness is a passive conjunction of neutral elements, while in the second context personality exhibits some active, purposive, and interested characteristics. E. N. Merrington suggests that, "One line fights for a sort of simplicity, and what looks like a monistic empiricism, while the other contends for fulness of life, individualism, and pluralism. The key to the struggle is given, I believe, in the Psychology, where the person is admitted as uniquely real, and yet is pushed into the whirling 'stream of thought.'" (1) The ambiguity and shifting meaning present in the use of the term, practical, is probably one way in which James easily slips from one view to the other; practical sometimes means purely empirical, and sometimes refers to active, personal values. (2) A criticism of James' two views of the self in the order mentioned above will now be undertaken.

b. Objections to the disappearance of personality in James' philosophy of pure experience.

Introduction.

In James' philosophy of pure experience personality disappears in any recognizable form. J. A. Leighton points out that in "neutral monism" in general "the self is resolved into an ever shifting phantasmagoria of neutral entities selected by the brain." (3) Hence, if personality is to mean a definite reality standing on its own grounds, it is necessary to show that the reasons why it vanishes in radical empiricism are fallacious. We proceed to make this attempt in the following pages.

In the first place, James is self-contradictory in his theory of experience. He wavers between a "neutral monism" of pure experience and a relative dualism of personal selves and their objects. (4) In his Principles of Psychology he holds that the duplicity between mental content and activity, between subject and object, is a fundamental fact, but in radical empiricism, (5) he refuses to

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(1) The Problem of Personality, page 21.
(2) See above, page 16.
(3) The Field of Philosophy, 2d edition, page 457.
(4) For extensive quotations from the sources bearing upon this and following points, see above, pages 21-2, 25-28.
(5) See above, page 29.

1'. Contradictions in James' earlier and later theory of experience.

to sustain his belief in this inner duplicity. The clear and daring tendency of his later thought is to deny his earlier view and to dissolve both knower and known into a common medium. The self and its activities become a part of the content of experience, and personality is merely one of the relations in which the terms of pure experience come to stand. Since the two views are mutually contradictory, we must decide which is the truer one. Some reasons for believing that the earlier view stands nearer the truth will now be offered.

2'. Pure experience is a barren abstraction.

In the second place, pure experience seems to be a pure abstraction. James has not succeeded in demonstrating its actuality. He leaves the manner of its existence unsettled. He asserts merely that it is, and tells us that we must not ask any further questions about it. We assert that it is not, save as an empty human thought, and will offer some reasons for this affirmation.

The adjective, pure, is presumably attached so as to call attention to the exclusion of the subject-object distinction from experience, and to indicate its simplicity in this respect. But what does this exclusion mean? Where will we find a sample of "pure" experience? In inarticulate and low-grade feeling? No; not in any such thing, because this is characterized by the presence of consciousness, and pure experience is neither mental nor physical; it is pure; it is assumed that consciousness is absent where mind is absent. Pure experience is more like "the boundless" of Anaximander, of which no samples can be found in the actual world, than anything else of which I can think.

Now it appears to be an abuse of language to call anything experience which is not mental or conscious in some sense. The pure experience of the philosophy of James ought to pass muster under some more appropriate name, such as, "the neutral mosaic" of E. B. Holt, (1) and then it could be more easily recognized for what it is, a barren abstraction, and it could not so easily cheat its way into the respectable society of significant terms.

I have endeavored to understand the meaning of pure experience in various ways. I have tried to find its significance in what James calls the subconscious world, but here I either meet God, who certainly has different characteristics than pure experience, or I meet nervous changes, and am lost in the haze of materialism. I have attempted to grasp its ontological status by comparing it with the entities of mathematics or mathematical logic, but it turns out in every case to be what I believe it is, an empty abstraction. For reasons which will be presented more fully below (2), I am compelled to agree with J. Laird, that no experience is possible unless the distinction between a conscious act and its object exists in it. This fundamental distinction is the foundation of James Ward's whole system of Psychology. (3)

We will now present a positive argument for objecting to James' doctrine of pure experience, and in doing so, we can fre-

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(1) The Concept of Consciousness, chapter VIII.
(2) See below, pages 233-45.
(3) Psychological Principles; see below, page 237.

3'. Actual experience at the human level involves a personal subject for the following reasons:

quently turn his own statements against himself. The chief positive reason for rejecting his view is that there is a personal aspect of our actual experience which cannot be reduced to or expressed in the neutral and impersonal terms of pure experience. That is, we shall remove the contradiction in his thinking by defending the second of his two opposed views, which are as follows: first, that experience leans on nothing, and is prior to the distinction between mental and physical; that is to say, it is pure; secondly, that all reality must be experienced by some personal experient. This experient is taken to mean the acting self possessing "personal" marks such as James himself describes in some places. The following are the reasons for preferring this second alternative.

a'. Personal experiences are irresoluble into neutral terms.

Many of our experiences, for example, memories, affections, loyalties, sins, acts of worship, cherished moral ideals, etc., seems to have a personal quality which is simply incommutable. In what way such personal experiences, aglow with the fire of our "private destinies," can surrender their personal attributes and be transmuted into the pallid "terms" of pure experience is exceedingly difficult to understand or imagine; the transformation would be as great a marvel as the transmutation of finite experience by the Absolute of F. H. Bradley. So long as these experiences exist at all, they retain the unique attributes derived from their connection with the vital interests of their owners. When one forgets certain of his affections and loyalties, he has no consciousness that they dissolve into a simpler form of existence,such as neutral elements. In brief, James' doctrine of pure experience assumes a relation between personal experiences and neutral elements which he has not explained in a convincing way.

b'. Personality is presupposed in all attempts to derive it from pure experience.

James does attempt to explain how consciousness or personality arises out of neutral elements. Consciousness, he asserts, is one of the relations or "contexts in which the neutral bits of pure experience come to be taken, and the physical world is another such context. It is a fundamental question to ask, How these pieces come to be "taken" in either way? His answer is, that "we" "sort" the terms of pure experience "according to our temporary purposes." (1)

The vicious circle of reasoning which is present in this argument is evident. The personality itself which is supposed to come into existence as a function when pieces of pure experience are sorted in a certain way does the sorting, and is, therefore, presupposed. The context-theory of personality or of consciousness assumes what it seeks to explain. This circle of reasoning demonstrates the impossibility of deriving personality from an impersonal or pure experience. If "our" sorting is required to get either mental or physical conjunctions out of pure experience, it looks very much as if pure experience rather than consciousness were a nonentity.

In other transformations of pure experience the self is also assumed. With great boldness James endeavors to account for knowledge without the presence of a conscious subject as distinguished from the known object. He maintains that knowledge is possible without assuming the existence of consciousness because one term

(1) See above, page 31.

may function as subject or knower and another as known. (1) The notable trouble with this argument is that the knowing subject is reinstated, and if it is not conscious, it is meaningless.

Again, James declares that pure experience means "the instant field of the present." (2) But now it seems absurd to suppose that anything is present without its presence being a conscious one, and anything that is consciously present, must be present to someone. But for whom is pure experience present? If it is not consciously present for someone, it is a bare abstraction; we do not find that James answers the questions, and we draw the appropriate inference.

1". Neutral monism fails to explain memory and self-consciousness.

Further, he asserts that one part of experience may take on a retrospective function with reference to another. This assertion involves several difficulties. If experience is present, it is not retrospective. Again, according to the fundamental principles of neutral monism, retrospection is impossible because it involves the conscious continuity of the self and this continuity is not provided in the variety of contexts which happen to befall the bits of pure experience.

Again, is not one following a fruitless trail in trying to express self-consciousness in terms of context? If consciousness is a context, what is self-consciousness? To say it is a context of a context is not illuminating. J. A. Leighton asks (3), "Can a searchlight search for its own searchings?"

In short, the attempts to explain personality in terms of a context of neutral elements is either meaningless or assumes what is to be explained. Not pure experience, but personal experience is the "materia prima" of reality. The doctrine that mental and physical may be distinguished as two points of view toward experience may be a valuable one, but points of view do not exist apart from some active interested self who takes them. The philosophy of points of view needs to be made more explicit.

c'. James overlooks the work of the active self in introducing relations into experience.

James deliberately tries to do without the active self in his doctrine that all relations, "both conjunctive and disjunctive", are matters of experienced contents and belong to the continuum of experience. This phase of radical empiricism avoids the atomism of classical empiricism and represents, so far, an improvement upon the view of Hume. For James, the states of consciousness are continuous and not discrete. This stream, however, tends to fall into pieces in his doctrine of a succession of passing thoughts each possessing an indecomposable unity. In any case, James' continuum of pure experience is as abstract as Hume's collection of sensations, and both alike lack a grounding in the personal self. Wm. Caldwell observes in this connection (4) that "In regard to this radical empiricism, I am obliged as a Kantian to say that to my mind it represents the reduction of all Pragmatism and Empiricism to an impossibility--to the fatuous attempt (exploded forever by Hume) to explain knowledge and experience without first principles of somekind or another. . . A philosophy without first principles, or a philosophy that reduces the relations between experiences to mere 'bits' of experience, is indeed no philosophy at all."

1". James makes one improvement upon Hume in recognizing the conscious continuum.

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(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism page 53; see above, pages 29.
(2) See above, page 29.
(3) The Field of Philosophy, 2d edition, page 457.
(4) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 11, note 2.

2". As a matter of fact the self transforms experience.

James' account of experience in his radical empiricism tends to represent it as quite too passive in character. In certain connections he himself ascribes to experience an active, creative capacity. He declares in one of his latest writings (1) that, "With concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this way or that, bend our experience and make it tell us whither it is bound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring far bits together and separate near bits," etc. In his account of activity, it was noted that he thinks that "real activities" "make things be" which otherwise would not be. In his Psychology he points out how interests greatly modify experience. "The interest itself . . makes experience more than it is made by it." (2)

This is the truer account of experience, but needs an active self to complete it, for the self is required not only if relations of any kind are to be experienced, but if new ones are to be introduced. The idea that all relations in which the pieces of pure experience are given--to what?-- is inconsistent with the facts which James himself brings forward. Some relations are experienced because some personal self desires or purposes that they should be; they are not immediately but subsequently experienced. James states in The Principles of Psychology that, "The things are conjoined in the thought, whatever may be the relation in which they appear to the thought." (3) A genuine "subjective synthesis" is accomplished by thought. (3) We conclude, therefore, that at least some relations are not given but introduced, and their introduction demands an active and intelligent self. Another fundamental objection, then, to neutral monism is, that it does not provide for the introduction of relations by the activity of the conscious self itself.

3". James admits activity, but regards it as given.

James admits the existence of activities, but does not meet our objection to the too passive character of experience, because he represents our activites themselves as "simply given." (4) Even free will means merely the fact of novelty in our experience and is phenomenal. (5) Pure experience lacks the push of Bergon's élan vital. The general tendency, then, of the radical empiricism of James is to surrender all the initiative of personality to the flux of the stream of consciousness. This direction of his thought is corrected by the "humanism" of the British thinker, F. C. S. Schiller, who emphasizes the importance of personal activity in the constitution of truth and reality.

d'. James assumes the self in many connections.

James, in his philosophy of pure experience, seldom succeeds in avoiding entirely those personal selves which in other places he explicitly regards as genuine samples of reality. We have seen at length how he wavers between a pure and a personal account of experience and consciousness. When he is endeavoring to talk in terms of pure experience, he repeatedly falls into the personal way of describing experience. This fact demonstrates the unstable and abstract character of pure experience. His intellectual circlings and revolutions are well illustrated in the following statements: (6)

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(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 64.
(2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 403.
(3) Ibid., page 331.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page 374.
(5) See above, page 51.
(6) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 151.

"Biography is the concrete form in which all that is, is immediately given; the perceptual flux is the authentic stuff of each of our biographies." He changes his point of view in two successive sentences.

That the world of pure experience really depends upon an experiencing subject he himself tends to admit in places. He maintains that a fundamental principle of radical empiricism is that "nothing shall be admitted as a fact . . . except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient." (1) What is the point of asserting that the stream of thinking is "emphatically phenomenal," (2) if thinking is immediately real and does not depend upon a thinker? I am unable to discover any thoughts which exist apart from the self-realizing life of some intelligent thinker or self. The flux of experience itself cannot account for the abiding conception of itself. Indeed, are not the notions of "the stream of consciousness" and "the passing thought" themselves constructions, as E. N. Merrington suggests? (3) The latter observes that, "Experience gives none of these hypothetical moments of consciousness in which the flow consists. . . And further such constructions as Empiricists put forward are incapable of being made except by the active mind or Self, enduring through time, and appear to transcend the terms of the series and connect them into a series." The places in the writings of James where the active self manifests itself in no indistinct way are so numerous that I have abandoned my original intention of listing some of the most important ones. (4)

4'. Summary. We concluded that the doctrine of the self in James' philosophy of pure experience contains numerous errors and is quite untenable. He has failed in his attempt to resolve "personal form and activity" into the contents of pure experience. His efforts to get rid of the inner duplicity of consciousness has resulted in its reaffirmation. The personalistic trend of his thought, found in parts of his Principles of Psychology where thoughts and feelings belong to personal selves, and notably present in his Varieties of Religious Experience, where reality is most clearly revealed in personal life, is the sounder of the two currents in his philosophy. We can agree with E. N. Merrington (5) when he concludes that, "Altogether, I feel that the examination of the efforts of Professor James to provide for a theory of experience without a Self confirms the opinion that such a theory, no matter how ingeniously worked out, is wholly unsatisfactory and in its very nature liable to all the objections brought against Hume's view of psychology and metaphysics." We must leave now James' conception of the self as worked out in his radical empiricism, and take up the discussion of the defects and virtues of his doctrine of the self as found in his psychological writings.

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(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 372.

(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 37.

(3) The Problem of Personality, pages 177-8.

(4) For some examples, see below, pages 79-80.

(5) The Problem of Personality, page 25.

c. Criticism of James' view of the self as it is found in his psychological and pragmatic writings. Introduction.

The second current of self-theory running through the thought of James is wonderfully fertile in suggestions with regard to the nature of personality. His conception of personality as it is construed especially in his psychological and pragmatic writings deserves very careful evaluation. These writings of course can be separated only in a very rough way, but there is no doubt but that they, especially the former, contain by far the richer of James' two general views of the self.

1'. James' immediate datum is the stream of consciousness rather than the personal self.

In his Principles of Psychology James starts out with the single postulate that "thinking of some sort goes on." (1) He calls the process a "stream of thought" or "stream of consciousness," the present changing center or crest of which is designated, "the passing thought." He "notices immediately five important characters in the process," and the first of these is that it is personal; "thought tends to personal form." (2) All thoughts and feelings are parts of some personal consciousness. (2) The "elementary psychic fact" is not "thought," but "my thought, every thought being owned." (3) Then he asserts, "On these terms the personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum of psychology." (4)

The word, might, should be italicized because the personal self remains for him only a possible immediate datum; the actual and ultimate one with which he works is the passing thought or the stream of consciousness. He maintains that, over and above the purely objective self and not-self, "there is nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact of the stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of their being experienced at all." (5) In other words, the working point of departure in the psychology of James is not a personal self which develops and changes in time, but the stream of thought which has, among other characters, a personal one. He desires his theory of consciousness to remain "unemcumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of mind." The metaphysical question which appears here is whether this stream of thought or the passing thought can successfully fill this office of a fundamental principle. Some reasons for denying that it can do so will be put forward.

2'. James' use of the term, thought, is misleading.

An objection which easily occurs to a casual reader of James is that his use of the term, thought, is illegitimate and misleading, for is it not inconsistent to attempt to classify all mental facts under the head of thoughts, when feelings and volitions seem to have such variant attributes, and is this not especially true of the pragmatist with his love of action? This appears to be a valid objection, but James is able to meet it in a very genial and courteous way by simply reminding the reader that he means thought to include "every form of consciousness indiscriminately." (6) His usage, therefore, is very similar to the Cartesian definition of thought. This is a nominal escape, but actually James ignores such a possible objection.

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 224.
(2) Ibid., page 225.
(3) Ibid., page 226.
(4) Ibid. For further evidence, see above, pages 25-26.
(5) Ibid., page 304.
(6) Ibid., page 224.

a'. Difficulties and doubts arise in the attempt to criticize James' theory of the self.

From much experience I can testify that the critic of James' theory of the self has a very difficult and doubtful problem in deciding just what view he means in the end to hold. So abundant are his observations and so exuberant his rhetoric that one can find, somewhere in his writings, statements to disprove almost any adverse criticism brought against him. This fact makes criticism of him an unpleasant task, because whatever fault one finds with some phase of his views, one can usually think of some statement of his own in the light of which the criticism is unfair, at least in part. One frequently wishes that James had been much more self-consistent so as to relieve one of the pains of doubt and hesitation in the interpretation of his thought.

For example, suppose one charges James with defending an impersonal psychology; he can reply that the passing thought does the work of the self; it not only thinks, but it chooses and remembers, and performs other functions of a person. And if you blame him for championing a self-psychology, he can answer by saying that the passing thought and not the self is his fundamental datum. Thus he can ward off objections, by twisting now this way and now that, but this devious way of varied rhetoric and unreconciled oppositions is an unstable and dangerous one. The passing thought is neither a mere thought nor a full self. It is a kind of hybrid which can pass for either as occasion demands.

b'. Since James personifies thought, he ought to talk in terms of personality or soul rather than of thought.

In spite of James' clear definition of his use of thought, it is fair to maintain that it is an abuse of terms to include in the class of thoughts such mental facts as emotions, feelings, choices, and impulsive actions. This use of thought is quite too broad. If the passing thought can recollect, act as an agent, and function as the principle of personal identity, it is no longer properly called thought. A new name is needed. Why not use the term, self or personality? It is certainly confusing to avoid the use of a term because it has certain meanings, and then to reinstate those meanings as connotations of another term. What James actually has done is to "personify thought," as F. B. Jevons well suggests; the latter adds, "By personifying thoughts we do not get rid of personality, any more than the magician's apprentice, by breaking to pieces the broom-stick, got rid of the pail of water it was fetching. On the contrary all the pieces fetched pails. So too the result of breaking up the unity of the self is that we get a self bewitched into as many selves as there are thoughts. But this embarrassing result is a mere piece of magic, which substitutes passing thoughts in the place of the identity of the thinker." (1)

3'. Does James hold a piecemeal view of consciousness?

A closer examination needs to be made of James' fundamental psychological assumption, namely, the stream of consciousness, together with its crest or center, the passing thought. The first question which arises in this connection is whether he regards the stream of thought as continuous or atomistic. While James plainly states that it is continuous, (2) yet when he explains personal identity, he seems to split up consciousness into a series of passing thoughts, every one of which possesses an indissoluble unity,

(1) Personality, page 70.
(2) See above, page 24.

and dies before its successor appears. James asserts that "each Thought dies away and is replaced by another." (1) In this situation consciousness is no longer a continuum, but a succession of many selves, each of which is a thinker. If this is a true representation of his view, he seems to have made little progress beyond atomistic sensationalism. F. B. Jevons maintains that this is the proper interpretation of the thought of James. Accordingly, it is quite possible to say, as James himself does, that there are as many selves as there are passing thoughts. In my judgment, this is a relatively untrue interpretation of James. His most characteristic view probably is that consciousness is sensibly continuous, although one should bear in mind the uncertainty connected with this judgment.

4'. Defects in James' theory of personal identity. Brief review of the theory.

Nevertheless, it is from the point of view of consciousness as a series of passing thoughts that James explains his theory of personal identity. What this theory is has been already stated. (2) A critical examination of it is now in order. The problem is, how one passing thought connects up with another? The answer is that one thought notices a similarity, with respect to the qualities of "warmth and intimacy", between itself and a "distant self,", and, by an act of comparison, judges that the two are continuous. Every passing thought, as it comes into existence, accepts and appropriates as its own certain of the possessions of another dying thought. In this way James tries to explain personal identity without introducing any abiding or identical being distinct from the stream of consciousness and without relying upon any hypothesis other than that of the passing thought. Its appropriation upon the basis of a judgment of identity constitutes personal identity. Attention will now be called to some serious defects in this appropriative theory of personal identity.

a'. The self-identifying, appropriative act of every passing thought is contrary to fact.

In the first place, this appropriative act of every newly-born passing thought, by which it links its history with another dying thought and thus establishes and maintains the identity of a personal biography, is evidently contrary to fact. It is undoubtedly true that many thoughts do precisely this "trick" in a limited way, but the warrant is lacking for asserting that many, or indeed that any large number, of our human thoughts actually perform this trick. But in order to destroy the validity of the theory of James it is not necessary that this function be denied to a majority of thoughts, but only to a few, indeed, only to one in the series of passing thoughts, for if only one of my thoughts fails, the instant it comes into being, to adopt its predecessors as its very own, its single hope of connecting up with any personal past is lost, since there is, according to James, no other identity than that which is made by the appropriative act of each newly appearing thought. If the hypothesis of James were correct, it would be possible for a stream of consciousness to lose all personal continuity if its core, the passing thought, should become so fully absorbed in a series of reflections about a beautiful painting or the solution of a difficult mathematical problem that it forgot to recognize its own ancestors.

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 339.
(2) See above, pages 36-7.

There is good evidence for maintaining that it is possible to find, in some cases of thinking, activity where there is lacking, as factors in the situation, any conscious judgment that a present affective warmth resembles, even if it is present, some past affective warmth.

In short, if one link in the chain of appropriations is wanting here or there, the chain as a whole is worthless. The consistent result would be, indeed, not a self-continuity, but a series of selves of varying longevity. Some of these selves would be exceedingly poor because of the brevity of their life. The first objection to James' theory of personal identity, therefore, is that not every pulse of thought does, as a matter of fact, stop to accept or repudiate various items of some other dying thought; I have been unable to verify the theory in my own experience. The newly-born thought does not always get to the bedside of the dying parent in time to receive its spiritual inheritance by word of mouth.

b'. The appropriation of one's whole past is too big a task for any momentary pulse of thought.

A second objection to this notion of personal identity is that the appropriation of one's whole past is too big a task for any single pulse of thought. The items in the past of any normal adult human being which he would desire to call his own are so numerous that it is altogether too much to ask each new thought that is born first to adopt all these items. If it takes some men many years to write their autobiographies, how can one little passing thought perform this task? The theory is top-heavy, and requires the passing thought to do more than it is capable of doing, at least in human experience. The possessions of the self which James himself mentions in his chapter on the consciousness of the self are so complex and elaborate that no single pulse of thought could appropriate them.

The fact seems to be that <u>when</u> we become interested in reviewing what belongs to our past history, we perform the task in a piecemeal manner, and we build up a conception of what we are just as we arrive at the idea of other complex entities, save that the source of the materials is different, and the conception, when it is constructed, is not before the mind in its entirety at any one moment. The work which the passing thought is called upon to do is too complicated for the time it has for its performance. James' appropriative theory is certainly an exceedingly bold assumption. That each passing thought does what he claims for it is extremely doubtful and hypothetical. Personal identity really disappears altogether according to this scheme, because in frequent instances links are actually lacking, and there is nothing other than the passing thought to bridge the gap which it fails to bridge.

c'. The appropriative theory over-emphasizes the retrospective character of consciousness.

A third objectinn to James' doctrine of personal identity is that it gives to consciousness a character which is altogether too retrospective and backward-looking to fit the facts. If each new thought had to appropriate its whole past, it is hard to see how it would have opportunity to do anything else. It would degenerate or come to a standstill in a stagnant pool of reminiscence. If the passing thought looks in one direction more than another, it is toward the future rather than the past. Conscious life as we know it is largely a forward-looking affair, a quest for ends which we experience as relatively permanent. James' theory of personal identity is too retrospective to fit well with the purposive char-

acter of consciousness which he emphasizes elsewhere. It will be indicated below (1) how the concept of personality involves both elements.

Summary of objections to the appropriative theory of personal identity.

These are the main objections to the appropriative theory of personal identity when it is put forward in an exclusive way as it is by James. They may be summarized as follows: His mistake lies (a) in over-emphasizing retrospection in comparison with prospective seeking, (b) in supposing that the assertion of the connection of one's present self with one's past is a universal characteristic of every passing thought, and finally, (c) in assigning to the present thought a task which is too large for it to bear. Since these are serious objections to the theory, it is unnecessary to bring forward other minor ones which could be urged against it. (2)

5'. Difficulties in the conception of a stream of consciousness.

It was pointed out above (3) that F. B. Jevons exaggerates his atomistic interpretation of James' theory of consciousness. On the contrary, James declares repeatedly that consciousness is "sensibly continuous." His original reason for adopting the metaphor of a "stream of consciousness" was the implied suggestion that it possesses "a unity of its own kind." His conception of the stream of consciousness demands careful criticism. The more serious difficulty in James' theory of consciousness does not consist in getting one passing thought to appropriate its predecessor, but in getting anything in the stream of consciousness that abides amid the flux, for thought is constantly changing. (4)

a'. The stream of consciousness lacks a constant factor, i.e. the self, which alone makes possible consciousness of the stream.

The essential difficulty to be noted is that, if the total mental life moves forward in the stream of consciousness, the consciousness of the stream itself would not arise. The presupposition of the consciousness of a stream, as distinguished from the stream of consciousness, is that something, whatever one calls it, abides and does not itself also partake of the flux in the same way or degree as other elements. From the point of view of the third part of this investigation, the active self or personality makes possible the consciousness of the stream by grasping in a unity the various passing thoughts or phases of the stream of consciousness. It is only because such a self is able to transcend any one phase of the stream and grasp other phases as parts of a series or progression that there is any stream of consciousness at all. One of the merits of Bowne's theory of personality is an emphasis upon this important function of personality in making change possible.

But does not James propose something which is relatively constant in the flux of consciousness? Yes, he does so. He maintains that a group of bodily feelings or sensations persist. It is important to ask whether it is as bodily or as mental processes that they supply the requisite abiding factor. That they are due to certain comparatively permanent bodily conditions is undoubtedly true, but it is well known that the distinction between before and after in bodily occurrences is not made by these processes themselves, but by a thinker who grasps certain bodily events in a single comprehensive thought of succession. James makes the same mistake that

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(1) See below, pages 262-65.

(2) Other objections are set forth by John Laird, Problems of the Self, pages 71-74.

(3) Pages 75-7.

(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 229.

Hume does: he looks for personal identity among phenomena and naturally does not find it. It is not, then, in the corporeal aspect of bodily feelings that we find the principle of permanence.

That principle must, therefore, be sought in their mental aspect. But these feelings, considered as mental facts, are themselves passing thoughts, which, by hypothesis, are constantly changing. Bodily feelings, then, do not provide the abiding element which makes possible the apprehension of the stream as a stream. Indeed, we find ourselves ending in an unadulterated temporalism where all is flowing and nobody knows it save the radical empiricist. This is an untenable and impossible situation. The self upon which alone the consciousness of the stream can lean is not a recognized part of James' theory. A stream of consciousness, flowing on without any one knowing it, belongs in the abstract world of pure experience, and not in the concrete personal world.

b'. The stream of consciousness itself is a construction which presupposes an active self.

The stream of consciousness itself is a scientific construction, selected for the purpose of explaining experience, by an active, interested thinker who is something more than the mere process of experience in which he participates. The passing thought, likewise, is an intellectual product of this same thinker. As abstract concepts for the purpose of explaining experience, they are very useful, but when one goes beyond their psychological function, and inquires for their metaphysical grounds, one does not find those grounds in the concepts themselves, but in the ~~in the~~ intelligent personality who builds them for its own purposes. James, therefore, would have done better to have adopted at the beginning personal selves rather than the stream of consciousness as the ultimate datum in psychology, for we must return to them in the end, when we seek a philosophic explanation of the stream of consciousness. James himself does not avoid coming back to them over and over again, even in his psychological writings, as the following facts will indicate.

Examples of how James assumes this active self.

As an example of the suggestions found in James' own words to the effect that the stream of consciousness depends upon something beside itself, let us take that summary of personal identity where he speaks of it as one of our "perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared." (1) It is evident that James here refers, in a way that is no longer merely implicit, to a factor in the stream of consciousness which lasts long enough at least to compare certain phenomena "before the mind."

Now many embarrassing questions could be propounded concerning this passage. To whom or to what are the phenomena presented? Who does the comparing, or are comparisons self-starting? What is meant by the "mind" here before which the phenomena pass in review? Who draws the conclusion? Who makes the judgment of sameness or identity, and who sees the resemblance? E. N. Merrington reminds us that, "The judgment itself implies a synthetic activity of the self." (2) For whom is the continuity? or is it an abstraction? Who does the perceiving?

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 334.
(2) The Problem of Personality, page 23.

This passage is an excellent illustration of the multiple difficulties which James faces in attempting to get along without assuming anything but the stream of consciousness. It contains in itself many hidden confessions of the insufficiency of his hypothesis. He had better stick to his assertion that, "The ego . . . must form a liaison between all the things of which we become successively aware." (1) He "fights shy," however of assuming any agency of combination outside the stream of thought; when the work of an agent needs to be performed, the passing thought is able to perform it; "it is the Thought to whom the various 'constituents' are known," (2) and which chooses among them to suit its own ends. Objections to this broad use of thought have been explained above. (3) What we have here is the active self making choices. The thought or agency of this self is the fundamental fact.

In the exposition of attention an incompleteness is present from the philosophical standpoint. James says that attention consists in holding an idea before the mind until it fills the mind, and having filled the mind, it results in action. (4) From the metaphysical point of view, the most interesting feature of this situation is the fact of "holding." What is the source of it? It is left by James quite unexplained. He regards it probably as a metaphysical question which a psychologist should avoid. It should be noted that some of the above criticisms of James deserve perhaps to be discounted to some extent because the point of view of this inquiry is metaphysical, while James clearly states that he avoids metaphysical implications. He lives up to this intention very well in his Principles of Psychology, but our criticism may be entirely justified in view of the way in which he takes over his psychological view into his philosophical writings.

6'. Reasons for thinking that James errs in identifying the spiritual self with bodily feelings.

Introduction: examples of how he identifies the self with bodily feelings.

We have found several crucial points in James' exposition of his theory of the self where he identifies the center of personality with bodily feelings. The most striking instance is where he avers (5) that he cannot discover any activities which figure as personal ones which are not movements in our bodies, and where he declares that the body is the center of our interests and actions. Likewise, when he wrestles in closest quarters with the spiritual self, he finds no spiritual element at all, but only bodily processes. (6) Again, the kernel around which are gathered all the elements of personal identity, especially "warmth and intimacy," is the feeling of the body. (7) There is no reason for supposing that James would have hesitated in affirming that the self is indeed the body as it is experienced. These facts confirm the assertion (8) that James tends to hold a too biological conception of mind. These points suggest certainly a very striking doctrine which calls for careful examination. We shall mention here in summary form certain

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 242.
(2) Ibid., page 340.
(3) See above, pages 74-5.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 564.
(5) See above, pages 49-50.
(6) See above, page 35.
(7) See above, pages 39-40.
(8) See above pages 64-65.

objections which seem relevant to James' view and return to the subject below. (1)

a'. James here confuses the genesis with the meaning of the self.

The first defect in James' general identification of the self with bodily feelings is that he here confuses the psychological and physiological conditions under which one becomes aware of the self, or under which the idea of the self appears, with the meaning of that idea. It may be that bodily feelings are the constant background of our personal life, and it is possible that sometimes, if we halt in the pursuit of our usual interests and try to introspect, we may find nothing but these feelings, not because they are the self, but just because they are not the self, the self being primarily the life of desire and purposive activity which we have momentarily forgotten or neglected in the confinement of our attention to the bodily processes which condition or accompany our customary preoccupations with varied personal ends. If introspection cannot give us any self except bodily feelings, we must either reject it or supplement it.

When we are realizing our personal life with the greatest intensity, for example, when we are discovering our love for some one, struggling with remorse for some sin, or deciding on a life work, who would agree, if asked to identify himself, that his spiritual and central self was "breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils?" (2) or "some bodily process, for"the most part taking place in the head? (3) or "intracephalic muscular adjustments?" (2) Who but a man consumed with biological interests would think of locating the essential self in cephalic movements? These may be discovered subsequently as accompaniments of certain psychic events, "but we are not usually aware of these facts until our attention is drawn to them." (4) Further, when our attention has turned to and discovered that certain bodily processes did accompany certain interests or emotions, we very frequently may regard those processes as irrelevant and insignificant in contrast with the personal worth and relevance of those interests or emotions. James makes the mistake of supposing that the self is essentially bodily feelings just because these usually do accompany our personal activities. It is unnecessary to deny that bodily feelings represent one subordinate aspect of our conception of ourselves, but there are apparently good reasons (5) for protesting against making them the central part. In any case, it is well to call attention to the danger of mistaking, as James seems to do, the conditions of genesis or of awareness for the significant meaning of the self.

b'. There are essential aspects of the self which cannot be reduced to bodily feelings.

This negative argument needs to be supplemented by a more positive one, namely, that there are essential aspects of the self which are properly called spiritual, and which, in my judgment, cannot be reduced to bodily feelings. Let us admit that emotions may be in part an awareness or sensation of bodily events, but they also have another,preferential feature. They possess an aspect of liking or disliking, which we seek to preserve or to hinder, and

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(1) See below, 200-11. See J. Laird,Problems of the Self,63-74.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 37.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 300.
(4) John Laird, Problems of the Self, page 67.
(5) See below, pages 200-11.

this aspect is certainly very different from the sensory one. Many emotions are connected with ends which we seek to realize, but the sensed bodily processes which may accompany this realization are placed in a subordinate place in any judgment of value as to what, in the situation, is essentially ourselves. James himself admits that these bodily feelings in themselves are insignificent, unimportant, and uninteresting except as they help in the control of "things and actions before consciousness." (1) Purposive control seems, therefore, to be the really important fact. Why, then, not look for the self in purposive, interested activity rather than in physiological events? Is it not possible to distinguish between bodily and psychical activity, as J. Laird does? The latter points out (2) that James gives an inadequate account of emotions because he finds their differentia in their bodily expressions, that is, really, in sensations of bodily processes. (3) J. Laird, however, maintains that we can distinguish psychical feelings from bodily sensations. (4)

James admits that there may be something in the self besides these bodily processes, (5) but he leaves the question open as to what this remainder may be. (5) When he criticizes the survival-theory of consciousness in his chapter on "Mind Stuff" in The Principles of Psychology, he makes an eloquent appeal for something more than merely the requirements of bodily survival in order to explain our human interests; it is intelligence which acts with reference to ends, but such an activity is certainly distinguishable from the sensation of bodily processes. Again, when one asserts that his present self is continuous with his self of the previous week, and asks what it is that is continuous, may he not truly affirm that his whole plan of life to-day is relatively similar to his plan last week? and may he not describe this identity in other terms than resemblance of bodily feelings? in terms, for example, of constancy of purpose? In the statement of this question reference has been made to a few personal facts which seem to be different from bodily feelings. Since this aspect of the thought of James will be subjected to further criticism in the positive exposition of personality, it may be left here at this point.

c'. Bodily feelings themselves presuppose a self of different character.

A third point of objection to James' corporeal theory of the self is that the bodily feelings themselves, with which he identifies the nuclear self, presuppose a thinking and acting self for whom they exist. F. B. Jevons observes that, if they are feelings, "they are felt by nobody, they are feelings which are not felt--that is to say, they are a self-contradiction." (6) The owner of the feelings is left out. "According to James a man's self consists of all that can be called his (7) but does not include the owner." (8)

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 302.
(2) Problems of the Self, pages 66-67.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 453.
(4) See further below, pages 200-11.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 305, 319.
(6) Personality, page 54.
(7) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 291.
(8) F. B. Jevons, Personality, page 50.

F. B. Jevons maintains that James falls into essentially the same error as Hume did in looking for the self among the objects of experience without inquiring for whom those objects exist. James does not avoid the difficulty by saying that consciousness is personal, in the sense of possessing a peculiar "warmth and intimacy," because the latter consists essentially of bodily feelings, and the subject of these experiences is still lacking.

And without this they are impersonal abstractions.

And without this active self for whom the bodily feelings have significance, they are essentially impersonal abstractions. When the central self is described as consisting in certain motions in the head, we have reached the borderland of materialism, in which personality is an alien. If kinaesthetic feelings can exist without being felt by someone, they are very different from anything we know in our concrete experience; in short, they are abstractions.

d'. The scientific blindness to personality.

James' localization of the spiritual self in bodily feelings may be due to a certain scientific blindness with reference to personality. Perhaps he misses the essential features of the self because of that requirement of the scientific attitude which leads him to look for what is actually going on in his mind instead of asserting himself in the interest of self-development and of discovering his real nature in the quest for the realization of his purposes. There is a limited validity in the contention of H. Münsterberg that a different method is required in the study of purposive psychology than in the study of descriptive psychology, and this method consists in living out one's life with all its fulness of meaning and purpose. He declares that, "We do not find our inner life as an object, but we know it immediately as our purposive deed." (1) This view is in harmony with what G. T. Ladd maintains, (2) namely, that those who identify the self with the body are talking about an infantile stage of self-development. These men may elaborate their doctrines with literary technique, but its principles are similar to those which the child early comes to possess.

e'. Approaches to the recognition of a spiritual activity distinct from bodily processes.

There are some places where James approaches the recognition of a spiritual activity which is different from the feeling of bodily processes. He speaks in one passage, for instance, (3) of one's spontaneity in reacting to various furtherances and hindrances. He recognizes that some of the resistances which one meets in the activity-processes are "not muscular but mental." (4) Again, he states that,"This volitional effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the muscular effort with which it is usually confounded. (5) We cannot help regretting that he did not explicate this line of suggestion more fully instead of holding in general to an essentially corporeal theory of personality.

We leave the adverse criticism of James with a sense of having come upon a multitude of intrinsically valuable observations concerning the nature of personality, but with a distinct feeling

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(1) Psychology, General and Applied, page 295.
(2) The Secret of Personality, chapter IV.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vo, I, pages 297 & 299, bottom.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 211.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 562, note 2.

d. Difficulty of determining fundamental principles in James' doctrine of the self.

of incompleteness with reference to systematic organization and of uncertainty concerning the determination of fundamental principles. James has left the self in the shape of a heap of parts so beautifully dismembered that he alone could solve for us the puzzle of which is head and which is heart, and of how the sections fit together into an organized whole, if such is really the case. Some instances of these two points may be mentioned.

1'. James' expositions of the self lack correlation.

In the first place, the different phases of James' exposition of the self are not correlated. We are left in doubt as to the exact relations of the stream of consciousness, the spiritual self, the passing thought, the will, the empirical self, the non-existent consciousness, the bodily self, the experience of activity, the bodily feelings and processes, the purposive and personal consciousness, the moral self, etc. These various abstractions lack coordination. In one place consciousness is a "fighter for ends," and in another it is a nonentity. He distinguishes the spiritual self from the bodily self, but under introspection the former turns out to be bodily feelings--why then distinguish them? In one connection personality is the most perfect reality, and in another it is subordinate to something more ultimate, namely, pure experience. His view as a whole is devoid of unity. It will be seen that the main line of conflict is between views expressed in the Essays in Radical Empiricism and those in his other writings.

2'. And the basic principle of personality is uncertain.

Even if James offers no systematic conception of personality, is it possible to discover what he thinks is the fundamental feature of personality? This is very difficult to determine. One cannot say with certainty that the basic principle of the self is thought, feeling, interest, activity, or something else. Judging from his use of thought in his Principles of Psychology, one might think that the cognitive function of personality were chief, and yet even there he sometimes subordinates that function to the purposive activity of consciousness (1); and in The Meaning of Truth (2), feeling usurps the chief place, and is used as the generic term for all states of consciousness; while in his discussion of activity, one gets the impression that all other phases of consciousness are logically subordinate to it. Since the spiritual self, personal identity, and the passing thought, in the last analysis, all center in bodily feelings, these have a high claim to the fundamental place in his conception. He searches with animation for the nuclear self in the "passive subjective thought" (3), but it ever eludes him except in the form of the rough whirl of bodily feelings which are always at the edges, if not always in the center, of the stream of consciousness. Although the stream of consciousness actually functions in his thought as the "immediate datum" of psychology, he says that "personal selves" might do so. Perhaps the best estimate with respect to what he regards as the fundamental principle of the mental life is just this stream of consciousness inclusive of all such facts as he thinks fall under the terms, thought and feeling--"thoughts which no person thinks and feelings which nobody

(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 14.
(2) Pages 1-2.
(3) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 371.

feels. (1) James' doctrine of the self, therefore, suffers from metaphysical disorder, and if one seeks for a well rounded and perfected conception of personality in his writings, he probably will not find it.

e. Some contributions of James to the study of personality.

Instead of looking for contradictions, let us now look for some contributions of James to the study of the self. There are several inspiring and satisfying features of his view as a whole, and of certain particular phases of it, provided one does not ask too many critical questions about details or interrelations of factors. His work exhibits several marks of personality which are distinctive products of his pragmatic spirit. What is now said must be regarded on the whole as the spirit rather than the letter of James' pragmatic view of personality.

1'. Emphasis upon the active features of personality.

The first point to be noted is his emphasis upon the active features of personality. It is certainly in harmony with the spirit of his pragmatism, if not with the verbal expression of it, to interpret personality fundamentally in terms of action or of interested activity. We shall not do more here than recall the unfortunate way in which this and other central features of personality tend to be reduced too exclusively to bodily feelings, including kinaesthetic sensations. The way of pragmatism for personality is the way of all human action, the way of volitional reality. Miss M. W. Calkins reminds us that we owe a debt of gratitude to the pragmatists for emphasizing the non-cognitive aspects of experience. It is characteristic of James' view of the self that it should be always doing something. He avoids the still waters of rationalism, and studies personality in its animated movement along the stream of consciousness toward the realization of its hopes and purposes.

2'. The purposive and changing aspect of the self.

The will to act which the pragmatist emphasizes is, however, directed to the future, and is a seeker after ends. Its nature and its world are alike unfinished, and it is called upon to take responsibility for their completion. The self must take risks, and, in the presence of uncertainty, assert its right to believe in that which best conforms to its hopes and desires rather than to its fears. (2) Accordingly, personality is in part an hypothesis, an act of faith, to be expressed in coming life, to be verified by that to which it leads. To be a "fighter for ends," to undergo progress and to suffer retrogression, is its order of development. The whole life of the self, including our ideas in the form of "working plans of action," represents a striving for satisfying practical expression; in short, it is teleological.

James, therefore, not only emphasizes the activity of the self, but its interested activity. It is a being that seeks to realize its ends; in a word, is a valuing creature. This phase of his view may be expressed by saying that emotions come into the closest cooperation with actions. Indeed, James does not clearly distinguish between instincts and emotions. On the whole, it is characteristic of James, the pragmatist, to make fundamental the conative aspects of personality.

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(1) F. B. Jevons, Personality, pages 55-56.
(2) Compare the essay, The Will to Believe.

From these remarks it follows that the self is not an immutable and self-identical being, but is in constant change. In James' view it is represented as a dynamic factor rather than a static thing. It is steadily growing and is different in each successive moment. Duration and change are of its essence. It is progressively unfolding and transforming its past in the light of the present and the future. It is probable, however, that James carries this temporal emphasis too far, and permits the self to be lost in the flux of consciousness. That there is a large element of truth, however, in his conception gives it significance.

3'. He emphasizes the concrete study of personality.

The general insistence of James upon a concrete study of personality should be noted especially. This is his greatest contribution--the bringing of the study of personality into close contact with life and action. This is the outstanding merit of the empirical way which James honestly seeks at all times to follow. He tries to avoid abstractions as he would shun a fever, and will not tolerate the cutting of consciousness into bits, whatever one chooses to call them--this is the spirit of his thought. Consciousness must be considered in a "concrete and total manner." (1) It is characteristic of him to say that, "The 'train of experience' kind of self gets its unity after the facts only;" (2) and, again, "in actual experience . . . there is in general no separateness needing to be overcome by an external cement." He seeks to know personal life at its "face value," and to avoid anything that is not "given."

A result of this empirical point of view is a lack of sympathy and even unconcealed impatience with metaphysical endeavors to understand personality. James is especially careful to avoid suspicious intercourse with the traditional conception of the soul. E. G. Spaulding declares that, "Toward the problem of the nature of consciousness, Pragmatism offers no positive contribution, except by elimination. It does, however, get away from any explicit teaching, that there is an ego or substance-like and indivisible, simple soul, or that consciousness in its several phases is a substance or energy." (3)

By reason of his empirical standpoint and his brilliant analysis, James has left a multitude of observations concerning the personal life which are full of fruitful suggestions and constitute a valuable mine of facts upon which the metaphysician may draw. His writings contain a mass of fresh and varied descriptions of human life. His service consists in greatly increasing the wealth of our knowledge of concrete mental facts rather than in any metaphysical doctrine of the self. By his "insistence upon the rights of reality in life and experience," (4) he certainly has contributed largely to a more concrete and genuine understanding of human nature.

James, therefore, is a personalist in spirit, if not in metaphysics. And is he not a personalist in metaphysics when he is led to reject the Absolute as a result of his psychological

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(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 231.
(2) See above, page 46.
(3) The New Rationalism, page 303.
(4) E. N. Merrington, The Problem of Personality, 139.

investigations? (1) But if he is not surely a personalist, he certainly is a humanist. W. W. Fenn says (2), "The affirmation of man is the important thing in this general movement; he is superior to his ideas, for his ideas do not exhaust him. Man is a valuing and appreciating being also."

B. THE SELF IN THE NEW REALISM OF RALPH BARTON PERRY.

1. The historical antecedents of new realism.

The philosophy of Ralph Barton Perry, one of the most brilliant of American new realists, will serve to represent the latter movement for the purposes of this investigation. In the lingering influence of certain historical antecedents of new realism may be found some of the reasons for its defective theory of the self. The starting point and goading inspiration of Perry and his philosophical kinsmen is their vigorous antagonism to idealism, especially of the subjective or psychological kind (3), the doctrine, namely, that the existence of objects is entirely dependent upon their being consciously experienced by a psychical subject. These thinkers even proudly characterize their anti-subjective attitude as "an achievement of critical reflection." (4) Also, opposition to certain subjective tendencies in pragmatism and personal idealism mediates the transition from disintegrating absolute idealism to new realism. (5)

New realism neglects the problem of the self because of:

a. Its aversion to subjective idealism; and

The main thesis of these philosophers is that there are entities and complexes "independent" of mind. (6) This center of interest requires them, on the whole, to turn their backs upon the self as a negligible side-issue, and "against anthropomorphism." (7) It is characteristic of and appropriate to the whole movement both to disregard the problem of the self and to refuse to consider it as preliminary to understanding the world. Perry is ostensibly quite exceptional, then, when he speaks of the "fundamental problem of mind," and "proposes first to discover what manner of thing mind is" before attacking other problems of philosophy. This fact qualifies him well to represent new realism in this inquiry where the self is the central issue.

b. Its affinities with immediate empiricism and logical idealism.

The historical and logical transition from psychological idealism (represented preeminently, in Perry's opinion, by George Berkeley) to new realism has been "radical empiricism," or the philosophy of pure experience. (8) The dialectic of this development has been expounded clearly by D. C. Macintosh. (9) He suggests that radical empiricism arises when the principle of psychological idealism is applied not only to objects but also to the subject, (now as object), so that both subjects and objects, both selves and things, come to be regarded as depending for their existence upon a pure or neutral experience. (10) Representatives of this movement who have especially influenced Perry are Wm. James, E. Mach, and R. Avenarius.

The transition from psychological idealism to pure empiricism.

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(1) See A Pluralistic Universe, chapter 5.
(2) Oral lecture on Theism, Harvard University, Nov. 3, 1915.
(3) The New Realism, page 11. (4) Ibid., pages 41, 143.
(5) Compare, Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 219.
(6) The New Realism, page 143.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 39.
(8) This theory is also called pure or immediate empiricism and empiriocriticism.
(9) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 219 ff., 109 ff.
(10) Ibid., page 109.

(1) In consequence, the subject loses its unique position in founding objects, and is given a place like other things in the pre-subjective, "neutral mosaic". (2) This step is the first one towards new realism, and the dethronement of the self.

The transition from pure empiricism to new realism.

The last step to essential new realism is taken when the analytical elements of pure experience are regarded as "neutral entities," (2) existing or subsisting independent of being experienced at all. Macintosh points out that (3) "If contents, as new realism claims, are independent of any relation to a conscious subject, it seems the natural conclusion to infer that they are real independently of their being experienced. This view . . is the position of new realism. It starts over again from the very beginning; its doctrine coincides with that tacitly assumed by the most uncritical naive realist."

The remnants of pure empiricism appear here and there in the philosophy of Perry; but instead of pure experience, he thinks of neutral entities or beings. He declares, for example, that "the simple qualities themselves evidently cannot be subjective any more than they can be physical. (4) That the above sketch represents the development of Perry's thought is seen in his suggestion that Hume lost his chance of becoming the founder of a new realism by failing to teach that the "ideas" to which he reduced both mind and matter were "elements or qualities" existing independently of mind, which could no longer properly be called "ideas." (5)

Influence of logical realism.

The influence of logical realism, the immediate descendant of logical idealism, according to which logical and mathematical entities subsist apart from thinking subjects, has no doubt been great in helping to make new realism both plausible and conceivable to its exponents, and in illustrating its method. The effect of this influence has been in large part due to the mathematical studies of B. Russell. Indeed, a mathematical form of exposition is frequently used, for example by E. G. Spaulding, in describing the neo-realistic method of analysis. (6)

In the above study of the historical antecedents of new realism, we have noticed how the self first became lost in the impersonal abstractions of pure empiricism, and how it has not been rediscovered in the more impersonal abstractions of new realism. In spite of this result, Perry attempts to present a theory of the self; we must now address ourselves to its examination.

2. Statement of Perry's doctrine of the self.

Perry's doctrine of the self may be understood by a progressive delimitation of his theory of mind or consciousness. He thinks

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(1) See R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, index.
(2) Ibid., page 316.
(3) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 109-10.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 324; compare also, page 310, and The New Realism, page 128.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 137, 306-7.
(6) The New Rationalism, e.g. chapter XXII.
(7) These terms are treated apparently as synonomous: in The New Realism, compare page 141 with 142; also, Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 284. The chief references to Perry's treatment of the self are: Present Present Philosophical Tendencies; The New Realism, pages 99-151; Present Conflict of Ideals, especially pages 376-9; and the three articles in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. VI(1909): see bibliography.

a. Consciousness, action, and the self; consciousness is the most general category applicable to the self. Nature of consciousness:

that consciousness, explained in a certain way, may be taken "as the most general category defining a self." (1) Now the "complex,"(2) consciousness or mind, is not an entity to be found among the original elements of reality, because they are simple, and, further, because they have "no generic character" which can be called mental, being neither physical nor psychical. (3) But if consciousness is not an entity or a quality of existents, it can only mean a relation between or among entities or objects that are experienced. These suggestions were made by James in his influential essay, "Does Consciousness Exist?" where he comes near to the confession of a new realist.

1'. It is in general a relation among entities;

Perry maintains that, "it must, of course, be assumed that consciousness <u>is</u> a relationship." (4) The peculiarity of mental contents is due to the "grouping and interrelations" which "compose" them. (5) Consciousness itself "is homogeneous and interactive with its environment . . . in the sense that it is composed ultimately of the same elements. But the particular combination of elements which distinguishes consciousness differs from other forms of combination, such as bodies or mathematical systems." In speaking of the object-side of consciousness, he observes that, "The theory of the immanence of consciousness means that these contents or objects are parts of the environment, borrowed by the mind, but not exclusively appropriated and owned by it. . . Mind and the surrounding world interpenetrate and overlap." (6) He complains of the vagueness of this grouping relation which constitutes consciousness. Its specific nature needs to be more exactly set forth. He attempts, in his own way, to explain the principle of it, and in doing so, presents his view of the self, so far as he has one.

2'. but a relation involving action; nature of mental action:

Perry's further specification of this consciousness-relation is contained in his conception of action. He is convinced "that consciousness is not a relation between objects unless there is also an activity of one object upon other objects." (7) The mental character of certain things is not inherent, but is a property derived "from that which acts" on them. (8) He agrees "substantially" with the view that "action of mind is not itself content, but is the unifying correlate of all content." (9) Mental contents, therefore, require "the agency" of some sort of "general action," which "defines content as such, and gives it its characteristic unity." (10) Here appears a clear distinction between two aspects of mind: its contents and its action. "Every type of consciousness exhibits this duality" between action and content. (11) In <u>The Present Conflict of Ideals</u> (6) he speaks again of the two sides of consciousness, namely, contents and "'subject' or activity of mind."

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(1) Psychological Review, vol. XI, page 296.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 303, 310; The New Realism, page 127.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 277.
(4) Ibid., pages 321, 332; The New Realism, page 143.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 277.
(6) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 376-7.
(7) D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 291.
(8) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 279, 332.
(9) Ibid., page 279; compare, 284.
(10) Ibid., pages 284-5. (11) Ibid., page 274.

In his theory of mental action we come in close quarters with his doctrine of the self. It is very hopeful to find him approaching the self from this fruitful point of view. His elaboration of it is full of interest, especially because of the astonishing conception of mental action which forms the climax of his argument.

a'. It is not spiritual activity;

He sets aside two common interpretations of mental action. (a) In the first place, he rejects the view that it is a kind of irreducible spiritual activity which is known by intuition. His first reason for disclaiming this conception is that activity is complex and "is not an ultimate term." His second reason is that analysis, and not intuition, is the proper method of knowing action. "The most cursory examination reveals" that it can be further analyzed and defined. (1) "Spirit, if we wish to retain the term, is not a discontinuous substance which can be discovered only by the unique method of introspection--by the inward awareness which each spiritual being has exclusively of himself." (2) Perry does not find in the depths of his own nature "a power to do, which is clear, simple, and self-sufficient," but only a "manifold of terms in relation," of bodily sensations and feelings. (3) Activity, as it appears in experience, is fused; the supposition that it is simple and ultimate is a case of the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity; for, when it is analyzed, it is found to be a "composite experience containing specific elements in a specific configuration." (4) In this view, a basic dynamism is mown down by the keen edge of analysis.

b'. Nor a feeling of bodily activity.

(b) We cannot "define mental action in terms of the feeling of bodily activities," because feeling is itself a content of mind, and also because it is required that that principle of action which defines this and all other mental content shall not itself be a content, for if it were, our reasoning clearly would be circular. (6) "The defining relation of mind is a kind of action, and it will not be found amidst the content which it defines." (5) This argument requires the rejection of James' view that the only thing introspection can catch that might stand for spiritual activity is a group of bodily processes. (6)

c'. But bodily action itself is the key to mental action.

The true solution, according to Perry, is very simple and lies near at hand. He defines "mental action . . . in terms of bodily action itself," (7) when this is controlled by the interests of the organism. "Consciousness is a species of function, exercised by an organism, . . . correlated with an environment from which it evolved and on which it acts." (8) Hence, "as mind appears in nature and society, it consists primarily in interested behavior," (9) or the selective behavior of an organism in a homogeneous environment.

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 263.
(2) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 377.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 99-100.
(4) Ibid., page 72.
(5) Ibid., pages 279-80.
(6) Ibid., page 284-5.
(7) Ibid., page 285.
(8) Ibid., page 322.
(9) Ibid., page 300.

If one considers the "subject" side of consciousness, or the active side by itself, one can say that that "consists of the acts of perceiving, thinking, remembering, etc." But according to the realist theory of immanence, this aspect of consciousness is also "homogeneous with its surroundings. . Spirit is one of the many kinds of things that may be found by any observer in the same field of observable experience with mountains, rivers, and stars. It is a peculiar combination of elements with a peculiar set of properties." (1) Now , if the content and the action sides of consciousness are put together, "there results the view that consciousness is a mode of interaction within one homogeneous world, an excerpt of things, which a cerebrally equipped organism selects for its special purposes from its surrounding environment." (2) In this way, he thinks, consciousness is admitted "into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent," and "may operate effectively" by interaction with its environment. (3)

1". Two aspects of mental action: nervous system and interest.

Mental action, therefore, has two aspects or phases, "mental action as nervous system," or physical body, and "mental action as interest." (4) Actions are governed by desires or interests. (5) Thus the final explanation of consciousness "is found in the capacities and action of the organism " (6) in relation to an environment. That portion of the environment which the organism, in its response, "picks out" or "takes account of" becomes contents of mind in virtue of this selective action. (7) It is interesting to compare this view with the declaration of E. B Holt (8) that consciousness is a "cross-section of the infinite realm of being, and a cross-section that is defined by the responses of a nervous organism;" "that entity is in consciousness to which the nervous system responds with a specific relation."

Summary of Perry's view of mind.

Hence, "the human mind, like the heart and lungs, is an organ, calculated to assist the adaptation of one body to an environment of other bodies." (9) Consciousness is "taken to signify selection within the realm of things." (10) "The natural mind, then, is an organization possessing, as aspects, interest, nervous system, and contents, or, in other words, externally observable action and independently existing contents."(11)

Perry thus summarizes his view of consciousness: (12) "Consciousness is a process containing a nervously endowed organism, a specific type of response to stimulation, and portions of an environment selected by the response. . Furthermore . . this operation as a whole is interested or teleological." Interest is used in a strictly biological sense, and his view looks like an attempt to combine in a synthesis the essentially physical and the physiological conception of consciousness. (13)

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(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 377-8.
(2) Ibid., page 378. (3) Ibid., page 379.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 301;304.
(5) Ibid., page 343.
(6) The New Realism, page 138.(7) Ibid., pages 147;475.
(8) The Concept of Consciousness, pages 208;217.
(9) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 50.
(10) Psychological Review, XI, page 292.
(11) D. C Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge, page 384; compare Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 304.
(12) The New Realism, page 134.
(13) D. C. Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge,. page 284.

a". The self is primarily the interest-phase of mental action; it is an "entity capable of desire."

As a further specification of Perry's theory of the self, we should note that he identifies the self primarily with the interest-aspect of mental action. He thinks that "my interests are myself, in the deepest sense. . They are the defining forms of my life. They mark me and give me my place, humble or obscure, in the open field of history." (1) "An individual life is distinguished by what it seeks to preserve and promote." (2) "An entity capable of desire" is what Perry really means by the self, for he says that "desire is a variety of consciousness and . . an entity capable of desire is a subject of consciousness." (3)

Desire seems to be the "introspective factor" or aspect of interest, but, as mere mental content, it is "not desire at all." (4) Its genuine form is seen only when it is in effective action, when it is a form of determination. (4) Whenever the action of an organism is controlled by its interests, its action is said to be purposive, (5) teleological, (6) or desiderative. (7) A little fuller account of this factor of interest must now be given.

b. Interests and disposition as bases of personality.

Introduction.

The idea of "the self as an entity capable of desire" will be unfolded under the heading, suggested by Perry: personality as a sum of dispositions. (8) This discussion will start from interest, and will involve the place of dispositions and of purpose in the concept of personality. This important phase of his doctrine of personality will be constructed by combining fragments derived from his lectures on "the theory of value", delivered at Harvard University during the first semester of 1915-16, (9) and from pages 16 and 17 of his book The Present Conflict of Ideals.

1'. Interest is the act of a constant biological subject.

In explaining the general nature of value, he says that, "The act of interest is the generating principle of value." (10) "Interest is an ultimate of consciousness." (11) Value exists whenever one is interested in any object. "Interest is a way of acting upon the environment." (12) But while the objects of human interest may vary, the "subject term is constant; it is the biological or the conscious subject." (13) Now the reason for the constancy of the "valuing subject" is that it possesses certain more or less permanent dispositions. "Most interests are functions of the dispositional rather than of the conscious." (14) "The disposition

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 301.
(2) Ibid., page 343. (3) The New Realism, page 141.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 301.
(5) The New Realism, page 141.
(6) Ibid., page 134; Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 300-1.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 304.
(8) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 17.
(9) The following quotations from these oral lectures are referred to by dates upon the basis of the practically complete shorthand notes taken by the writer while in attendance upon this course. Prof. Perry has kindly granted permission to make this use of his lectures.
(10) Lecture, Nov. 1, '15. (11) Lecture, Nov. 22, '15.
(12) Ibid. (13) Lecture, Nov. 3, '15.
(14) Ibid.

in the organism must not be ignored," (1) since it is to that the stability of interests is due. His account of dispositions, therefore, will be briefly described.

2'. Nature of dispositions.

The dispositions here concerned are, of course, connected with the human organism. "There is a physiological mechanism there, but not substantial or transcendent in the old sense; there is an actual correlation of nerves and possibly of muscles." Now, "a disposition is some constant relation between the valuing subject and the achievement (2) despite the variability of the action. When a person regularly attains a certain achievement, you say he has a disposition, under different circumstances, to bring about the same end. So you cannot dissolve the subjective sides of behavior into acts, for you would lose this constancy. (3)

Let us consider some concrete situation. "If one takes avarice or ambion, acts and circumstances vary; acts so vary and combine with the circumstances as to produce the same general results, although the acts may all be different. Then one would say that there is something in that subject, some permanent sentiment. This is the correlate, on the subjective side, of a series of achievements. Disposition is extremely important; a certain constancy in the subject is needed in order to account for the consistency of his behavior. So one might think of value relative to the disposition, and not to any one particular reaction. A disposition cannot become conscious, but it is that which happens when you evoke all the latent attitudes by a series of images. Disposition consists of many attitudes, but these may be realized through the exercise of the imagination." (4)

3'. Personality as sum of dispositions.

Dispositions of the human organism, then, are the "springs of action," and, we may also say, of conscious interests. "Wars are due, not to the operation of mechanical laws of the astronomical sort, but to the passions, purposes, decisions, and volitions of men. . . There are enormous differences in the causal power exerted by different minds." (5) The stable ground of our interests, as we have seen, is to be found in the dispositions which correspond to them. They dictate the actions which we perform.

Personality can be defined now in terms of these interests, or of the dispositions upon which they rest. "Each of us is a bundle of interests, a little colony of different impulses, wishes and aspirations. They are bound together so that no one of them can act itself out without affecting the others. Given any one of these interests, all the rest of the personal household of interests act as a check upon it. The more unified a person is, the more character or consistency or purpose he has, the less is any of his interests left to itself. Each interest has got somehow to satisfy the rest. . . Getting reasons for an action . . . means securing additional incentives to its performance--getting the

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(1) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915.
(2) On the nature of achievement, see below, page 95.
(3) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915.
(4) Ibid. On the place of imagination in action, see below pages 95-96.
(5) The Free Man and the Soldier, page 141.

sanction, and perhaps the active, dynamic support of my whole personal complex. . . The justification of action, in short, is the means of securing the adoption of the act by the self as a whole; so that it may enjoy the support of the whole sum of dispositions that constitutes an active personality." (1)

4'. Personal value originates in the organization of interests.

The science of ethics is occupied with the study of the interaction and organization of human interests or desires. The "moral task" of the individual is the achievement of a harmonious organization of his own interests and of these interests with those of others. Personal value, in the best sense of the term, originates in this organization of interests. Speaking of this, Perry says, "A more significant meaning of personal values would be the organization of values in the subject, where the values of one subject have been harmonized by a process of discipline, and have been made consistent with one another. The whole set of harmonious values, constituted as a unified group, make up one's personal values. The meaning of personal value would be found in terms of organized harmony." (2)

Such unity as these personal interests may possess is a product or moral organization, and is not to be explained as the expression of a single fundamental or comprehensive interest, for Perry says that he "should not now speak of a general interest in self-preservation." (3) The basic character of the self, therefore, is not to be sought in a central interest, at least of a native kind, which unifies the rest.

c. Personality and purpose: Perry's analysis of teleological behavior.

Another important phase of Perry's theory of value is his endeavor to present, from the behavioristic point of view, a description of teleology in action. He rejects the introspective standpoint "because of the ambiguity in the words, desire, feeling, and will in psychological literature," (4) and also because, in the end, he thinks, "you will have to adopt behavioristic criteria" anyway (5) in order to get intelligible distinctions among these terms. Hence, he "begins with behavior," since "interest is an attitude or act of favor or disfavor towards an object--for or aginst it. It embraces will, desire, and feeling." (6) "Behavior will be the stable center around which" move "will and desire." (4)

1'. Interest points to a non-existent future.

A behavioristic account of interest or value requires a behavioristic teleology for the reason that "action is always away from something to something. Action is always substituting existence for non-existence. It makes U^1 non-existent and U^2 existent. (7) It is, from--to. It has 'sense.'" (4) "My liking is causing to exist; it has been described by reference to some future existence. So I think you have to define value in the direction of a possible or

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(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 16-17.

(2) Lecture, Dec. 20, 1915.

(3) Unpublished letter of January 9, 1920; this view supersedes a contrary one expressed in Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 332.

(4) Lecture, Nov. 8, 1915.

(5) Lecture, Nov. 24, 1915.

(6) Lecture, Nov. 1, 1915.

(7) U is an abbreviation of Umgebung, i.e., for one environmental situation. Perry here adopts the symbolism of R. Eisler, Studien zur Werttheorie, pages 23 following.

hypothetical existence which is its end, towards which it proceeds. But the account of value is an existential account." (1)

2'. Interest involves achievement, which is a teleological concept.

Now the Endlage in the second period of time, as distinguished from the Anfangslage in the initial period, is an important situation requiring analysis. "Behavior is always substituting a new state of things for a previous one." (2) Perry adopts the word, achievement, for the resulting situation because of its "teleological suggestion." "Achievement is the outcome or result of the action,--the reaction of the organism,--but would not be regarded as outcome unless action had this in prospect." (3) "One cannot think of this without the prospect of the achievement determining the act. The relation between act and achievement is a curiously reciprocal relation; the achievement is the final cause or motive of the act. Achievement implies both of these." (2) It is impossible, therefore, to avoid the concept of teleology. "In valuation, as theory, there can be no question as to the existence of ends. There is apparent teleology, whether or not there is real teleology. The first step, anyway, is to get a clear description of apparent teleology." (2) "The assumption is that teleology is present where there is life and consciousness and conduct." (4) Let us endeavor to get an "end-distinguishing behavior as differentiated from mere automaton." (5) "What is the meaning of teleology?" Perry's attempt to define this from the behavioristic point of view is very interesting.

3'. Nature of teleology or purpose; an "anticipatory adjustment."

After critically rejecting three current doctrines of teleology, he adopts, as his own, "anticipatory adjustment." (6) The essential point of this view is that whenever behavior is modified by the presence of the consequence, in the form of an anticipation or memory, purpose is present. "You do not have the genus, teleological, until you get to associative memory, where the expectation concerns the sequel, where the action is not a constant function of the environment, but where it is qualified by some expectation of the end-situation to come. This is what occurs when an animal learns by experience. We make the response a function of the stimulus, qualified by the stored memory. Here you cannot explain an act without reference to what is to come. You strongly suspect you have the same thing in instincts. So some biologists call instinct a racial memory. It is hard to say that fear is not an anticipation of getting hurt. It is so with all human reactions. I know no reason why there should not be congenital anticipations, but you don't get the same kind of empirical evidence of anticipation there as in modifications of reactions in associative memory. We conclude that it is only where the principle of associative memory is operative, where we can show that the organism is influenced by its past experience, that it is proper to say that the action has taken place because of the end." (5)

a'. The part played by associative memory.

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(1) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915. (2) Ibid.
(3) Lecture, Nov. 8, 1915.
(4) Lecture, Nov. 15, 1915.
(5) Lecture, Nov. 17, 1915.
(6) Ibid. See bibliography for three articles written by Perry concerning purpose.

b'. Modification of action in view of consequences.

In general, then, we may say that, "when the action is modified by the consequence, you have the process in question; the attitude here is behavioristic. If you must refer the action to a consequence of certain past action, then you must qualify U^2 by that consequence. So far as a reference to the consequence that has been previously experienced has to be used for the explanation of the action, then it is proper to say that the action is a function of the consequence." (1)

c'. Response to an absent environment through ideas is characteristic of human beings.

"In case of the operation of ideas, one gets another instance of this operation by consequence. In case of ideas you have a centrally stimulated process of some sort--it may be articulatory or kinaesthetic or internal speech, etc.--which may become definitely associated as the sign of some environmental situation, in which case you may act to an environment which is not now present at all. This is the fact in most human reactions--a response to an idea or an image or a word. This is the most characteristic change of character as you pass from animals up to human beings; it is more and more difficult to explain action in terms of the environment; it is more and more a function of certain futures or possibilities which are mediated by the existence in the organism of an idea or an image or sign-character which represents the environment. No psychology could get along without the view that actions, coming through associative memory, set up action." (2)

d'. Symbols for teleological action.

The situation can be expressed in the form of symbols. "In the organism the non-teleological action is $\underline{U} + \underline{A} = \underline{E}$. (3) Where the $\underline{E}$ is present as anticipation or memory, you have teleology; thus: $\underline{U} + (\underline{E}) + \underline{A} = \underline{E}$. The trend of this discussion would be to define value in terms of some kind of behavior: the object would possess value in so far as behaved to in a certain way. The constant would be primarily a mode of behavior." (4)

e'. Factor of consciousness.

"All the different factors involved in behavior may become topics of consciousness. Where achievement is the object of consciousness, you have the image or idea of the end, as we say." (5) The responding organism also may come into consciousness--act and organic accompaniments and disposition. (5) "Conscious value would occur where there is anticipatory adjustment--where the organism reacts not to what is given but to what is to come." (6) We might say that there was unconscious value in case of compensatory adjustments, illustrated by increase in heartbeat, when one runs. (6)

4'. Purpose and personality.

We are left to draw our own inference as to the connection of this analysis of teleology with the concept of personality. The relation, however, seems to be clear. Since achievement is the result of most acts of interest, and since the active personality is the sum of an individual's dispositions in which his interests are rooted, it is fair to conclude that not only interested behavior, but also and therefore, purposive behavior, is characteristic of the human personality. In other words, since the active person-

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(1) Lecture, Nov. 20, 1915.
(2) Lecture, Nov. 22, 1915.
(3) These letters are abbreviations of Umgebung, Anfangslage, and Endlage, respectively.
(4) Lecture, Nov. 24, 1915.
(5) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915.
(6) Lecture, Dec. 6, 1915.

ality is a sum of interests rooted in certain more or less constant dispositions, and since these interests are acts in the performance of which one seeks the achievement of varied ends, one may infer that personality is not only made up of organized, interested behavior, but that personal behavior is also essentially purposive behavior.

The logical progression in ix Perry's conception of the self, so far as it can be determined, has now been set forth. This dialactic of consciousness, from existent to relation and from relation to action (of the physical organism with its nervous system), is characteristic of the historical movement of American new realism as a whole. (1) According to Perry's theory of action, personal action is interested, organized, and in general teleological. His complete view of the self, however, will not be plain until the methods of reasoning and investigation by which he seeks to establish it have been examined.

3. Perry's method of studying the self.

We can learn much about Perry's conception of the self by studying his methods of procedure because he requires this conception to be formed within the limits strictly determined by that dominating method of analysis which he champions. He thinks there are really two fundamental and "right" methods of knowledge: the observational, experimental method which science has perfected; and the logical or analytical method of intellectualistic philosophers and mathematicians. (2)

a. "General observation" of the "mind at large."

The first step in an investigative procedure is that of general observation, for which mind is well fitted, because mind, "so far as knowledge of it is concerned," is "as generally accessible, as free to all comers, as the motions of stars or the civilization of cities."(3) He "treats mind as though, like any other thing, it were open to general observation." (4) It is not necessary to infer the existence of other selves or other consciousness because "it is observed precisely as physical phenomena are observed." (5) It is easy to observe mental action because it is bodily or physical. The knower is to be known in the same way as the things it knows. (6) General observation, therefore, is the one and only successful and dependable method of studying this "mind abroad," (3) the mind which lies in the "open field of experience." (3)

1'. The uselesness of introspection.

Perry objects strenuously to the opinion that the mind is accessible, in a peculiar way, to introspection. (7) We cannot find mind by introspecting some unsharable something. (8) "It is

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(1) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 291.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 264.
(3) Ibid., page 273.
(4) Ibid., pages 286 and 255. Present Conflict of Ideals, p.377-8.
(5) The New Realism, page 147.
(6) Ibid., page 35.
(7) See the following series of articles in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. VI, 1909: The Hiddenness of the Mind, pages 29-36; The Mind's Familiarity with itself, pages 113-122; The Mind Within and the Mind Without, pages 169-175.
(8) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 279.

impossible to find the common bond of things mental, until we abandon the introspective method and view mind as it operates in the open field of nature and history." (1) Again, he declares, "I am confident that the nature of mental action is discoverable neither by an analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition; that it is necessary, in short, to abandon the method of self-knowledge altogether and substitute that of general observation." (2) We are, therefore, to study mind "like any other thing," (3) by observing the open action of the body, the public behavior of the organism.

a'. The puzzle of "the whole mind" which includes the result of introspection.

We are rightly surprised, therefore, when Perry expresses the intention of making use of introspection by presenting a view of "the whole mind," which is "in reality one," (4) which will combine "the mind within" and "the mind without," "the mind at home" and "the mind abroad," in other words, by unifying the results obtained by the methods of introspection and of external observation. (5) This proposal is so misleading and gives such little promise of consistent fulfilment that it is hard to take it at its face value. This difficulty is increased because of his rejection of traditional introspection, and also because of the puzzle connected with distinguishing between his conceptions of introspection and of external observation.

Two neo-realistic meanings of introspection:

Introspection, in his system, might mean one of two things. (a) It usually means the analysis of mental contents, (6) but when this is done, we find that the objects we discover are the same as the elements of the environment to which the "bodily complex" responds. Introspection of our own experience only reveals "a chaotic manifold of fragments of other-than-mind." (7) "A subjective complex can always be analyzed into elements, or even into lesser complexes that are 'objective.'" (8) It seems pardonable, therefore, to suggest that one looke for the "mind within," when, by hypothesis, one may expect to find only "other-than-mind."

1". Analysis of mental contents.

2". Report on organic sensations.

(b) But there is another meaning of introspection which at last gives a definite meaning to Kant's phrase, "the internal sense." Introspection, for Perry, might consistently mean taking account of proprio-ceptive sensations. (9) In that case we might learn "the whole mind" of our neighbor by supplementing our observations of his behavior with his account of those organic processes which circumstances especially favor his securing. (10) The whole mind, therefore, means a combination of behavior and those objects in the environment to which the organism responds.

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 279.
(2) Ibid., page 283. (3) Ibid., page 286.
(4) Ibid., page 274. (5) Ibid., pages 273-5; 304-5.
(6) Ibid., page 305.
(7) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, VI, 1909, page 170-1.
(8) The New Realism, page 143. On meaning of subjective, see Ibid., page 136.
(9) See description of our observation of these sensations in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, IX, pages 119-21. (N. K. Smith)
(10) Ibid., also Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 274; 292-5.

2'. The observation of interest.

We have reached the conclusion, then, that "the person best qualified to report on the nature of my mental action would be not myself, the user of it, but the physiologist or moralist who is the beholder of it." (1) Of course one can learn something at least about himself by noting those proprio-ceptive sensations which his neighbor, by reason of physiological circumstances, finds difficult to observe, although it is perfectly possible for him to gain knowledge of them. One's neighbor is fully able to observe what is essential to another's mind; nothing that is "typical" escapes his observation.

Now it might be supposed that one's interests, which constitute his essential self, are not public property and open to general observation. This is a serious mistake, however, for they "are evident to any intelligent observer." (2) Genuine interests and desires belong "to mind at large in nature and society." (2) "And precisely as a mind's interests are evident to general observation, so are the objects on which it acts interestedly." (3) Indeed, the desiderative or purposive elements of mind are least likely to escape observation. (4) "This element of my mind is revealed even in my gross action, in the motions of my body as a whole. . The content of my purpose, that is, the realization proposed, and my more or less consistent devotion to it are in your full view. (5) The consistent conclusion, therefore, of this phase of new realism is a radical and extravagant form of behavioristic psychology, which is, in fact, practiced by many of the new realists themselves, e. g., Perry and E. B. Holt.

3'. The observation of the mental subject.

How, then, does Perry solve the question with reference to how a mind, which is subject, can also be object? The solution is easily and wonderfully accomplished. That organism which is subject, in virtue of its interested response to selected phases of its environment, becomes object whevever someone else observes or responds to it. I, as an acting agent, become object when my neighbor watches my behavior. That which responds is subject; when this subject is responded to by another organism, it becomes object. In this way the subject then becomes object. (6) "The difference between subject and object of consciousness is not a difference of quality or substance, but a difference of office or place in a configuration." (7)

b. The fundamental method of analysis.

When one comes to seek those most general elements and systems with which philosophy is concerned, the method proper and all-important is that of analysis. By this method truth is reached, and problems are solved by resolving complex things into their elements. (8) It is "the method of exact knowledge in general." (8) It "means simply the discrimination and specification of the detail of experience. It has led to the discovery of certain elements and relationships that possess a remarkably high degree of generality, such, e. g., as those of logic and mathematics." (9)

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 298.
(2) Ibid., page 301. (3) Ibid., pages 301-2.
(4) Ibid., page 295. (5) Ibid., pages 295; 297, etc.
(6) Ibid., page 298; The New Realism, pages 144-5.
(7) The New Realism, page 476. (8) Ibid., page 24.
(9) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 236.

Analysis everywhere, of course, should be thorough-going. No field of investigation, no aspect of experience, should, in the end, be reserved from it for any reason, lest one fall into confusion and dangerous errors, such as that of "pseudo-simplicity." Perry is especially fearful lest philosophers, by reason of insufficient analysis, should smuggle into respectable thought some peculiar kind of mental activity that can be"revealed to the agent himself in an immediate intuition," for he thinks that, "when the so-called experience of mental activity is so analyzed, no activity-element is found." (1) Hume refuted the doctrine that mind is a unique activity accessible only to a special intuition, when he showed, Perry believes, "that the most exhaustive introspective analysis reveals no such 'creative power' but only a manifold and nexus of contents." (1) The man who believes in the reality of mind can find no theoretical justification (1) for not carrying through that method of analysis which ends by finding that mind and spiritual activity are composed of elements which have no mental character. This dominating method will be the first topic of our criticism. (2)

c. The self in the light of these methods: it is the physical organism.

Our study of Perry's theory of mental action and of his methods of investigating mind leads to the surprising conclusion that the self or psychical agent is the behaving bodily organism. Mental action is bodily action, for it is "bodily process which in my own experience functions as mental action;" "mental action is a property of the physical organism." (3) "The subject is the living and responding organism." (4) "The knower . . . is homogeneous with the environment, belonging to one cosmos with it as does an attracting mass, or physical organism and may itself be known as are the things it knows." (5) As a result of our elaborate philosophical analysis, we reach the profound conclusion that the self is the physical organism, an opinion identical with that of the primitive savage who naively identifies himself with his body. This substitution of bodily action for mental action is one of the most cold-hearted and daring attempts in the history of philosophy to replace, from the objective side, a self which has been robbed of its familiar and customary meaning.

d. Classification of Perry's view of the self.

To classify Perry's conception of the self is not at all easy. Its most dominant features would require us to classify it as an objective type among the immanent theories. This exclusive placing of it, however, is of doubtful validity if we take account of the whole context of his view. The following considerations should be noted.

(a) While mind lies in the "open field of experience," (6) and the "selective consciousness," in which the self is found, is identified with "experiencing," (7) yet the elements of this selective consciousness, when analysis isolates them, are regarded as existing quite independently of their being experienced. Thus, while mind,

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 280.
(2) See below, pages 101-113.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 298.
(4) The New Realism, page 126.
(5) Ibid., page 35. Compare The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 377-8.
(6) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 273.
(7) The New Realism, page 150.

when it is present, is immanent in experience, yet analysis shows that the elements which compose it are transcendent. Accordingly, Perry's idea of the self should be put among theories of the immanent-transcendent type.

(b) In the second place, while the self is primarily an object to be observed by others, "like other things," yet, from a different cognitive point of vantage, this same object may become a subject. Further, Perry purposes to take account of "the whole mind," "the mind within," (studied by what he calls introspection), and "the mind without."

(c) One who tries to classify such a complicated theory will find that his classification of it will be determined by reference to what aspect of the theory he considers to be most fundamental, or by reference to the amount of respect he pays to phases of the theory which seem unimportant to him. If one can actually recognize all the details of Perry's view, he will be obliged to classify it as both immanent and transcendent, and as both subjective and objective; for when mind exists in experience, it is either subject or object according to one's cognitive point of view, but it contains elements which do not depend upon experience for their existence. But if one considers that the transcendent factor is inconsistent and the subjective factor a misnomer, he will properly classify this view as an immanent one of the objective type. If one considers that the important place of emphasis in the neo-realistic metaphysics, is upon the transcendent factor, the view might be placed among the transcendent theories. Because of these complications I have felt obliged to put it in all three places. (1)

4. Criticism of Perry's theory of the self.

The criticism of Perry's theory of the self which will now be undertaken is qualified by the following considerations; these apply equally well to the critical discussion of James:

a. Introduction: limitations of the following criticism.

(a) The criticism is largely destructive and assertory because, in an inductive study, like this one, of several views, space forbids the introduction of constructive and evidential argument in connection with each theory. Such argument may be presented with greater economy and appropriateness in the last part of the investigation. Criticism must consist chiefly in pointing out inconsistencies and inadequacies.

(b) The criticism is based upon the most general and characteristic lines of the theory in question, and, therefore, may be inconsistent with some minor and isolated phases which are no doubt discoverable in a view which is unsystematic and divergent within within itself. (2)

(c) Some important defects in the theory are due to its imperfect method, but it is beyond the scope of this investigation to work out a complete theory of metaphysical method. The same remark holds good of the theory of reality and of knowledge.

b. Criticism of Perry's method of treating the self.

An attempt will be made to show that Perry's conception of the self is inadequate. The first reason for this proposition will be found in the inadequacy of the method to which he restricts himself. If one accepts his method, with its assumptions, one must, apparently, agree to his view of the self. Since, therefore, his notion of

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(1) See above, pages 5, 7, and 9.

(2) See notes to this effect concerning James' theory, above, page 75.

1'. Correlation between method and self-theory.

the self is essentially correlative with his method, it is important to briefly examine the latter.

An interesting question in logic and psychology would be to inquire how far devotion to an exclusive method of procedure has led Perry to his theory of mind, and how far an original supposition as to the nature of reality and of mind has determined his method of inquiry. The reader gets the impression, however, that he advocates the method he does because he supposes the universe to be such as it is, and that he compels personality to fit into a methodical mold which distorts it.

2'. The underlying assumptions of his method.

Now the analytical method of new realism which Perry defends, when applied exclusively to the study of personality, is objectionable expecially because of the family of underlying assumptions which it confessedly implies. Let us first notice what these assumptions are; the chief ones are as follows:

(1) That the subject matter with which science and philosophy deal is capable of analysis into ultimate elements; so:
  (a) That the universe is a "complex" or "evident composition," an indefinite "multiciplity" of distinct and not-further-analyzable terms; (1) and the experiencing of these facts makes no difference to them, (2) that is, the terms are "neutral entities";
  (b) That the mind is a "complex capable of being analyzed into more primitive terms";(3) and mental activity has an "unmistakable multiplicity" of character; (4)
(2) That these analytical, simple terms may stand in an indefinite number of relationships, but their being and nature is not "dependent" in any sense; (5) that is, relations are extrinsic or external to the being of the terms;
(3) That, therefore, the truth about anything, or its reality, may be known by pushing analysis through until one reaches its simple elements and their arrangement; (6)
  (a) That, therefore, a whole is identical with the totality of its components; (7) so that it may be known by analyzing it into its parts; "that wholes are to be regarded not as indivisible unities, but rather as collections or sums of the natures and values possessed by their parts"; (8)
  (b) That, then, the combination of elements into wholes does not introduce new characteristics into the terms, (and should, therefore, be called in strictness an arrangement, "sum," or "complex," rather than a whole);
  (c) That, therefore, the surest way to avoid such errors and confusion as are found, for example, in dynamism and all mystical philosophies,which mistake complexes for simples, is to carry analysis to the limit. (9)

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 236; New Realism,p. 35.
(2) The New Realism, page 105.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 310.
(4) Ibid., page 236.
(5) The New Realism, page 126.
(6) Ibid., pages 32, 127. (7) Ibid., page 24.
(8) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 374.
(9) The New Realism, pages 127-128.

a'. Some chief passages illustrating these assumptions.

Only a few of the fundamental passages upon which the above summary is based will be inserted. "The analytical method does imply that reality consists of terms and relations." (1) "The procedure of logic and mathematics--any procedure, in fact, which employs the method of analysis--is necessarily committed to the acceptance of the externality of relations. The method of analysis presupposes that the nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character of the whole. If such were not the case the specification of the parts and their arrangement would not afford a description of the whole, and one would have to be content with an immediate or mystical apprehension of it." (2)

"If they" (change and activity) "turn out to be reducible, then they must be identical with the totality of their components." (3) "The world is of an articulate structure that is revealed by analysis, consisting of complexes, like bodies, persons, and societies, as well as of simples." (4) These "elements, processes and systems" which constitute reality "are <u>independent of being experienced</u>." (5) "A neo-realist recognizes no ultimate immediacies nor non-relational nor indefinable entities, except the simples in which analysis terminates. The ultimate terms of knowledge are the terms that survive an analysis that has been carried as far as it is possible to carry it." (6)

"Mind and body are both complexes capable of being analyzed into more primitive terms. Neither mind nor body is really simple. . When they are submitted to analysis it appears that the more primitive terms of which they are composed are, in many cases at least, interchangeable. . The same elements compose both mind and body. " (7) "The expression, 'neutral entities,' will perhaps serve better to emphasize the indifference of the terms of experience, not only to their subjective relations, but to their physical relations as well." (8)

b'. The need of making assumptions is recognized, but they should be the result of criticism.

One is obliged to recognize, of course, that it is inevitable that any philosophical approach or method must make certain assumptions. The assumptions, however, should be the result of criticism, and ought to be self-consistent and as simple as possible. Certain fallacies and shortcomings into which Perry falls in the use of the method of analysis will now be pointed out.

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 234.
(2) Ibid., page 319. (3) The New Realism, page 24.
(4) The New Realism, page 35. (5) Ibid., pages 103-4, also p. 128.
(6) Ibid., page 32.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 310-11.
(8) Ibid., page 316. See the context of these passages for further evidence. The difficulty of stating neo-realistic presuppositions in a way that might be acceptable to even several new realists is recognized, and is not attempted here. See, for example, E. G. Spaulding's somewhat variant conception of analysis in The New Realism, pages 237-247.

3'. Errors in his doctrine of method:

a'. The exclusive use of the analytical method is a fallacy of "exclusive particularity."

Instead of characterizing his method as dogmatic, which may fairly be done, we will speak of it as fallacious in various respects. A fallacy of "exclusive particularity," as Perry calls it, or of "definition by initial predication," is present in these assumptions concerning the analytical method. The great value of the analytical method in the study of human personality need not be doubted, but it will be maintained that it is a one-sided and incomplete method; and, being such, it is fallacious to assume that it is the only method necessary to know the full truth about personality, which is what Perry assumes.

The error present consists in supposing that, when the analyst has found the ultimate elements of the self, if there be such, he has, therefore found the full meaning and reality of the self. We deny that this is the case, and the supposition that it is, is a fallacy of "exclusive particularity," so well described by Perry himself. (1) Any one who declares that the so-called intuitive method is the only one that will reveal the real personality, as H. Bergson tends to affirm, falls into the same error in an opposite form.

Perry condemns the intuitive method because the objects of intuition, self, change, activity, etc., are presumably complex, and the truth about them can be ascertained by complete analysis of them without resorting to any unique intuition. He explicitly states a disjunction which requires one to choose <u>either</u> one method or the other; indeed upon the validity of this disjunction rests his "most general argument for realism." The steps in the argument are as follows:

(a) If the doctrine of the externality of relations is true, realism is established.

(b) But this doctrine is true, because it is necessitated by the method of analysis.

(c) We must adopt either the method of analysis or the (uncritical) method of mystical apprehension.

(d) But we adopt the analytical rather than the intuitive method, because the structure of the universe is such that only by it can we reach a true description of the universe. (2)

In the study of personality the analytical method might profitably be combined with some other method.

This disjunction may be challenged upon the ground of its imperfection. The function of a method is to discover reality and not to prescribe its nature in advance. The <u>a priori</u> and exclusive determination of method in the realism of Perry may be regarded as a fallacy of "initial predication," although of course further reasons for this opinion need to be offered. (3)

There seems to be no initial reason why a synthesis of both methods referred to, or of these two and some others, might not yield the truest results. It might be that after any elements which the self may contain in analysis had been exhibited, some other method would be necessary to reconstruct and apprehend the whole. In particular, the process or test by which one might judge in his own experience of the truth of the analysis of personality might not itself be a process of analysis, however valuable the latter might be as a stage on the way to reality. For

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 128; The New Realism, page 12.

(2) See above, 99, 102. Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 319-320.

(3) See below, pages 176, 178-87.

example, it may be that when a work of art, such as a painting of a landscape, has been analyzed into all of its physical, chemical, aesthetic, and psychological factors, some kind of an enveloping appreciation may be necessary before one really grasps the picture as a beautiful individuality, and that this judgment of individuality may be something in addition to anything included among the termini of the analytical method. The need of some such supplement to the analytical method is proved by its failure in dealing with the self; this failure will be explained more fully below. (1)

1". Genetic explanation of the presence of this fallacy in new realism: the latter has developed under the influence of natural science and of mathematics.

The first reason why Perry and the new realists have such confidence in the analytical method xx probably is its success, not indeed in their own thought, but in the fields of natural science and mathematics from which they have borrowed it. The definite and authoritative results obtained by these sciences, in determining the quantitative character of the world, undoubtedly inspired the use of the same method in philosophical endeavor. (2) We recall how Descartes many years ago felt a similar impetus. The details of recent historical developments cannot be recited here.

A striking example of the genetic connection suggested may be seen in B. Russell's development of neo-realistic principles out of his mathematical studies. In this respect he and other new realists have fallen in to the "fallacy of mental make-up" or "individual prepossession," in that they have become fascinated by a single methodical point of view which seems in need of correction from other standpoints. The hypothesis is suggested that the doctrine of the externality of relations has gained much of its esteem among new realists by reason of mathematical influence; namely, from the analogical reasoning, of uncertain validity, that other entities besides numbers might enter into numerous relations without suffering an alteration of their intrinsic values. The neo-realistic world of subsistence is, to all appearances, a daughter of mathematics.

And inherits from natural science the same defects in the theory of the self.

Now it is well known that the attempt of naturalism to universalize scientific method, as applied especially in the physical sciences, has not brought insight into the nature of the self. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to prove this assertion, or to show how, for example, impersonal monism, represented by E. Haeckel and W. Ostwald, has failed to give a satisfactory account of personality. (3) B. P. Bowne and James Ward are notable antagonists of naturalistic views of the self. (4) It is very probable that philosophy may henceforth neglect, so far as principle is concerned, these naturalistic theories of personality.

Now when the new realists adopt, in their metaphysics, the analytical method which in principle is identical with that used in mathematics and physical science, we may expect to find the same failure when they deal with the problem of personality. We may

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(1) See below, pages 109-12.

(2) For a specific recognition of this influence see W. T. Marvin, The New Realism, pages 84-7.

(3) See below, pages 194-200, in connection with the nature of mental activity.

(4) See Bowne's Metaphysics and Personalism; and Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, and The Realm of Ends.

expect that the sins of the fathers will fall upon the children unto the first and second generations. The evidence in support of this hypothesis will appear in the following criticisms. The characteristic attempt of new realism is to get consciousness out of a combination of elements which themselves are not conscious; the reader may judge whether this is an improvement over E. Haeckel's derivation of consciousness from elements endowed from eternity with a primordial sensibility.

b'. The fallacy of abstraction.

In the adoption of his method Perry falls into the fallacy of exclusive particularity, and in the use of it, into two fallacies: (a) the fallacy of abstraction, or of the universal, (1) and (b) the analytical fallacy, as I shall call it. (2) It is the former of which naturalism is especially likely to be guilty. Perry verbally intends to avoid it by recognizing that the abstract quality of the elements of mind is itself just an added fact which is irrelevant to the real nature of mind. In spirit and fact, however, his doctrine of the self suffers from all of the faults of this fallacy. Just how this happens will now be explained.

The world which the method of analysis "discovers" is regarded by most new realists as being the real world. It is supposed to consist of an arrangement of ultimate, simple entities like "sensory qualities and logical indefinables." But "the simple qualities themselves evidently cannot be subjective, any more than they can be physical." (3) We have seen that the same is true of the elements of the mind, (4) for Perry declares that, "The elements of the introspective manifold are in themselves neither peculiarly mental nor peculiarly mine; they are neutral and interchangeable."(5) In other words, the components of mind are neither subjective nor objective, neither physical nor mental; they have a "neutral" existence,--rather subsistence,--until the peculiar grouping called consciousness endows them with an accidental mental character.

This account of mind seems to remove its elements about as far from concrete human experience as one can well imagine possible. If I had to make a choice, I should much prefer that the truant officer, called "Ego-centric Predicament," should confine me in the prison of solipsism, with its limited but concrete life, than that Perry's Selfless Predicament should exile me and make me a homeless wanderer in the abstract and hypothetical world of neutral and indifferent elements. Perry abstracts from the subject-object character of actual experience, as well as from the spatial-temporal character of the physical world as we know it, and conceives certain pre-mental and pre-physical elements as being simply what they are, whatever that may be, without feeling obliged to locate them anywhere. (6) This is the very height of abstraction, and tells us, as J. Royce tries to prove, (7) "absolutely nothing."

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(1) For exposition of this fallacy, see B. P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 244-259.

(2) See below, pages 107-9.

(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 324.

(4) See above, page 98.

(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 277; compare 310.

(6) Ibid., page 316.

(7) The World and the Individual, vol. I, page 137.

We know that Perry desires to escape the abstractions of subjective idealism and of naturalism. He does it by what D. C. Macintosh calls a "homeopathic treatment" of these abstractions--namely, by making one more abstraction. And the "independent" world he reaches is so abstract and unreal that its status is quite unintelligible. And that to which the whole process most clearly points is the reality and the marvelous activities of the conceiving mind. He supposes that he avoids the presupposition of the latter by speaking of "discovering" entities, and by talking of "elements" rather than of phenomena or experiences. Actually, his vigorous analysis is a testimony to the initiative and creative power of the self. His success in escaping from mind is seen in the following striking proposition: "Thus the case for realism rests on showing that to be content of mind, is not to be dependent on a mind." (1) If this assertion does not involve a self-contradiction, or a too restricted definition of dependence, then mind has been reduced in fact to a state which James described as pure diaphaneity. For, if entities can become contents of mind without depending upon mind in any significant sense, then mind appears indeed to have become a nonentity, or at least a negligible abstraction.

The term, "general observation," however, is a good camouflage for this abstraction, for does not observation give concrete elements? Certainly but if mountains and rivers and consciousness all belong to the "same field of observable experience," (2) they are not neutral entities at all, but facts of conscious and interested experience.

c'. The analytical fallacy.

1". Meaning of this fallacy.

The fallacy paramount of new realism needs to be christened with a special name. It may be called appropriately, the analytical fallacy, because it arises from an assumption made in connection with the analytical method, the assumption, namely, that completed analysis reveals the whole or essential truth about any object of observation. No objection need be raised against the assertion that completed analysis yields part of the truth. But Perry appears to be mistaken in supposing that he has found reality when he has analyzed anything so far as he can. His conception of a whole is that of a complex which is to be understood by examining all simple components which stand arranged in it. The error lies in neglecting any significant character which an organized whole may have over and above the individual characters possessed by the terms which compose it. It is true that Perry hints in places at a recognition of such a whole-character, but the spirit of his writings and the use of his method is to neglect it as insignificant, and to rush ahead in the endeavor to find reality in the ultimate and independent elements in which analysis terminates. In short, the fundamental error in the analytical method, as used exclusively in new realism, seems to be the fallacious assumption that entities that enter into a whole produce nothing which cannot be understood by examining its elements. (3)

This fallacy cannot be charged indiscriminately against all new realists. E. G. Spaulding, for example, clearly states that

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(1) The New Realism, page 143.
(2) See above, pages 97-99.
(3) Compare J. Laird, Problems of the Self, pages 140-8.

it is "a matter of great importance" to note that "new properties or new values appear . . . in the actual synthesis . . . of existential wholes out of parts." (1) In proportion as this conception is recognized, and in proportion as analysis is regarded as bringing changes in the real properties of things, (2) a way is opened for the active functioning of a self, and for a conception of personality in which the latter cannot be explained in terms of a composition of neutral elements. Perry's position with reference to the bearing of the method of analysis upon the problem of the self is very difficult to make out, for at the same time that he asserts that "philosophy is necessarily involved" in the "isolation" of its materials, he affirms that the logician deals "in a very direct and rigorous way with relation." (3) On the whole, it is fair to charge him definitely with the analytical fallacy as it has been described.

a". It is the opposite of the fallacy of "pseudo-simplicity."

This fallacy is the converse of that of pseudo-simplicity, which he charges against the idealistic view of consciousness and spiritual activity. He thinks that the idealist errs in believing that the simplicity of the self, activity, consciousness, the will, etc., which is present when these things are as yet unexplored, belongs to these objects themselves. (4) When a complex experience has been analyzed into its elements, there is no unique central "that" left over, which must appear among the elements. (4) So he argues that dynamism is false because it rests upon activity, which is complex. True simplicity is that which comes after analysis, and it belongs to the object itself. (5)

2". Antithesis between simplicity and value as foundation of philosphy.

This certainly is a curious kind of argument. The underlying assumption is that simple elements are the proper foundation of a philosophy. This, I say, is an assumption, and a very questionable one. Why should one assert in advance that a complex may not be the foundation of a metaphysics? or an individual whole? The contrast here suggested rests upon a difference in judgment as to what a good foundation for a philosophy is. (6) The whole issue turns on whether that which is simple or that which is valuable, whether that which initiates or that which crowns evolution, should be the groundwork of metaphysics.

The correlation of this antithesis with new realism and idealism is evident. It may be maintained that the simplicity of Perry's independent ultimates does not compensate for their philosophic worthlessness. The thesis to be defended below is that personality is the most illuminating point of view from which to understand the world regardless of how complex the concept of personality may turn out to be. (7) If it is a success as a metaphysical principle of

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(1) The New Realism, pages 238.
(2) Ibid., page 242.
(3) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. VII, pages 627.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 237.
(5) Ibid., page 263.
(6) Compare James' plea for a balance between "abstract monotony and concrete heterogeneity," between wholeness and separateness, in "The Sentiment of Rationality," pages 66-7 of The Will to Believe, etc.
(7) See below, pages 341-5.

explanation, we will not feel that any lack of simplicity which it may have will militate against this success, provided any lack of simplicity which may be present is duly recognized.

I think, however, that Perry has attached excessive worth to analysis, and that this over-emphasis deserves to be called the analytical fallacy. We have often heard of thinkers missing the forest for the trees. This is the special danger into which the method of analysis is likely to fall. It is unnecessary to decide whether or not mind is a complex before proceeding to show that the attempt to represent the self as a complex of such elements as Perry claims it is, is a failure. The justification for charging him with the analytical fallacy will appear more clearly in the following discussion.

d'. The failure of the analytical method in explaining the unity of the mind.

One who falls into the analytical fallacy is likely to face a serious difficulty in accounting for that unity of mind which seems to be a fact of experience. The analytical method, used exclusively, does not provide a solution of this difficulty, which fact Perry himself recognizes. He admits that, "It is necessary, as the spiritualists and transcendentalists have rightly maintained, to suppose some kind of action that shall bring contents together, and give them the peculiar within-mind unity which they possess." (1) He rejects the usual idealistic solution, (2) in which mental unity is found in the "immediate apprehension" of some spiritual activity or substance. His reasons for this are, first, that the "only possible justification" for it is the doctrine of internal relations, which he rejects; (3) and, secondly, that the solution is a case of the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity. (4) His attempted solution implies the doctrine of external relations, and will be successful only if he gets together certain elements which by hypothesis have no dependence upon one another.

Rejection of idealistic conception of unity.

True unity, he says, is found by complete analysis.

Now he thinks that "there are two ways of unifying experience." One is, to refuse to analyze: that is, to carry analysis back only to its vanishing point in bare feeling, which means an experience which is not the experience of anything, and is equivalent to solving the problem by going to sleep. The other "way is to carry analysis through, and discover the connections of the parts, and the articulate structure of the whole." (5) It is not at once clear how this analytical process will explain the unity of consciousness without assuming it, but let us do our best to see what Perry might mean by the unity of the mind.

Some of the different kinds of unity that are possible in new realism:

The inadequacy of the analytical method as employed by Perry is clearly evident when we examine the different kinds of mental unity which it makes possible. Now we can imagine how it might be supposed that one of the ultimate, simple entities of new realism might be regarded as possessing a certain kind of unity, but Perry thinks that the mind is not an entity, but a complex of entities, and we must look, therefore, for some way in which a complex may

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 284.
(2) For example, that of T. H. Green or J. M. E. McTaggart.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 157.
(4) See above, page 108 . The passing debate concerning external and internal relations is too complicated a problem to be introduced into the discussion of this investigation.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 237-8.

1". Unity of a simple entity or of a series.

be regarded as being unified. In any case, it is obvious, of course, that one of these basic entities is too simple to account for the felt variety that may be present in a mental whole.

Another possible kind of unity is that of a series, the unity of which would lie in its definition, but while E. G. Spaulding makes use of such a unity (1), I do not know that Perry does. B. P. Bowne sought in various ways to prove that the conception of a series presupposes a self which abides through the series; (2) so that we cannot define the self in terms of a series without circular reasoning.

2". Unity of a class; meanings of such unity:

The kind of mental unity characteristic of Perry and the new realists in general is defined by the idea of class. The mind or self is a class of elements; it is an "intersecting" class; that is, the elements are interchangeable with those of other classes. (3) For example, the elements composing a given individual consciousness may also, under other circumstances or from a different point of view, enter into the composition of a physical class or of another mind. The question arises now as to what constitutes the class?

a". The complex, mind, is not a class of mental elements.

In the first place, the complex, mind, is not a class of mental elements. There is no point of resemblance among the elements themselves which can be called mental. The contents of mind have "no generic" character. That is to say, the elements which go to form a unique class called mind do not possess in themselves any essential characteristics by reference to which they may be classified as mental.

b". Mind is a class constituted by the selective response of an organism.

In the second place, any unity which the class possesses must be derived from the relation of its members to some other thing. This is the case in Perry's view. These members are united in a specific way, and form a definite class, because they have a relation to a particular thing, namely, a behaving body. Mind has as much unity as is present in a class of elements selected out of the whole universe of things by the reaction of a definite nervous organism. Those things in the environment which are selected or taken account of by an interested organism become thereby mental contents, and the behaving, reacting body becomes thereby mental subject or agent, and the whole thus composed is mind or consciousness. So Perry asserts that "The objects selected by any individual responding organism compose an aggregate defined by that relationship. What such an aggregate derives from consciousness will then be its aggregation, and nothing more. A subjective manifold will be any manifold whose inclusion and arrangement of contents can be attributed to the order and range of some particular organism's response." (4) "Several sounds listened to or heard jointly compose a mental unity." (5) Mind, therefore, is a class or complex constituted by the selective response of an organism.

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(1) The New Rationalism, pages 180 ff.
(2) For example, Metaphysics, pages 61 ff.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 288.
(4) Ibid., page 323.
(5) Ibid., page 285.
(3) Also, The Hiddenness of the Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, VI, pages 29-36.

c". Criticisms of this kind of unity:

The chief and sufficient criticism of this theory of unity is stated by D. H. Parker (1): "But you cannot define mind as the class of elements reacted to by a body for this one reason at least, namely, that many of the elements do not exist previous to their existence as elements of mind, and so are incapable of being selected out through the body's action." For example, it is absurd to suppose that the organism reacts to memories, to ideas of invisible objects, to purposes, trains of reasoning, and various sentiments and ideals, just as it reacts to light, heat, or sound. How can the kind of mind which Perry describes "collect my past experiences?" (2) These various facts referred to, however, evidently must be included in mind, but how shall we get them out of mind in order that the organism may react upon them and thereby constitute them mental? This unreasonable and impossible terminus of the hypothesis condemns it as insufficient to account for the facts.

1"'. The mind reacts to elements which are not in the environment.

2"'. We can learn about the mind without understanding the nervous system.

Further, this theory of unity presupposes an exact knowledge of how objects in the environment and the nervous system interact. (3) It appears quite probable, however, that mind may be known quite apart from any knowledge of the body or the brain, for it was comparatively well known before the nervous system had been dissected. We are dangerously near the old materialism which attempted to conceive mental unity in analogy to the parallelogram of forces. And if we take Perry literally, the unity of the mind is the unity of the bodily organism, which is not mental unity at all. (4)

3"'. Mental processes do not interact in the manner of class members.

D. H. Parker gives another interesting reason why mental unity cannot be described as a class or collection. He observes that (5), "It is characteristic of a class or collection that when you take away or adjoin an element, you alter only its numerical and ordinal properties. But this is not true of the mind. The loss or adjunction of an element produces changes both in the mind as a whole and in the individual elements of the whole." For instance, the sudden emergence of pain will cause the disappearance of many elements and those that remain will be suffused with dissatisfaction; the relation of clearness and unclearness will be reversed. As a matter of fact in the mind "there is a mode of combination of one element with another, an interfusion which no mere enumeration can describe. . In short the elements of a mind are a whole, not a mere class," (5) and this whole cannot be explained or described by means of reactions of a body to elements of its environment.

3". Unity of interest; its meaning.

The most successful kind of unity which is possible for the self in Perry's thought is the unity of interest, if only a fuller psychological account of it were offered. We might suppose then that mental action is unified when a single interest dominates the behavior of the organism and its selection of objects in the environment with reference to which it acts. Since Perry identifies the interested and the teleological, we have here the suggestion that conscious life may be unified in terms of purposive action.

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(1) The Self and Nature, page 15.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 275.
(3) The New Realism, page 34
(4) See below, especially pages 205-6.
(5) The Self and Nature, page 16.

The idea of unifying the mental life in terms of interest or purpose is highly commendable and promising as an hypothesis, but Perry has not worked out this suggestion, and he denies that human nature contains a single dominating interest. (1)

a". Difficulties in Perry's view of it.

His own description of interest tends to destroy the apparent unity promised by the concept of interest. Sometimes he uses interest as the name for the whole behavior-situation, which, by hypothesis, is a complex. Or again, interest sometimes seems to be a phase of bodily or instinctive structure which again is complex, and which does not at once exhibit the sense in which it is mental at all. Further, what is the relation of the varied and successive interests to any one which might be regarded as a central one? Strictly, according to the neo-realistic method, they ought to be regarded as elements, but this view would destroy the unity we seek. Hence we do not find unity in any of these directions.

When Perry, in his theory of value, regards interest as an "ultimate of consciousness" and the generating principle of all value, he violates his own analytical maxim, for it seems clear that interest is not an ultimate simple, but that it can be analyzed further; or, as we should prefer to say, can be shown to have several aspects, such as active, affective, and cognitive phases. A very serious difficulty threatens one also if he attempts to explain how the great variety of human interests can possibly arise from simple and neutral elements. Having assumed that such elements compose reality, Perry should explain how they come to form such facts as human interests in their great variety and mutations.

b". Is personality a complex at all?

In concluding this study of the relation of the analytical method to the problem of mental unity, I suggest that the initial definition of mind as a complex might be challenged on good grounds, for it may be that personality is a unique unity (2) in spite of Perry's conception of mind. It might have various aspects or modes of activity, but these might be mistakenly called elements in a complex.

4'. Need of correction in Perry's method.

If the analytical method is the only metaphysical method, it should yield some fruitful results in its application to the problem of personality. The neo-realistic philosophy in which it is used contains many opportunities for analysis which have been passed over entirely up to date. A serious pragmatic objection to its exclusive use in the study of the self is that, in the hands of the new realists, it has not produced valuable results. Perry has not illuminated by analysis any significant phase of personality, except its teleological aspect. A true method should yield better results than have yet appeared. When the analytical method is referred to in this way, it is considered as being integrally associated with the family of neo-realistic assumptions noted above. (3) The method of analysis, when separated from these assumptions and considered in general, is of course a valuable and necessary part of philosophical procedure.

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(1) See above, page 94.
(2) See below, pages 309-20.
(3) See above, page 102.

Further objections might be raised against Perry's use of the analytical method in connection with personality. Certain objections to his conception of introspection, to his thorough-going behaviorism, etc., might be introduced. However, probably enough has been said to indicate that his mode of procedure needs to be supplemented in itself and corrected in its use. A metaphysical method in the application of which personality vanishes in any recognizable form or familiar aspect, as it does here, is thereby shown to be inadequate. To be sure, the self hovers in the background, unrecognized and undiscovered, as the ever-present, active analyzer and the constant giver of value. But what he calls mind is so masked with behavioristic and physiological verbiage, and so distorted by the method, with its accompanying metaphysical presuppositions, which has been applied to it, that we do not recognize it.

And not only in appearance but in fact his method confessedly explains mind in terms of what is not mind. (1) No metaphysician has a right so to define and limit his method in advance that he is led to a completely insufficient explanation of so important a fact as human personality. The exclusive use of the analytical method, as interpreted by Perry, does not bring to light a satisfactory theory of personality, and, therefore, either must be rejected or supplemented, preferably the latter. It is well to bear in mind that methods of procedure and categories of explanation are not ends in themselves but instruments for making experience and reality intelligible.

c. Errors in Perry's theory of mental action:

We turn now from the study of Perry's method to an examination of the concepts of mental action, consciousness, and others, which have an important bearing upon his theory of the self. We consider, first, errors in his doctrine of mental action, especially the circular reasoning which is present in it.

1'. His reasoning is circular.

One of the most striking promises in Perry's doctrine of the self is that we should expect to find the key to it in the concept of mental action. He agrees with the spiritualists in arguing that mental action is necessary to explain mental contents; that mental contents or objects become such by virtue of a "general action of some sort." If this is the case, then we cannot regard mental action itself as mental content without circular reasoning. (2) These are the limits set for the inquiry. Let us examine the actual results.

It turns out that mental action is bodily action, and this action is to be studied by the method of general observation, especially as carried out by my neighbor. "For those bodily actions which now become most significant are only accidentally, if at all, felt by the conscious agent himself." (3) If these statements truly represent Perry's conclusion, it is evident that mental action has become indeed mental content. This result violates the limitations set upon the argument ahich were mentioned in the last paragraph.

The point at issue is whether or not action <u>is</u> a mental content? In Perry's doctrine of general observation there is no doubt about the answer to this question. Mental action is a kind of mental

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(1) See above, page 98.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 279-80.
(3) Ibid., page 285.

content. He himself falls into the vicious circle against which he sounded a warning. That unifying action which at first was promised and required as a presupposition to give mental contents their distinctive character is lost in the broad field of mental contents and our hopes are disappointed. Perry has not succeeded in restoring that activity which consciousness lost when James denied the existence of the latter. Mental action must gain some other meaning than bodily action if it is to retain any significance.

Perry might reply by saying that what I have called his circle in reasoning is my fallacy of exclusive particularity; that I err in supposing that mental action may not be both mental action and mental contents under varying circumstances. This rejoinder would be cogent provided mental action were ever anything different than bodily action, which it is not in his theory, so far as I am able to understand it; and bodily action, if it appears at all, always appears, in my judgment, as mental content; but it cannot even thus appear without the presence of a self very different from that described by Perry.

2'. The barrenness of his doctrine of mental action.

Here the bankruptcy of Perry's theory of the self appears in its clearest light. His untenable conclusion is that mental action is bodily action. All genuine mental action has vanished, and the phrase is preserved as a sop to those who, before they become new realists, suppose they have active minds. He apparently prefers the term, action, to that of activity because of the physical and physiological connotations of the former. The barrenness of his theory of mental action is concealed by the ambiguity in such frequent words as reaction, response, etc. These words suggest some sort of mental dynamism. This suggestion is useful in giving a measure of plausibility to a theory which in fact has no place for mental activity. What really is selection? It is the reception by a sense organ of certain stimuli for which it is fitted by nature to receive. Selection means the specific response of an organ to the stimulations appropriate to it. The bodily action present is called mental action. But if it is bodily action, why call it mental action? Or, if it is mental action, why call it bodily action? The whole argument and phraseology is thoroughly misleading. Reaction, too, is a physical or organic response, and in no sense a creative act of mind.

His behavioristic teleology reveals some factors which are not items of behavior or objects in the environment. This is seen in his account of purpose in terms of "anticipatory adjustment." (1) In a case of purposive behavior the organism adjusts itself to an environment which does not yet exist, and it does so by means of images, especially the free images of memory. Here is obviously a factor which cannot be reduced to the reaction of the organism to its environment, for how can an organism respond to an environment which is not present or yet existent? It is clear, therefore, that if "anticipatory adjustment" is to mean anything different than mechanical reaction, it involves a "mental" activity or factor which is different from organic response or behavior. It is no doubt correct to say with Perry that most of our human actions are thus reactions to an environment which is to come, but this does not fit in with the realistic conception of mind as bodily action.

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(1) See above, pages 94-96.

d. Defects in his conception of consciousness:

1'. His definition is circular.

Let us examine now some phases of his conception of consciousness. It consists in a complex relation between a sentient and interested organism and some parts of its environment." (1) This is clearly a circular definition, for it includes that which is to be defined. If one starts with "a sentient and interested organism," obviously one will have no difficulty in getting consciousness. What is required is a definition which does not assume that which is to be defined, or a clear recognition that such a definition is logically impossible. In Perry's later statement of his theory of consciousness, (2) in The Present Conflict of Ideals, he asserts that it is made up of elements from the environment that are "borrowed by the mind." The circular character of his description of mind is here exhibited in still clearer light. If the mind is required to select elements in order to get consciousness, it looks as if consciousness were the presupposition rather than the product of the interactive process in question.

2'. And it is too narrow.

Another serious defect in this definition of consciousness is that it is too narrow. That organic response which is essential to consciousness cannot "take account of" countless objects and facts of which we are actually conscious, because they lie in a different realm than that of the "natural environment," which he treats as made up of "sensory qualities and logical entities." (3) How can my body react to memories and intentions, to ideas and ideals of any kind, to history and facts of change in things, to future contingencies and religious aspirations, to the claims of the analytical method and new realism? A person who was just becoming acquainted with new realism might well reckon that one of the most difficult things for the body to react to would be an independent real. These objects cannot enter that environment to which response is made. It is not at all clear how the action of an organism can bring a logical entity into a mental group. What light is thrown upon recollections referred to my youth, upon the pictures of my creative imagination, and the syllogisms of my reasoning, by saying that my consciousness of them depends upon my bodily reaction?

Two of the chief mysteries in neo-realistic doctrine are the prospective and the "retrospective functioning of my body." (4) It is said these consist of certain modifications of the cerebrum, of certain central, active processes, but in experience these do not mean the past or future until some mind makes them do so.

The whole problem of meaning is unsolved. The comprehensive grasp of vast orders of logical and mathematical systems which Perry himself exhibits in his writing requires a mental activity very different from the bodily action which he describes. Neither a business man nor a philosopher could succeed if Perry's account of consciousness were true and complete. Life is more than contact with environment. It may be indeed that it consists in part in this, but it is also an inner and purposive development. If the new realists themselves do not feel spiritual strivings, their

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(1) The New Realism, page 147; compare Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 324.

(2) See above, page 89.

(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 310.

(4) Ibid., page 296.

metaphysics must explain the presence of these in others, and should not explain them away.

3'. In experience body is not mental subject.

We have seen that in the conscious-complex Perry regarded the behaving body as the mental subject. This is not confirmed, but refuted by experience. It is simply contrary to every-day facts to suppose that when we become conscious of objects in our environment, the body is either experienced or regarded as the subject of these experiences. They have often a center of reference all their own which is very different from the body. Only when one possesses a considerable measure of scientific knowledge does he infer indirectly that certain mental processes are probably conditioned by certain nervous changes, but even then he never says, "My cerebrum is aware of this book." But further, if we are able to prove that the self is the necessary condition for the spatial-temporal representation of the body apart from which the body has no meaning, (1) then it is fallacious to turn about and declare that the self is corporeal. The error in this procedure is excellently expounded by G. Kafka. (2)

4'. Deficiencies in Perry's definition of consciousness.

We have seen how Perry tries to describe mind or consciousness in terms of action, but have noted that what he calls mental action really means bodily action, one among the "interacting things" in the universe. As a matter of fact, therefore, we are thrown back upon the relational theory of consciousness. Consciousness then is a "complex" which arises when an organism responds to a limited group of objects in its environment. Now this important question arises: Does consciousness precede or accompany this "aggregation" (3) or complex? There are passages which permit either answer.

a'. In some places Perry represents consciousness as a combining agency; hence, as preceding the complex called consciousness; hence, consciousness explains the complex, not vice versa.

In the first place, we read, for example, that "the presence of some elements together in one complex is dependent on the combining action of consciousness," and in this way the elements are "correlated" and "are determined exclusively by the agency (selective and combining) of the subject of consciousness." (4) Again, "Consciousness is the means of bringing things within the range of purposive action. It determines the limits of the environment 'taken account of,' as distinguished from the total environment. The range of consciousness defines a field of things liable to action. . The actual dealings of the organism with such objects, the process of art itself, is guided by consciousness. The modification of the object is not in this case directly due to consciousness." An object "is made dependent on the body by the action of the mind," etc. (5) The neo-realistic version of immediatism is that concepts are discovered and not made; that intellect is an organ of"discernment" rather than of fabrication. (6)

b'. Failure of the attempt to find consciousness in the mental complex.

The passages just quoted seem to indicate that consciousness is in part something which precedes, and in part is something which determines the complex which is called mind. We ask then, What is this consciousness? Perry's reply is: It is the group

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(1) See below, pages 200-11; 259-60.

(2) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen über das Ichproblem. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, bd. XIX, 1910, page 216.

(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 323.

(4) The New Realism, pages 139-40. (5) Ibid., page 141.

(6) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 239-41.

of objects to which the behaving organism responds. This complex of objects, however, we decline to call consciousness. We are, therefore, thrown upon the other alternative: consciousness must accompany, or first appear in, the complex to which its name is applied. This is on the whole the interpretation which is most in harmony with the thought of Perry. But it does not solve the problem of consciousness for various reasons, some of which will now be noted.

In the first place, if this resultant combination is called mind or consciousness, it is inconsistent to speak of "the combining agency of consciousness," (1) as if this were some activity which preceded the complex. If consciousness is ever a combining agency, the relational hypothesis falls to the ground; for, then, the complex which results from its combining operations is a product of consciousness, and cannot logically be called upon to explain consciousness itself. On the whole, however, consciousness, in the philosophy of Perry, is not an antecedent of the group of elements called mental, but only an accidental (2) accompaniment of it, or perhaps a consequence of it. But, in this case, to speak of consciousness as an agency is mistaken, and is alike the cause and the result of confusion in thinking. That which produces nothing should not be called activity or agency. The survival of the phrase, "agency of consciousness," however, shows the lingering of a fact for which the theory in question has no place.

Suppose, in the second place, that we should try to catch consciousness in the "aggregation." It is not itself an entity for by hypothesis entities are "other-than-mind." It is not the bodily action, for bodily action is bodily action and not consciousness. It is not an agency of any kind because, first, such agency cannot be found by inspection, and also because consciousness is only the accompaniment or result of the agency of the behaving organism. Consciousness must, therefore, be a relation, but how shall we conceive or imagine a relation which is accidental and absolutely external to the terms related, as neo-realists assert? and how would such a relation initiate itself or make itself known? (3) I confess that I cannot find consciousness in Perry's exposition of it. Our wanderings through the labyrinth of neo-realistic argument in search of mind bring us in the end to a kind of epiphenomenal fairy so diaphanous that it evades all our attempts to capture it for examination.

c'. Personality in connection with Perry's doctrine of the immanence of consciousness.

Let us make another attempt, however, to understand the relational theory of consciousness in new realism. Let us do so from the point of view of epistemological monism which Perry is interested in maintaining. (4) For him consciousness is not strictly epiphenomenal, but is completely "immanent." In either case, however,

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(1) The New Realism, page 138.

(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 285.

(3) Here would be the proper place to explain the bearing of the important dispute over the externality of relations upon the problem of the self if time permitted its introduction.

(4) See The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 376-80; D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 309, etc.

it is entirely passive, and the self can only mean the bodily organism. The situation seems to be about as follows.

Perry develops his idea of "the immanence of consciousness" from the standpoint of the "homogeneous" things of the environment rather than from the point of view of a spontaneous and conscious self. (1) In this development consciousness, and therewith the self, is dissolved into the same stuff as "the remainder of the world." Personality, therefore, loses all uniqueness which some claim for it in distinction from the objects of its "natural environment." "Consciousness is . . . an excerpt of things, which a cerebrally equipped organism selects for its special purposes from its surrounding environment." (2)

According to this doctrine, consciousness produces nothing, but is a product or combination defined by the group of environmental factors to which a behaving organism responds. Consciousness, to be sure, is immanent in this group of things, but it so completely lacks influence and significance with reference to them, that it is also said to be "external." It is not external in the sense of being a second fundamental principle of explanation, for Perry rejects dualism along with the spiritualists. (3) Consciousness is external in the sense that its presence makes no difference to and does not determine the being and properties of the elements which compose it. These independent entities of the "natural environment" constitute what is fundamentally real. In some of these consciousness is immanent, not as an agent which does something, but as a bare relation of togetherness of certain things in the world of nature. In terms of these consciousness is to be explained. The result is that consciousness loses all ordinary meaning, and becomes either an empty and impotent abstraction, or, more exactly, becomes absorbed in and indistinguishable from the vast and neutral realm of the "natural environment." So far as the problem of personality goes, this is the real meaning of the idea of the immanence of consciousness as interpreted by the new realists. Any agency which consciousness sometimes is said to possess really belongs to neutral entities, or to physical things. That seems to be Perry's meaning when he speaks of "realism . . . admitting consciousness into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent." (4)

The consistent development, then, of epistemological monism from the realistic standpoint means the reduction of personal experience to the same stuff as things. Spirit and mental activity are explicitly classed with or dissolved in the midst of things. (5) All spontaneity and efficacy which they sometimes are supposed to possess are transferred to the environment. In this case the denial of dualism and the assertion of a metaphysical homogeneity means the denial of personality. An understanding of personality is not a condition for a knowledge of the neutral universe, but any significance which it may possess is borrowed from the latter. This conclusion is quite in harmony with E. B. Holt's statement (6)

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(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 376 ff.
(2) Ibid., page 378.
(3) Ibid., pages 378-9.
(4) Ibid., page 379.
(5) Ibid., pages 377-8.
(6) The Concept of Consciousness, page 136.

that "the real object of this book" is "the interpretation of the universe as a purely neutral universe, or, in other words, the deductive showing of how a neutral universe can contain both 'physical' and 'mental' objects." The particular place in this universe where a thinker, supposing him to exist, would look for data for the understanding of personality would be in the vicinity of a behaving, human organism. (1) Our study of the neo-realistic doctrine of the immanence of consciousness has brought us to the border land of materialism without revealing to us a significant understanding either of consciousness or personality. (2)

In short, "Perry . . has not succeeded in coralling consciousness in his definition," as D. C. Macintosh says. "In adding together the results of the two methods, Perry has succeeded in 'rounding up' all the important associates of consciousness, but consciousness itself is not to be found in the aggregation; other-than-mind added to other-than-mind does not give other than other-than-mind. . . To be sure, the terms 'mind' and 'consciousness' may be used with radically altered meaning, and arbitrarily applied to the aforesaid sum of elements; but it ought to be no less acceptable to the neo-realist, as it would be far less misleading, if he were to employ instead of these terms some neutral algebraic symbol. His definition would then be stripped of the false greatness that has been thrust upon it by calling it a definition of mind. . It might very well be that mind was the cause of both the selection of the object and the organic response, and not a mere effect of their occurrence together, much less a mere name for their combination." (3)

d'. Ambiguity of "selection".

One of the reasons for the plausibility of the neo-realistic doctrine of consciousness lies perhaps in the convenient and adaptable ambiguity of the term, selection. How much and what does it include? Knowing, for example, perception of an object, emotional attitude to it, choice for or against it for the sake of an end, and reaction to it--all of these? or more or less? The suggestion of mental activity in this word makes it very useful as a key-term in a philosophy in which consciousness is interpreted as a purely passive and external thing. This term is in dire need of explication. As interpreted by the new realists, it refers too much to the present, is not sufficiently prospective in its connotation, and actually means as a rule a mechanical or organic response.

e. Perry does not show in what sense mind is real.

A final objection to the neo-realistic doctrine of the self is that no definition of its reality is offered. Perry has not yet consistently answered this central question: What is the reality of personality? He presumes to have found the reality of mind when,

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(1) For criticism of the behavioristic conception of mental or personal activity, see below, pages 200-11.

(2) There are no doubt other interpretations, for example that of D. C. Macintosh, of epistemological monism, which would not lead to this negative conclusion concerning personality.

(3) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 284-5 and note 5.

after a thorough analysis, he reaches a group of simple elements which have a character of their own independent of being experienced. (1) These ultimate entities do not depend upon experience in order to be. What, then, is it to be real? There is no clear reply. Perry points out that "the realist does not propose to define reality in terms of its independence." (2) In fact, "there is no sense in which simple entities can be said to be dependent at all." (3) "The realist must be satisfied to say that in the last analysis the elements of experience are not anywhere; they simply are what they are. They find a place when they enter into relationships; but they bring into these relationships a character which they possess quite independently and by themselves." (4)

He has no positive doctrine of reality.

This is his last word about reality. This net metaphysical result of new realism is disappointing. We do not intend to set forth the difficulties in the theory of reality here involved. (5) That is beyond our purpose. We merely notice the negative and insignificant result so far as the problem of personality is concerned. A metaphysics which does not solve that important problem is inadequate.

We desire a metaphysical and not a psychological solution of the problem of personality.

Since Perry accepts the results of the various sciences, he might refer us to behavioristic psychology for an empirical answer to the question concerning the nature of the self. What we desire, however, is a metaphysical solution and not a psychological one, least of all a behavioristic solution, if Perry is a representative behaviorist. (6) He himself does not add, save by generating fog, to the description of the world offered by physics, psychology and logic. (7) He does suggest that reality is more than "this bare term-and-relation character," but what it is in addition to this abstraction is quite unclear. (8)

f. Undeveloped suggestions and elements of worth in Perry's view of the self:

1'. A real self is assumed in many places.

In the course of our study of the thought of Perry there were many places where the active self was assumed without being recognized as such. Some of these instances may be specified. The process of analysis, for example, does not appear to sustain itself in the air of abstractions, but presupposes and rests upon a capacity to make distinctions and grasp wholes which points to a mental activity of a very different sort than sensory specification or bodily adaptation. The adoption of the analytical method is not well described by saying that it is an organic response or an adaptation to some objects in the environment. How this method, with its assumption of the existence of "independent" entities, is connected with self-preservation is far from being evident. In short, the analytical process itself points to a living and active analyzer or thinker which Perry has failed to explain. In speaking of error, he points out how, through "the intervention of mind, a law may be misapplied to an event." (9)

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(1) The New Realism, pages 149-50. (2) Ibid., pages 117 ff.
(3) Ibid., page 126.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 316; compare The New Realism, page 128.
(5) Compare J. Royce, The World and the Individual, for a criticism of it.
(6) Compare below, pages 200-11.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 310. (8) Ibid., p. 234.
(9) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, XIII, page 513.

This is only one of the many unexplained aspects of the mind which could be mentioned. Some others are implied in the following statements: "In so far as I am reflective, my impulses and ideals are repeatedly the objects of my contemplation and scrutiny. They are defined, adopted, rejected, or reaffirmed in every moral crisis." When Perry considers the foundations of morality and religion, he demands "a world in which consciousness . . may operate effectively, and in which there is therefore a chance of its bringing the world into accord with its interests." (1)

2'. Valuable elements in Perry's theory of the self.

Some of the valuable elements in Perry's theory of the self will now be pointed out. (a) The first is his emphasis upon the importance of the analytical method in the study of personality. There is a real need of observing better than he himself does his injunctions regarding logical clearness and exactness in the study of consciousness and the self. We may recognize the great worth of the analytical method without committing ourselves either to the exclusive or to the neo-realistic use of it, and without accepting uncritically the various assumptions which Perry ties up with it. We may regard analysis as an important stage on the way to insight into the nature of personality, and as a part of a true philosophic method.

a'. The analytical method.

b'. Emphasis upon mental action.

(b) He seems to be on the road to a correct understanding of personality in pointing out that action of some sort is the distinguishing character of mind. The word is acceptable, although his interpretation of it is quite objectionable.

c'. Importance of the body to the self.

(c) However, his interpretation of mental action in terms of bodily action brings into the foreground certainly the importance for personality not only of the bodily life, but also of the relation of personality to its environment. It is a warning against overlooking the significance of the objective realization and study of human purposes. His idea that the permanence of personality is to be found in the more or less constant dispositions of the biological subject should be noted also.

d'. The self as interest.

(d) Perry's most important contribution to the theory of personality, in my judgment, is his view that interest is the essence of the self, that the active personality consists in the whole of an individual's interests and of the dispositions upon which they are founded. (2) Another valuable suggestion that is implied in this connection is that the unity of the mental life might be found in the control of action by a single dominating interest. His metaphysical grounding of his doctrine of interest needs to be greatly altered, especially in the way of granting to the interest-self an autonomy which it lacks in his general theory.

Some needed enlargements in the theory.

Some suggestions for this remodeling may be found in Perry's own thought. His idea that the source of value lies in interest or desire might easily be reinterpreted so that we might say that values are to some extent the products of mental activity. He says that desire is a "form of determination," (3) and that "there is sufficient ground . . in reason and in fact, for asserting <u>that interests operate</u>, that things take place because of the good they

(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 379.
(2) Ibid., page 376.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 301.

promote. And this, I think, is the meaning of freedom, both as an actuality and as a prerogative. . Action . . is in a measure governed by desires and intentions. And this measure is capable of being increased. . The unit of life, the animal and human individual, is a moral and not a mechanical constant. An individual life is distinguished by what it seeks to preserve and promote." Purposes are "effectual" in the world. "The good is both objectively real and actually operative." (1)

e'. His analysis of teleology.

(e) Finally, he offers a suggestive analysis of teleological action from the behavioristic point of view. It appears that for him most human interests and action involve a direction towards an end which is more or less consciously present in the form of an anticipation or expectation which arises as a result of past experience. Hence, not only interest, but teleology plays an important part in Perry's account of personality.

C. THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY IN THE PERSONALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE.

1. Introduction.

William James asserted that the soul belongs only to "scholasticism and common sense." (2) It will now be indicated how this is too narrow a reference because there is another form of philosophy in which the soul has a logical and welcome home.

a. General character of Bowne's theory of personality.

The third and last type of personality-theory which will be considered is found in the personalistic philosophy of the late Borden Parker Bowne. The intrinsic importance of his conception is out of all proportion to the meager recognition which it has received in the literature of the problem. His view is characterized by being simple in its outlines, and strictly metaphysical in its genesis and setting. His manner of exposition is frequently polemical, but his reasoning is regularly vigorous and luminous. His method of argument consists largely in disproofs of objectionable theories and in the affirmation of his own upon the basis of a constant and direct appeal to experience. His form of presentation is somewhat systematic, and we shall, therefore, feel obliged, in our exposition, to quote freely from the sources. His standpoint is distinguished by the fact that he considers personality to be the fundamental principle of philosophic explanation, while personality itself is an ultimate fact to be accepted for what it is known as in experience.

Sources.

All of the essential features of his conception are found in Part III of his Metaphysics, (3) and in chapters IV, V, VI of Personalism, while some important supplementary material is located in Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part I, chapters V, VI and VII.

b. Reasons for rejecting certain theories of personality:

Bowne's destructive criticisms of certain theories which he regarded as erroneous are elaborated in his writings in such a detailed way that they cannot be set forth here. His chief reasons for rejecting these theories will be presented in only the most summary way.

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(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 342-4.
(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 208.
(3) See especially pages 330-44; 421-9.

1'. The materialistic or naturalistic theory.

The materialistic or general naturalistic view of the soul seems to have been dealt a knock-out blow. (1) The main reasons why Bowne thinks that matter in any form cannot explain the soul are as follows: (a) Its physical characteristics are entirely unlike mental facts; a feeling, for instance, having nothing in common with matter and motion. (b) Matter is multiple or made up of parts, and, therefore, cannot explain the unity of the mind, which is not in any sense a composition or union of spatial parts. (3) (c) Matter itself is phenomenal, and, therefore, presupposes a mental subject as knower, and also an intelligible being as dynamic ground. Hence, the existence of both matter and materialism is conditioned by that active intelligence which is denied by materialism. (4) (d) If intelligence is a product or aspect of the brain, thoughts should give information about the nature of the brain processes, but it is a notorious fact that they fail to furnish such knowledge. (5)

2'. The theory of associationism.

The following are Bowne's reasons for rejecting the attempt of the associationists to compound the soul out of mental states. They are quite similar to the above objections to materialism. This resemplance is due to the mechanical and spatializing tendencies common to the two views. (6)

(a) In the first place, just as physical elements cannot explain the unity of mind, so abstract states of consciousness cannot explain that unitary consciousness of states which comprises and owns many states in an individual's life. (7) "Such units of conscious feeling could never constitute a unitary consciousness." (8) The spatial analogy fails because the mental life is essentially non-spatial. (9)

(b) The most important objection to the associationist attempt to construct the soul is found, however, in the fact that sense impressions or particular states of consciousness, regarded as component units of mind, are fictitious abstractions and exist only for a mental subject. The latter, therefore, is not the product or consequence of their composition, but the presupposition of their existence. (10) The theory fails to show where or for what sensations and ideas"are associated." (11)

(c) The attempt to account for the self as a series of mental states fails because there is no abiding subject to comprehend the series as a whole. The associationist doctrine fails to account for personal identity and for memory.

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(1) The chief records of the conflict are to be found in Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part I, chapter I; Metaphysics, pages 300-31; Personalism, chapter V.

(2) Metaphysics, page 302. (3) Ibid., page 306.

(4) Ibid., page 317. (5) Ibid., page 320.

(6) See especially Metaphysics, Part III, chapter III; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Part I, chapter II.

(7) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 23-24.

(8) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 239.

(9) Metaphysics, page 383.

(10) Ibid., page 390; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 23.

(11) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 23-4.

(d) States of consciousness as described by the associationists cannot account for self-consciousness or the objectivity of thought, for "by hypothesis no one knows itself to say nothing of knowing its neighbors." (1)

3'. Other objectionable theories:

a'. Realistic.

All realistic theories of the soul are inconsistent with the general type of metaphysical idealism which Bowne defends. "We have repudiated the substratum-notion as the product of sense-bondage. . We admit no substance behind the subject and outside of knowledge. The ego which thinks, feels, and acts is all there is to know." A substance behind "the conscious, active ego" is a myth. (2)

b'. Phenomenalistic.

The Kantian doctrine that the self is a phenomenon is self-destructive because "where there is no perceiving subject there can be no phenomena; and when we put the subject among the phenomena, the doctrine itself disappears." (3) The self cannot be regarded as phenomenal in the same sense as other phenomena without contradiction. Bowne doubts if any one was ever convinced by Kant's argument, and concludes that either we have valid knowledge of the transcendental or noumenal ego or it "vanishes from thought altogether," because the categories cannot be applied to it in any way. (4) He thinks the ego is the "abiding self revealed in thought and consciousness as one." (5) These are the chief theories which he attacks.

2. Bowne's method of studying personality.

Bowne has a very definite conception of the function of epistemological principles in explaining personality. His theory of knowledge is grounded in part upon his conception of personality, for the reason that knowledge arises and is constructed only through the proper and free activity of a unitary and intelligent self. The latter builds the structure of knowledge organically from within in accordance with the principles, called categories, which are immanent in its own nature. "The principles or knowing are primarily immanent laws of mental activity." (6)

a. Personality and the categories.

1'. Nature of the categories.

The doctrine that the categories are immanent in personality is an important one. Their "formal" application in the understanding of phenomenal reality presented to the self is different from their use in comprehending intelligence itself; the latter is their "real" application. (7) "The soul itself as object of knowledge does come under the categories; but it does not come under them as abstract principles imposed from without, but as the living principles of intelligence itself revealed and understood in experience." (8)

2'. In what sense personality falls under the categories.

"As we have so often said, intelligence cannot be understood through the categories, but the categories must be understood through our living experience of intelligence itself. Intelligence is and acts. This is the deepest fact. It is not subject to any

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(1) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 23.
(2) Metaphysics, page 335. (3) Personalism, page 88.
(4) Metaphysics, page 336. (5) Ibid., page 333.
(6) Personalism, page 57. See also especially: Metaphysics, pages 316-7; 421 ff; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages iii-iv; 10-11.
(7) Metaphysics, page 336. (8) Ibid.

laws beyond itself, nor to any abstract principles within itself. Living, acting intelligence is the source of all truth and reality, and is its own and only standard. And all the categories, as abstract principles, instead of being the components of the mental life, are simply shadows of that life, and find in that life their only realization. This may be called my transcendental empiricism." (1) "In thinking of the soul we must not look for a lump, nor for a category, nor for a picture, but for the agent which thinks and feels and wills, and knows itself in so doing. And this soul is neither in the heights nor in the depths; it is very nigh indeed, for it is simply the living self." (2)

3'. All explanation must start from intelligence itself as an accepted fact.

It is a fundamental and oft-repeated idea of Bowne that personality cannot be explained by the categories. He offers various reasons for this view. (a) One is that categories are abstract while personality is concrete and is to be grasped in a living, not in a formal way; the abstract presupposes the concrete.

(b) A second reason is that the categories are the result or the product of personality, and "all explanation lies within the sphere of the products of thought and must not be extended to thought itself. We explain the work of intelligence by tracing it to intelligence, but intelligence itself simply is. It accounts for everything else, but it accepts itself. When we seek to construe intelligence in any way we fall into illusion. . When we come to intelligence we must stop in our regress and understand it as intelligence. Here our transcendental empiricism again appears. Intelligence has no means of understanding itself as product. It is the source of all products and for knowledge of itself it must fall back on experience." (3) Again, "Our analysis of the mind gives not components but aspects, distinctions rather than divisions. And the mind is not to be understood through these aspects, but, conversely, they are to be understood through the mind." (4) Since personality itself, therefore, is the starting point of all explanation, we fall into a vicious circle of reasoning if later we regard personality as a product.

(c) In the third place, the attempt to understand personality in terms of the categories reduces it to a lower degree of reality, namely, phenomenal, than it actually possesses, and at the same time undermines the solid foundation for metaphysics which personality furnishes.

Bowne's personal idealism.

It is evident, then, that according to Bowne intelligence itself as an accepted fact is the starting point from which all explanation must proceed, and that if it is to be understood at all, it must be understood in terms of itself. (5) For example, he says, "Reality for intelligence is intelligible in the forms of intelligence," (6) and we have to assume that intelligence knows "what it is doing and why it does it." (7) Personality as it lives

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(1) Metaphysics, pages 424-5; see also Ibid., pages 66, 341, etc.
(2) Ibid., page 339. (3) Ibid., page 428.
(4) Ibid., page 261.
(5) Compare Metaphysics, pages 186; 401; 425-6; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 97-8; Personalism, pages 215-6, etc.
(6) Metaphysics, page 422. (7) Ibid., page 428.

itself out contains the richest and most original principles for the comprehending of reality in any form. Bowne's philosophy may be called personal idealism in the sense that he is convinced, after thorough-going criticism, that personality is the fundamental postulate of metaphysics, and furnishes the principles for the understanding of everything else in the universe, while personality itself is to be understood only as an actual, self-realizing life. "When we make active intelligence the basal fact, all other facts become luminous and comprehensible, at least in their possibility, and intelligence knows itself as their source and explanation." (1)

b. The elements of self-consciousness: self-experience and self-knowledge.

Introduction: Bowne's appeal to experience.

In Bowne's effort to construe personality, it is evident that he constantly follows the guide of the actual experience of personality. (2) Since personality is an actual fact of experience, there can be no doubt as to its possibility. (3) Also, in his description of many of the special phases of the self, such as self-determination, the nature of the categories, personal identity, and self-consciousness, he makes constant appeal to experience. (4)

1'. Two factors of self-consciousness.

Among the original items of experience is the self-experience, which is one phase of self-consciousness. When we come "to the possibility of self-knowledge, experience only can decide. We have no knowledge of any sort which can deal with this problem apart from experience." (5) He regards self-consciousness as an important feature of developed personality. (6) Self-consciousness exists in various stages of explicitness, but is rooted in an original and unique self-experience. This self-experience may be supplemented by self-knowledge, which is a conceptual construction of the self upon the basis of the various phases of the self-experience. Self-knowledge and self-experience are the two distinguishable elements in self-consciousness. He describes these as "(1.) our thought, or conception, of ourselves, and (2.) our experience of our thoughts, etc., as our own." (7) Let us set forth in order Bowne's view of these two elements. (8)

a'. Self-knowledge.

Self-knowledge is a product of thought and is not given. "Our conception of self is a variable one, and . . is least of all an original and constant datum of consciousness. Even yet it is not complete, as appears from the oft-repeated question, What are we? It not only does not appear what we shall be; it does not even appear what we are. If complete self-knowledge were given in immediate consciousness, this could not be the case. In this sense, then, the idea and knowledge of self are developed, and the history of the idea can be given." (9) "The conceptions we form of ourselves are manifestly acquired like our conceptions of any

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(1) Personalism, page 216. (2) Metaphysics, page 429.
(3) Personalism, page 264.
(4) For example, see Metaphysics, 411-12, 429, 336, 423.
(5) Ibid., page 336. (6) See below, pages 132-33.
(7) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 244.
(8) The chief sources are: Ibid., Part I, chapter VII; Metaphysics, pages 235-6; Personalism, pages 258-9; Theism, pages 165-6.
(9) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 245.

other object; and this conception, like all others, may be more or less accurate," (1) or "adequate." (2)

But self-knowledge alone would not give us self-consciousness, for we might have a conception of self without having any immediate experience of it. Bowne points out that this "conceptual self-knowledge is by no means identical with self-consciousness; indeed, we can conceive a mind to have the fullest conceptual knowledge of itself, and yet have no proper self-consciousness at all. . And there would be nothing in its experience to explain that peculiar intimacy and vividness of self-consciousness which makes each mind for itself, not merely a specimen of a class, but a special case which puts all other things and persons into absolute antithesis to itself. . These conceptions" of others "lack entirely the vividness and reality of our experience of ourselves." (3) Hence we must go below self-knowledge to self-experience.

b'. Self-experience. It is an original datum.

The "original and constant" datum upon which self-knowledge is grounded is our immediate experience of the self. "The experience of self is primal. The conception of self is secondary." (4) Living experience is the source of all our knowledge of personality. (5) "The personality of others we merely conceive; our own personality we experience. Our mind is not merely a mind; it is our mind. The simple categories of the intellect would affirm only a mind; we pass from a mind to our mind, because we do not merely grasp ourselves in conception, but also realize ourselves in immediate experience. It is this self-experience which attends all our mental states which interprets to us what is meant by our; and if it were lacking, there would be no way of telling what is meant thereby. This self-experience is the original and irreducible factor of self-consciousness. It is in the life of feeling, desire, emotion, interest, that selfhood acquires any vividness and reality." (6) "No deduction of this self-experience is possible. It is something unique and can be understood only in terms of itself." (7) "This self-conscious experience is truly the ultimate fact." (8)

Bowne frequently refers to the self-experience in other writings than his Introduction to Psychological Theory. In this experience he finds the "concrete meaning" (9) for personality of which he is in search. "Self . . . is one of the surest items of experience." (10) "For each person his own self is known in immediate experience." (11) Intellect "knows itself in living and only in living." (12) The soul "is what we all experience as ourselves."(13)

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 244.
(2) Ibid., page 249. (3) Ibid., page 245.
(4) Ibid., page 249.
(5) Personalism, page 264.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 245-6.
(7) Ibid., page 246.
(8) Personalism, page 265.
(9) Metaphysics, page 341.
(10) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 27.
(11) Personalism, page 269.
(12) Ibid., page 215.
(13) Metaphysics, page 330.

(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 244.
(2) Ibid., page 249.
(3) Ibid., page 245.
(4) Ibid., page 249.
(5) Personalism, page 268.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 247-8.
(7) Ibid., page 248.
(8) Personalism, page 269.
(9) Metaphysics, page 387.
(10) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 57.
(11) Personalism, page 269.
(12) Ibid., page 417.
(13) Metaphysics, page 110.

"Actually . . . it is the self that thinks and feels and wills, and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the active and abiding subject of this inner life." (1) He states, again, that "The ego knows itself as the subject of its acts." (2) Indeed, he declares that, "the knowing self is . . . the only reality of which we have proper consciousness." (3)

c'. The interrelations of self-experience and self-conception:

1". The self-experience is the raw material of self-conception.

"Hence we hold that self-consciousness rests on an immediate experience of self. This self-experience is the raw material out of which our developed conceptions of self are wrought Experience does not intensify it, but only furnishes us with clearer ideas whereby to interpret it. . . We conclude, then, that all consciousness of which anything can be said has in it this element of self-experience and that this element is primal and undeducible. The self does not stand behind experience as its mysterious noumenal ground to be reached only by inference, but reveals itself as present in experience." (4)

His most striking statement of the relation of self-experience to self-knowledge is found in Personalism: (5) "When it comes to the self-knowledge of intelligence, there is always an element which mere conceptual knowing can never adequately grasp. We have seen that concepts without immediate experience are only empty forms, and become real only as some actual experience furnishes them with real contents. Hence there is an element in self-knowledge beyond what the conceptions of the understanding can furnish. This is found in our living self-consciousness. We conceive some things, but we not only conceive, we also live ourselves. This living indeed cannot be realized without the conception, but the conception is formal and empty without the living. In this sense intelligence must accept itself as a datum, and yet not as something given from without, but as the self-recognition of itself by itself. Intelligence must always have a content for its own recognition. The recognition would be impossible without the content, and the content would be nothing without the recognition."

Beware of stopping with abstractions.

Bowne warns the reader over and over again against supposing that personal life can be understood in abstract forms alone. "In general the self taken abstractly is worthless. . . But the self is not to be abstractly taken. It is the living self in the midst of its experiences, possessing, directing, controlling both itself and them." (6) It "can be realized only in life itself. . . All warmth, richness, vividness, and immediacy are found in the living experience; and the logical form is only an instrument for its realization." (7) "When we have lived and described the personal life, we have done all that is possible in sane and sober speculation. If we try to do more, we only fall a prey to abstractions." (8)

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(1) Metaphysics, page 330; see also, pages 339, 418.
(2) Ibid., page 335.
(3) Ibid., page 331.
(4) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 247.
(5) Personalism, page 258.
(6) Ibid., page 262.
(7) Metaphysics, page 400.
(8) Personalism, page 265.

2". Meaning of the immediate experience of the self.

By means of this distinction between the experience and the conception of the self, Bowne solves the old dispute concerning whether or not we have direct consciousness of the ego. The negative arguments are "valid for our conception of the nature of the self;" the affirmative arguments are "valid for our immediate experience of our thoughts and feelings as our own." (1)

Our author emphasizes the fact that the soul "is not something which can be sensuously presented; it is what we experience as ourselves. It is not a sense object, it is the living subject in unchangeable antithesis to all sense objects. It is not an object, it is the subject which is the condition of all objects." (2) "Personality and corporeality are incommensurable ideas." (3)

3". Stages of self-consciousness.

"Self-consciousness may remain on the lowest level of self-experience; and it may advance from this to a distinct conception of self, and to an affirmation of self as the controlling subject of experience. Only in that case would self-consciousness be perfect. This state is reached only as the mind comes into reflective self-possession and self-control. In childhood there is an abundance of self-experience, but no reflective self-knowledge. . . Even in our mature human life, self-consciousness often remains on the level of self-experience, without any distinct reflection upon self as the subject of our experience. . . It is possible that, in the case of lower animals, self-consciousness may remain permanently on the level of simple self-experience without further rationalization of that experience." (4)

2'. Relation of subject and object in self-consciousness.

Since consciousness in general has the antithetical form of subject and object, which "is as valid for self-consciousness as for any other," (5) it is an interesting question as to just what this relation can mean in case of self-consciousness. "Self-consciousness has been declared a contradiction, for if the self be the subject, it has no object; and if it be the object, it has no subject." (6) Bowne's solution, in essence, is that "the distinction of subject and object, on which consciousness depends, is only a mental function and not an ontological distinction." (7) "All this quibbling disappears upon remembering that the distinction of subject and object represents primarily the form under which consciousness takes place, and not any ontological separation between them." (8) "The possibility of personality or self-consciousness in no way depends on the existence of a substantial not-self, but only on the ability of the subject to grasp its states, thoughts, etc., as its own." (7) Neither subject nor object may be absent from consciousness at any time, but "the mind may direct its attention to either to the neglect of the other, or rather . . consciousness may be focused upon either of its

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 247-8.
(2) Metaphysics, page 330. (3) Personalism, page 266.
(4) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 248-9.
(5) Metaphysics, page 117.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 243.
(7) Theism, page 166.
(8) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 243.

elements, according to our interest at the time." (1)

3'. The personal character of all articulate experiences.

We have seen, then, that Bowne, in order to ascertain the facts about the reality of the soul, is constantly thrown back upon the world of experience. It is an ultimate fact and a datum which we must accept as trustworthy. "Experience stands absolutely in its own right and is independent of our metaphysical theories concerning it." (2) It is to be admitted rather than explained. (3)

Experience, in Bowne's system, has several important characteristics. (a) It is essentially a living thing, and "change is the most fundamental feature of experience." (4) (b) Further, the experience in which he finds the meaning of the categories "is not the passive experience of sense, but the active self-experience of intelligence." (5) "Intelligence itself is the great constitutive factor and condition of this experience." (6) "A rationally passive mind" could not "attain to articulate consciousness at all." (7)

"Experience, apart from the constitutive action of the mind, is an elusive phantasmagoria without intelligible contents, and . . articulate experience is possible only as the mind imposes its own rational forms on the sense matter." (8) These rational principles "are not conscious possessions of the mind prior to all experience, but they reveal themselves in and through the experience which they alone make possible." (9) It is clear, then, that "in all articulate experience the self appears as the abiding subject," (10) and as the one who owns the experience. (11) The self that owns the experience is the soul. (12)

(c) Hence, experience is not only active, but it is also personal. "We are in a personal world from the start." (13) Reflection gains a concept of personality by a critical interpretation of this original owner of all articulate experience. Let us consider, then, the rationalistic elements in Bowne's philosophic method.

c. The rationalistic elements in Bowne's philosophic method.

While we "begin with the data of experience, . we do not end with them. We find ourselves compelled to transcend them by giving them a rational interpretation." (14) Although the self is given in experience, it is the business of the metaphysician to ask, "How must we think of it?" (15) and in this way try to "satisfy the

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 249.
(2) Personalism, pages 25, 27.
(3) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 98; Metaphysics, pages 5,6.
(4) Metaphysics, page 44.
(5) Metaphysics, page 424.
(6) Personalism, page 150.
(7) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 353.
(8) Ibid., page 346.
(9) Ibid., page 364.
(10) Metaphysics, page 299.
(11) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 23.
(12) Metaphysics, pages 299-300.
(13) Personalism, pages 25, 26.
(14) Metaphysics, page 6.
(15) Ibid., page 332.

1'. His method is rational criticism.

rational demand for a sufficient reason for the mental life." (1) The only way we have of dealing with reality is by forming conceptions of it. (2) Bowne is rationalistic in the sense that he believes there is no other way to "grasp reality than by thinking of it." (3) He describes his method as "critical" of experience rather than "creative" of it. The phrase, rational criticism, then, might fairly represent the general character of his philosophical method.

2'. His use of the principle of contradiction.

He devotes much energy to the destructive criticism of theories which he believes to be erroneous. One of his characteristic ways of demolishing an opponent's view is by showing how it assumes what it is intended to disprove. For example: "This self has never been other than verbally denied, and . . when denied, it is always forthwith reaffirmed in some figure of speech, or assumed in the language employed. The very nature of thought and language make it impossible to maintain the denial without self-contradiction." (4) He is relentless in ferreting out the hidden assumptions in objectionable theories and in refuting them.

3'. The limitations of reason.

Bowne's view of personality is rationalistic, however, only in a restricted sense, namely, in the sense that his method of studying personality consists in critical thinking or interpretation, in the endeavor to "rationalize" experience. (5) Reason, however, must not be thought of as a separate faculty of personality distinct from the will, for in Bowne's philosophy, thought and will are intimately united; thought itself is a form of activity; he says, "I am not thought but I think." (6) Further, he does not expect reason to exhaust the meaning of personality because he says, "Our reason is not contradictory, but limited. . And when knowledge fails, we have to fall back on belief based on the necessities or the intimations of practical life. Here the test of truth is not speculative insight, but practical necessity or practical absurdity." (7)

4'. The illegitimate use of the imagination.

Bowne is very insistent on the point that the soul cannot be imagined but only may be experienced or thought. (8) This follows from its non-sensuous character. (9) "The soul and its products cannot be pictured in their proper existence." (10) It is essentially unpicturable. (11) Such an ontological reality as it is "can be grasped only in the unpicturable notions of the understanding." (12)

3. The general nature of personality in the philosophy of Bowne.

The main part of the exposition of Bowne's thought, namely, his conception of the general nature of personality is the next topic to be considered. He uses quite a number of terms beside

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(1) Metaphysics, page 337. (2) Ibid., page 3.
(3) Ibid., page 332.
(4) Ibid., page 317. For other examples of this use of the principle of contradiction, see: Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 26, 28-9; Metaphysics, 97, 311, 408; Personalism, 263.
(5) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 98.
(6) Ibid., page 28.
(7) Metaphysics, page 427. (8) Ibid., page 394.
(9) See above, page 129.
(10) Metaphysics, page 145.
(11) Ibid., page 352; page, 371.
(12) Ibid., page 28.

a. Use of terms.

personality to designate the same object. He does not make any important distinctions between personality, soul, self, spirit, intelligence, mind, ego, mental subject, or personal agent. He uses these words interchangeably. (1)

b. The fundamental, descriptive phases of personality.

The following summary of Bowne's conception of personality will fall into three main parts: (a) descriptive phases of personality; (b) two fundamental conditions; and (c) its reality and substantiality. This outline has been devised for the purposes of facilitating systematic exposition in this review.

The chief marks of personality in his conception may be noted first. He affirms that, "Selfhood, self-knowledge, and self-direction are the essence of personality." (2) Again, he declares that, "The essential meaning of personality" is "self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control." (3) If we adopt the terminology in his Introduction to Psychological Theory, then the two fundamental features of personality would be self-consciousness and self-direction or self-determination. Let us consider these phases in order.

1'. Self-consciousness and its implications.

Only the main implications of self-consciousness need to be referred to here, since it has been explained already at length. (4) That the ego is conscious is of course assumed, (5) for this is a part of its self-consciousness, and consciousness is "the specific feature or condition of all mental states . . . which constitute them mental states." (6) It is "an essential property" of all mental activity. "The field of consciousness is simply that of immediate experience without admixture of inference." (7) The distinction between subject and object is the unique form under which consciousness in general exists, (8) and this distinction, along with consciousness itself, cannot be spatially represented, but can only be experienced. (9) Wherever there is consciousness which is rational, or of which anything can be said, the mental subject or self is present, for "consciousness by its very nature must depend on a unitary activity." (10) "The conscious self grasps all its elements in an indivisible act, and thus makes consciousness possible." (11) In any endeavor, then, to understand consciousness, we must start with the active self as its central element. "Only as the states are discriminated from self as their subject, and are united in the various rational relations, does any intelligible consciousness arise." (12)

a'. Consciousness.

b'. Knowledge and intelligence.

Bowne usually includes self-knowledge in his enumeration of the fundamental phases of personality. This is one of the two ele-

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(1) For example, see Metaphysics, pages 66, 302, 334, 335.
(2) Theism, page 162.
(3) Metaphysics, page 118. See a similar statement in Personalism, page 266.
(4) See above, pages 126-128.
(5) Compare, Metaphysics, page 338.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 237.
(7) Ibid., page 237; compare Theory of Thought & Knowledge, 19.
(8) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 238.
(9) Metaphysics, pages 384; 149.
(10) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 359. Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 247.
(11) Metaphysics, page 193.
(12) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 239; 241, 15.

ments of self-consciousness. (1) Self-knowledge involves "the power to know," which Bowne mentions as one of the basic characteristics of personality. (2) This power is "the only thing essential to intelligence." (3) So important is intelligence in personality that Bowne uses intelligence freely as a synonym. It is to be identified especially with "the relating activity" of the mind, the source of the rational relations which characterize all articulate consciousness. (4) Indeed, there is "no consciousness without some knowing." (5) In the most elementary experience "the mind does not yet possess reason, but reason possesses the mind. Under the guidance of the immanent reason we see the mind lifting itself above the flux of impressions into a rational world, which, while potential in it from the beginning, only slowly becomes its conscious possession." (6)

Intelligence and personality.

Intelligence and freedom.

While the laws of thought which are immanent in intelligence itself are fixed, they require the "ratification by the free spirit;" so that we become truly rational "by our own free act." (7) "The mind must accept these laws and govern itself in accordance with them." (8) Thus in intelligence there is mysteriously united a strict uniformity with an element of self-determination. Indeed, "there is no effective rationality without self-control." (9) Knowing, therefore, can be separated from will, as also from feeling, only in abstraction, for it is in the light of intelligence that the will, or active side of personality, determines itself. (10) In fact, thought and act are essentially one. (11) "In developed self-consciousness the soul is aware of its aims and ideals, and directs its activities accordingly." (12) Hence, the step from self-consciousness to self-direction is very direct. Before discussing the latter, however, one other important element in self-consciousness must be noted.

c'. Selfhood and feelings.

When Bowne mentions the essential characteristics of personality, he sometimes includes selfhood, (13) but its meaning and relations to self-consciousness and self-knowledge remain very uncertain. We are left to guess that by selfhood he means that original and unique self-experience which has been described above as one of the "elements" of self-consciousness. (14) Just what he means by this primal self-experience which is given I have been unable to determine.

From one or two statements we might infer that it is akin to feeling. At any rate, feelings play an important role in personal

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(1) See above, pages 126-7.
(2) Personalism, page 266.
(3) Metaphysics, page 118. (4) Ibid., page 187.
(5) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 235.
(6) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 44.
(7) Personalism, page 206.
(8) Ibid., page 205. (9) Ibid., page 320.
(10) Metaphysics, page 415; on freedom, see further below, pages 134-38.
(11) Personalism, page 259.
(12) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 249.
(13) See above, page 132.
(14) See above, pages 127-8.

Feelings and the self.

life. He asserts that "experience first acquired living reality in feeling. . Mental functions become personal and significant only as our feelings and interests inform them with life and meaning. . Our feelings and interests are the deepest thing in us. . Will and understanding have no significance except as instruments of this throbbing and aspiring sensitive life." (1) In another book he states that, "Man has been considered solely as an intellect or understanding, whereas he is a great deal more. Man is - will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than logical understanding. Man is also a practical being." (2) Bowne thinks that the affective "feature of our life must be ascribed to a special reaction of the soul against the incitements of its physical and cognitive experience." (3)

Personality and values.

In the chapter on feelings in the Introduction to Psychological Theory, (4) Bowne emphasizes very clearly the idea that "few of our experiences have value in themselves, as passive gratifications of our sensibility; their value lies rather in the elements of personality which we have put into them. . All significant values in experience are seen to be constituted by their relation to self in self-consciousness." (5) He shows in detail how various feelings get their worth from their reference to certain personal aspirations.

Self-consciousness also involves unity and permanence. (6)

2'. Self-determination or freedom of personality and its implications.

The second outstanding characteristic of personality in Bowne's conception is its power of self-direction or self-determination, which is one of the ultimate and mysterious facts of our existence. (7) The "measure of self-control or the power of self-direction" which we experience "constitutes us real persons, or rather is the meaning of our personality." (8) This feature calls forth some of Bowne's most fervent eulogies. If one aspect of personality is more fundamental in his theory than any other, it is this one. "Self-determination . . can only be recognized as the central factor of personality." (9) It is most akin to that fundamental activity in which we shall expect to find the reality of personality. Let us consider now the nature and some of the more direct implications of self-determination. (10)

a'. Importance of self-determination.

b'. Nature of freedom or self-determination.

"By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not mean an abstract freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-direction in living men and women. . Actual freedom is realized only as one aspect of actual life; and

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 217. The desires are secondary to feelings and "form the transition from knowing to willing. In feeling and knowing, we have the condition of desire; and in desire we have the condition of proper volition." Ibid.

(2) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 376.

(3) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 185.

(4) Part I, chapter V. (5) Ibid., page 194.

(6) See below, especially pages 139-41; 144-5.

(7) See, for example, Metaphysics, pages 404, 415, 102.

(8) Ibid., page 102; Personalism, page 280.

(9) Metaphysics, page 416.

(10) Chief references are: Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part I, chapter VI; Personalism, chapter IV; Metaphysics, Part III, chapter IV.

it must always be discussed in its concrete significance." (1) "If anything is free, it is the soul, and not the will; for the will is only an abstraction from the volitional activity of the soul. And this free soul is also the knowing, prevising, ethical soul." (2)

Bowne identifies "the power of self-control with the will." "The will is the power which the soul has of controlling itself within certain limits, and a volition is an act of such control." (3) "In the intellectual life self-control is chiefly manifested in the form of attention, and the guidance of our cognitive powers towards a desired end." (4)

c'. Evidence for freedom.

Bowne offers various reasons for believing in personal freedom. (a) It is a fact of experience. (5) "We have some experience of it as actual," while we "have no experience of necessary agency." (6) In volitional activity we have a "peculiar consciousness . . of being the cause and source of the activity." (7)

(b) Again, freedom is "a necessary factor of rationality."(1) Indeed, we would not have any personal or rational life without the power of self-determination. (8) "The purest illustration we have of self-direction is in the case of thinking itself. We direct and maintain attention, we criticize the successive steps of the argument, we look before and after, we think twice and reserve our decision. . This life itself spontaneously takes on the form of freedom." (9) "In conducting . . a train of thought we have a very clear conviction that it depends upon our volition whether it shall go on or not, and that the volition depends upon us." (10) In another place Bowne declares that, "In the field of thought proper, everyone, in spite of himself, assumes that reason is a self-controlling force. Freedom in thought cannot be rationally disputed without assuming it." (11) Freedom is especially important in making error possible. (12)

(c) Freedom is also a "necessary postulate of conscience." (13) The fact of the sense of moral responsibility implies freedom. (14)

d'. Purpose and causality in the personal life.

"The soul determines itself, not in the dark of ignorance, or in the indifference of emotionless and valueless life, but in the light of knowledge and with experience of life's values," (15) and, as a result of this purposive self-direction, introduces new

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(1) Metaphysics, page 405.

(2) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 231; see also, Metaphysics, page 415.

(3) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.

(4) Ibid., page 233.

(5) Metaphysics, pages 416-7; Introduction to Psy. Th., page 232.

(6) Metaphysics, page 415.

(7) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 222-3.

(8) Metaphysics, page 406. (9) Ibid., page 406; see also p.407.

(10) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 223; also, 227. For an especially excellent account of the part of freedom in knowledge, see Ibid., page 333.

(11) Metaphysics, page 408. (12) Ibid , pages 406-7; Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 227.

(13) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 232.

(14) Metaphysics, page 404; Introduction to Psy. Th., page 223.

(15) Metaphysics, page 415.

departures and genuine novelties into reality. Bowne has some clear words on the place of purpose, as well as of causality, in the conception of personality.

1". Volitional causality is purposive.

"The causality of freedom means self-determination. This is a causality which looks to the future and is not driven by the past. It is a causality which forms ideals and plans, and devotes itself to their realization. Instead of being shoved out of the past, it is self-moving into the future. It may posit an order and maintain it. It may conceive purposes and realize them. Our experience of such causality is limited to the inner life, but it is in fact the only form of proper causality of which we have any experience whatever." (1) "The great distinction between mechanical and intellectual" (rather volitional) "causality is that the former is driven from behind while the latter is self-determined towards ends which lie before. As looking towards future ends it is called final causality--that is, it is purposive. Final causality is the causality of will informed by intelligent purpose.

"Hence in our experience of intelligence we find its activity taking on the purposive form The whole range of volitional activity . . is otherwise unintelligible. And everywhere the mind seeks to relate its objects as means and ends, or to comprise them in a scheme of purpose or an all-embracing plan. Moreover, we experience a peculiar satisfaction when we are able to trace relations of purpose. . Thought must become teleological before it can complete itself." (2) In order to get the systematic totality in our conceptions of the world which we desire, "the unity and system demanded must be internal, and this true inwardness can be found only in self-determining, self-conscious causality, guiding itself according to plan and purpose." (3)

2". Volitional causality and novelties.

It should be noted also that "the idea of new beginning" is "involved in volitional causality." (4) The causality of conscious intelligence . . possesses and directs itself. Here we have a cause that can make new departures without losing itself in the infinite regress,--a cause that was and also is,--a cause that does not lie temporally behind the process, but is immanent in the process as the abiding power on which it forever depends." (5)

3". The category of purpose.

Since "generally volition implies foresight and intention," (6) the place of purpose in connection with personality must be considered. Bowne maintains that "purpose is a category involved in the nature of free intelligence." (7) Explanation in the terms of purposive intelligence is the highest form of explanation and takes up all lower forms into itself. (8) The soul can "estimate motives and reasons; it can foresee consequences; it can compare

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(1) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 96-7.
(2) Ibid., pages 106-7. (3) Ibid., page 105.
(4) Ibid., page 97. (5) Personalism, page 197.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.
(7) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 106.
(8) Ibid., page 233.

its principles with the law of right." (1) But "a purpose as such is only a conception, and demands some means for its realization. . The realization of our purposes through mechanical means, so that the result is an expression at once of purpose and of mechanical necessity, is one of the most familiar facts of our experience. (2)

4". Freedom and law.

In various ways freedom or self-determination is linked up with fixed law. (3) In the realization of our purposes we make use of mechanical laws. (4) In moral obligation the self lays upon itself a duty which it plans to follow. (5) The most striking combination of freedom and law is in the operations of pure thought. "Here we have a self-directing activity which proceeds according to laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself." (6) "The process goes on within reason itself, reason supplying the motive, the norm, the driving force." (7)

Hence, "in both physical and the mental realm the believer in freedom finds an agent acting in accordance with an order of law and, by means of that order, freely realizing his own aims." (8) Indeed our freedom presupposes the order of law as its condition, so that "an element of uniformity must always be allied with freedom." (9) The self-determination of personality, therefore, is not arbitrary, but it is a "life of freedom as well as of law " (10) While these two ideas may be contradictory in the abstract, in concrete life they coexist and, therefore, their union is not only possible but real. (11) "Thus we discover freedom and uniformity united in reality; or rather we discover reality as having these opposite aspects." (12)

e'. The limitations of self-direction.

There are certain limits to the personal power of self-direction. "We cannot regard ourselves as self-sufficient and independent in any absolute sense. . Now our independence means just that experienced limited self-control; and our dependence means just that experienced lack of self-sufficiency. How these two aspects of experience can be combined in the same being we cannot tell, (13) any more than we can tell how freedom and uniformity can be united in the same being. But we find them thus united nevertheless." (14)

When we ask by what self-determination is limited, we find that Bowne replies in a very clear manner in his Introduction to Psychological Theory. "It is limited, on the one hand, by our mental and physical constitution; and, on the other, by the intensity of the desires and impulses which it has to control. . Within these

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 231.
(2) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 110.
(3) See Personalism, pages 204-12. (4) Ibid., page 208.
(5) Principles of Ethics, page 193.
(6) Metaphysics, page 408.
(7) Ibid., page 406.
(8) Ibid., page 414.
(9) Ibid., pages 412;411.
(10) Metaphysics, page 419; see also, Personalism, page 208.
(11) See Personalism, pages 204-5; Metaphysics, page 411.
(12) Metaphysics, page 412.
(13) Compare Metaphysics, page 415.
(14) Personalism, page 281.

limits freedom has its realm. . The outcome of volitional action is habit, fixed disposition, settled character. The soul may freely bind itself with chains which it can never undo. . Freedom may choose the seed, but it can neither determine nor escape the harvest." (1) He expands these ideas further by saying that, "Some factors of the mental life are entirely withdrawn from volitional control. Thus the essential nature of the susceptibilities and the constitutional activities is independent of volition. The laws of mental procedure and of mental change and combination also admit of no volitional control. Such are the interactions of thought and feeling, the laws of formal thought, and the judgments of conscience. These are forever secure from volitional modification. These laws furnish a basis of uniformity of which the free soul may avail itself, and without which freedom itself becomes meaningless. Of the feelings we have little or no direct control." (2)

But "within . . limits the soul can elicit or guide, intensify or repress, its activities, according to a preconceived rule, or for the realization of a preconceived end." (3)

1". Relation of personality to God: its existential dependence upon Him.

We human persons are also limited by the fact that the ground of our existence and nature is found in the Infinite. "The finite is dependent on the infinite. . The result is that the finite spirit has only a limited and relative existence at best." (4) God alone has perfect and complete personality. (5) "Hence, in the finite consciousness, there will always be a foreign element, an external compulsion, a passivity as well as activity, a dependence on something not ourselves, and a corresponding subjection." (6)

Its creation by God.

"The personal finite, the spirit, must be viewed as created." (7) "Creation seems to posit something in existence which, apart from the creative act, would not be." (8) "Where and when the divine plan, which is the law of cosmic activity, calls for it, there and then a soul begins its existence and development." (9)

Transition.

In self-consciousness and self-determination we have found the two fundamental characteristics of personal life according to the teaching of Bowne. These two phases of personality are prominent in all of his descriptions of it. Let us now turn to certain aspects of personality with which these are very closely bound up, and which I have called, for convenience, the general conditions of personality.

c. The general conditions of personal life:

One chief condition, not only of volitional activity, (10) but of all mental life, is consciousness. Bowne's conception of it has been already set forth. (11) It should be added, perhaps,

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 234.
(2) Ibid., pages 232-3.
(3) Ibid., page 222; for an excellent statement, see also, Metaphysics, page 413.
(4) Metaphysics, page 100. (5) Ibid., page 118.
(6) Theism, page 168.
(7) Metaphysics, page 99; see also, Theism, page 206.
(8) Theism, page 206.
(9) Metaphysics, page 373; see also, Metaphysics, page 379.
(10) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.
(11) See above, page 132.

1'. Consciousness.

that consciousness is always "living;" this attribute is frequently referred to by Bowne. (1)

2'. Identity and change in connection with personality.

The second general condition of personal life is to be found in identity, that is, in a certain abiding character of the self. The identity of personality has to be considered in close connection with certain other questions, especially intermittent consciousness, change, time, and memory.

a'. Identity or permanence of personality.

Let us first consider Bowne's belief in the fact that personality is a permanent reality. (2) "In all articulate experience the self appears as the abiding subject, the same yesterday and to-day." (3) Further, the self "knows itself as the . . . abiding subject of the inner life." (4) "The soul, then, is real and abiding or identical." (5)

1". Inadequate explanations of identity.

When we come to define more closely the nature of this personal identity, we find that several inadequate explanations of it have been proposed. (a) Identity cannot be found in a series of particular mental states; for they are only a succession of perishing and mutually external existences. "For if we suppose the particular states to be in time, they vanish as fast as they are born, and if there be nothing which abides across this flow and unites the past and the present in the unity of its continuous and identical existence, once more the judgment becomes impossible." (6)

a". A series of mental states.

b". A stream of consciousness.

(b) Likewise, the attempt to find identity in the stream of consciousness fails, for the reason that "it is a stream only for that which is not a stream." (7) If the stream of consciousness is nothing but stream, how does one part of it transcend itself and apprehend some other part so as to compare the two parts and assert that they are connected?

c". Bare substance.

(c) Further, "identity is not to be viewed as any rigid core of being." (8) "There is no way of seeing how the soul as bare substance could ever provide for the identity of consciousness," for "we have done away with the soul as lump or inert substance." (9) Brain substance or transcendent substance cannot explain identity, for all these are abstractions.

d". Identity explains the soul.

These various attempts to account for personal identity assume that some principle of identity can be found outside of the soul which will explain its permanence. This inverts the true order of explanation. We have already seen that no abstract category can constitute the soul, but soul itself explains each and all of the categories. (9)

Having eliminated these erroneous conceptions of identity, Bowne finds that "experience shows only two kinds of permanence, fixity of meaning and permanence of the thinking subject." (10)

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(1) Personalism, 258, etc.
(2) See Metaphysics, pages 339-349.
(3) Ibid., page 299. (4) Ibid., page 330.
(5) Ibid., page 339.
(6) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 22.
(7) Metaphysics, page 340. (8) Personalism, page 123.
(9) Metaphysics, page 340; see above, pages 124-125.
(10) Personalism, page 115.

2". Identity found only in consciousness.

The former is logical identity, and in the latter alone do we find the key to identity in the concrete. Identity is "provided for only in consciousness." (1) "Consciousness not merely reveals, but makes, the only identity worth talking about." (2) "If we would know what concrete identity is, we must not look about for an abstract category to tell us, but must rather consider the self-identifying action of intelligence. There is no other real identity; indeed, closely considered, real identity has no other meaning than that which emerges in the self-identification of intelligence," (3) in "the self-equality of intelligence through its experience." (4) And this self-identifying intelligence is nothing but the soul itself. It is the "conscious soul" which is identical. It comprises the successive mental states "in its own unity; it must distinguish itself from them as the abiding subject, and must work them over into the forms of intelligence." (5) "The conscious subject remains as the only fixed point to which everything, both permanence and change, has to be referred. Self-consciousness is the origin of ordinates in this field." (6)

a". Memory and personality.

Locke is mistaken, Bowne thinks, when he asserts that memory makes identity. The fact is, "memory does not make but reveals the fact that our being is continuous." But continuity does not yet mean that identity is present, for these two concepts are different. Continuity "means only that the being which now is has been developed from the being which was." But to "raise continuity to proper identity or sameness," we need a "fixed factor" in the flow. "And this can be done only as the agent himself does it; and the agent does it by memory and self-consciousness, whereby a fixed point of personality is secured, and the past and present are bound together in the unity of one consciousness. The permanence and identity, therefore, are products of the agent's own activity. We become the same by making ourselves such. . . Proper identity is impossible except in consciousness." (7) It is the living mind, too, which performs for itself "the unique act of memory." (8) "It distinguishes itself from its affections, and affirms itself as abiding through them." (9) It is the "self-identifying intelligence," then, which constitutes permanence in the midst of its essential change. (10)

If the identity of the soul depends upon a self-identification of conscious intelligence, the question arises as to the meaning of the permanence of the soul after a period of unconsciousness? "What of the soul when it is unconscious?" (11) The realist would reply that only some "back-lying substance" can meet this difficulty,

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(1) Metaphysics, page 339.
(2) Ibid., page 339; see Personalism, page 123.
(3) Ibid., page 341; see also Personalism, page 260.
(4) Personalism, page 123.
(5) Metaphysics, page 340.
(6) Personalism, page 124.
(7) Metaphysics, page 64.
(8) Ibid., page 345.
(9) Ibid., page 57.
(10) Ibid., page 66.
(11) Ibid., page 341.

b". Intermittent consciousness and personal identity.

for if sameness can endure across unconsciousness, something besides consciousness must constitute it.

Bowne acknowledges the great difficulty raised by the fact of intermittent consciousness, such as periodic sleep illustrates. He tries to meet it by emphasizing the unreality of time and the dependence of the soul upon God.

(a) He points out, first, that it is false to assume that there is a real time in which anything can exist apart from self-consciousness, to which alone time is relative. (1)

(b) In the second place, he says, there may be continuity without the identity which is made by consciousness, although it is hard to say what this continuity is. It means some sort of dependence of the finite upon the infinite, for whom alone the complete notion of existence is realized. (2) "The soul has its existence primarily in the divine thought and act, and it may remain on the plane of existence for others without at once attaining to, or always possessing, existence for itself. Apart from the latter the soul has its existence and continuity solely in the divine thought and will. . . How that which begins without selfhood and in absolute dependence can yet attain to selfhood and a measure of independence is the mystery of finite existence." (3)

In any case we must not hunt for, or at least expect to find, any kind of identity apart from what we experience; for in experience, if anywhere, we can understand identity. The self-identification of the soul is the best proof of identity, for identity has no other meaning. Whatever may lie beyond this must be sought, not in the realm of metaphysical abstractions, but in the thought and self-consciousness of the Infinite. (4)

b'. Personality and change.

1". Self-identical personality alone explains change.

In the permanent or self-identical subject which has just been described is found the "fixed factor" which alone makes change intelligible. (5) The abstract contradiction between change and identity disappears when we consider that the free personality initiates changes without being itself involved in them. (6) We would not have even the notion of change if the thinking subject itself were also a part of the flux of things. In order to get an idea of how there can be change in the phenomenal world, "we are thrown back upon the conception of an underlying intelligence which is at once the seat of the idea and the source of the realizing energy. Otherwise we can only oscillate between an impossible realism and an impossible idealism." (7) "And the change which we find is not an abstract change running off in an abstract time, but is simply the successive form under which the self-equal intelligence realizes its purpose and projects the realizing activity against the background of its self-consciousness." (8)

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(1) Metaphysics, page 341.
(2) Metaphysics, page 342.
(3) Ibid., page 343.
(4) Ibid., pages 343-4.
(5) Ibid., page 60.
(6) Ibid., page 191.
(7) Ibid., page 62.
(8) Personalism, page 255.

2". Personality and time.

a". Intelligence originates temporal relations.

"Time, then, is not an ontological fact but is essentially a function of self-conscious intelligence. . No one can deny time as a form of our experience, and, in this sense, as a fact of reality. But this time exists only in the experience of a self-conscious intelligence." (1) It has no meaning apart from such an intelligence. It is the mind alone which gives ideas "temporal form and fixes their temporal relations." (2) "Here the identical posits an order of change and abides unchanged across it." (3) If, then, any ideas or events are to have a temporal order, active intelligence must set them in that order. (4)

1'". The origin of the present and of the future in finite experience.

One of Bowne's most profound insights into the relation of personality to time is found in his idea that the limitations of our consciousness require us to regard the actual as the present and the future as the unpossessed. He declares that, "The present is relative. We have seen that we cannot have experience in the present, but we constitute the present by the actual in experience. But the range of this experience varies with the range of our powers. One able to comprehend a large body of objects or events within the field of consciousness would have a more extensive present than another who could grasp but a few. If we could retain all the objects of experience in equal vividness and immediacy they would be alike present. A mind which could do this would have no past. Again, a mind in full possession of itself, so that it does not come to itself successively, would have no future. Such a being would have a changeless knowledge and a changeless life. It would be without memory or expectation, so far as itself was concerned, yet it would also be in the absolute enjoyment of itself. For such a being the present alone would exist, and its now would be eternal." (5) "Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the range and contents of self-consciousness." (6)

The same striking idea is expressed in Personalism: "The present of experience is simply a relation in self-consciousness which gives the origin for all time measures and judgments, and the range of this present depends solely upon the range of the apprehending quality of the mind. The present, therefore, is no fixed measure, but is relative to our mental power." (7)

b". But intelligence itself is timeless.

But if intelligence establishes temporal relations, it cannot itself be constituted by them, so that "the finite intelligence, in so far as it is intelligence, is timeless; that is, it has no real before-and-after in it, but it establishes temporal relations." (8) Personality originates changes and abides self-identical across them. (9) This is the actual fact, although we cannot tell just how it is possible. (10) Personality, therefore cannot be described in temporal relations since it is itself the source of time. Time applies only to phenomena, but personality is not a phenomenal but an ontological reality. (11)

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(1) Metaphysics, page 186. (2) Ibid., page 393.
(3) Ibid., page 91. (4) Ibid., page 66.
(5) Ibid., pages 188-9. (6) Ibid., page 193.
(7) Personalism, page 144; see also pages 145-7.
(8) Metaphysics, page 187. (9) Personalism, page 197.
(10) Metaphysics, page 191.
(11) Ibid., page 193.

c". In what sense the soul is temporal.

The only sense in which the self can be said to be in time is that its activities are limited, as we have indicated above. (1) It is largely subordinated to a great cosmic system. "This relation manifests itself in a certain temporal character of our experience. The self is limited; it comes and goes, has beginnings and endings, and unpicturable pauses and variations which are imposed upon it from without. In this sense our life is temporal; and in this sense temporality is only the shadow of our finitude and limitation. And this temporality is not in time; it is simply an aspect of our experience." (2)

d". The development of the soul.

In view of these facts Bowne's conception of how personality develops is very interesting. He observes that, "the soul, as substance, forever changes; and, unlike what we assume of the physical elements, its series of changes can be reversed only to a slight extent. The soul develops, but it never undevelops into its former state. Each new experience leaves the soul other than it was; but, as it advances from stage to stage, it is able to gather up its past and carry it with it, so that, at any point, it possesses all that it has been. It is this fact only which constitutes the permanence and identity of self." (3)

c'. Summary of how change and permanence are united in personality.

He concludes, therefore, that "in personality, or in the self-conscious spirit, we find the only union of change and permanence, or of identity and diversity. The soul knows itself to be the same and distinguishes itself from its states as their permanent subject. This permanence, however, does not consist in any rigid sameness of being, but in thought, memory, and self-consciousness, whereby alone we constitute ourselves abiding persons. How this is possible there is no telling; but we get no insight into its possibility by affirming a rigid duration of some substance in the soul." (3)

"We must remember that the soul, as substance, comes under the perpetual flow. We are not conscious of a permanent substance, but of a permanent self; and this permanence is not revealed, but constituted by memory and self-consciousness; for, if we abolish them, and allow the soul to sink to the level of an impersonal thing, identity is degraded into continuity, and permanence passes into flow. Consciousness, then, does not simply reveal permanence in change; it is the only basis of permanence in change. . If, then, the idea of being must include permanence as well as activity, we must say that only the personal truly is. All else is flow and process." (4) "In the consciousness of self as identical throughout change we have the only example of identity in change. The conception of a permanent thing with changing states is founded as conception, as well as realized in being, in the fact of the conscious self." (5) "Only the personal can combine change and identity, or flow and permanence." (5)

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(1) See above, page 142.
(2) Metaphysics, page 188.
(3) Ibid., page 63.
(4) Ibid., pages 64-5.
(5) Ibid., page 66.

3'. The unity and individuality of personality.

The third general condition of personality to be considered is its unity and individuality. "The unity of the true ego is necessary to the existence of any mental life." (1) "This unity appears on reflection as the absolute postulate of the mental life." (2) Without this unity the thought life, indeed the mental life as a whole, would fall asunder. (3)

a'. Unity a fact of consciousness.

Unity is given as a fact of consciousness. "The ego knows itself . . as one in the unity of its consciousness." (2) For Bowne the unity of consciousness and the unity of the self mean the same thing. (4) The very fact that we are conscious proves that consciousness has unity, (5) for "the conscious self grasps all its elements in an indivisible act, and thus makes consciousness possible." (6) "Only in the unity of consciousness can the category of unity be realized" in its concreteness. (7) Here, as elsewhere, a fundamental category gets its significance from personality and cannot be used in turn to explain personality. "The free and conscious self is the only real unity of which we have any knowledge, and reflection shows that it is the only thing that can be a true unity. (8)

b'. This unity is not a composition.

We must not try to picture this unity as any kind of "an emanation, budding, fission division, and composition." (9) It cannot be pictured in spatial or sensuous terms, for it is not a combination of parts. "Personality can never be construed as a product or compound." (10) Further, we cannot grasp the unitary nature of mind by bringing the various mental factors of analytical psychology under a class term and calling that personality. (11) Such terms are empty until they are filled with the concrete reality of personal life.

c'. This unity has various phases.

The unity of the self, however, is not a bare and "abstract unity without distinction or difference, but a living, conscious unity, which is one in its manifoldness and manifold in its oneness. (12) Intelligence, will, and feeling do not exist in a pure state; they can be distinguished only in abstract analysis; in reality they constitute the concrete unitary whole of the self-directing, self-conscious soul. "We are not abstract intellects nor abstract wills, but we are living persons, knowing and feeling and having various interests " (13) "In the actual mental life, all its factors exist in complex synthesis from the start. In our study of that life, we must consider its factors successively and one by one." (14) "The simplest mental fact is com-

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(1) Metaphysics, page 333; see also, page 373.
(2) Ibid., page 335.
(3) Ibid., pages 337, 339; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 20-22.
(4) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 25.
(5) Ibid., page 28.
(6) Metaphysics, page 193.
(7) Metaphysics, page 66.
(8) Ibid., page 91.
(9) Ibid., page 373.
(10) Personalism, page 264.
(11) Metaphysics, page 398.
(12) Personalism, page 262.
(13) Ibid., page 263.
(14) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 235.

plex; and the elements into which we break it up in our analysis are only the different phases of the one indivisible conscious state." (1)

Hence, "unity is entirely intelligible as the unity of the self in the plurality of its activities." (2) "In our experience of free intelligence . . we find a unity which produces plurality without destroying itself. Here the one is manifold without being many." (3) "Here is a unity which in the oneness of consciousness can posit plurality and remain unity still." (4) Bowne's conclusion is that, "we insist that in the face of all the facts we must think of it (the self) as one and not many, as simple and not compound." (5)

d'. Individuality and personality.

He holds to "the ontological individuality and separateness of souls," and "the metaphysical separateness and incommunicability of each individual." (6) He speaks of "the inalienability of personal experience," (7) and asserts that we finite thinkers "have an inalienable individuality and personality." (8)

4'. Personality and the organism.

a'. Interactionism.

Bowne maintains that the relation between soul and body is best conceived as that of interaction. (9) By this he simply means that each affects the other. "The union of the two has no other meaning than this fact of mutual influence." (10) In this way "the organism seems to be a kind of link between the inorganic physical and the mental. As physical, it is allied to the world of matter; and, as living, it is allied to the world of mind." (11) "The statement that the soul is in the brain means only that the soul is in direct interaction with the brain; a change in the brain is attended by a change in the soul, and conversely." (12) This reciprocal influence is the only definite meaning that can be given to the question as to the seat of the soul. (13) "The actual organism is only a stimulus to mental unfolding and a servant of the unfolded life. . At present, however, the organism is mentally conditioned and the mind is organically conditioned, in the sense of mutual concomitance in their respective changes." (14)

However, "we do not see that the body is necessary to consciousness. . The relation, whatever it is, can only be viewed as factual and contingent. The actual body, then, is no analytically necessary factor of our inner life." (15)

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 237-8; also, page 250. (2) Personalism, page 260.
(3) Metaphysics, page 91. (4) Personalism, page 197.
(5) Metaphysics, page 332. (6) Ibid., page 377.
(7) Ibid., page 102. (8) Ibid. page 103.
(9) The chief passages dealing with the relation of body and mind are: Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part II, chapter IV; Metaphysics, Part III, chapter II.
(10) Metaphysics, page 351. (11) Ibid., page 355.
(12) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 300.
(13) Ibid., page 300; Metaphysics, page 188.
(14) Metaphysics, page 346.
(15) Ibid., page 378.

b'. The soul builds the organism.

We have noticed above that the soul is created by God; (1) that is, the soul is posited by God and, under the conditions set by him, builds and maintains the organism which "becomes a visible expression of the personality, a means of personal communion, and also a means for controlling to some extent the inner life." (2) The laws of interaction between soul and body "must be sought in the plan and agency of the infinite." (2) "Seeing that the soul is that with reference to which the organism has its existence, we may also speak of the soul as the builder and maintainer of the organism. There is no reason to think there would be any organism if there were no inner life." (3)

c'. Union of organic and conscious activity in the soul.

The soul, therefore, has two phases: "it has a phase of organic activity and one of conscious activity. Both of these are united as the expression of the nature of the one soul." (4) Bowne distinguishes four stages in the development of these phases. "Conscious activity based upon and growing out of the organic activity is the final stage. Thus the continuity of the organic and the mental world is in a measure assured and some reason given for their intimate interrelations." (4) Whether Bowne means to accept this idea in this form is uncertain from his account on these pages. (5)

d. The reality and substantiality of the soul.

Let us turn now to the central question in the metaphysics of personality, namely, the problem of its reality. The fundamental principle of personality in Bowne's conception is activity, which guarantees its existence, its substantiality, and its reality. "The soul is a proper agent acting out of itself;" (6) and because it acts, we know that it exists and is real; for whenever anything is "able to assert itself in activity," it "acquires the right . . to be viewed as real and substantial . . and existing. In like manner the soul has no being in it; it knows itself as active and as acted upon; and in this fact and knowledge it has the only possible mark of reality." (7)

1'. Activity is the fundamental principle of personality.

a'. The relation of agent to his action.

We cannot, however, make any real separation between the agent, its being, its action, unless we confuse "logical with temporal antecedence. The postulate of action is an agent, but this agent is not temporally antecedent to the action. Action is a dynamic consequence of being, and is coexistent with it. Neither can be thought without the other, and neither was before the other. . . Both being and action are given in indissoluble unity. Being has its existence only in its action and the action is possible only through the being. . Metaphysically considered, being is self-centered activity, without distinction of parts or dates. In our thinking, we separate the agent from the agency but, in reality, both are posited together; indeed, each is but the implication of the other. . We deny that the agent can, in reality, be separated from the agency." (8)

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(1) Page 138.
(2) Metaphysics, page 368.
(3) Ibid., page 369; see also Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 300.
(4) Metaphysics, pages 356-7.
(5) Compare Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 300-1.
(6) Metaphysics, page 300. (7) Ibid., page 335.
(8) Ibid., pages 24-5.

"These agents, again, have in them no antithesis of passive being and active energy, but are active through and through." (1) "The only gulf in the case is that between the agent and the act, the doer and the deed. We may trace the deed to the doer, but to trace it into the doer involves confusion and nonsense. The producer is not the work, but he is revealed through the work; and the work is understood through the producer. This is a relation which is perfectly intelligible in experience; and beyond it we cannot go." (2) Agents themselves are ultimate facts, and why they are is not a question to which we finite human beings can be expected to give an intelligent answer. "How the soul can act there is no telling." (3) "The reality is always an agent. How an agent can be made, we do not claim to know. . How an agent can act is also unknown; but it is plain that we get no insight into the possibility by positing a rigid core of inert reality in the agent." (4)

b'. Forms of activity.

If we cannot go beyond the agent, we can start from the individual personal agent, when it first appears in consciousness, and describe the various forms of its activity. In fact "activity in general, like being in general, is impossible." (5) Rather should we consider the different, particular mental states which are generated by the activity of the soul. We must look "for the agent which thinks and feels and wills," (6) and which, although it is unitary, yet produces a plurality without destroying itself. (7) Only when we find such "definite" kinds or forms of activity do we find any real activity at all. (8)

"Things differ only in the form or kind of activity." (8) The definite and different characters of agents are to be found in the law of their activities. "We define the nature of a thing as that law or principle which determines the form and character of its activity." (9) One agent is distinguished from another by the "form and sequence of the activity." From these we derive certain "laws of action." (10)

"In one sense, all forms of mental experience, including even sensations, are modes of action; as they express a mental reaction against either external or internal stimuli. The mind when passive is not properly inactive; but the form of its activity is determined by its circumstances, according to some fixed law." (11) "Mental states in general . . are not things, but mental acts or functions." (12)

That this is true of volitional and constitutional activity is clear. "Attention may mean simply the direction of our activity toward a given object. In this sense it is a form of self-determination, and is a condition of mental action." (13) The important

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(1) Metaphysics, page 27. (2) Ibid. pages 428-9.
(3) Ibid., page 339. (4) Ibid., page 23.
(5) Ibid. page 30.
(6) Ibid., page 339.
(7) Ibid., pages 91; 339.
(8) Ibid. page 30.
(9) Ibid., page 39. (10) Ibid., pages 30, 40.
(11) Introduction to Psychological Theory page 220.
(12) Metaphysics, page 394.
(13) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 240-1.

kind of activity to which attention leads is the "rational, or relating, activity of the mind; and this it is which has such high significance for consciousness." (1) The various modes of thinking or intellectual experience, then, may be described as forms of self-conscious activity. (2) Sensations are not themselves agents, but are the "flowing forms of action." (3) Categories are "modes of intellectual manifestation." (4) And in general, knowing is a "form of mental activity." (5)

2'. The reality and substantiality of personality.

Because personality acts and is acted upon, it is real. "The reality of the soul consists in its ability to act; other reality it has none." (6) "What we mean by calling the soul real is just what we mean by calling anything real, namely, that it acts and is acted upon, and that it is a determining factor in the world of change and effects." (7) "The evidence in favor of the reality of the soul is indefinitely stronger than for the reality of matter." (8) "There is no escape from regarding the soul as something substantially real. It abides, acts, and is acted upon; and these are the essential marks of ontological reality. . No other finite thing can show so good a title to the name of reality." (9) "The self is the only reality of which we have any knowledge, and the only thing which fills out the notion of reality in distinction from phenomena." (10) Again Bowne asserts that "Active intelligence is the only reality." (11) Even if there be a greater "absolute reality," this "does not remove the fact that we still are real in the sense that we can act and be acted upon." (12)

Since "that which can act and be acted upon is the essential idea of substance," (13) the soul or personality is also a substance. "When we have found the mental subject, we have found the mental substance, for subject and substance are identical." (14) Again, "Substance and subject, or agent, are identical." (14) Obviously Bowne has no objection to calling the soul a substance in this sense. It is a substance, not in the sense of being a self-sufficient or "rigid core" of being, but in being "the subject of action and passion." (15)

e. Classification of Bowne's conception of personality.

Bowne's theory of personality belongs in the class of immanent theories. While personality is primarily the subject of experience, it includes in its wholeness various objective aspects. (16) It is

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 241.
(2) Personalism, p. 212; Theory of Thought & Knowledge, page 9.
(3) Metaphysics, page 387. (124-125.
(4) Ibid., page 424; see Personalism, page 57; see above, pp.
(5) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 193.
(6) Metaphysics, page 339. (7) Ibid., page 337.
(8) Ibid., page 338. (9) Ibid., page 349.
(10) Ibid., page 317; see also, pages 302, 337.
(11) Ibid., page 316.
(12) Ibid., page 338.
(13) Ibid., page 335.
(14) Ibid., page 335.
(15) Ibid., page 101.
(16) See above, page 8.

characteristic of him to regard a person as essentially an active subject immanent in experience. He is especially careful to exclude from personality anything which might be said to transcend experience. One of the two outstanding marks of personality is self-consciousness; and while personality is grounded in the infinite, knowledge of its grounds is not essential to the esperience of its reality, but only knowledge of its own activities. Strictly, personality is not to be understood as an object which we can perceive, but rather an experience which we can live out, and a reality we may conceive and think about.

4. Estimate of Bowne's theory of personality.

a. Some imperfections in it:

1'. In the general character of his exposition.

The above survey includes the main elements in Bowne's theory of personality. Our effort to present an orderly and condensed review of his conception gives it, as in the case of that of James, the appearance of possessing more system than it actually has. A thoroughly systematic exposition of his theory is not to be found in any particular section of his writings. His characteristic mode of procedure is to set forth various panoramic views of personality. In each of these one gross feature may occupy the foreground, but it is usually bound up closely in language and logical connection with other important features. Consequently, there is much overlapping, and much repetition and restatement, as the above quotations illustrate. The several aspects of personality are not finely distinguished, and then exactly joined together into an integrated whole. This loose tendency is seen in his use of many different terms for personality without any clear distinction between them. (1) This generalizing tendency of his presentation has involved necessarily much repetition in our account. In his own account it has resulted in some loose ends and numerous unsolved problems of detail.

2'. In his method of studying personality.

Certain general defects in Bowne's method of studying personality should be noted. On the whole, his method is too rationalistic. (2) He spends so much time in hunting logical flaws in the theories of others that he has too little time for laying a solid foundation for his own, and in the end his view rests too much upon assertion and too little upon evidence.

Again, his references to experience are as a rule quite too general. He leans heavily upon the authority of a general appeal to experience for the solution of many difficulties. When any one of many problems connected with personality cannot be conceptually solved, he calls upon experience to show forth the actual solution. His numerous appeals to experience are so similar and so general that they become largely useless. Many of the obscure places in his theory might be clarified by means of a closer analysis of experience. How various aspects of personality, such as self-determination, selfhood, activity, agency, subject, intelligence, etc., are actually differentiated in experience, if at all, is undetermined.

In particular, an important question which he does not adequately discuss in view of its importance is the meaning of that "constant and original" datum which he calls "self-experience." (3) He fails to say just what the constant self is which we experience.

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(1) See above, page 132, top.

(2) Compare, W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, page 502, note 2.

(3) See above, pages 127-8.

If it cannot be described, he should say so more explicitly, and give us more guides for its identification. While he says intelligence cannot recognize itself without "content," (1) he does not explain exactly what content it is which he has in mind.

In his references to experience it is sometimes unclear whether or not he means experience to be a more ultimate philosophical postulate than personality. It was stated above (2) that he probably means personality, or "the active self-experience of intelligence," to be ultimate. (3)

On the whole, however, his method of studying personality should be highly commended so far as it goes. It deserves to be carefully considered by those who seek the proper method of treating personality.

3'. In his view of activity, and its relation to permanence.

His treatment of activity is altogether too meager and simple in view of the importance of the concept in his metaphysics and in his theory of personality. Activity must be comprehensive, of course, in order to serve as the first principle of reality, but since he regards concrete activity as the only real kind, he should explain more definitely how we may identify it in our experience, what are its psychological marks, and especially how it is related to the other varied phases of the mental life. He does this, to be sure, by reference to the idea of form. But form is quite too abstract a term to be used without some more concrete or psychological filling. The various forms or kinds of activity need to be more carefully distinguished and their interrelations exhibited. It is very regrettable that Bowne has not explained more fully the nature of activity, since it plays such a central part in his conception of nature and mind.

He falls, in fact, into the following logical difficulty: personality, in his view, is essentially activity, and therein its reality consists; but activity involves, certainly, change; yet he says personality is one and the same. This is a fundamental inconsistency in his system which he does not explain.

It is interesting to note that A. Vannérus points out a similar difficulty in his summary and criticism of W. Wundt's conception of the soul. (4) Wundt vigorously opposes the theory of a substance existing behind conscious states. He regards the soul life as an immediate actuality or reality whose essence is activity, but he emphasizes the activity so strongly that it seems to pass over into mere change, and the permanent factor is ignored. On the other hand, in his criticism of associational psychology, he closely approaches the substance theory. Evidently Wundt meets the same difficulty that Bowne passes by, namely, how provide for permanence if the soul is regarded as essentially activity.

The point of objection, then, is that the relation of activity to change and permanence is especially unclear in the philosophy of Bowne, so far as I can ascertain. Personality is essentially activity and yet it is permanent; then the permanent changes or

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(1) See above, page 128.
(2) See above, page 130.
(3) Metaphysics, page 424.
(4) Archiv für systematische Philosophie, vol. I, 1895, pages 363-400.

the active abides. The permanent self is the "same yesterday and to-day," and yet "each new experience leaves the soul other than it was." (1) It may be fair to say that he suggests incidentally the solution in principle of this paradox by asserting that while personality, as substance, is continually changing, yet its purposive or rational self-determination gives it a permanence amid its changes. But certainly this very important doctrine needs much more careful treatment than the general statement that experience actually solves it for us.

It should be noted, however, that the difficulty of the problems which Bowne faces is very great. It is much easier to point out the dark places in his theory than to find means of illuminating them any more than he does. It is easier to count up the contributions of his conception of personality than it is to find imperfections in it.

b. Some contributions of Bowne's theory of personality:

1'. Comprehensive grasp of the problem.

Bowne's gross method of explaining personality mentioned above is really, from one point of view, a chief merit of his treatment, because thereby he gains a breadth of comprehension and an emphasis upon essential principles which is notably lacking in most other theories, and also because in that way he is able to accentuate the main features of personality without losing perspective by reason of too many details. Bowne certainly deserves credit for bringing into the foreground of attention problems in connection with personality which are undoubtedly fundamental.

To mention all of the outstanding features of personality upon which he dwells would require the repetition here of most of the outline of the above exposition of his view. This rehearsal is unnecessary. Only a few of his especially notable contributions will be indicated.

2'. Personality is central in philosophy.

Among his valuable points of indefatigable emphasis is that personality is a ground principle alike in epistemology and metaphysics. It is a fertile source of explanatory concepts, and in its concrete life gives meaning to basic categories which otherwise would be hopelessly irreconcilable and abstract. Personality alone fills out the complete meaning of reality, and it becomes, therefore, the rational key to all lower forms of existence. Bowne has done a signal service in contributing largely to the establishment of personality in the central place in philosophic inquiry, and in criticizing other theories, especially materialism and associationism, which fail to give personality its due philosophic recognition. His conception of the relation of the categories to personality is another important contribution.

3'. The reality of personality.

Since personality itself is a first principle of explanation and since it makes the categories intelligible, the categories cannot be applied to personality itself, except in a peculiar way, without circular reasoning. In our search for ultimate principles we find a right, and indeed, the need of stopping with personality. We find its nature by a direct recognition in our living experience. We discover that its reality consists in its activity. Because it can act and be acted upon, it exists and is rightly called a substance. The soul is substantial in no other sense, but this is the important meaning of substance. To have emphasized this meaning of substance in connection with personality is one of the important services of

(1) See above, page 143.

Bowne to current philosophy. (1)

4'. Activity and purpose.

One of the most significant points of emphasis in Bowne's theory of personality consists, in my judgment, in his conception of the relation of activity to purposive intelligence, to willing and thinking. (2) Activity and intelligent purposing constitute an essential unity in that personal activity is self-directed in the light of various purposes or ideals which it is the function of intelligence to furnish. He makes the suggestion, (3) without developing it, that change is due to the fact that intelligence is seeking to realize certain purposes. He loses an opportunity to go a step further and to point out that perhaps the future is dependent upon the fact that we have certain desires or purposes that are unfulfilled. He maintains that the future is due to the limitations of our finite perception, and that if we were omniscient, we would have no future, for we would not need any more time to know things. Here the rationalistic tendency of Bowne breaks out. Even if our knowledge were complete, still it might be necessary to have a future in order to realize certain of our incomplete purposes. Nevertheless, Bowne's emphasis upon the central place of intelligent self-determination, upon the purposive character of personality, deserves strong commendation.

5'. Conclusion.

Only a few of the valuable points in Bowne's conception of personality have been mentioned. One who is seeking a metaphysical theory of personality will find his conception the most profitable starting point, perhaps, of any that can be found in the history of philosophy. Such a seeker could hope to improve upon Bowne's conception by systematizing it, by offering stronger proofs for certain aspects of it, by connecting it up with the newer movements in psychology and philosophy, and by elaborating certain details which he too lightly passed over. The importance of Bowne's theory will appear more clearly in the course of the historical summary of current movements which follows.

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(1) No attempt is made in this investigation to exhibit the connection of this active character of the self as set forth by Bowne with certain other classical philosophical conceptions, for example of Aristotle and Leibniz.

(2) See above, pages 133-6.

(3) See above, page 142.

D. RÉSUMÉ OF SOME OF THE CHIEF PRESENT TENDENCIES AND PROBLEMS OF PERSONALITY-THEORY BASED UPON A COMPARISON OF THE VIEWS OF JAMES, PERRY, AND BOWNE.

Introduction: Need of résumé.

The detailed study of the personality-theory of a representative of each of three typical current movements in American philosophy has now been completed. A comparison of the results obtained in this investigation provides a basis for a résumé which will emphasize some of the present tendencies, summarize the positive results of our study, and finally indicate some of the unsolved problems.

1. Some present general tendencies in the theory of personality.

a. Various possible avenues of approach to the problem of personality.

Various avenues of approach to the problem of personality may possibly be adopted. In this investigation the metaphysical one has been chosen. The business of the metaphysician, so far as personality is concerned, is to set forth systematically its fundamental principles and ontological status. His construction should be based upon whatever relevant and significant facts he can glean from biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, law, religion, theology, epistemology, aesthetics, literature, observation of every-day life, or any other phase of human activity. The several partial aspects of personality which these disciplines reveal should be organized critically by him into an interpretation of the nature of personality which will be comprehensive, unified, and well-ordered.

The most fundamental approaches to personality, apart from the general metaphysical one, are the biological, the psychological, the legal-ethical, and the religious or theological. Biology, in the course of time, should provide facts which will throw light upon the place of life and individuality, heredity and development, dispositions and character, in the concept of personality.

Psychology, more than any other single science, should constantly yield an abundance of data of use to the metaphysician in his endeavor to determine the first principles of human nature. Our study of James shows how the psychologist furnishes or may furnish very much empirical evidence of which the metaphysician must take account in his constructions. G. Wobbermin affirms that, "The chief reasons why recent philosophers ascribe existence to the ego as an enduring real are psychological." (1) Because of the great importance of the moral component in most modern conceptions of personality, I regret that space and time have forbidden the presentation of the personality-theory of a representative American ethicist, such as, for example, G. H. Palmer.

In the consideration of historical views of personality, the study of law and theology is especially significant because it is from the old discussions of the law of persons and the meaning of personality in the Godhead and in Jesus Christ that the concept of personality first finds its way into modern philosophy. The conviction, in common religious thought, that what one is has a paramount bearing upon his destiny brings about the result that religious thinkers want to understand personality, and consequently often make valuable contributions to its comprehension. It is in metaphysics alone, however, that a complete and ultimate view of personality properly may be found. Many theories of personality, through deficiencies in metaphysical setting, err in incomplete-

(1) Theologie und Metaphysik, page 151.

ness rather than in positive misconception. The metaphysician should feel it his duty to present, as soon as he is able, a consummate and complete conception.

Our historical study is not intended to include current representatives of all possible modes of attacking the problem that have been referred to. The three representative thinkers whose thought has been reviewed approach the problem from the metaphysical point of view, except that James' original and dominant standpoint is psychological; he became metaphysical in his later years. Our survey warrants us, therefore, in pointing out some of the present metaphysical tendencies concerning the theory of personality, together with some preliminary notes on psychological tendencies.

b. Two current metaphysical tendencies concerning the self.

1'. The development of James' theory.

a'. Perry and Bowne develop two tendencies in the thought of James.

General interrelations of James, Perry and Bowne.

I have reviewed the thought concerning personality of three representative American thinkers for the purpose of seeing how certain metaphysical questions with reference to it have actually been answered. Originally the personality-theories of Perry, James, and Bowne were considered in the order named because this seemed to be the order of their increasing worth. Later the first two were interchanged with a view to accentuating the logical-historical development from James to Perry.

There is no evidence that Bowne exercised any influence upon either James or Perry. His own essential view was set forth in the first edition of his Metaphysics (1882), eight years before the appearance of James' Principles of Psychology. However, the theory of Bowne is properly regarded as the logical, even if not the actual historical, development of one line or aspect of the thought of James. The conception of Perry represents both a historical and logical development of a second current in the thought of James.

The two currents in the thought of James.

It has been indicated already (1) that the writings of James contain two currents so far as the problem of self or personality is concerned. One may be called the personalistic and the other the "radical" or empiricistic trend. James does not champion either in an exclusive and completely consistent way. On the whole, the first trend dominates his earlier works on psychological and religious topics; in these writings the second trend is present as an undercurrent, and comes to be the dominant view in his later works dealing with phases of "radical empiricism."

These illustrated in his treatment of personality.

The two divergent tendencies in his thinking sometimes may be distinguished in his treatment of the same problem. The personalistic trend is illustrated in his conception that consciousness is a "fighter for ends" and is something which is always personal; the radical trend appears when he declares that consciousness is a nonentity and a functional, resultant relation among certain bits of pure experience. Personal identity sometimes is represented as an act of appropriation on the part of each newly born thought; and sometimes it is described as a sensible contin-

(1) See above, page 68.

uum given in experience; in the first case it is the product of self-activity and in the second it is passively given. Again, in the personalistic context, he holds to the distinction in consciousness between content and activity, while in radical empiricism all such inner duplicity is stoutly denied. (1)

Their relation to Perry and Bowne.

The thought of Perry may be regarded as starting from James' empiricistic trend and developing into a bold realism. The personalistic trend in James' thought, on the other hand, stands in much more harmonious relations with Bowne's conception of personality. In general, these two thinkers may be regarded as developing, respectively, two tendencies which are present in the thought of James. These two lines of development will now be pointed out in a more specific way.

b'. Transitions in James' thought.

We may begin by reviewing certain transitions in James' own theories. The conception of the self in his pragmatic writings occupies a very uncertain middle ground between the personalistic and radical extremes to which reference was just made. There was reason to expect his pragmatism to contain a real contribution to the problem of personality, especially because its emphasis upon practical activity and individual values touches central features of personality, but also because James originally strove in his pragmatism to correct the impersonal cult of absolutism and intellectualism by advocating a more adequate recognition of the finite and concrete life of the historical individual. For example, he complains that the Absolute is "the great de-realizer of the only life we are at home in." (2) In this reaction against intellectualism James stands in the company of numerous other great contemporary thinkers, notably A. S. Pringle-Pattison, F. C. S. Schiller, and Henri Bergson. We should expect that his negative protest against reducing the practical life of man to intellectual terms without remainder would lead to a positive metaphysical theory of the self in his pragmatic writings. Our hopes in this direction were strengthened also by his much talk about pluralism, and about the individual worth and independent significance of the finite life. But these promises of a more adequate conception of personality--promises justified by the personalistic trend in his psychology and by the essential principles of his pragmatism and pluralism--have not been fulfilled. As a matter of historical fact, his thought took a very different direction.

Development of his empiricism.

The actual conclusion of his philosophy was a doctrine of "pure experience" in which the fulness of real personality has become a memory only. That the germs of his radical empiricism were present in his earlier thought, of course cannot be denied. I have already pointed out how a person, starting from his psychology, might set forth two possible ways of explaining how he came to hold the doctrine of radical empiricism. (3) To be sure he started in his Principles of Psychology with personal experience, or with a stream of consciousness which has a personal "character." The

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(1) See above, page 29.

(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 49; see the whole of chapter 2. His opposition to absolutism is already appearing in his Principles of Psychology; compare chapter I, pages 353, 366-7.

(3) See above, pages 29-30.

latter becomes more and more incidental as his philosophy develops; the stream of experience becomes more and more the great ultimate and absolute fact which leans on nothing. In his pragmatism he demands verification in experience, but his conception of experience becomes less and less private and more and more a public, abstract, and general affair. He ends in a metaphysics of pure experience in which the finite self is lost in a neutral and impersonal whole. That this is no necessary conclusion of the pragmatic dialectic is proved by the very different conception of personality which has been reached by other pragmatists, for example, the British philosopher, F. C. S. Schiller.

The gradual development of the thought of James, then, represents actually a steady decrease in the richness and the depth of his conception of personality. In trying to escape the barren deserts of intellectualism and absolutism, he passed along the path of radical empiricism until he faced the borderland of the neo-realistic waste. He himself did not boldly enter this land--certainly not a land of promise--although he, in a way which is not characteristic of him, admits that "things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum." (1) The step which James did not take was taken by Perry and other new realists.

2'. The neo-realistic trend with reference to personality: R. B. Perry.

a'. Perry's development of James' thought.

1". From radical empiricism to new realism.

Perry develops the radical empiricism of James and boldly champions a realism in which the pure experience of James falls apart into countless transcendent elements. Their existence as neutral entities does not depend upon their being experienced at all, and their reality is quite independent of knowing mind or intelligence. (2) Just as the pure experience of James is homogeneous, so the ultimate entities in Perry's metaphysics are neither physical nor mental but just "neutral." For James' later thought experience appears to be possible without a self; for Perry things exist independent of any mind. The most important logical link between the thought of James and of Perry is to be found in James' doctrine that consciousness is not an existent, but a relation among existents. Consciousness thus becomes a product or function of primary or pre-existent entities and thus the door is opened to realism.

These are the general points concerning the manner in which Perry carries out the radical empiricism of James. A more specific way in which Perry develops the latter's psychology needs to be mentioned. While Perry holds to a relational theory of consciousness, he also maintains that this relation comes about only as the result of an activity of one object upon other objects. Now that which acts is the living organism. The subject of the activity is the behaving body. The self is the behaving organism with its numerous dispositions.

2". From the self as bodily feeling to the self as bodily behavior.

This doctrine represents a development of two aspects of the thought of James. It connects up with that excessively biological conception of the self which was mentioned as characteristic of American pragmatism. (3) In the second place, the attempt of Perry to give a purely behavioristic account of the self is a

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(1) The Meaning of Truth, Preface, page xii.

(2) On pages 87-8 above I have put down briefly the antecedents of new realism, and explained how Perry develops the thought of James.

(3) See above, pages 64-5.

radical development of James' doctrine that the nuclear or spiritual self is to be found in the feeling of bodily processes. Perry is fond of quoting James' opinion that the essential person is to be found in bodily activities.

Thus the mental activity which James strove to analyze, and finally identified with the feeling of bodily stresses and strains, is boldly identified by Perry with bodily behavior itself. The changes in the stream of consciousness become bodily movements. The active life in pragmatism becomes organic behavior in new realism. The result is the doctrine that the mental subject is the behaving body. The real and fundamental agent turns out to be the nervous system. (1) J. A. Leighton declares that, "Since the brain is the real selective and attentive agency, the searchlight which makes the illumination which is consciousness, neutral monism is but a new and specious name for materialism." (2)

New realism and behavioristic psychology.

When this conclusion has been reached, the metaphysician loses his claim to the problem of mental activity, and it passes into the hands of the physiologist or of the psychologist who uses a purely behavioristic method. In consequence, some of the new realists themselves are ardent promoters of this method in psychology, for example, Perry himself and E. B. Holt. Behavioristic psychology urgently needs a more solid metaphysical foundation, but this is not to be found in new realism as it has developed up to date. The presuppositions of behaviorism need to be brought to light and subjected to thorough philosophical criticism. (3) Perhaps this turning of the problem of human behavior over to the psychologists accounts in part for the barrenness of neo-realistic metaphysics so far as personality is concerned.

b'. Contrast with English humanists.

Behavioristic psychology, however, is no necessary culmination of the pragmatic movement with its emphasis upon activity. The humanist, F. C. S. Schiller, and some new realists, for example, S. Alexander, have attempted to describe the activity, which is so important in the life of the self, in mental instead of bodily terms. The English realists on the whole have maintained also that consciousness is an activity, but the activity of a mental subject upon physical and other objects. (4)

c'. Result: three distinct conceptions of mind.

The result of our study of the interrelation of the thought of Perry and James is the discovery of three distinct conceptions of mind. (a) There is, first, the view of the English new realists, who regard mind as a peculiar psychic activity which is to be distinguished from objects or sense data. In some parts of his Principles of Psychology (5), James approximates to the same view, and this view resembles the one held by Bowne. (b) James later held a different notion, according to which mind and physical things are two orders or complexes of the homogeneous pieces of pure ex-

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(1) For criticism of this doctrine, see below, pages 200-11.

(2) The Field of Philosophy, 2nd edition, page 457.

(3) A meager beginning in this direction has been made; and even a confession of the need is hopeful. See H. H. Bawden's article, "The Presuppositions of a Behavioristic Psychology," Psychological Review, vol. 25, pages 171-190, 1918.

(4) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, the Problem of Knowledge, page 259.

(5) For references, see above, pages 27-8.

perience. (1) This is the relational theory of consciousness to which the American new realists adhere: the mind is a peculiar grouping of neutral entities. (c) When Perry, starting from this conception of consciousness, nevertheless thinks that activity somewhere is necessary in order to constitute a mental group, we reach a third conception, the behavioristic one, according to which the self is the selective, behaving organism; in connection with the latter consciousness appears whenever it brings together a group of objects by reacting to them in a certain specific way. Here the mental subject is the behaving organism.

d'. Retrogressive tendencies in the thought of Perry:

When we attempt to judge the worth of Perry's theory of the self, we are compelled to assert that it represents a distinctly retrogressive movement. The chief reasons for this proposition are as follows:

1". The attempt to derive the self from impersonal elements.

Perry represents a backward step so far as the theory of personality is concerned because he attempts to explain it in terms of impersonal elements. New realists have met with no greater success in this endeavor than the materialists and associationists before them. The difficulties of all three types of thought are very similar in principle, (2) although, of course, they differ among themselves with respect to the character of the real elements with which they begin. The neo-realistic entities are more refined but very much more indefinite and intangible than the elements of materialism. In general they resemble mathematical units more than physical things. Just as the materialistic conception of the soul grew up under the influence of a successful physical science, so the neo-realistic view of the self is coming to be more and more determined by the influences of mathematics and its younger brother, "symbolic logic."

The greater the number and variety of the failures that occur in the attempts to derive personality from neutral or impersonal elements, the surer is the conclusion that that endeavor is a mistaken and hopeless one. The neo-realistic definition of mind, therefore, has at least a negative value. Our inductive study certainly enforces the conviction that personality must be explained, if at all, in terms of personal principles or realities.

2". The endeavor to explain personality in purely objective terms.

A second retrograde tendency in the philosophy of Perry is the endeavor to explain personality in objective terms. The new realists are anti-subjective, and take pride in that attitude. The only subject required in their system is an object, namely, an organism capable of behaving by reacting to certain selected things in its environment. This anti-subjective spirit fits well the method of an exclusively behavioristic psychology. Purposive action, for instance, is described in terms of anticipatory adjustments, and images are explained as incipient motor reactions. Perry promises to take account both of the "mind without" and the "mind within," but he never really reaches the "mind within;" while he seems to admit its existence, he neglects it; and in the end the self is lost in the world of things. Some reasons will be presented in the third part of this investigation which will tend to

(1) See above, pages 29-30.
(2) See below, page 159.

show that it is impossible to give a purely objective account of personality, especially because it is, in part at least, a subject or agent which acts in varying ways. (1)

3". Perry's atomism--his failure to explain the unity of the mind.

Perry returns to a form of mental atomism in his attempt, born of his analytical method, to explain consciousness as a peculiar grouping of primordial entities. This view is similar to the older associationism in that both doctrines teach that mind is a compound of elements. Perry himself recognizes his affinity with Hume, and rebukes the latter for not making himself more famous by taking the easy step to new realism. (2) For associationism, however, the elements of mind are at least states of consciousness to begin with; for materialism they are physical facts; but for Perry they are neither mental nor physical. He is really farther from the truth, therefore, than Hume. All the objections which hold against the associational doctrine of the self hold against Perry's view, and other objections also. Perhaps the fact which his theory meets the greatest difficulty in explaining is the actual unity of the mind. (3) New realism, associationism, and naturalism all alike are shipwrecked on this rock of every-day experience. Personal identity is a second problem for the explanation of which Perry has no theory to offer.

4". His excessive rationalism.

His excessive rationalism leads to too abstract a theory of the self. He robs personality of much of its concrete vitality and richness. It is an incidental product in an unmeasured multitude of neutral entities, the real meaning of which in human experience is obscure, and which are derived by a process of abstract analysis. The result is a conception of the self which is as barren and unreal as any absolutistic account ever was. The rationalistic tendency of new realism is developed in a striking way in The New Rationalism of E. G. Spaulding. This book is especially significant because it emphasizes the need in new realism of setting forth its underlying assumptions and of defining its peculiar method. Since this need is obviously very great in the metaphysics in question, Spaulding's work represents a forward step in that he tries to meet it.

5". His dogmatic method.

Perry's use of his analytical method is dogmatic because he not only uses it in an inexcusably exclusive way, but because he fails to set forth its presuppositions. He is dogmatic also in that he does not think it is necessary to consider the problem of the self as preliminary to understanding the world. It is characteristic of new realism to neglect this problem. If one searches, for example, through the cooperative volume, The New Realism, in the hope of finding something to illuminate the problem of personality, he will find that the latter is utterly neglected.

Not only, therefore, is the neo-realistic method dogmatic, but it has been actually fruitless, at least so far as the problem of personality is concerned. Perry might have set up the analytical method, as interpreted by him, as an hypothesis, and then proved its usefulness by trying it out. He has not followed this more cautious mode of procedure, but has assumed its perfection. Its

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(1) See below, pages 233-45.
(2) See above, page 88.
(3) See above, pages 109-111.

exclusive use, however, is of extremely questionable value, and so far as he has applied it to the problem of the self, the results may be regarded as negligible.

6". Concluding remarks.

The self, which was sick and dying in James' radical empiricism, is dead and buried in the strange and unknown realm of everlasting neutrality. Whether its death was due to neglect or to the sharp edge of the analytical method does not matter. Just how Perry's neutral elements make personality more intelligible than the substantial substratum against which the new realists, notably E. G. Spaulding, rail, is a wonderful uncertainty.

e'. Contributions of Perry.

The several elements of relative worth in Perry's view of the self have already been summarized. (1) The one significant point at which he makes an advance beyond James is to be found in his attempt to work out that objective system of values which seem to be necessary to save pragmatism from subjectivism. (2) Perry grounds this system of values in inherited and acquired dispositions and their corresponding interests. In this notion we have a positive suggestion as to the permanent basis or ground of personality. On the whole, however, the positive results of new realism so far as the understanding of personality goes are negligible.

3'. The personalistic trend with reference to personality: B. P. Bowne.

We have now seen in general how Perry and other new realists have transformed the "radical" trend in the philosophy of James into a realistic metaphysics with a somewhat characteristic conception of the self. Let us now turn to another aspect of that philosophy, namely, its personalistic and pluralistic undercurrent.

a'. The personalistic trend in the thought of James.

We have noticed already (3) how in several places (4) James eulogizes the ultimate reality of personal experience. He says, for example, in the first reference, that "the axis of reality runs solely through the egotistic places," and in the second, "the fons and origo of all reality . . . is ourselves." This doctrine might form the starting point for a conception of the self which would turn out to be very different from the one in which the realistic development of James' thought has actually ended.

b'. Its development by Miss Calkins.

The disciple of James who has elaborated most explicitly this personalistic phase of his thought is Miss Mary W. Calkins. (5) She even selects James as a representative of personal idealism. (6) We recall that the first mark which James mentions in his list of the characters of consciousness is its personal quality. This is also a primary factor with Miss Calkins. She states that, "With . . . a great company of philosophers, the writer finds that consciousness is not mere idea or series of ideas, but that it is the unique subject of ideas." (6) Hence, she develops "psychology as science of selves." (7)

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(1) See above, pages 120-122.
(2) See above, page 63.
(3) See above, pages 27-8.
(4) Notably in The Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 499-502, and in The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, pages 296-8.
(5) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th ed., pages 405-10.
(6) Ibid., 3rd ed., page 558.
(7) See article by this name in Psychological Review, 1900, pages 490-501; also her book, First Book in Psychology. See a list of numerous other writings in bibliography below.

Not only does she make the self the unit of psychological investigation, but she develops a personalistic metaphysics. She points out that the existence of such a self as she describes cannot be proved to one who finds only momentary ideas, "for proof means bolstering up an assertion by a more fundamental one, whereas the self, supposing it to exist, is fundamental to ideas." (1) Her conception of the outstanding features of the self or person, and its use as a fundamental principle of metaphysical explanation, are set forth in an article, "The Personalistic Conception of Nature." (2) The characteristics of the self here are essentially the same as she has defended all along.

Miss Calkins no doubt has done a real service in promoting a personalistic philosophy, and especially in keeping the matter of a self-psychology before the minds of psychologists and philosophers by her intermittent articles and reviews on that subject. Her point of view, however, is primarily psychological, and her metaphysical elaboration of the concept of personality is brief. I have, therefore, preferred to select Bowne as a representative of personal idealism because his standpoint, like that of this investigation, is primarily metaphysical, and because he has a comprehensive theory of personality.

c'. Personal idealism in relation to other current philosophical movements.

From the above order of exposition it should not be inferred that Bowne derived his personalistic philosophy from James, because he probably had developed his own conception of personality before the appearance of James' important works, and also because Bowne was singularly independent both of contemporaries and classical philosophers. In his writings he seldom refers to either save as exemplars of mistaken views. The one important historical influence effecting his conception of personality is H. Lotze, to whom he dedicated the first edition of his Metaphysics. He held a disparaging view of the value of the historical study of philosophy, and preferred the systematic approach.

Nevertheless, Bowne's view of personality has close affinity with, and may be regarded as the logical development of the minor or personalistic trend in the thought of James, and, as such, forms a striking contrast to Perry's realistic development of the major or empiricistic current. Bowne's Personalism and the self-psychology of Miss Calkins are both somewhat older than the chief works of new realism. The latter, according to its exponents, is in part a reaction against certain over-subjective tendencies in personal idealism as well as in pragmatism, just as the latter were in part a humanistic reaction against the impersonal tendencies of absolute idealism. New realism, however, has failed to clarify the problem of personality, and has ended with a conception of it which is not only incomplete and vague, but which is as impersonal as that of absolute idealism, and in some respects less satisfactory. Perry states clearly that new realism reacts strongly against anthropomorphism in philosophy as well as against absolutism. (3) J. Royce is in general a mediator between absolute and personal idealism in

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(1) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4ed., page 407.
(2) Philosophical Review, vol. XXVIII, March, 1919.
(3) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 39.

that he tries to maintain the integrity of the human person as well as of the Absolute; he calls himself an absolute pragmatist.

Over against absolutism, personal idealism and pragmatism seek philosophic defense of finite individuals with their freedom and their varied practical interests, and with their sense of private worth and uniqueness. As Perry says (1), "Personal idealism represents the party of man within the idealistic movement, seeking to save the essentials of moral responsibility." In explaining human life, pragmatism on the whole tends to make biological categories basic, while personal idealism tends to make ethical categories fundamental. Both alike refuse to assign a central place to mechanical principles. Both tend to emphasize the historical or temporal phases of life. The pragmatism of James runs into a thorough-going pluralism, while Bowne, with his theistic doctrines, stands closer to absolutism, of which he has been falsely accused.

In these statements the relation of personal idealism to several philosophical movements has been indicated from the standpoint of the problem of personality.

d'. Points of resemblance between the views of James and Bowne.

A considerable number of points of resemblance between the views of James and Bowne have appeared incidentally. Others will come to light in the summary below. A few may be noted here. (a) Both of them make a constant appeal to concrete experience in the course of their endeavors to verify their hypotheses. (2) (b) While James speaks of personal identity in certain places as a kind of appropriation, upon the part of each passing thought, of its whole significant past, Bowne describes it as a conscious "self-identification of intelligence." (3) (c) We have noted in several places that the self, with its capacities of thought, interest, and spontaneity, is regarded as a sample of reality. This idea is suggested by James and is developed by Bowne as a basic metaphysical principle. (4) For him personality is the key to the real world and it alone makes intelligible the fundamental categories of explanation:

e'. The general result or character of personal idealism.

The general result of the philosophy of Bowne is to put personality into the central place in philosophy. He makes personality the first principle in philosophical explanation. It is the key to reality and provides the categories for the understanding of all else besides itself. Personality itself is grasped by being lived, by an act of self-recognition. Here is a powerful emphasis upon the importance of life as well as of individuality. Personal idealism "proclaims the irreducibility of the soul," as Perry expresses it. (5)

The features of personality which Bowne and the personal idealists emphasize are its active, self-determining, teleological, and moral--in general, its spiritual characteristics. These points of accentuation stand in strong contrast to the teachings of naturalism, and in part, too, to those of absolutism. This emphasis is one of its chief contributions.

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(1) Present Conflict of Ideals, page 201.
(2) See above, pages 15-16 and 127, 130, 150.
(3) See above, pages 37 and 140.
(4) See above, pages 27-8 and 148.
(5) Present Conflict of Ideals, page 8.

In the "personal idealism" of the Oxford philosophers similar factors are put at the center of their conception of personality. They seek to defend "the reality of human freedom, . . the validity of the moral valuation, and the justification of working enthusiasm for ideals." (1) The whole movement emphasizes the spontaneity of personality, points out its responsibility in the world of knowledge and of morality, and strengthens its sense of independent worth.

The central place of personality in philosophy.

This conception of the central place of personality in philosophy is being developed by other recent and younger thinkers; for example, by John Laird (2), and E. N. Merrington (3). These men seek to elucidate, in the light of historical criticism, certain problems in connection with personality. The historical manifestations and relations of personality, as contrasted with its metaphysical status, have been worked out in an original way by W. E. Hocking. (4)

The need for a more systematic exposition of the concept of personality is becoming increasingly evident. The three theories to which most attention has been given lack such elaboration. Attempts at such a comprehensive interpretation have been made already with a measure of success, notably by C. G. Shaw (5) and by G. T. Ladd, (6) as well as by W. Stern. (8)

2. General results of our study of personality.

A summary of some of the general results of the above study of personality with respect to methods and problems is now in order.

a. Results with respect to methods.

1'. Correlation between philosophic method and personality-theory:

First, in connection with each of the theories of personality examined special attention has been directed to the problem of method in order to ascertain whether there is any correlation between a philosopher's method and his conception of personality. The number of cases studied does not warrant a certain conclusion, but they point to the probability that there is a close correspondence, provided a system has been worked out with some degree of consistency and completeness. Some evidence for this generalization may be derived from a review of the representatives who have been studied.

a'. In personal idealism.

(a) Bowne's conception of personality as an active subject of experience fits his "transcendental empiricism" or personal idealism with its method of rational criticism of a given experience which is regarded as originally personal and spontaneous.

b'. In new realism.

(b) Perry's rejection of introspection and his adoption of the method of "general observation" of "the mind at large" (7) leads logically to the conception of the self as the behaving organism. Again, when he proceeds to reduce reality, by the method of analysis, to neutral and independent elements or entities, it is fitting for him to find the distinguishing marks of consciousness in a functional complex of these elements which lacks any

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(1) Personal Idealism, edited by H. Sturt, page vi.
(2) Problems of the Self: see for instance pages 2-4.
(3) The Problem of Personality: see pages 170-2.
(4) Human Nature and its Remaking.
(5) The Ego and its Place in the World, 1913.
(6) The Secret of Personality, 1918.
(7) See above, pages 97-8.
(8) Person und Sache.

clear principle of unity or any really personal factor. (1) A deficient and dogmatic feature of this conception lies in his failure to explain more fully the conditions under which this complex comes into existence and is known at all. H. Dreyer (2) points out explicitly that realism works in the domain of analysis and the relative; personalism, in the domain of synthesis and the absolute.

When new realists analyze reality into countless ultimate entities, the existence of which does not depend upon relations to mind, it seems that the most appropriate mode of apprehending them would be a kind of intellectual intuition, of the sort of Platonic contemplation, which would not utilize such incidents as relations to distinct minds. This consistent conclusion, however, is precluded, not only by their dread of introspection, but also by the fact that they do not have a mind to apprehend these entities until the entities themselves become grouped in certain ways. Hence they are in the anomalous position that their only recourse in knowing their own elements and in explaining consciousness is to make use of terms of non-essential mental relations. The doctrine of the immanence of consciousness is really, from one point of view, an attempt to express the idea of immediate apprehension, but we have noted the difficulties involved in consistently and profitably working out this doctrine when no personal subject is presupposed. (3)

It is not surprising, then, that the analytical method, with its assumption that it can reach ultimate simples which will explain everything by their combination and with its easy-going dogmatism, should result in a conception of the self which really robs it of all personal character and allows it only an incidental place in the universe.

c'. In pragmatism.

(c) The fact that no characteristic doctrine of the self is actually correlated with the pragmatic method does not discount the general conclusion mentioned above (4), but merely goes to confirm the opinion that this method is really not at all a distinct one. As a matter of fact, it could be used to defend any conception of the self which might make a significant difference to some one. If we consider it generously and generally, however, it is fair to affirm that the intellectualistic conception of personality is inconsistent with it, and that a pragmatist would defend, most appropriately, a view of the self in which volition and emotion are central, and in which the quest of ideals with a sense of risk is characteristic.

2'. Contributions and problems in connection with the method of knowing personality.

These last statements bring to notice the importance of considering how personality may best be known. James and Bowne wrestled with this question. Our study warrants us in setting down certain contributions which they have made, and in indicating some of the problems in connection with the method of knowing personality.

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(1) See above, page 102.
(2) Personalismus und Realismus, 1905, page 52.
(3) See above, pages 117-9.
(4) See above, page 163.

a'. Importance of studying method in connection with personality.

(a) A general observation needs to be made first of all. Our study has demonstrated the need of a fuller and more specific consideration of the problem of method in connection with personality. Many thinkers are clear in the general opinion that we do not know personality in precisely the same way as we know other objects or realities, but a satisfactory and thorough-going explanation of how we do know it is still lacking.

b'. The categories and personality.

(b) Bowne's criticism enforces the need of choosing whether or not one will adopt the principle of personality as his starting point in metaphysical explanation. If he accepts it, the categories which it supplies out of its abundant life cannot be applied in the same sense to it as to other things without falling into a fallacious circle of reasoning. He defends this alternative with great vehemence.

But if the philosopher does not adopt personality as his fundamental principle, it is incumbent upon him to set forth his assumptions or his starting point, and to exhibit how they explain personality. The failure of the attempts of naturalism, radical empiricism, and new realism to account for personality in terms of elements which are not personal is evidence against the latter alternative. A brief criticism of Bradley below (1) will also bring out the notion that even his system presupposes personality as the ground of his principles, notably the principle of consistency.

Our survey has shown the need that every philosophy of personality should set forth plainly its basic presuppositions. It is interesting to note that there is a close resemblance between James' "knowledge of acquaintance" and Bowne's "real" application of the categories to personality.

c'. Self-knowledge and its problems.

(c) In any case the problem of self-knowledge appears for solution. This problem is complicated by several facts. First, two of our philosophers are convinced that something besides conception is essential in order to grasp personality. James finds it difficult to know the self in terms of concepts because he thinks the latter are static, while the self has a flowing and dynamic character. (2) He has failed, however, to set forth adequately the legitimate part that conception does play in the knowledge of the self.

1". Inadequacy of mere conceptual knowledge of personality.

Bowne claims also that conceptual description is incapable of setting forth the full meaning of personality, (3) but he puts a much higher value than does James upon conception as a means of understanding and enlarging our knowledge of personality. While Bowne holds that the self, in a sense, is given in experience he believes nevertheless that a true and valuable conception of it may be gained by intellectual effort. (4) Thus James and Bowne are in harmony upon the point that conceptual construction by itself is an inadequate means of knowing personality as a concrete and living experience. Both agree that an adequate comprehension of it requires that conceptual knowledge be supplemented by some

(1) See below, pages 343-4.
(2) See above, pages 17-8.
(3) See above, page 128.
(4) See above, pages 126-7.

kind of direct or perceptual experience. Bowne's combination of immediate and conceptual apprehension is an important step in the right direction, but their relations and development need fuller explication.

It is well known that F. H. Bradley finds discrete thought utterly incapable of attaining a consistent interpretation of the self. H. Münsterberg is especially insistent that a scientific or causal description of personality tells only half the story and touches only the surface. (1) It is fair to say, therefore, that there is a rather general tendency at the present time to demand that conceptual construction with reference to personality be completed by some more immediate form of knowing.

2". Subject and object in the knowledge of personality.

The problem of self-knowledge has often been stated in terms of self and object: if personality is the subject of the mental life, how can it ever become an object to itself? Perry makes a wild thrust at this problem by simply asserting that since the body is the subject of the mental life, it can of course be observed as an object in the same way as stars and trees. James denies in his "radical empiricism" that there is any such fundamental distinction in experience, and solves the relation between subject and object by saying that any particular bit of pure experience may function at different times as either subject or object. In his Principles of Psychology, where he holds to the inner duplicity of experience, he believes that the subject which is present in any mental situation may become an object, not at the same time, but at any later moment. When James, however, comes to identify the subject, he finds that it consists of bodily feelings, but since these are clearly objective, the problem in question disappears altogether from his consideration. This is James' typical treatment of it.

Bowne holds that the distinction is not an ontological one, but is purely formal, although it is essential to the structure and nature of consciousness. He thinks, however, that consciousness can direct itself now to one, and now to the other. (2) He thinks that the subject of the mental life may know itself as an acting and choosing agent.

3". Münsterberg defends a special method of knowing personality.

H. Münsterberg defends (3) a unique method of knowing the subject of the mental life. He bases his thorough-going distinction between causal, empirical, or descriptive psychology upon the one hand, and purposive psychology on the other, upon the postulate that the contents of consciousness are known in a different way than the agent of consciousness. Causal psychology "treats man as an object, the other as a subject. We do not find our inner life as an object, but we know it immediately as our purposive deed. . The deed of the subject is the first, the causal interplay of the objects the dependent reality. Our mental life is free, and through an act of freedom we decide to consider it as a mental mechanism in which nothing is free." (4) "Our real inner acting creates the thought of causal connection, but is never subject to it." (5) Purposive psychology proceeds on

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(1) See below, this page.
(2) See above, page 129.
(3) Psychology, General and Applied.
(4) Ibid., pages 295-6. (5) Ibid., page 300.

the assumption that "in our immediate reality of pulsating life we know ourselves as the subjects of our will." (1) These spontaneous activities of the living self, he thinks, are not to be described, but to be appreciated. "To understand a single act, . to enter into the purposive expression of the self, is simply life, not science." (2)

4". The demand for a concrete method in apprehending personality.

Bowne, James, and Münsterberg agree that the real personality is to be apprehended, in part at least, by some form of an immediate and living experience. Bowne and Münsterberg employ almost identical phraseology in accentuating the idea that the subject of the mental life, the free personality, grasps itself most adequately in its own purposive and spontaneous activities, and James bids us seek an immediate acquaintance with "the active sense of life which we all enjoy." He prefers the "concrete and total manner" of studying the mind. He emphasizes the "warmth and intimacy" of the self-feeling, while Bowne speaks of the "vividness and reality and immediacy" of the experience of the self. (3) All three demand a concrete method of apprehending personality. It may be noted in passing that the British "humanist", F. C. S. Schiller, also emphasizes repeatedly the need of studying the whole personality as the starting point, and perhaps also as the end, of philosophy. Bowne, too, says we should speak of aspects of personality rather than of its elements or parts. (4) There is, therefore, a definite tendency in American philosophy to regard personality as immanent in experience and as something dynamic.

The attitude of these men stands in striking contrast to the abstract method advocated by the new realists. It is appropriate that Perry should confess kinship with associationism, and that Bowne and James should both reject it, because of the abstractness of the elements out of which its exponents seek to construct the mind.

d'. Experience as starting point.

Merrington has pointed out (5) that there is a general tendency at the present time to begin with experience in the study of personality. Bowne constantly appeals to experience to solve problems which reason cannot solve. James' "pure experience" and Bradley's "centers of finite experience" are notorious. And while Perry avoids the appeal to experience, he adopts the method of general observation of the mind at large, which, if explained, would lead to the same appeal. Of the three men whom we have studied, Bowne alone defends to the end the originally personal character of all articulate human experience.

b. Results concerning the nature of personality.

The above criticism of three theories of personality has brought to light certain results with respect to its nature. These need to be summarized now. A number of points of agreement among our philosophers may be noted first.

1'. Rejected theories.

Bowne and James agree in rejecting several theories of the self. (a) One of these is the old substance-theory, according to which the mental life is to be explained by postulating a rigid core behind conscious phenomena. Neither thinker will suffer any

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(1) Psychology, General and Applied, page 292.

(2) Ibid., page 297. These ideas are stated at length in Chapters 21-22 of this book.

(3) See above, pages 126-7. (4) See above, page 125.

(5) The Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter I.

transcendent factor in his conception of the self. (1) (b) Again, both present elaborate arguments against any view which tries to explain the mind in terms of physical atoms, energy, or matter. Bowne is notably vehement on this point. (2) (c) Both, also, find the old doctrine of associationism quite inadequate. (3)

2'. Evidence from various movements for the central place of activity in personality.

Probably the most important positive result of our study of three American philosophic movements is the discovery that all present dynamic conceptions of personality. Somewhere in each, activity has a central place in the concept of the self. Other movements tend in the same direction. Let us consider in some detail the evidence for this general conclusion.

a'. Pragmatism.

(a) The spirit, if not the logic, of pragmatism points to the practical or active life as the basic factor in personality. The self is revealed in its effort to find satisfaction in the realization of certain desires and ends. It has been pointed out that the actual, historical forms of pragmatism have not consistently worked out this appropriate and valuable doctrine. The logic of James is not sufficiently rigorous nor developed in connection with this problem. He does, however, find "the experience of activity" to be regularly present in all mental life, and he has had greater success than either of the other two philosophers studied in giving an adequate and concrete description of this experience. (4)

1". Biological influence in pragmatism.

In support of the practical character of the mental life, the pragmatists are in the habit of offering biological evidence, and of connecting the theory of mind with the general theory of organic evolution. James himself points out (5) that the great contribution of physiology, outside of its own realm, has been to show that the willing side of human nature is the dominant one, and he asserts also (6) that the theory of evolution is chiefly accountable for the new emphasis upon the practical aspect of mind. The reason, no doubt, is that when the biological theory of evolution is extended to mind, ideas are included in the class of instrumentalities that are useful in the active adaptation of the organism to its environment.

The result of this biological influence in the philosophy of mind is sometimes very surprising and paradoxical. By intention, the instrumental conception of the higher forms of the mental life emphasizes the fundamentally active character of the mind. But when this biological doctrine is made thorough-going, the mind loses rather than gains spontaneous character, because it becomes thereby merely a machine for an adjustment that is all one-sided; that is, mind yields itself entirely to the determination of the environmental forces, and its autonomy is surrendered to the push and pull of physical nature.

But this one-sided adjustment is untrue to the facts of mind, for the mind, by means of its purposes and ideas, may sometimes adjust the environment to itself. In a highly developed and pow-

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(1) See above, pages 40-42 and 124.
(2) See above, pages 40 and 123.
(3) See above, pages 43-44 and 123-4.
(4) See above, pages 46-49.
(5) The Will to Believe, page 114.
(6) Talks to Teachers, page 23.

erful personality, this is regularly and notably the case. We say that a great man changes the course of history, or gains control over nature. The true view is probably that the adjustment works both ways, in which case the mind is seen to have a measure of self-control, and thereby demonstrates its active nature.

In the "humanism" of F. C. S. Schiller we find also the doctrine of the primacy of action in personal life. (1) He insists "on bringing out the active character of experience." (2)

b'. New realism.

In the new realism of Perry we find expressed also the intention of presenting a "dynamic" view of mind. He holds (3) that some kind of "general action" or "agency" is necessary if there are to be any mental contents at all. It turns out, however, that the kind of mental action in which he believes is to be defined "in terms of bodily action itself." In this notion Perry is in agreement with the radical behaviorists in psychology. In this form of psychology it is evident that a dynamic conception of the self is in general the only consistent one, although the particular conceptions of action held by its various exponents may not always be tenable. Below (4) I shall offer reasons for supposing that attempts, including that of Perry, to explain the self in terms of bodily behavior are inadequate. Miss M. W. Calkins observes, "There is, however, no inherent reason why the term behavior should not be used as well to designate the response of the self, as to designate the response of the body, to environment." (5)

Some of the English new realists entertain a different conception of mental action than the behavioristic one of American realists. (6) These thinkers also defend the importance of activity in the mental life, although they regard its character as psychical rather than merely bodily.

c'. Personal idealism.

In personal idealism activity in a spiritual form comes into clear and striking predominance as the central feature of personality. Bowne uses the term activity explicitly and repeatedly, and finds the reality and substantiality of personality to consist in it. G. H. Howison too (7) defends at length the doctrine that the self is a spontaneous and active existent; for instance, he affirms that (8), "It is just in thinking all these elements in an active, originating unit-thought, or an 'I', that the essential and characteristic nature of man or any other real intelligence consists."

Since Bowne refuses to separate the will, save in abstract thought, from other aspects of the unitary personality, it is inexact to call his view voluntaristic, but it is fair to do so if

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(1) See, Studies in Humanism, pages 408, 447.
(2) Ibid., page 30. (3) See above, pages 89-91, 95-7, 118.
(4) See below, pages 200-11.
(5) Psychological Bulletin, vol. 16, page 112.
(6) See the articles of S. Alexander, for instance, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, for the years: 1907-8, 1908-9.
(7) The Limits of Evolution.
(8) Ibid., page 47.

by voluntarism one means simply to emphasize the basic position of volition or activity in the individual self. Bowne's view, however, is more adequately characterized as activistic or personalistic.

d'. Dynamic psychology.

A novel standpoint in psychology, called "dynamic psychology," has recently been put forward by R. S. Woodworth. (1) It is intended to be an improvement upon behaviorism, especially of the type in which the mind has lost its spontaneity as suggested above. (2) Woodworth describes this standpoint as "the science of the workings of the mind." His interest centers in the "springs of human life," rather than in the structure of mental processes. He talks constantly about the "drives" behind our activity, the secret principles which actuate our mental operations, the causal relations of mental phenomena, etc. (3) He believes that "A well-integrated personality is organized about its master motives, these acting as selective agencies with respect to other tendencies." (4) He thinks that it is the task of psychology "to be working always toward a clearer view of the mental side of vital activity," and to be seeking "for an understanding of the complete processes of mental activity and development." (5) It is to be hoped that in the near future much light may be thrown upon the nature of personal activity by psychologists working from this standpoint. This point of view needs to be supplemented, however, by a functional or purposive psychology, which asks: for what ends do men act? and by a metaphysics, which asks, what acts?

e'. Naturalism.

The concept of activity is also frequently employed by natural scientists who seek to develop a philosophical monism which will unify the physical and the mental realms. In other words, when these men pronounce views upon the philosophy of mind, they favor the idea of mental activity because of the promise it holds out of leading to some kind of continuity between physical energy and psychic activity or energy. For example, N. von Grot holds that the concept of psychical energy is as justifiable as that of physical energy; that in the human organism there is a continual transformation of the one into the other; and, further, he finds no logical or factual grounds for denying the possibility that the universal application of the law of the conservation of energy some time will be demonstrated. (6) R. Müller likewise asserts that, (7) "The primary cause of all subjective existence is recognized to be psychic energy, as our scientific study of the soul has shown, and this energy is the fundamental cause of all conscious and unconscious life."

W. Ostwald.

The energetic monism of W. Ostwald is the best-known example of the naturalistic tendency in question. (8) He declares, for instance, that, "There is really an idea which bridges over not only

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(1) See his book by that name. (2) See above, page 168.
(3) See Dynamic Psychology, pages 34-7.
(4) Ibid., page 126. (5) Ibid., page 36.
(6) Die Begriffe der Seele and der psychischen Energie in der Psychologie, Archiv für systematische Philosophie, vol. IV, pages 257-335.
(7) Naturwissenschaftliche Seelenforschung, vol. III, pages 584-90.
(8) See classification of theories above, page 4.

the chasm between force and substance, but also that between mind and matter, and which is of a nature sufficiently manifold to embrace the totality of our experiences, the interior as well as the exterior. This idea we term energy." (1) He says, again, "In all that we know of intellectual processes there is nothing to hinder us from regarding them as a particular form of energetic activity." (2) But he does not desire to leave the impression that he thinks that the subordination of psychical phenomena to the idea of energy is as yet fully proved. (3) He confesses that "what seems to be the most difficult is to comprehend the fact of self-consciousness, the ego or personality, as a phenomenon of energetics." (4) This form of monistic naturalism evidently makes important the concept of mental activity, however imperfect the interpretation of it may be.

f'. Classical idealism.

That philosophers who stand in the line of Kantianism and of classical idealism should cling to the significance of activity in the mind need not be pointed out. C. C. J. Webb points out that the impulse, present in much recent speculation, to find the fundamental characteristic of personality in will rather than in cognition, is probably due more to Kant, with his doctrine of the "primacy of practical reason," than to any one else. (5) J. A. Leighton observes that, "The conception of intelligence as an active organizing principle is the last remaining legacy of the objective idealists, from Plato to Hegel, which our newest instrumentalists have preserved." (6) As a notable idealistic representative of activism, Rudolph Eucken may be mentioned, for he strongly urges the recall of a view of personality which will preserve its autonomy and spirituality.

It is evident, therefore, that numerous contemporary intellectual movements emphasize the active character of personality. No doubt many ethical writers would desire to be added to the list of those who defend a dynamic conception of personality. The facts in the preceding paragraphs constitute evidence for the proposition of H. H. Bawden (7) that "we are coming to regard all science as the study of activity." He believes that "the sciences meet in the concept of action," and he speaks of action as "the common denominator of all science."

3'. Purpose and personality.

R. B. Perry.

That personality has an essentially purposive character is a second important point of agreement among our philosophers. Perry may be included among the advocates of the teleological character of the self. (8) His interesting analysis of teleology is a sincere attempt to explain purpose from the behavioristic standpoint. His problem is how a behaviorist can describe an action which is a

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(1) International Quarterly, vol. VII, p. 311.
(2) Ibid., page 313. (3) Ibid., page 315.
(4) Ibid., page 314. For a criticism of these views, see below, pages 194-200, and reference in bibliography to C. G. T. Reute.
(5) God and Personality, page 59.
(6) The Field of Philosophy, 2d ed., page 459.
(7) Principles of Pragmatism, pages 62-64.
(8) See above, pages 94-96.

response to a future or ideal situation, and not to anything present in the physical environment. He tries to meet the difficulty by the concept of "anticipatory adjustment." When, however, he comes to ask how or where we learn about the absent object to which adjustment is to be made, his behaviorism breaks down, as it must necessarily do, and he approximates very closely to the introspective standpoint, without of course acknowledging it. There is no doubt, from his discussion, however, that he believes in the fundamentally teleological character of mind. This conclusion is reenforced by his opinion (1) that the self is primarily an "entity capable of desire."

James and Bowne.

There is no doubt that James, in the personalistic trend of his thought, holds to the teleological character of mind. (2) In his Principles of Psychology he uses the well-known phrase that consciousness is a "fighter for ends," and he holds that mental activity always has a "direction." For Bowne, too, intelligence or personality is fundamentally purposive. Indeed, without purpose there could be no thought at all. (3)

It should be noted, also, that in all three of our philosophers purpose and activity are intimately united. The same holds true of the conception of the self entertained by J. Royce and G. H. Howison.

4'. Personal identity.

Bowne and James (in his personalistic trend) each have an interesting theory of the nature of personal identity. The latter explains it as an act of appropriation upon the part of every newly-born passing thought.(4) Bowne's view is very similar (5), for he speaks of the self gathering up all of its past and carrying it along with it. Bowne's more characteristic way of expressing his view of personal identity is "the self-identifying action of intelligence." Both agree that identity is a result of momentary activity, and is not to be referred to some abiding core which does not appear in consciousness.

5'. A general comparison of our philosophers.

In conclusion, we may note certain contrasts among the views of the thinkers whom we have studied. James' conception of personality is characterized by abundance of empirical evidence; Bowne's, by a comprehensive metaphysical attack; Perry's, by confusion, dogmatism in method, and general paucity of results. For Perry and for one line of James' thought, the self is a product of simpler neutral elements; while for Bowne and for James, in the other line of his thought, personality is an original reality. While we have difficulty, in connection with both James and Perry, in deciding upon the first metaphysical principle of personality, we have no such problem in the case of Bowne, for he is the only one of the three who attaches a clear and definite meaning to the reality of the mind.

Contributions of Bowne.

Bowne's theory of personality has the merit of covering the central problems and of presenting clear-cut conceptions. Some of his more notable contributions are:

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(1) See above, page 92.
(2) See above, pages 25, 52-55, 58.
(3) See above, pages 135-8.
(4) See above, pages 36-7.
(5) See above, pages 139-41.

(a) His idea of the relation of the categories to personality;
(b) His conception of self-knowledge as a self-recognition of intelligence.
(c) His finding of the reality and substantiality of personality in its active character.

6'. Reasons for divergences in personality-theory.

The enumeration of the points of agreement among our philosophers should be followed by a list of their differences, but this list will be omitted because the solid grounds of agreement are our chief interest, because diverse views have already been presented in the classification of theories in the first part of this investigation, and also because some of the main points at issue are stated in the list of unsolved problems mentioned a page or two below.

The fact of great divergence in views.

It has become evident that there is in present philosophy great confusion, indefiniteness, incompleteness, and even contradiction with respect to the meaning of personality. It is clear that it is no "transparent unity" to be solved without severe intellectual effort. Without some native and common-sense acquaintance with himself, one would not recognize some of the strange doctrinal creations which have been published under the name of personality, and which have not yet been confined, where they belong, in the museum of metaphysical monstrosities. The motley collection of theories is disconcerting and discouraging to one who, for the first time, seeks light upon this problem. The fact that popular usage is as vague as philosophical definitions are diversified shows that the concept is no simple one. However, the great variety of terms which are used to name the fact we are seeking to isolate and describe confirms the belief that there is some persistent reality there if we could only grasp it clearly. (1)

Reasons for the divergence.

There are several fundamental reasons for the existence of the astonishing divergence among theories of personality.
(a) Since the self or personality is or ought to be an important principle in any philosophical system, when these systems themselves clash, oppositions also are likely to appear with reference to the concept of personality. This concept is so intimately implicated in the various problems of philosophy that any difference in these is likely to be reflected in conflicting conceptions of it. The difficulty of agreement is enhanced by the fact that many philosophers assign the concept of personality to a subordinate place in their systems, or quite neglect it.

(b) Another ground of difference in the notions of personality is that the sources from which the metaphysician must draw belong to such varied and contrasting disciplines that few thinkers are prepared to consider them all in their completeness. Conflicts arise because of the very different points of emphasis in connection with personality which appear according to whether the dominant interest of a thinker is psychological, legal, theological, ethical, biological, sociological, metaphysical, aesthetic, etc. There is great need for a more systematic and comprehensive treatment of the problem of personality.

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(1) Note: for lengthy collections of different views in condensed form, see articles on Seele, Person, Ich, Selbst, in Kirchner's Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe, 6 Auflage, edited by C. Michaëlis, 1911. Also W. M. Thorburn, What is a Person? in Mind, N. S., vol. 103, July, 1917.

(c) The problem is confused by the great variety of terms which are used for personality and the self. Nearly every one of them has a connotation which more or less overlaps the meaning of related terms. This lack of agreement in terminology makes the problem very much more difficult. Some of the terms in question are: personality, soul, self, ego, psyche, subject, person, self-consciousness, individuality, selfhood, spirit, "I" or "me,"--to say nothing of the great variety of such phrases as: transcendental unity of self-consciousness, synthetic unity of apperception, the passing thought, the empirical ego, the moral self, etc. (1)

(d) Another reason, pointed out by W. B. Pillsbury (2), for the contradictions in theories of the self, is found in the fact that different methods are used. Opponents do not accept the same methodological principles. This confusion needs to be corrected by a more adequate consideration of method in connection with personality.

c. Some of the chief unsolved problems with reference to personality.

Our résumé of current tendencies with reference to personality has brought before our attention several fundamental questions which remain unsolved. Some of the most important of these are as follows:

(a) What is the nature of an adequate method for interpreting personality?

(b) What is the meaning of self-knowledge? What is the place of self-consciousness in personality? Is there an original self-experience?

(c) What is the nature of mental or personal activity? It should be noted that the very complexity of the motives reviewed above which converge in the concept of personal or mental activity, naturalism, idealism, behaviorism, pragmatism, dynamic psychology, ethics, is perhaps the chief reason for the present confused status of this concept, and its very vagueness makes it useful in these different contexts.

(d) What is the place of purpose in the concept of personality, and how is it related to activity, memory, and to the affective life?

(e) What is the relation of value to personality?

(f) What is the nature of the continuity of personality, i. e., personal identity?

(g) In what does the unity and individuality of personality consist?

(h) Above all, in what sense is personality real?

We now turn to a systematic and constructive treatment of some of the basic problems in connection with personality.

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(1) Compare E. N. Merrington, The Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter II.

(2) Philosophical Review, vol. 16, pages 387 ff.

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METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY

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THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

by

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PART III

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PART III. A CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY OF PERSONALITY.

A. STATEMENT OF PHILOSOPHIC METHOD ADOPTED IN THE FOLLOWING STUDY OF PERSONALITY.

1. Importance of studying method as a preliminary to understanding personality.

a. Introduction.

The historical criticism of several theories of personality which now has been completed has brought out clearly not only the importance of adopting an adequate method as a condition for a complete understanding of personality, but also several of the chief factors that must enter into a systematic theory of personality. A presentation of the latter will follow a brief exposition of the salient features of a proper method of dealing with personality.

b. Illustrations of imperfect methods.

The chief reason for the need of considering such a method consists in the danger that a method which is imperfectly adapted to discover and express the full meaning of personality will lead to a partial view of it, because of the close correlation between method and the results of metaphysical theorizing. (1) We have met already several examples of how a one-sided conception of personality results from the use of an incomplete method. We found, for instance, that the exclusive use of the analytical method by R. B. Perry led to a neutral and atomistic theory of the self in which genuine personality vanished. (2) Again, the exclusive employment of an intuitive method results in a view of the self which is too short in its time-span and too devoid of the comprehensiveness of meaning with which conception or purposive and universalizing intelligence may supplement the insights of bare intuition. (3)

William James and B. P. Bowne, on the whole, stand between the extremes of the rationalistic analytical method and the radically empirical method of intuition. James, however, does not sufficiently recognize the value of conceptual interpretation, and is inexcusably uncritical respecting the presuppositions of the pragmatic method which he defends. Bowne, on the other hand, might profitably have been more empirical and less rationalistic in his procedure. Evidently, then, it is worth while to give careful attention to the problem of personalistic methodology in order not to arrive at an imperfect view of personality as a result of a hasty initial adoption of an inadequate method.

2. The conditions of an adequate method of dealing with personality.

Only a few of the important features of an adequate method of dealing with personality will be explained here, for it is beyond the plan of this investigation to present a system of personalistic methodology and to answer completely all the questions with reference to method which, as it was noted above, (4) may be propounded in connection with the numerous theories of personality. Perhaps the most fundamental, general requirement of a satisfactory method is that it should lead to as complete an insight into the nature of personality as is possible for human intelligence at its present stage of evolution; in short, it must be a suf-

a. The fundamental requirement of such a method.

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(1) On the summary of our results concerning the correlation between philosophic method and personality-theory, see above, pages 163-4.

(2) See above, pages 104-113, 117-9.

(3) On meaning of intuition, see below, pages 180-2.

(4) See above, page 12.

ficient instrument for reaching the reality concerned; and since one cannot be sure in advance of what this reality is, he should especially avoid adopting an unmodifiable method at the beginning of his inquiry. An adequate method should neither conceal nor warp the relevant facts. It must be nothing but an aid in the understanding of personality, for we must remember that our point of view is metaphysical, and that we are in search of knowledge of real personality and of its essential principles.

b. Recognition of the possible evolution of method corresponding to the development of personal experience.

The general character of our method, then, will be determined by the reality, namely, personality, with which we are concerned, but since our initial understanding of this reality is undoubtedly imperfect, it will be difficult to lay down in advance a method which surely will turn out to be perfect. Rather, our view of personality and of an adequate method will interact, and, on the whole, their development will proceed hand in hand; so that really we would be better able to present in conclusion the outlines of a proper method as a kind of inductive review of the methodological principles involved in our best constructive efforts to understand personality. We cannot be certain but what our expanding comprehension of personality will reveal new requirements for a method.

These observations warn us against prejudging our conception of personality by an unalterable, initial prescription of method. They remind us of the probability that our experience undergoes growth and transformation in the course of philosophic interpretation. A person who has won a thorough understanding of his own nature and of its position in the universe as a whole may possess a richer personality than before his attainment. (1) Experience is not a fixed magnitude, but may greatly increase in significance with the progress of personal life and of metaphysical insight and organization. Rational criticism may reveal principles and relations which will enlarge the meaning of the passing pulse of experience. If this is true, we should rightly expect to find a great variety of conceptions of personality. Indeed, it is precisely the business of the metaphysician to enlarge and enrich his original experience by bringing to light the principles of its existence and development. If it is true that personality is fundamentally a purposive reality, then a criticism of personal experience may open up new and valuable possibilities of future self-realization.

One of the conditions, then, of an adequate personalistic method is the recognition of the possible evolution of method to correspond with developing personal experience. Because of this intimate correlation, the conscious study of method with reference to personality may help us to understand the latter better.

Now, in the study of personality the metaphysician will draw of course upon his personal experience. He cannot avoid making the assumption of his own total experience. F. J. E. Woodbridge observes (2) that, "reality cannot be defined intelligibly as a system absolutely external to the one who formulates it, nor a

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(1) E. G. Spaulding, for example, points out that alterations and new properties appear in things as a result of analysis and synthesis. The New Realism, page 242.

(2) Philosophical Review, 1903, page 375.

c. A peculiarity in the study of personality: it is an explication of principles immanent within the personal thinker himself.

system in which the one who formulates it is a mere incident, or of which he is a mere product." But when he adds (1) that nothing can be defined without a "point of view which allows an independent position over against the matter to which it is directed," the question arises as to how a person who is seeking to define himself can take such a position?

The reply is that in the study of oneself, one cannot take such a point of view, for in every case the person taking it is the one to be defined. This fact brings to light a striking peculiarity in the criticism of personality which it is important to notice, namely, that this study consists in the explication of principles immanent within the personal life of the thinker himself, and only in this sense can one take a point of view at all in a first-hand examination of personality. That is, a proper personalistic method ought to start from the human individual himself in his endeavor to gain a coherent and satisfying understanding of his own total activities.

1'. The use of introspection.

From this requirement it follows that the investigator of personality should make every legitimate use of introspection. The justification for Perry's summary rejection of the latter seems to be lacking; (2) its value is confirmed by the significant results which James attains by its use. The latter urges us, in his inimitable way, to "bury ourselves in the thickness" of immanent reality; (3) we should strive to put ourselves at the point of view of the "interior doing" or the burning focus of personal living. Bowne, too, points out the need of a kind of self-recognition or self-acceptance upon the part of a person, if he would know the "concrete meaning" of himself. (4)

2'. Verbal difficulties in describing personality.

It is easier, however, to attain this concrete standpoint than it is to describe personal experience, for a serious obstacle is met in the limitations of verbal expression. Language is so objective and spiritually lean, so ill adapted to the expression of the subjective life, that it takes one out of himself, usually into a sensuous or mechanical world, as soon as he undertakes to tell what he is in himself. The difficulties of literary expression are so great for the personalist that he often sympathizes with the mystic who, after doing his best to symbolize the deepest phases of his inward life, denies what he has said, and resorts to an assertion of its ineffability. These limits suggest that some sort of intuition or feeling of personality may well supplement the conceptual interpretation of it. (5) Consequently, the metaphysician is often less occupied with exploring strange realms of personal life than he is in devising an adequate medium of communication whereby he can state in an orderly and intelligible way what most people already believe; he must agonize to describe what is more or less familiar. His difficulties in this connection have been somewhat relieved by the discovery of the judgment of individuality; its use in the comprehension of personality will be explained below. (6)

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(1) Philosophical Review, 1903, page 376.
(2) See above, pages 97-98. (3) See above, pages 19-21.
(4) See above, pages 125-8.
(5) See below, pages 184-5.
(6) See below, pages 185-7.

We must expect, then, that the living principles within personality itself will, when elaborated by personal intelligence itself, explain that intelligence so far as it can be explained. The peculiarity in a discussion of the nature of personality is, therefore, that we must assume implicitly at the beginning that which in part we reach explicitly at the end. The conception of personality which we shall have constructed will be simply a clarification and systematization by a free and personal thinker at work upon those facts which he recognizes as his own real and inward life. A proper method must provide for this comprehension of experience from within.

3. Some general characteristics of a personalistic method.

If it is true that there is a close correlation between metaphysical method and the reality studied, we should expect that an adequate personalistic method would be composite because of the highly complex character of personal life, but we should expect especially that it must provide a means of grasping personality as a unique whole. Let us consider these points in order.

a. Analysis and synthesis go hand in hand.

A personality-method is composite in that it will include any valuable metaphysical methods that are applicable to personality, such as the analytical method, as ordinarily understood. We shall grant only relative and not absolute value to the latter, however, and thereby avoid the fallacy of "exclusive particularity" into which Perry falls in his use of it. (1) Analysis regularly goes hand in hand with synthesis; they are really only two distinguishable aspects of a total developing process of thought. In analysis the emphasis is upon the discrimination and differentiation of factors, while in synthesis their organization and systematization is accomplished.

b. The principle of consistency.

It is assumed that the synthetic conception of personality at which we may arrive in the end must be consistent within itself and in its derivation. It will be noted below (2) that this demand for consistency is a striking revelation of the nature of personality itself and its esteem of a certain kind of cognitive value, and is achieved only in the unifying and active work of personal intelligence. The latter fact is frequently overlooked, so that consistency is sometimes assumed to be a kind of agreement floating in an abstract universe apart from a personal thinker.

c. The supplementary value of conception and intuition.

In our historical review of personality (3) we discovered a warm debate respecting the relative value of conception and intuition in apprehending personality. James,(4) Bradley, (5) and Bergson (6) alike argue that so far as the self is concerned, a conceptual construction of it is, in varying ways, inadequate to the facts, while Perry maintains that it is only by conceptual analysis that we find the real elements of personality, although these elements exist independently of thought. An adjustment in this controversy is easily reached by recognizing that both conceptual interpretation and intuitive revelation may contribute to

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(1) See above, pages 104-105.
(2) See criticism of Bradley, below,
(3) See above, for example, pages 17-18.
(4) See above, pages 165-6.
(5) Appearance and Reality.
(6) See, for example, Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 15 to 19.

our insight into the nature of personality. (1)

1'. Rationalistic elements in personality-method.

Rational criticism or rather rational self-criticism, however, will be the chief mark of our method of procedure, since we are primarily seeking for a conceptual interpretation of personality, and since we believe such an interpretation is possible and valuable. There may be other forces or phases of human nature beside intellect, but the philosopher must take account of these by means of concepts. But concepts in the service of a philosopher who is humanistic need not be empty of emotion nor devoid of contact with personal reality.

a'. Importance of intellect in philosophy.

Intellect has always been the peculiar tool of the philosopher in his effort to understand himself and the world, even in those cases where the basic principle of personality at which he arrives is something other than intellect itself. However meager the results may be, most thinkers are not willing, at the present stage of culture, to surrender the hope of there appearing some day an adequate rational or conceptual interpretation of human personality. Consistent and persistent thought, then, is the pathway to our goal.

b'. The understanding of personality is an intellectual achievement.

In this rational construction, however, the philosopher draws fully and freely upon whatever revelations of his own nature may come in his aesthetic or practical life, or in any other forms of conscious experience; and he can build concepts which will refer to these forms of experience without falling into the mistake of supposing that his concepts exhaust their essence, for in the very moment when one forms a conception of himself, his real self is the conceiver. When an understanding of personality does come, it will be no doubt a notable intellectual achievement; for, apart from strenuous intellectual labor, we know of no way of attaining that clarification of personal experience which many intelligent men treasure highly and eagerly long for. Even if a finally satisfying view of personality should be relatively simple, it might represent the result of an immense amount of mental effort upon the part of many thinkers.

c'. A defense of the worth of a conceptual interpretation of personality.

James, and Bergson too, maintains that the static character of concepts prevents their truly representing the dynamic reality of personality. It has been pointed out, however, (2) that the static character of a concept need not be attributed to the real objects to which the concept may refer, and that in fact its value lies in its permanence of meaning, albeit that meaning may be activity. Hence, just because one's apprehension of personality may be conceptual, it need not be untrue, provided one has recognized its abstract character, and provided further that it has been verified in or rests upon concrete experience. James himself has pointed out that conception has a genuine, though greatly restricted value in knowing active life because it gives a breadth of perspective that percepts lack. (3) It should be emphasized, however, that intellect after all is an abstraction from concrete, personal activity. (4)

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(1) Compare J. M'K. Stewart's explanation of Bergson's intuitive method, and its relation to intelligence, Introduction of his Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy.

(2) See above, page 67.

(3) See above, pages 18-19.

(4) See below, pages 289-91.

A conception of personality, therefore, may have great pragmatic value as a guide in enabling one not only to recognize personality when he has it, but to comprehend better its vast implications and its significance. The intellect is capable of a comprehensive envisagement of its objects, and of providing a universal setting for them, and for these reasons a conceptual interpretation of personality may have real worth.

2'. The place of intuition in a personality-method.

a'. The meaning of intuition in connection with the apprehension of personality.

But in the recognition of the validity of the conceptual interpretation of personality, as well as in its concrete origin, is there not an intuitive element? There probably is such a factor, both in the immediate character of the activities from which that interpretation starts, and in the final verification of it by an immediate recognition of its truth. In the second case our ideas of personality lead us, as a pragmatist would say, right up face to face with our real, personal experience, and in the recognition that the idea is actually more than filled out in that experience, we have a kind of intuition in which I say, It is I, or, more exactly, I am I. D. C. Macintosh thus describes Bergson's view of supra-intellectual intuition as applied to the self: (1) "The true nature of the self, as of duration and change, is given immediately in our own direct self-experience, whereby, instead of merely circling about the object in conceptual flights, we penetrate into the very heart of it and view it from within." Several qualifications, however, need to be attached to the statement that intuition plays a part in the apprehension of personality.

1". The abstract character of intuition.

A general definition of intuition will not be undertaken, because this perplexing problem would take us too far afield, if it is true that there are at least eight varieties of intuition in philosophy. (2) In metaphysical discussions the root idea of intuition is that of directness or immediacy of acquaintance with reality, as contrasted with representative, abstract, or mediate knowledge of it. (3) If we neglect the rare moments of mystical ecstasy and certain other exceptional states of mind, and consider only the usual experiences of the normal individual, it seems that any acquaintance with reality involves the presence of some intellectual and discursive factor. But if intuition is regularly mixed in this way with mediate elements, it follows that pure intuition is an abstraction.

This inference is in line with W. E. Hocking's promulgation of the idea of the cognitive value of feeling, and with his assertion that "all feeling means to instate some experience which is essentially cognitive." (4) H. Bergson, too, includes an intel-

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(1) The Problem of Knowledge, page 403; see H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, page 176, and Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 1, 9, 22, 43.

(2) So A. C. Armstrong, Jr., in article, "Intuition," in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. For an excellent account of Bergson's philosophy which is unified by constant reference to the intuitive method, see J. M'K. Stewart's A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy.

(3) See reference to Armstrong in preceding note.

(4) The Meaning of God in Human Experience, page 68.

lectual aspect in his definition of intuition: "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. . . We may sympathize intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves." (1) As a matter of fact, intuition seems to be as much an abstraction from the concrete whole of personal experience as reason or sensation. But if intuition is an abstraction, how is immediate acquaintance with reality possible in it? The difficulty here seems to be analogous to the self-contradiction present in the hypothesis that there is immediate knowledge. Even the mention of the intuitive method implies that one has gone beyond the original intension of intuition and added a mediate factor. In other words, if one is to mean by intuition of personality anything different than the actual existence or functioning of personality, he is obliged to recognize the presence of a mediate factor. Hence, intuition is either a self-contradiction or an abstraction; the latter alternative is undoubtedly preferable, for there is some genuine value to be found in retaining the term.

This discovery that pure intuition does not exist under ordinary circumstances, confirms the need mentioned above (2) of pursuing our study of personality by a progressive explication of the living principles that are immanent in it. This result is also in harmony with our proposition that James' "knowledge of acquaintance" is an abstraction. (3)

2". The meaning of intuition.

Now the particular meaning of intuition which we shall adopt as an element in our personalistic method has already been suggested, (4) namely, the perception of the self as active in its activities. It means one's familiar feeling of active presence, and this feeling is immediate in the temporal sense of being mine here and now; the personal present is what the self recognizes as now being experienced, as now involving a purposive act. This interpretation of intuition makes it practically synonymous with perception as used by James in connection with one's awareness of his own activities. (5) It is also almost identical with what Bowne apparently means by "self-experience" when he speaks of it as an original datum. (6) W. R. Sorley refers to it as "an apprehension which is immediate--which is lived in the moment that it is known." (7)

Bergson calls this intuition of the self a "coincidence of the person with himself," (8) or "a taking possession of the spirit by itself." (9) "It is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us." (10) He asserts also that, "There is one reality, at

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(1) Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 7, 9.
(2) See above, page 177.
(3) See above, pages 65-67.
(4) See above, page 180, top.
(5) See above, page 19; for a description of his conception of knowledge of acquaintance, see above, pages 20-1.
(6) See above, pages 127-8.
(7) Moral Values, etc., page 262; see pages 262-6 for his view of the intuition of the self.
(8) Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 4-5.
(9) Creative Evolution, page 360.
(10) Ibid., page 176.

least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time--our self which endures." (1)

Intuition, in other words, is the living and conscious union between the personal actor and what he does which constitutes his experience; or it is the awareness that one has of his personal experience, which is suffused with the warmth, intimacy, and immediacy which James so often recalled. (2) This kind of intuitive experience is not strictly a self-reference, but rather a conscious self-assertion, or self-being, for the moment one speaks of an intuition of himself, he has gone beyond the immediacy which is supposed to characterize intuition.

3". The intimate correlation of intuition and intelligence.

And yet the introduction of a mediate or intellectual factor is inevitable. Intuition must be thought of as intimately bound up with an intelligence-factor from which it was abstracted a moment ago for the purposes of exposition. The term, intuition, however, may be retained profitably to call attention to the living and relatively immediate character of certain of our personal experiences as contrasted with the more thoroughly mediate or conceptual character of certain others. It emphasizes the fact that the experiences out of which one builds a conception of personality are concrete and present in an active way. But it is out of these self-intuitions, permeated with intelligence and existing as a kind of undeveloped or uncritical self-consciousness, (3) that the personal thinker constructs an idea of himself.

In other words, as a result of our interpretation of our intuitive and every-day life, we may build a synthetic conception to express what our personalities mean to us. (4) In this development the personalistic philosopher will draw his materials from a long series of intuitive acts, for, as Bergson suggests, (5) one does not exhaust his reality in a single act of intuition. "In every effort of intuition the philosopher sympathizes with reality in only one of its rhythms." (6) This expanding character of our acquaintance with ourselves which this interpretation of intuition makes possible provides a necessary elastic element in personalistic method. (7) By the cooperation of intuition and conception one may gradually enlarge his insight into his own personality.

The final synthetic conception of personality which an investigator may reach cannot be said to be itself an intuition, but it leads simply to one more new and significant intuition as described above in which a person can, within certain limits, verify his idea of himself by a kind of self-recognition. (8) Such a

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(1) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 9.
(2) See above, page 26.
(3) See below, pages 351-3.
(4) Compare Bowne's account of the relation of self-knowledge and self-experience in self-consciousness, above, pages 126-8.
(5) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 56.
(6) J. M'K. Stewart, A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, page 27.
(7) See above, page 176, where the need of providing for the possibility of a growth in personalistic method was pointed out.
(8) See below, page 358.

self-intuition is the logical culmination, so far as personality is concerned, of the pragmatic doctrine of verification. (1) But "even for the direct contact of the self with the self, the final effort of distinct intuition would be impossible to any one who had not combined and compared with each other a very large number of psychological analyses." (2) We may discover the truth of our judgment about ourselves in our immediate experience, (3) but so long as intuition and conception have distinct meanings, the guiding idea of the self and the living personality will not entirely coalesce. The idea will retain a comprehensiveness and perspective which the momentary intuitive self cannot possess; while the latter will have a warmth of life and fulness of reality which the concept can never completely envisage.

It seems, then, that intuitive revelation and conceptual construction always unite in a concrete and personal whole. The predominance of one over the other at any time,or the interest of the moment, determines whether that whole shall be called an intuition or a conception. Again, sometimes the fulness of intuitive life leads to conceptual interpretation, and sometimes conceptual interpretation calls for intuitive verification. In both cases intuition means essentially the same thing: the turning of attention to the experience or perception of the self as active in its activities. In neither instance can intuition be separated from the factor of intelligence which is ever present in personal experience. This intimate blending of intuition and intelligence, of immediacy and mediacy, in acquaintance with oneself, perhaps may best be called interpretation, in the expression of which judgments of individuality play an important part. (4)

b'. The value of the intuition of personality is rationally determined.

While, therefore, the view of personality which results from conceptual interpretation may be verified in part by reference to an immediate or intuitive experience, it is very important to note that such intuition will reveal the real person because the thinker so purposes. Intuition in connection with the apprehension of personality gets its value from association with intelligence. The worth of intuition of personality is rationally determined, and intuition reveals personality because conceptual interpretation has led us to value such revelation.

Bergson's reasonings undoubtedly have enhanced greatly the authority of intuitive experience in metaphysical discussions. But if this mental function has such marvelous powers to grasp reality, why is its worth not easily and generally recognized? Because the assertion of that value is a product of long and painstaking intellectual effort; because the discovery of the significance of intuition is made by thought. (5)

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(1) See above,page 28. From this point to the neo-realistic doctrine of the immanence of consciousness the path is apparently direct and short; see above, pages 117-8.

(2) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 92.

(3) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 453.

(4) See below, pages 185-7.

(5) Bergson himself hints at this idea: Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 89-92; see above, page 183, top.

The chief value of intuition in connection with personality, therefore, comes at the end of the process of conceptual construction; namely, in that final moment, when, after intellectual synthesis has done its best, I assert myself to be just what I have found myself to be, and say, Here am I in the fulness of my immediate existence. (1) But such fulness and significance as I discover in this concluding insight will be a reflection of the rational interpretation which has preceded. Intuition reveals the real personality because the thinker intends that it should, and he thus purposes because he has found its worth in rational criticism.

It seems to be a fundamental mistake of the intuitionists to suppose that intuition by itself, apart from discursive thought, makes significant deliverances. To make this supposition is to fall into the fallacy of abstraction, for intuition on the plane of our human intelligence must mean something--it must at least mean the quest for reality,--but this meaning which gives intuition its value is something added to intuition by reflective reason. A recognition of this fact saves us from over-estimating, as James tends to do (2), the importance of immediate feeling.

But reason itself also is an abstraction, and the concrete fact is that there are human individuals or personalities who, in various ways, may seek to understand themselves, but who can never permanently reduce themselves to the level of either purely intuitive feeling or of purely rational thought. Both of these are inextricably interwoven with the activity of personal intelligence. Intellect and intuition alike are abstractions from the concrete personality, in which indeed one or the other may be preeminently present at some particular times.

c'. Supplementary character of the rationalistic and intuitive methods, with reasons:

The most satisfactory view, then, is to regard the intuitive (including the empirical) and the rationalistic (including synthesis and analysis) methodsas supplementary and cooperative. Each of them has its value in the study of personality, but neither has absolute or exclusive value. On certain occasions it makes for clearness, however, to distinguish between these methods. "Both are regarded as due to creative psychical activity, but at the same time as being moulded upon the independent reality presented in and through that activity. It is convenient, however, to use the term intuition in connection with the more original and immediate states of consciousness, and the term category in connection with those that are more mediate and derivative." (3) In the constructive discussion which follows we shall present a conceptual interpretation of personality, and at the end we shall consider the problem of self-knowledge and the place of immediate apprehension or intuition in it.

1". Avoids abstraction.

There are various reasons for regarding the two types of method as supplementary. First, this recognition will save us from falling into dangerous abstraction.

2". Nature of human personality.

In the second place, the need of supplementation arises from the nature of the human person, who has capacities both for feeling and thought, and cannot maintain his human integrity if he suppresses

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(1) See below, page 358. . See also the discussion of how a person learns to know himself by acting purposively, below, page 240.

(2) See above, pages 66-7.

(3) D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 485.

either function in the exclusive interest of the other. The "concrete universal" is a fact of human experience.

3". Need of transcending the moment.

Finally, for minds that are admittedly finite, we need just the universalizing work of intelligence to exhibit the relation of our immediate and personal feelings to the rest of the universe. Without intelligence that transcends the momentary processes of consciousness, these feelings would seem to be of little significance, and would be shut off from intercourse with the common or social world of knowledge. The community of knowledge is made possible by the work of intellect, and this community is a precious human function. Conceptual interpretation then gives to the revelation of intuition both significance and a place in the universe.

d. The judgment of individuality.

So far we have not come upon any novel features which characterize a proper personalistic method, and in general probably none such exist, except perhaps the very strong emphasis which this method puts upon the use of what has been called "the judgment of individuality."

1'. Description of it.

This is well described by J. Creighton: "By Judgments of Individuality, we mean judgments which regard some complex object as a real whole with a definite nature of its own. Judgments of this kind are also frequently called Judgments of Purpose, or Teleology. . This form gives expression to the organic unity and wholeness of things, and emphasizes the way in which the parts cooperate for a common purpose or end. Thus we regard the parts of a plant as a unity cooperating in a common purpose, and a man as a conscious system of ends. . The mark of individuality, on the other hand, is the power of origination, or self-determination. If, then, there exist any genuine individuals, they are something more than causally determined phenomena...

"Ethics . . has to begin with the individual. It does not regard mind as a thing or substance (that is the naive point of view against which psychology rightly warns us), but as a self-conscious system of ideas, purposes, and feelings, which possesses the power of initiating action, and of determining itself in accordance with some purpose. The judgment of Individuality, as a more concrete form, must use the results of judgments of Causal Connection. What it really does is to interpret what for the psychologist is a sum of mental processes in terms of a system which has a real unity of its own. For it is only when a person is regarded as a self-conscious and self-acting individual, that he can be supposed capable of conduct to which the term 'moral' and 'immoral' can properly be applied." (1)

2'. Its importance and use in describing personality.

We shall resort frequently to this kind of judgment to express the concrete whole of a purposive kind in which personality consists and from which we start in our study. This judgment is an expression of the nature of personality, and is not something which is introduced from outside in order to explain it. If this is true, then to tell what individuality is and how it applies to personality, would be to tell what personality is. The self objectively considered or conceptually expressed is a judgment of individuality in its most typical form, for it is in the self and in the self alone that individuality first gets its meaning. (2)

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(1) J. E. Creighton, An Introductory Logic, pages 370-72.
(2) See the discussion of individuality below, pages 185-7.

The judgment of individuality, then, is not something which explains personality, but it merely provides a means of expressing the meaning of a real self which it presupposes. The special advantage of this type of judgment is that it furnishes a mode of interpreting the inward and purposive unity which personality possesses in the midst of the multiplicity of its aspects; other kinds of judgments, such as those concerning quantitative and causal series, often presuppose a certain externality or succession of parts which is foreign to personal life. The use of the individual judgment enables one to avoid the "analytical fallacy" (1) into which Perry falls when he supposes that the method of analysis alone can fully reveal and properly express the nature of personality. W. R. Sorley points out that, "In this immediate knowledge of the self we find the two marks of wholeness which are absent from analysis and its results." (2) A judgment of individuality is always one concerning a purposive and organizing reality which is in some measure self-contained. This is precisely what personality is, for "no one doubts that the self has a degree of individuality, (3) and that it develops to a large extent from within itself. The judgment of individuality, therefore, appears to be a very useful mode of expression in describing the facts of personal life. It conforms to our general rule that a true personalistic method should be determined ultimately by the nature of personality itself.

3'. The individual judgment and intellectual intuition.

It is very interesting in this connection to note B. Croce's suggestion that, "That famous intellectual intuition . . . should be declared, with the full rigour of letter and concept, to be nothing but the individual judgment; which is, in truth, intellectual intuition or intuited intellection." (4) This opinion supports the contention above (5) that intuition and intelligence are intimately associated. In the case of the self we may say, in the words of Croce, that "there is certainly a case for thinking, but also one for looking, or for thinking while we look, and for looking while we think." (6)

4'. It enables us to start with the original unity of personal life.

Our fundamental problem will be to understand the various factors which go to make up the individual or unified whole of any particular instance of personal life. Instead of studying the elements of personal activity, we shall speak rather of its implications or its aspects, for we can never escape from its original unity. We shall try to understand this unity by examining its actual operation rather than by reducing it to elements or powers.

We shall not expect to define personality in terms other than itself, but shall seek only to understand the various phases of personality as it is manifest in experience. We do not start with the

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(1) See above, pages 107-113.

(2) Moral Values, etc., pages 263-4.

(3) B. Bosanquet, Logic, 2d ed., vol. II, page 258; compare p. 253; see also the whole of chap. VIII, of Book II, in which he explains the theory of logic which he holds in relation to absolutism.

(4) Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, page 154; see the whole of the Second Section of this work.

(5) See above, pages 181-183.

(6) Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, page 154.

expectation of finding the sole meaning of personality in either intellect, will, or feeling, but our general expectation is that all will be necessary for an understanding of it, and that all will prove to be intimately interwoven in concrete personal life. Our interpretation of personality will be meaningless to any one who is not himself a person. K. Oesterreich observes, concerning the ego, (1) that it "is a kind of thing which one can merely indicate, but which one can as little demonstrate to the I-blind as one can demonstrate a color to the color-blind." A final test of our conception of personality will consist in whether or not it justifies itself in that kind of intuitive self-identification or self-recognition in the verification of it to which reference has already been made. (2)

The fundamental difference between this conception of method and that of the new realist lies in our assertion that the personal whole is an original fact, and not a derivative one which may be explained by analysis into elements. Within the given whole we may gradually distinguish and correlate various aspects, and thus come to a better understanding of our individuality, but in no sense is personality to be regarded as a sum or correlation of parts, in the way that the realist sometimes seems to maintain. Once personality is a fact of experience, it may experience itself in a multitude of ways; that is, it may act with reference to different purposes, but it never surrenders its original unity.

e. Conclusion as to method.

We may conclude our discussion of method, then, by saying that the investigator of personality should make use of any method which will enable him to know, to feel, to understand, or in any other way, to grasp the meaning of personality. He should seek a conceptual interpretation of personality by way of rational criticism, and make what use he can of intuition. Judgments of individuality should form one of his most important modes of interpretation.

1'. General statement.

2'. The small value of the genetic method.

The genetic method of studying personality is of insignificant value, for the reason, first, that when personality has in fact appeared in the universe, its unified life is so rich in categories that nothing apart from itself is sufficient to explain its nature; in particular, it cannot be built out of simpler forms of sensitive life which may have preceded it in the course of natural evolution. Secondly, when personality has been developed, it may take on novel forms, by reason of its capacity of self-determination, which may be distinct from anything that went before it in evolution.

3'. The assumptions which our method involves.

The fundamental assumptions which we make have been suggested already in the discussion of method. The first is the whole subject matter of experience as we normal human beings have it. We are unwilling to prejudice our problem by regarding our experience as made up of discrete elements, such as the ideas of traditional associationism, or by any abstract doctrine of "pure experience." We have presented above reasons for rejecting this latter conception. (3)

This original experience of man is not at first orderly, but is in need of organization and interpretation, and this task, in its general form, is the primary one of the philosopher. We assume

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(1) Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen, page 197.

(2) See above, page 182, bottom, 183.

(3) See above, pages 69-72; compare Bowne's conception of experience, above, pages 127-8, 130; see also, E. N. Merrington, The Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter I.

that a consistent construction of it is attainable by the work of thought, for we know of no way of avoiding the postulate of consistency as at least one of the marks which real things must possess.

Since we who seek a systematic view of personality are ourselves persons, we must develop the meaning of personality by setting forth the principles which are already implicit in our experience from which we start. These, then, are the main assumptions. Our task will consist mainly in a progressive explication of our personal experience.

B. PERSONALITY AND ACTIVITY.

1. Reasons for beginning with the concept of activity; introduction.

The above criticism of several historical theories of personality has served as orientation for the constructive metaphysical argument which will now be developed. Our critical studies have provided us with a fruitful point of departure amid the bewildering variety of views and implications of the concept in question. (1) That base of operations is the idea of activity, which offers a means of systematic exposition and a touchstone of relevance for material in the discussion. In other words, the third part of this investigation consists in an attempt to throw light upon the nature of personality from the standpoint of the concept of activity; and aspects of personality which are not organically related to this concept will be neglected as a rule.

Both in every-day life and in scientific thought there is abroad a general conviction that somehow a person is a doer of deeds, an active seeker after ends which he esteems. This common sense or agreement probably rests at once upon the consciousness of a genuine feature of personality and upon a convenient indefiniteness and breadth in the notion of personal activity itself. (2) Out of the numerous possible approaches to the problem of personality (1) this notion is adopted because there are many reasons for believing that it is a fundamental feature of personality. The reasons for this belief also furnish grounds for beginning our inquiry by an examination of the idea of activity. The chief reasons referred to are as follows:

a. Predominance of dynamic views of the self in contemporary philosophy.

In the first place, abundant evidence has been presented already (3) to indicate that there is a widespread tendency in present scientific and philosophical thought to regard activity as a very important factor in the concept of personality. It is unnecessary to review here this evidence for a strongly dynamic trend in contemporary theories of personality. Some of those thinkers who either defend or fruitfully discuss the active feature of the self are listed below in a special bibliography on "Personality and Activity," which stands after the general bibliography.

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(1) For some of these, see (a) the classification of Part I, pages 3-11; and (b) the corresponding methodological questions, page 12; (c) as well as various avenues of approach to the problem of personality, pages 153-4.

(2) See above, pages 168-171, for various contexts where the concept of activity is employed.

(3) See above, page 10.

This predominance of dynamic views has not, however, brought a general understanding as to the concept of activity, and there is great need in both psychology and philosophy for a more satisfactory elucidation of it. This need is expressed by E. D. Fawcett's strong appeal (1) for an investigation of this "vital problem." Its various phases should be analyzed, and its implications and conditions should be set forth. The question concerning how activity is possible is considered quite too rarely.

b. The concept of activity connects the metaphysics of personality with biology and psychology, for these sciences in general contain a dynamic view of human nature.

In the second place, the adoption of the standpoint of activity enables us to draw upon the evidence for the dynamic character of human nature which is furnished by biological and psychological sciences. The human organism, in the light of these sciences, appears to be a persistently active creature, a living, responsive, moving, behaving entity, which exhibits its capacities for action by adapting itself in a multitude of ways to complex and novel situations in its environment. Now the idea of activity offers an opportunity to gain the support of the relevant results of these important sciences. In them the outstanding character of mind is its selective adjustment to its surroundings in the interest of its own ends. The metaphysical conception of personal activity should be developed with reference to other kinds of activity, if there be such.

1'. The active character of the organism:

biological evidence.

In modern biology we learn that the old notion that the organism is passive in relation to its environment has been supplanted largely by a dynamic conception. The idea of adaptation stresses the activity, not the receptivity, of the organism, and suggests that the organic individual must exert itself if it would successfully meet its environment. (2) Indeed, all living beings seem to possess a measure of spontaneity, and the higher they are in the scale of life, the greater it is. (3) The organism is the center of numerous actions which make for the sustaining and maintaining of itself, and these arise from within itself because of its impelling organic needs, such as nutrition and reproduction.

Numerous authorities may be quoted in support of the active character of the organism. J. A. Thomson, for example, asserts that, "The organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive, living creature--to some extent master of its own fate." (4) H. S. Jennings maintains that "the organism is activity." (5) And C. H. Judd declares that "Every animal is a reacting being. All its functions relate to what it can do." (6) Activity, as used here, is a general term covering many specific acts, each of which is complex and forms a little "action-system." (7) Correlated bodily behavior, based upon a coordinated nervous system, is characteristic of human beings as of other developed organic beings.

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(1) Mind, N. S., vol. 27, pages 92-3, 1918.
(2) Compare C. H. Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 147.
(3) Compare H. S. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pages 261, 283-5.
(4) Heredity, page 172.
(5) Behavior of the Lower Organisms.
(6) Psychology, page 132.
(7) Compare H. S. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, page 107.

Evidence from behavioristic psychology.

The starting point in contemporary psychology is frequently the coordinated behavior of the human organism. In fact, so important is the fundamentally dynamic character of the life of the animal and human individual that one school of psychologists, the behaviorists, restrict the subject matter of their science to the acts of a responding organism. The limitations and dogmatism so frequently connected with this standpoint need not blind us to its value in emphasizing the active character of human nature, and in thus bringing psychology into closer relationship with biology. It is clear that the same emphasis is present in the newer point of view called, "dynamic psychology," (1)

2'. The original practical function of consciousness.

A chief difficulty in behaviorism is its inability to describe consciousness, especially in its higher forms. That consciousness or mind in its origin is intimately connected with bodily activity is generally agreed. The function of consciousness seems to have appeared in the organism, as a means of ordering behavior, when its purely physiological mechanism became incapable of meeting the demands of a complex and varying environment. (2) In short, it is a "master device" for perfecting the adaptive operations and satisfying the needs of organic life. The dictum of William James, that "all consciousness is motor " (3), has become a foundation stone of modern psychology, and has been developed by many others. B. B. Breese, for example, affirms that, "From its very first appearance in the life process, consciousness has been connected with the motor responses." (4)

Now our expectation is that this primordial function of consciousness in the control and coordination of human behavior will be preserved in the higher forms of mental life, and,if so, we shall have grounded the fundamentally active nature of personality upon well attested facts of biology and psychology, and, also, we shall have attained a certain continuity in the forms of human action. W. E. Ritter, a biologist, objects to the separation of organic and psychic action, and says, "That the individually active and creative power of the human organism on its psychical side is not a whit less real, less objective, less a natural phenomenon to the natural historian than is the individually creative power of physical growth and variation, and reflex and tropistic action." (5) This expectation warrants us in stopping to note the dynamic character of the organism and of primitive consciousness, and also in beginning our study of personality with the notion of activity.

3'. The multiplicity of man's native tendencies to action.

The active character of original human nature is exhibited by a review of several other series of facts: the abundance, the variability, and the excessiveness of human tendencies to action. Let us notice these points in turn.

It is well known that man's native tendencies to action are very numerous. James' view that "man has more instincts than any other mammal," (6) is familiar. The number of these tendencies

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(1) See above, page 170.

(2) Compare H. Bergson's view of the practical function of intellect, Creative Evolution, index.

(3) Psychology, Briefer Course, page 370.

(4) Psychology, page 397.

(5) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, page 227.

(6) The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, pages 403-41.

tends to increase with the development of psychological knowledge. The latest "classification of reflexes, instincts," etc., contains almost a hundred of them. (1) Man is richly endowed with specific as well as general capacities for action.

From personal experience we can testify to the presence in our nature of many deep and powerful impulses which sometimes are difficult of control and which are hard to get rid of. We find ourselves constantly adopting new purposes which we energetically seek to achieve, and we find ourselves shaping the course of our thinking and the face of our environment.

4'. The variability of man's actions.

The variability of man's actions is also notable. His original nature prepares him to respond to certain situations without always determining in a precise way what response he will make; so that in learning to make a successful adjustment to the same particular situation, he sometimes carries out many responses before he hits upon the right or satisfying one. This fact has been called by E. L. Thorndike the law of "multiple response or varied reaction." (2) He says, for example, that, "In the pronunciation of a foreign language, in force and coherence in English composition, or in skill in billiards or tennis, the right responses cannot be guaranteed beforehand;" so that "in very many cases . . multiple response is the first step in learning." (3) Indeed, "this principle .. will be found to pervade at least nine-tenths of animal and human learning." (4)

We are justified, therefore, in saying with W. E. Ritter (5) that, "The third certainty about reflex and instinctive activities is that they are by no means so stereotyped and invariable as older cursory observation or as much theorizing . . has held them to be. . The principles of 'random movements,' 'avoiding reactions,' 'trial and error,' and others, are thoroughly established." A summary of a long list of experiments aimed at demonstrating numerous kinds of variability in the actions of organisms may be found in the part of Ritter's second volume to which reference has just now been made. (5) This fact of variability in action, certified to by an eminent psychologist, biologist, and philosopher (6), furnishes further evidence for the dynamic character of human nature. It points to a striking, original spontaneity of the organic individual, and makes many actions possible.

5'. The excessiveness of organic actions.

A third line of evidence for the originally active nature of man is to be found in the excessiveness of his actions. This fact is also based upon the testimony of a well-known biologist, who says (7) that, "The fourth and last certainty about reflex and instinctive activities . . is their tendency to excessiveness--their way of going beyond what is necessary or even really safe for the welfare of the organism." He believes that too little attention has been given to the marvelous exuberance of animal activities. He

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(1) H. C. Warren, Psychological Review, May, 1919, vol. 21, pages 197-203.
(2) Educational Psychology, Briefer Course, pages 56-8, 143-4.
(3) Ibid., page 143. (4) Ibid., page 132.
(5) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, pages 251-2.
(6) See below, J. Royce, page 192.
(7) W. E. Ritter, The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, pages 256-261.

thinks that animals are "notorious repeaters." "Think of the monotonous repetition in the croaking of frogs, the chirping of crickets, the stridulations of cicadas, and so on!" He presents much specific evidence for his conclusion. These facts point to the presence in the organism of a kind of general capacity or instinct for "trying " as R. B. Perry describes it: "It seems to be necessary to predicate two springs of action in the docile organism: (a) the more deep-seated, sustained, and general propensity, which accounts for the increased reactivity called 'trying,' and which prescribes when this shall be brought to rest; (b) the more superficial, transitory, and specific propensities, which are rendered hyper-excitable by the former, but are ordinarily released by sense stimuli." (1)

J. Royce's theory of mental initiative.

These facts of variability and excessiveness in human actions form the conditions of mental initiative according to J. Royce. (2) His "thesis" is that "the restless over-activity of the organism in carrying out its instinctive processes, or in seeking opportunity for the establishment of new functions, is the principal condition of every significant form of mental initiative." (3) Upon this principle all theories of "activity must be founded." (4)

He offers numerous illustrations in defense of his thesis. "Ordinary active attention is a process of restless persistence in advance of adaptation," (5) and represents "an eagerness to get into some kind of relation to objects or to ideas." (6) The plays of children too, are examples of "the restless overflow of activities that the playful organism shows." (7) Children persist in a great number of ineffective or useless movements just "because of the inner impulse to try them again and again." (8)

Royce believes that this disposition to perseverance in active trying is a general instinct of human nature. It functions when we discover that we are in a position where we have undertaken something and have so far failed. It predisposes us to no particular kind of action, but only to a persistent trying. (9) It keeps us ever attacking the situation which faces us until either the feeling of restlessness disappears with success, or until we suffer fatigue. It produces "novel forms of conduct," which in the physical world are analagous to the "spontaneous variations" in biology. It can be explained neither by heredity, the environment, nor docility (10), but must be regarded as an original and general instinctive tendency. It is a condition of all mental initiative and novel adaptations, and is certainly a powerful testimony to the dynamic character of human nature.

Transitional note.

Probably enough evidence from biology and psychology has now been presented to establish the general proposition that the human being is by nature active in some sense. This conclusion is a second reason for beginning with the concept of activity in the study of personality. Our defense of it has brought before us

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(1) Docility and Purposiveness, Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 19.

(2) See his interesting discussion in Outlines of Psychology, chapter XIII and Preface.

(3) Ibid., page 318.

(4) Ibid., page 330.

(5) Ibid., xxiii.

(6) Ibid., page 330.

(7) Ibid., page 321.

(8) Ibid., page 307.

(9) Ibid., pages 307, 314, 317, xi.

(10) Ibid., page 305.

numerous facts which will prove of value in the course of our discussion.

c. Human activity is exhibited in history and culture.

In the last section some of the natural active tendencies of man were described. In this section attention is called to the available evidence for the dynamic character of human nature which might be derived in great abundance from a consideration of human history, institutions, and culture. E. Krieck, who has written a "critical foundation for a philosophy of culture," under the title of "Persönlichkeit und Kultur," asserts (1) that, "the living and free personality is the vital kernel of culture"; and in the last paragraph of his book (2) he declares that, "Every artist who has attained the supreme height of life and art, and who has become self-conscious of his work of creation and the sources of his art, becomes an idealist; he becomes conscious in himself of the freedom and the divine intrinsicality, the sovereignty of life over all existence and contingency."

It is unnecessary to multiply illustrative facts in this connection. Certainly the building of cities, steamships, and canals, the setting up of governments, schools, and varied institutions, the tilling of the soil and the manufacture of countless things, the writing of books and the painting of pictures,--these and unnumbered other products of man exhibit a being which is persistently transforming and harnessing the forces of nature, and is essentially active. This general point is clearly indicated in L. F. Ward's description of two branches of sociology; he believes that "while in pure sociology the constructive direct affects of human effort only were dealt with, in applied sociology it is the success of such efforts in supplying human wants that is taken into account." (3) The latter branch, he says, is concerned with enforcing the truth that man can adapt to himself an imperfectly adapted environment. (4)

d. Other advantages of beginning with the concept of activity.

Other advantages of beginning our study of personality by an analysis of the concept of activity could be mentioned. This idea seems to offer an opportunity for a synthetic exposition and conceptual unification of several fundamental features of personality, and we are proceeding on the hypothesis that this will prove to be the case. This development will be possible if a typical concrete activity turns out to be a complex possessing several important phases in intimate union.

The notion of activity also fits in with the present tendency to emphasize the progressive development and the constant flux of the mental life. James talks much about the stream of consciousness and H. Bergson defends a radical temporalism. It is out of philosophic fashion to suggest a study of personality by starting from some fixed or abiding substance. The real justification for beginning with the concept of activity, however, must be found in its success in illuminating the problem of personality.

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(1) Page xi.
(2) page 512.
(3) Applied Sociology, page 6.
(4) Ibid., page 7.

2. What mental activity is not.

The above exhibition of the general dynamic character of human nature pepresents only a rough beginning of our task, for we have offered as yet no precise definition of activity; but "it is to be hoped that the impression begins to grow in your minds that we are very active beings." (1) Let us turn to answering the question: What is the meaning of that activity which is called mental, or perhaps personal? We must first clear our path by getting rid of two inadequate views concerning the nature of mental activity which have been proposed. According to one of these, mental activity is to be identified with "psychic energy," and according to the other, with "bodily behavior." These may be referred to as the energetic and the behavioristic or corporeal theory, respectively.

The question: What is mental activity? answered first by refuting two inadequate views.

a. Reasons for rejecting the view that mental activity is "psychic energy."

The interpretation of the self in terms of "psychic energy" or "energetic activity" is especially popular in monistic circles where the attempt is made to bridge the gulf between matter and mind by the concept of a universal energy which is regarded as taking on various forms to meet the contingencies of philosophic explanation. Judging from the descriptions which these monists put forward and from their naturalistic turn of mind, one infers that the phrase, psychic energy, is an adaptation from the idea of energy of the mechanical or physico-chemical sort.

1'. Statement of this view, as illustrated by W. Ostwald.

Little needs to be added to the general statement of this conception of mental activity which has been made above. (2) W. Ostwald asserts that, "I deem it possible to subordinate to the idea of energy the totality of psychical phenomena." (3) His argument is based upon the exhaustion of the human organism in mental labor, and upon the agreement among all nations that intellectual activity as well as the generation of mechanical energy is involved in work. (3)

Concerning the nature of this psychic energy, Ostwald observes that, "Whether psychical energy is to be regarded as a form of energy in and for itself, like heat or kinetic energy, or whether it is only a particular of several combination energies, as is known to be the case with sound and probably so with light, must here remain undetermined." (4) In his Natural Philosophy he speaks as if he considered spiritual energy to be a transformation of chemical energy in the brain under determinate conditions, and as if it might be changed back again; the energy of consciousness is the highest and rarest form known to us. W. P. Montague (5) "holds that consciousness is identical with potential energy into which a portion of the kinetic energy of the stimulus is transformed when there is a check in the motor discharge."

2'. Ostwald avoids the central issue of the ego.

The striking feature of Ostwald's article on "The Philosophical Meaning of Energy" (6) is that he dodges the main issue: after suggesting the hypothesis that psychic phenomena may be subordinated to the concept of energy, he excludes the conscious ego from his

(1) C. H. Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 96.
(2) See above, pages 4, 170-1.
(3) International Quarterly, vol. VII, page 313.
(4) Ibid., page 314.
(5) Essays in Honor of Wm. James, pages 103-35, quoted from Miss M. F. Washburn, Movement and Mental Imagery, page 25.
(6) International Quarterly, vol. VII, pages 300-315.

general explanation and relegates it to the class of special psychological problems. He affirms that "If, then, consciousness is not really a general property of psychical processes, the difficulty of explaining the ego does not pertain to the question of a general conception of psychical phenomena, but is irrespective of the general conception and belongs within the especial domain of psychology." (1) It is obvious that if he so defines mental or psychic phenomena that they are not conscious, he simply avoids the issue and does not touch the important fact of conscious activities which challenges his theory. Further, if the monistic notion of psychic energy is to be verified, certainly the conscious ego is one of the most significant realities which that hypothesis must explain, and to avoid it is a confession of weakness. Here as in many other expositions of the doctrine in question the exact meaning of psychical is left in obscurity. We must consider, however, more positive objections to the hypothesis than this default of Ostwald.

31. The vagueness and instability of the concept of psychic energy.

When the ambiguity in this flexible phrase, psychic or personal energy, is cleared up, the result is either an untenable materialism,--the usual result,--or a theory of mental activity in which the idea of energy has lost its mechanical characteristics and its scientific meaning. The first consequence may be passed by, and some examples of the second may be noticed. R. Müller concludes that the psychic energy which is the "primary cause of all subjective existence" is an "imperishable essence, independent of time and space." (2) F. Lieder (3) also maintains that "psychic energy" is something sui generis. This concept is so likely to lead to confusion and misunderstanding that it should be banished speedily from the vocabulary of philosophy.

The equivocation in the phrase and its position of unstable equilibrium are further illustrated in J. Waldapfel's analysis of personal energy. Near the end of an article on this subject (4) he asserts that, "All kinds of personal energy fall apart into two factors, of which the one has the nature of a mass or magnitude, and the other of a strength. This terminology, so far as the understanding of personality is concerned, means replacing one obscure term by two vaguer ones. What he means here by strength, and in what sense mass can be applied to personal activity, is certainly hard to understand. The confusion warns us that we are following a fruitless tangent. The phrase, psychic energy, leads to the abuse and twisting either of the meaning of psychic or of energy; the terminus of this line of thought tends to be either a psychic entity which is not mechanical energy at all, or a mechanical energy that lacks psychic characteristics.

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(1) International Quarterly, vol. VII, page 315.

(2) Quoted in Revue Philosophique, 1900, Part II, pages 416 ff., from his work, Naturwissenschaftliche Seelenforschung, vol. III, pages 584-90.

(3) Die psychische Energie and ihr Umsatz: Eine Philosophie des Seelenlebens, 1910.

(4) Annalen der Naturphilosophie, vol. V, page 319.

The careful use of psychic energy requires that its meaning be confined to the mechanical realm. Then, why not identify personal activity with psychic energy when the latter is given a strictly mechanistic interpretation? The objections are so well known that only a brief summary of some of them that pertain to the view in question need to be presented here. The general objections are that: (a) this view gives a very incomplete account of personal experience, and (b) it contains several self-destructive presuppositions. The specific reasons for these general conclusions are as follows:

4'. The purposive and evaluating activities of human beings cannot be explained in terms of psychic energy.

The fundamental objection to the energetic theory of mental activity is that it cannot account for those actions of intelligent beings which result from the idea of a valued end, for in the mechanical conception of energy, it is essential that states should be determined by antecedent factors, and not by conscious reference to the future desired ends. The doctrine in question meets a formidable difficulty in providing for a state of mind which is in part a function of a future or anticipated state. Any particular state of an energetic mass is what it is because of a past of which it is ignorant. The character of a person's activity, however, is regularly determined in part by what he is about to experience, and certainly his actions would be very different if he did not expect certain modifications of his life as a result of what he is about to perform. The defenders of the doctrine of psychic energy, then, either must admit that their category is inadequate for the explanation of purposive mental activity, or they must modify their definition of energy as applied to the mind so radically that that concept would lose the significance which is ordinarily attached to it in natural science; and the result of this modification could only be confusion, as has been indicated already.

In other words, it is simply foreign to the concept of energy, in scientific usage, to suppose that the energetic masses, whatever they are, should ever sense the directions of their operations; they neither recognize any useful work they may have done, nor approve their own courses of action. If the work done by energy or by any kind of a machine is useful, its value is appreciated only by an intelligent and conscious being external to it, but human personalities may estimate their own achievements. In short, the category of purpose, used to designate the fact that one event occurs in order that some subsequent event may occur, does not apply properly to energetic activity as described in natural science, and yet this concept is necessary to explain much human behavior.

The monistic view of psychic energy is self-destructive.

If energetic activity is incapable of self-realized action, then the monistic system is a self-destructive one, for the psychic energy which W. Ostwald, for example, describes in the pamphlet, "Monism as the Goal of Civilization," (1) could not give rise to the idea of "monism as the goal of civilization," or to any other kind of goal for itself or society. The monists seek a cosmic synthesis under a concept which does not make possible such programs and plans as they entertain for the future of educated men. The existence of the theory under consideration depends upon certain interests and purposes of human beings which have no consistent place in the sys-

(1) International Committee on Monism, Hamburg, 1913.

tem proposed. In brief, the theory of psychic energy fails to explain those purposive and valuing functions which form so important a part of our human experience.

An attempt to give a more concrete meaning to psychic energy leads only to the acknowledgment that it is a purely abstract concept which depends upon the actuality of certain human purposes and volitions which the concept itself excludes. This abstract energy is a part of a mechanistic conceptual system the existence of which presupposes the interested and active work of a physicist aiming at the realization, in his descriptions, of certain ideals of order and universality. The attempted proof of this system with its energy and atoms, its motion and mass, is a testimony to the indefatigable work of a free intelligence who purposes to introduce order into the chaos of sense perceptions.

Proposed use of terms: restrict energy to physical world, and activity to mental.

The attempt to extend the concept of energy so as to include the mental functions above mentioned leads only to intellectual confusion. Misunderstandings are inevitable when energy or activity are used in the spiritual sciences in a different sense than in the physical ones. The application of energy and motion should be restricted to the physical or mechanical universe, while the concept of activity should be excluded from it, and used only in the psychic realm. G. S. Fullerton also believes that activity has no place in the material world, (1) and thinks that activity is possible only for minds, and not for physical things, where only causes and effects are. (2) The attempt to reduce complex personal activity to the simpler form of mechanical energy results in the confusion of both. The latter idea is too limited to include the rich life of human persons.

Probably the fundamental reason for this failure of the general principles of energetics to explain purpose and value is that they cannot be applied to facts whose variations are purely qualitative, and which cannot, therefore, be measured. A. Aliotta points out that "The world of mind, and, to a certain extent, that of life as well, inasmuch as it is perennially evolved by the multiplicaiion of its qualities and forms, cannot be explained by the principles of physical energy, which, when left to itself, should, in accordance with the second principle of thermo-dynamics, sink towards a greater uniformity." (3) What is there in the variation of the work of energy or of physical things that could constitute an analogical type from which to construe personality, with its striving to improve its future existence, with its memory of its own past and its hopes for the future, with its creation of rational systems, and new worlds of experience, its love of beauty and its sense of responsibility? Our experiences may differ with respect to their satisfying or annoying, their good or bad qualities, but never as to their weight, size, or horse-power. The burden of personal qualities and values is too great for the energetic conception to bear.

The uncritical character of the energetic view of mental activity and the self is seen when one seeks to understand the genesis of the concept of psychic energy. W. Ostwald thinks that

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(1) System of Metaphysics, page 235.
(2) Ibid., pages 545-6.
(3) Idealistic Reaction Against Science, page 367.

5'. The concept of energy originates in personal experiences which that concept does not explain.

energy is a fact given in sensation. This opinion shows how easily he passes from one abstraction to another. Both energy and sensation are abstractions which depend upon the reality of active intelligence. This assertion is confirmed by those thinkers who hold that the idea of energy, and also causality, stands in genetic dependence upon human volitional experience. Thus C. Renouvier asks (1), "What is mechanism? That raises the question of the nature of force. That nature is undoubtedly in the internal feeling (sentiment) of the will on the one hand, and on the other, in the constant experience of the efficacy of the will in bringing about the products of a movement in our bodies which we must claim as a psychological fact--there is no other way to name it." He adds that (2), "It is, then, under the aspect of personality that we ought rationally to represent to ourselves the total synthesis of phenomena and to define the real world, the living world."

Other thinkers hold a similar view of the origin of the idea of energy. G. T. Ladd, for example, asserts that, "The beginning of its (Force) solution, so far as it has a solution, is to be found in the fact that every Self knows itself as a self-active will. As self-active will, the rational personality has experience, in reality, out of which his intellect evolves all the conceptions of Force, Cause and Effect, Causation, and the so-called Law or Principle of Universal Causality." (3) James Ward is of the same opinion for he declares that, "The history of the concept of physical causation, from the cruder anthropomorphism of pre-scientific thinking down to its dynamical interpretation in the present day, shows plainly that the notion of action was first imported into it from the sphere of conscious life, and it has been gradually but at length completely eliminated." (4)

6'. The psychic energy doctrine cannot account for the time required in doing work.

The uncritical and abstract character of the doctrine of psychic energy is seen also in the common oversight of the question as to the nature and conditions of the time which is involved in all work that energy does and in all motion. The passage of time seems to require a consciousness of succession which is foreign to the concept of psychic energy. The time span must be bridged by an intelligent experient whose constitution is something different from, or atleast something in addition to, merely psychic energy. If one should speak of motion in connection with psychic energy, some account would need to be given of the one for whom the motion existed.

Further, if psychic energy should do work, and "energy is defined as the ability to perform work," (5) the estimate of the value of the work must devolve somewhere upon a conscious being who is capable of experiencing means in relation to ends. But we have already pointed out the impossibility of psychic energy doing this. It would seem rather that the experienced sequence, requisite for the accomplishment of valued work, is possible only to an intelligent being who is able to grasp successive phases of a system in one embracing insight. If psychic energy is independent of time,

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(1) Le Personnalisme, etc., page III.
(2) Ibid., page VII.
(3) The Secret of Personality, pages 139-40.
(4) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., page 228.
(5) B. Snow, Notes on Physics, page 83.

as Müller teaches, (1) then it is no longer energy that does work, nor is it mental activity, which always has a historical aspect. Since, then, the concept of psychic energy involves time, but excludes the consciousness of temporal flow which is present in personal experience, the energetic conception of personality must be rejected.

7'. Differences between energy and will.

Another possible objection to regarding the soul as energy is pointed out by H. Schwarz. (2) He observes that if the soul were a regular energy in the physical sense, it would grow weaker and weaker because of the actions it performs, but the facts confirm the opposite conclusion, namely, that the will intensifies itself in action. Further, unlike natural energy, the will does not go over into the action, but we say it produces action, and preserves its capacity to produce more action. J. Waldapfel similarly declares that "personal energy" is the capacity of the individual to perform a work which maintains or increases the sum of personal energies. (3)

8'. The psychic-energy doctrine does not account for the actual unity of the mental life in action.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the difficulty involved in trying to explain the unity of the conscious life and purposive activity in terms of psychic energy. How will psychic energy account for that synthetic gladness of a healthy boy as he romps amid the flowers on a summer day, sensing at once the fragrance and color of the blossoms and his own movements? Here is a qualitative and unique coalescence or mental unity of which a mechanical conception of psychic energy can give no account. It is too complex in character, too highly integrated, for energy to explain. B. P. Bowne illustrated in a beautiful way how a musical symphony derives its symmetry and unity, not from the succession of air vibrations, but from the abiding and appreciating mind. (4) In the very attempt to split up a conscious experience into parts, one acknowledges both parts as being his own in an intimate and unique sense. What one finds in active consciousness is not divisions or parts, nor conjunction of energies, but aspects or distinctions within a single whole.

9'. Summary of the discussion of psychic energy.

If the above criticism has done injustice to the concept of psychic energy, a very probable reason is that its advocates have failed to make themselves plain enough to give clearness and point to the vital issues. It would seem that all attempts to conceive personality in the mechanical terms of some peculiar energy break down because the self exhibits certain conscious, qualitative, temporal, unifying, purposive, valuing functions which the latter lacks. A negative answer must be given to the question (5) as to whether one can adequately explain or describe personality from the mechanical point of view. The persistence of the attempt to explain personality in terms of some kind of energy can be regarded only as the result of the enduring qualities of certain forms of superficial metaphysics. Our fundamental objection to the theory of psychic energy is that it cannot do justice to the fact of purposive activity in personal experience. An intelligent man may not only do

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(1) See above, page 195. (2) Die Seelenfrage, page 277.
(3) Annalen der Naturphilosophie, vol. V, page 310.
(4) Personalism, page 113. For further discussion of the unity of the mind, see Bowne, Metaphysics, part III, chapter I; H. Lotze, Microcosmus, especially book II, chapter I; W. McDougall, Body and Mind.
(5) See above, page 12, a.

work, but know what it is for, and value it. He may not only move his body, but know where he is going, plan to make excursions, and consider his progress.

b. Reasons for rejecting the view that mental activity is bodily behavior: the behavioristic theory.

1'. Statement of the theory,

The exponents of behavioristic psychology and new realism sometimes advocate a different theory of mental activity, which may be designated the behavioristic one. They maintain that it is to be identified with the bodily behavior of a living organism. Some examples of this view may be cited. R. B. Perry defines "mental action . . in terms of the bodily action itself." (1) W. B. Pillsbury declares that "'mental activity' is really bodily activity." (2) W. E. Ritter asserts that, "The Self . . is literally the human organism according to my hypothesis," (3) and that, "personality is indubitably objective both substantively and kinetically " (4) William James believes that "so far as we are 'persons' and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment,' movements in our body figure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense." (5)

Some of the important reasons for rejecting this behavioristic conception of mental activity will now be set forth. (6) The question before us is not primarily, What is the relation of the self to the body? but rather, Is mental activity bodily behavior or activity?

and its implication: all conative experiences must be expressed in sensory or objective terms.

Now, if the behavioristic conception of mental activity is to be taken at its face value, it follows that all features of such conative experiences belonging to the self as striving, intending, seeking, etc., should be expressible in sensory or perceptive terms, whether these refer to the external world (visual, tactual, spatial perceptions, etc.) or to the internal sphere (kinaesthetic, organic sensations), the terms depending upon whether the observer be considering his own or another's activity. In other words, the advocates of this hypothesis must find some region among the objective processes (7) mentioned to include all such facts as emotions, desires, and volitions, purposes, wishes, and values.

James apparently tries to meet this situation when he maintains that one's affective and active life really consists in the sensory awareness of his varying bodily behavior as it appears in what he calls, from his introspective standpoint, "bodily feelings," or "feelings of bodily processes." The term, feeling, is very convenient in this connection, if one wishes to slur over the distinction between sensation and emotion. It is precisely James' unjustified confusion of organic sensations and bodily feelings with psychical feelings or emotions which explains, according to J. Laird, his i-

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(1) See above, pages 90-1, 100, 156-7.

(2) Attention, page 63.

(3) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, page 306.

(4) Ibid., page 332.

(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 170, note. For statement and criticism of James' view, see above, pages 35, 39-40, 49, 64-5, 80.

(6) Pages 80-1 and 115-6 above may be read in this connection, where a number of objections to the theory in question are offered.

(7) W. P. Montague recognizes this need, and objects to it. See, The New Realism, page 271.

dentification and confusion of psychical activity with bodily behavior. (1) James affirms that, "Its breathing is my 'thinking,' its sensorial adjustments are my 'attention,' its kinaesthetic alterations are my 'efforts,' its visceral perturbations are my 'emotions.' (2)

2'. Why James fails in his attempt to resolve the spiritual self into bodily "feelings" or sensations.

Keeping in mind James' analysis of the spiritual self in his Principles of Psychology and Essays in Radical Empiricism, we may examine a simple instance of activity to ascertain whether this view is adequate for the description of the facts. Suppose that I sit down at a desk to carry out my intention of writing a letter of sympathy to a bereaved friend. It is granted that numerous bodily motions and corresponding sensations are present; the question at issue is whether these exhaust the mental activity which is admittedly present, whether they are the "storm-center" of the self; or whether they are incidental or peripheral? In the constructive part of the present chapter, I shall defend the latter alternative; here I shall offer some reasons for rejecting the former one.

a'. The subtle danger of overlooking the main factor in introspecting mental activity or conation.

Suppose that I introspect, and carefully note my experiences at any state in the course of the letter-writing. Will I not find a variety of organic and kinaesthetic sensations? The answer is certainly affirmative. To identify mental activity with bodily activity means, for the observer himself, to identify it with motor sensations, with sensations of strain, pressure, effort, or tension. If I am interested in the behavioristic theory of activity, I may discover these to be outstanding features in the field of my observed conscious processes. Are these then to be regarded in introspection as the central factors in that specific kind of mental activity called writing a letter of consolation? Assuredly not, for a simple reason which is often overlooked; that reason is that, with the beginning of introspection, they are no longer elements or phases of that experiential system called letter-writing, but of a quite different system, namely, a momentary psychological introspection; for clearly when one is making psychological observations, one is not letter writing! Carveth Read thus calls attention to this oversight: "If we try to bring forward a conation so as to study it, it ceases to be the present conation; for that is now the effort to bring it forward; and this effort is marginal." (3) What has become of the letter-writing activity in the instance we are considering? It has disappeared, and if one neglects the interest in scientific observation which has taken its place, one may truly say that, under these circumstances, all that does remain of that activity is the group of sensations arising from breathing and heart-beat and from the head and throat, but these are also present in psychological observation. James concludes, therefore, that these constitute the nucleus of mental activity, of that active self which abides; and that they are the core of the spiritual self, and the basis of personal identity. He has, in fact, overlooked the main factor, and has fallen into the subtle danger which is present in observing one's own mental activity,

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(1) See his suggestive and interesting discussion of "The Self and the Body," in chapter 3, Problems of the Self; especially page 63 ff.

(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 153.

(3) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, pages 256-7. Compare also M. F. Washburn, Movement and Mental Imagery, page 162.

namely, that the endeavor to introspect a present conation displaces it by a new conation, which, if neglected, may lead to the mistake of supposing that the first consists only of the bodily feelings which also may accompany the second.

b'. James neglects the purposive bond which conditions and binds together the various bodily feelings present in mental activity.

The incidental position of these bodily feelings or sensations will appear from some further considerations. We have here a clear case of abstraction, for the interesting feature of the concrete situation is precisely what is neglected: that is, the psychological interest, or the interest in letter-writing, and the various unified steps in the achievement of one or other of these ends. J. Laird suggests that, "It is probably true that there is a contraction of the eyes and brows when we are annoyed, (1) and that we feel something in the pharynx when momentarily embarrassed. But we are not usually aware of these facts until our attention is called to them. They may conceivably be felt obscurely, but certainly not acutely. At the same time the annoyance or the embarrassment is felt acutely." (2)

The trouble with the introspection of James in this case is that he takes too close and narrow a view of the field of consciousness. What is required is that one take account of a series or train of experiences, and not of one aspect alone of the action-system. James takes an inclusive view more successfully in his chapter on "The Experience of Activity." (3) And if one takes a larger view, one discovers other factors in addition to the organic and kinaesthetic sensations; one finds also an interest in comforting a friend which leads to the performance of certain specific acts in order to satisfy this interest; one finds an experience of progress toward the goal and of performing various movements of the fingers and arms as a more or less vaguely conscious part of the total achievement. The purposive feature naturally disappears when one suddenly tries to turn his introspective glance upon what he is doing, for then another interest has been substituted; and when the original one has disappeared, one cannot regard what is left as the sole or even the fundamental feature of the original dynamic whole. The analysis of James, therefore, represents an oversimplification of the situation, in that he neglects that purposive bond which connects the series of bodily sensations in such a way that we say we act in a certain way. G. F. Stout declares that, "The quickened beating of the heart and the increasing tension of the muscles would not be acknowledged by the man himself or by others as being the man's deeds." (4)

The fundamental feature of the activity-situation which the behavioristic theory of mental activity does not include

A feature of this activity-situation which is more fundamental than the various sensations of movement which are present consists in that upon which they depend for their existence, namely, the intention of writing a letter. This progressively realized purpose is the conscious thread upon which is strung the succession of bodily feelings which may be involved in its fulfilment. It is the center of the developing system of action, for without it the system itself would cease to be, except for the sensations of heartbeat

(1) See W. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 451.
(2) Problems of the Self, page 67.
(3) Essays in Radical Empiricism, VI.
(4) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II, part I, p. 1.

is conscious and unifying interest or purpose.

and breathing which would be similar in the next action-system.

When, for example, one says that he has solved a complicated mathematical problem in his head, or that he has composed a piece of music which he has not yet written down, it is both difficult and unnatural to suppose that the meaning of these mental activities, that the mental processes which occur in carrying out the respective interests in these operations, could be exhausted in terms of bodily feelings or behavior; and it is exceedingly hard to understand in what sense the body is the center of reference. How will that activity which arises in a response of a self to an ideal situation be expressed in terms of bodily behavior? W. P. Montague, himself a new realist, points out in criticizing "the identification of consciousness with behavior," that, "The square root of minus one is not a bodily movement nor does it enter into such movement in any intelligible sense. I cannot move towards it or away from it. And the same is true of past events." (1)

The situation would be described more accurately by saying that the phases of that behavior which are present are subordinate to the interest or purpose which unifies them, which gives them point and meaning, and upon which in many cases even their existence is contingent. W. H. Winch observes that, "The motor sensations, which are said to be what we mean by conation, themselves occur, like other sensations, within the process which they are said to constitute." (2)

1". The bodily feelings may become more noticeable when activities are obstructed, but do so only because of their bearing upon the purpose they obstruct.

Some physical or other impediment to the free development of an activity-train may throw the several accompanying organic and kinaesthetic processes into the focus of attention, but even in that event they will not be focal on their own account. We would endeavor to rid ourselves of them because they are signals of defeat; our real interest undoubtedly would center in the contrivance of means for overcoming the obstacles presented, in order that we might carry out our purpose and complete the activity-system in spite of the obstruction. W. H. Winch suggests that, "We may compare also the speed of effortless activity with activity under strain. In the one case we feel we are getting on, in the other, whatever the result of the work may be, we are slow and dispirited." (3) If a dominant interest or purpose were not in the course of fulfilment, it is probable that these bodily processes would not become more noticeable and central in the face of difficulties, for the latter are significant only because of their bearing upon the realization of momentary interest.

2". The subordinate position of bodily feelings or sensations in the typical mental activity.

The argument of the preceding paragraphs warrants the inference that bodily feelings or sensations occupy a subordinate place in the total activity-situation. (4) This conclusion is supported by another series of facts. The muscular movements and strains with which activity is sometimes identified are the expression and not the conditions of mental activity. Bodily feelings are to be regarded as being, sometimes at least, subsequent, contingent, or concomitant phenomena, and not the core of activity. If this statement is valid only for some bodily processes, that is, if some of them at least are products, collaterals, or consequents of that activity, they cannot be identified with the activity itself. In the case of

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(1) The New Realism, pages 271-2.

(2) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, vol. VI, page 513. (3) Ibid., page 511.

(4) See below, pages 259-60.

voluntary action at least movements exist which follow the volitional act or decision. In abstract thinking bodily feelings may sometimes be found to be present as accompaniments. S. Alexander, for example, points out that, in his case, "Mental activity, especially in thinking, is accompanied by marked movements of the eyes, which are apt to change their position with each change of the thought." (1) J. Laird observes that, "We can choose to do and strive to do things in which bodily movements have no place or, at any rate, no conscious place. And if we reflect carefully we shall find that the activity characteristics of choice or striving are in no way affected thereby." (2)

The above argument is not intended to exclude the fact that bodily actions may play some part, often a significant one, in the development of mental activities and in the manifestation of personal experiences. The importance of these bodily aspects of personality is suggested by the popular tendency to find the peculiarities of personality in winning manners, winsome smiles, stately or impressive deportment, graceful movements, etc. G. T. Ladd goes so far as to say that, "We may readily discover . . that it is impossible to conceive or a real person of the type afforded by human beings, as existing or developing without a body." (3)

It seems, therefore, that it is not in bodily feelings, taken by themselves, that we may expect to discover the key to the consciousness of activity, but rather in some sort of experienced transition depending upon the presence of a goal which we are interested in reaching. The organic processes may have a place in the concrete whole, but they will not be "nuclear." The prospect is that we shall find an important factor of personality in the kind of purposive activity suggested in the above paragraphs.

3'. Some further erroneous implications of the behavioristic view of mental activity:

If the behavioristic view of mental activity is assumed to be true, certain deductions may be made from it which are contrary to fact. If, for example, James is right in finding the center of the spiritual self in organic and motor sensations, we should expect that our strivings usually would be directed to their production. It is certainly possible, however, to enumerate many bodily feelings which are not sought for their own sake, and many actions which are not performed for the sake of getting such sensations or feelings. W. H. Winch offers some evidence which supports this statement.(4) He says that there are cases, such as the last stretch of a crew race, where the persons concerned would gladly avoid the unpleasant feelings of fatigue connected with further exertion if these feelings were the important factor in their interest. Since, then, we do not always discontinue motor sensations when they are painful, we may infer that in these cases something else is present which makes for their continuance.

a'. Bodily behavior is not always sought for its own sake.

b'. Many states of the self are not corporeal qualities.

Further, if the self is bodily behavior, its contents should consist wholly in bodily states. The various aspects of the self with its multiple interests and memories, its ambitions and regrets, should be merely translations or equivalents of bodily qualities.

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 216. (2) Problems of the Self, page 113.

(3) The Secret of Personality, page 21. Compare J. Laird, Problems of the Self, page 79.

(4) See Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, vol. VI, page 512.

However, there are numerous facts of our personal life, such as those just referred to, which simply are not bodily qualities. (1) W. P. Montague observes that, "I do not see in what sense my consciousness of such things as the life of Julius Caesar can be identified with any specific behavior or movement of my body." (2)

c'. There is no constant ratio between intensity of conation and motor sensations.

Again, there is no constant ratio between intensity of conation and motor sensations. G. F. Stout suggests that if we identify conation with motor sensations, "the intensity of conation would be simply identical with the amount of motor sensation connected with it. But this is not so. Conation may be as strong in giving the finishing touch to a house of cards as in lifting a heavy weight." (3)

It may be noted, too, that mental activity may be very intense while the subject's body is practically quiescent. We do not suppose that a person's mental activity necessarily stops with the cessation of bodily action, for he may be wrestling with fateful problems of life while he is sitting in a restful position. The intensity of mental effort does not vary in direct proportion to the speed of bodily action. Intellectual activity may be at a minimum when one is running for exercise, while an exceedingly vivacious intellectual struggle may be accompanied by very slight bodily movements.

d'. Bodily behavior cannot explain consciousness of past and future.

Also, if I reduce my self to bodily sensations or behavior which exist today, will the self which is equivalent to these processes to-morrow be the same self as the one that exists today? If it is, in terms of what bodily behavior will this awareness or this identity be expressed? If it is expressed in a judgment of identity between two cases of "warmth and intimacy," or between two similar bodily movements, then we ask, in terms of what bodily behavior will we describe this judgment? Somewhere in the process an active subject different from the body is required to make the judgment of identity, if there is to be any.

Further, from the pen of a new realist we have the confession that the behavioristic conception of consciousness does not account for conscious contents which refer to the past or future; W. P. Montague says, "Consciousness does at each moment of a train of conscious behavior have for its contents past incidents of the behavior that <u>are</u> no longer and future incidents that <u>are</u> not yet. But it is obvious that with respect to the behavior itself all its incidents are successive and so outside one another in time, the past and the future never being present together." (4)

e'. Bodily behavior cannot provide a principle for connecting a series of different actions contributing to a common end.

Again, we learn in psychology that an organism in trying to satisfy a particular need, may make many different reactions; (5) a man may seek to satisfy a deeply felt want by a multitude of means. The actions themselves may be very different, and yet we have no hesitation in saying that they are unified by a single desire. Does this purposive unity among distinct actions come from the actions themselves? This is requiring too much of them. We must postulate an abiding self of a quite different character than

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(1) See below, page 211.
(2) The New Realism, page 272.
(3) British Journal of Psychology, July, 1906.
(4) The New Realism, page 272.
(5) See above, pages 151-2, on the excessiveness of human activities.

bodily actions. Bodily behavior cannot provide a principle for connecting a series of different activities contributing to a common end.

4'. Laird's reasons for not identifying the self with bodily sensations.

J. Laird gives reasons, from the introspective standpoint, for thinking that "most of us would agree that the self must be distinguished from the body." (1) He defends this distinction by a description of the "internal sense," which he takes literally; its "objects are certain real states of the body. The acts of sensing these objects are parts of the self, but the objects themselves are not." (2) One's organic and kinaesthetic sensations are cognitive acts which tell one something about the states of his body, but these states are not to be identified with that self which is interested in them, or which is said to possess them or have them; although, as Laird points out, they have an "obvious subjectivity" and certain characteristics like psychical feelings which make easy the confusion of these two groups of facts; the latter alone belong to the self. "The objects of the internal sense should not be confused with the self. Although they differ in many respects from the objects of the external senses, they are at one with these in being the objects for the conscious self, not parts of it." (3)

5'. A strictly behavioristic account of mental activity should be expressed in physical or neurological terms.

The behavioristic and neo-realistic advocates of the theory of mental activity which we are considering might object to the above analysis because it is based upon introspection. Let us, then, consider the hypothesis in question from the strictly behavioristic point of view. From that standpoint, what would be the consistent mode of procedure in the endeavor to describe bodily behavior, with which mental activity is identified? One dislikes to make the appropriate reply to this query, for it would be: study mechanics, solid geometry, and the principles of curve-plotting. Develop a kind of anthropological mechanics, with a view to formulating the laws of human movements, just as the astronomer and physicist describe the movements of masses, and with a view to exhibiting the daily orbits and perambulations of human bodies, just as H. S. Jennings draws diagrams to illustrate the movements of the unicellular Oxytricha. Human actions might be projected on a large scale similar to Karl Pearson's description of the changes in position of a button on the coat of a man who walks up a winding flight of stairs. (4)

Evidence from W. P. Montague.

From one of the new realists themselves we have an indication of the difficulties involved in the identification of consciousness with behavior; W. P. Montague observes that, "All that is visible or profitably observable as behavior relates to movements with which it is physiologically impossible for consciousness to be identified or even directly correlated. For physiology teaches us that consciousness depends upon, or is immediately and directly bound up with, neural currents which are always intra-organic, if not intracortical. Now what we observe as behavior in a man, a bird, or a rat, is never the flow of neural currents, but only the gross

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(1) Problems of the Self, page 51.
(2) Ibid., page 52.
(3) Ibid., page 57; see also, pages 17, 52, 53, 58, 67, indeed, all of chap. II.
(4) Grammar of Science, page 195.

(1) Problems of the Soul, page 91.
(2) Ibid., page 92.
(3) Ibid., page 97; see also, pages 17, 36, 95, 96, 101, Indead, all of them, 11.
(4) Grammar of Science, page 195.

movements of the body and its members. These latter can by no possibility be the physical correlates of the consciousness involved. Still less can they be identical with it." (1)

W. P. Montague affirms also that, "Behavior is only one of many purely objective processes. We can be conscious of behavior as of anything else. But if behavior is itself consciousness, there seems nothing left in terms of which we can define consciousness of behavior. In short, we have here the same sort of difficulty that confronts the crude materialist who would identify consciousness with motion. Motion has an actual qualitative nature of its own, which is obviously different from the nature of consciousness." (2)

There are various reasons why the thorough-going behaviorist does not waste his time in the preposterous exercise of plotting the movements of human bodies in their environment. He is inconsistent and disloyal to his method in that he smuggles into his account of mental activity principles of interpretation derived from the use of a method of a different sort. He reads into bodily actions desires and purposes, obtained from introspection, which make of the former teleological groups, and which give them their real significance. Again, the variations of human bodily movements are infinitely complex; for instance, in writing and walking--but why not have more descriptions of these physical movements? Exactly because they are not the important features of mental activity in which the psychologist and philosopher are primarily interested; after all, the interesting thing about human activities is not usually their spatial projections, but the values or ends which they subserve.

6'. The behaviorist actually describes bodily behavior in terms of action-systems, but the principle of their unification is derived from the introspection of purposive mental activity.

What the behaviorist actually does is to describe human behavior in terms of "organized habits" (3) and "dispositions" (4), of "action-systems" and "units of behavior," where the individual whole is determined by the apparent worth of the response. Certain bodily actions are regarded as "successful" or "satisfying" responses; others, as "unsuccessful" or "annoying." If they appear to be of the latter kind, they are likely to be followed by other trials, until a satisfying one is found. There are many cases where the achievement of a satisfying response, or where the conclusion of a series of movements, seems to be the reason for their existence. (4) We have in this case what have been called "anticipatory judgments."

Now an important question in the interpretation of these systems is whether the principle of unity in them is derived from a strictly objective study, or whether it originates in introspection. A careful consideration of the facts seems to compel the choice of the latter alternative. Perry thinks that a teleological account of behavior is necessary in order to account for its value-aspects, but in this account he is forced in the end to come back to the purposive revelations of introspection, for the influence of subsequent behavior upon present action is mediated, according to him, by memory-images. (4) And in an action-system the various

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(1) The New Realism, page 272.

(2) Ibid., page 271.

(3) J. B. Watson, Psychology, from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, page 397.

(4) See Perry's teleological account of value, above, pages 94-7. Compare also his article, Docility and Purposiveness, Psychological Review, vol. XXV, pages 1-20.

steps from the initial to the final situation are bound together, not indeed by the successive spatial positions of the behaving organism as presented to an outside observer, but by the presence of a meaning or goal in the mind of the latter, who regards the end-situation as significant in the light of the initial one. But this sense of teleological movement comes first from personal experience, after which it may be read with truth into the behavior of those whom one studies, and in the light of which action-systems may be constructed. Hence, while the behaviorist talks in terms of action-systems, the principle of unification for these systems is derived from the introspection, present but unrecognized, of his own purposive experiences, and of activities of a very different kind than bodily movements. This introspective contribution is suggested by the long list of questions which a prominent behaviorist proposes as a means of getting information in the study of the behavior of a person. (1)

7'. Some summary remarks regarding the behavioristic theory of mental activity.

The fundamental and necessary defect, then, in the behavioristic method of studying mental action lies in its exclusion of that inward experience of end-seeking and satisfying achievement which alone gives action significance and offers a principle of unification in classifying movements of the body. There is no convincing evidence that these experiences are revealed by a study of individual bodily movements, and yet without them the bodily behavior of men would be trivial or meaningless. If we take literally the method proposed by the thorough-going behaviorist, the bodily actions of men would fall under the class of the mechanical movements of physical masses, without inward meaning, and these movements in themselves are too intricate and too insignificant to call for careful or complete scientific description.

So far in our examination of the behavioristic theory of mental activity, we have found in it very serious defects, chiefly psychological. These are present whether activity be interpreted in terms of the awareness of a certain class of physical, organic objects, or in terms of sensory awareness of organic processes. We have found that mental activity cannot be described adequately from the behavioristic standpoint alone. One must find the key to it in introspection, but even the method of introspection must be used circumspectly if the real mental activity is not to be lost among motor and organic sensations. (2) We may agree with G. P. Adams when he says that "no complex of found and describable elements will ever be the equivalent of mental activity." (3)

8'. The behavioristic theory of mental activity neglects the subject of experience.

In the consideration of the behavioristic theory it has been assumed so far that such objective facts as bodily feelings and visual perceptions of movement could exist without regard to the subject who has them. But these feelings and perceptions themselves are abstractions, when considered apart from the interested self who experiences them. Their existence confirms rather than disproves the operation of a subject or self different from bodily behavior. In speaking of James, E. N. Merrington suggests that, "What we want is the Introspector, not the results of his analysis. Those re-

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(1) J. B. Watson, Psychology, from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, pages 398-405.

(2) See above, page 201.

(3) Philosophical Review, Mind as Form and as Activity, vol. XXII, page 277.

sults seem to me to concern a psychology of vital feeling. What is described is the bodily background or object to the Subject in its quiescent contemplation. The Self is the spiritual factor manifested in our highest psychical experiences, where bodily terms are absolutely unmeaning. As matter of fact . . consciousness is given as the presupposition and active participant in all experience. In comparison, judgment, selection, love, aspiration, and volition, the Subject preponderates over the field of objects, which do not seem to be given in that 'hyphenated' condition which James represents (1) as being the characteristic of the field of consciousness." (2)

In this argument a logical or epistemological reason is met for rejecting the behavioristic theory. The body is treated as the center of activity because a subject or self very different from it is interested in so regarding it; and if it be said, as Perry inclines to say, (3) that the body itself is the subject of mental activity, let us consider whether this is the way in which normal persons express themselves. When James, for example, says in his analysis, "I forsake general descriptions," he does not mean that his legs carry him in a certain direction determined by the points of the compass, but he means that he is substituting one point of view or interest for another, and this supplanting takes place in a way which does not at all resemble physical displacement or movement. If the view in question is taken literally, I ought not to say that I propose to write on personality, but that my body intends to do so.

a'. G. Kafka's criticism of Schuppe's objective theory of the ego.

Further, if the work of the self as a subject is required, as it appears to be, as a necessary condition of the spatial and temporal representation of the body, apart from which such a representation of the body is difficult to conceive, it is obviously fallacious to turn about and identify this self with the body which it conditions. In criticizing W. Schuppe's view that the ego is the total content of consciousness, G. Kafka offers an illustration of this fallacy. He states that (4), "The attempt to place the immediacy (5) in the sensation of the 'compact extensity' of the ego (6), resting upon sensations of touch and pressure, appears to be from the first a begging of the question. But even if the immediacy of the bodily sensations is sought in their dependence upon the will, still over against this spatially extended body as part of the content of consciousness, there always stands the subject of consciousness, repeatedly and expressly designated by Schuppe himself as non-spatial; (7) so that on this basis no identification

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(1) The Principles of Psychology, pages 278 ff.

(2) The Problem of Personality, pages 22-3.

(3) See above, pages 99, 116.

(4) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen über das Ichproblem, Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, vol. XIX, 1910, page 216.

(5) Which is present when an object is immediately present to the ego.

(6) W. Schuppe, Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik, page 26.

(7) Ibid., page 24; also Erkenntnistheoretische Logik, page 75.

of the ego with the body can be asserted. . Further from the spatiality of the immediate objects of the subject, the spatiality of the subject itself does not at all follow." In J. Laird's argument it is just as essential to the sensations of the "internal sense," for instance, organic and kinaesthetic sensations, to have a subject for which they are, as it is essential to the objects of the "external sense." (1) The need, in case of bodily feelings, of a subject which feels them was indicated above. (2) These considerations with reference to the need of a subject demolishes a strictly phenomenalistic view, such as that of W. E. Ritter. (3)

9'. Bradley's objections to identifying the self with the body.

F. H. Bradley objects to identifying the self with the body because of the ambiguity in the term, body. (4) He affirms that, "Even 'my body' is ambiguous, for the body, which I imagine, may have no spatial relation to the body which I perceive. And perception too can be illusive, for my own body in dreams is not the same thing with my true 'real'body, nor does it enter with it into any one spatial arrangement. And what in the end I mean by my 'real' body, seems to be this. I make a spatial construction from my body, as it comes to me when awake." (5)

This account is interesting because he refers to an "I," other than the body, which is the source of that spatial construction of the body with which a behaviorist might later identify his self. But if my body is something which "I mean" when I am awake, I cannot consistently turn about, and declare that my body is myself, for in some of my speculations, my mind may be active for a conscious period of time without my being aware at all that I have a body; in those cases my mind is directed in an entirely different direction than toward cephalic or glottis movements.

10'. Proposed use of terms.

In order to avoid confusion in examining the nature of activity, I propose that the latter term be reserved for exclusive use in the mental realm where there is some measure of conscious reference to a future state or experience as determined or determinable by introspection. This usage is adopted only for the sake of clearness in the following exposition, and does not imply that the meaning of activity could not be extended after metaphysical criticism. Movement or motion should be used exclusively for changes in the position of inorganic beings or masses. Behavior would then refer to the changes in the position of organic beings when considered in a purely objective way by an observer; it would not imply a conscious reference to ends upon the part of the behaving organism itself, although this reference might be made by the observer for the purposes of describing or explaining the relevant facts. Action might very well refer to a combination of activity and behavior as above defined, that is to organic individuals possessing at once bodily behavior and mental activity in intimate union. Conduct, then, might be used either as equivalent to action, or preferably, in a wider ethical sense, so as to include the idea of a series of actions deliberately directed or regulated. In brief: the conduct of rational

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(1) See above, page 207. (2) See above, page 82, bottom.
(3) See above, page 200, top.
(4) Appearance and Reality, page 77; also page 287.
(5) Ibid., page 287. For further criticisms, see Ibid., pages 308-9.

persons includes a series of actions; an action involves both mental activity and bodily behavior; the bodily behavior of an organism involves physical movement; but the key to all these processes is mental activity as we shall attempt to expound it.

11'. Concluding remarks: the irresolubility of mental activity and the self into bodily behavior.

The attempt to resolve the self and mental activity into bodily behavior cannot be realized, and represents an unjustified mixing of distinct categories. As J. Laird suggests, "The experience of activity should not be confused with these accompanying states of the body. Feelings of effort may be bodily, and so may feelings of strain; but these are different from psychical endeavour. Congenial work gives scope to much endeavour, but not necessarily to appreciable effort or appreciable strain." (1) The behavioristic theory makes for vagueness rather than clearness in thinking. If its defenders are interested in studying bodily behavior, they may do so, but they promote neither the study of mind nor of organic behavior by calling the latter also mental activity. It is simply an inexcusable confusion in use of terms to say that the self, characterized by the historical development of ends that are valued, should be identified with an organism moving in space. The mental activities of striving, thinking, and aspiring, etc., call for different descriptive categories than bodily behavior. L. T. Hobhouse well observes that, "To say that mind is body is as much a confusion as to say that a weight is an inference or that an acceleration is a wish." (2) G. T. Ladd, too, asserts that "The person is something more than animated body, no matter how well adapted and trained to its control over its own domain. Man's bodily self is more than mere body. It is more than animated body; it is more than embodied soul." (3)

We have considered in this section various reasons for refusing to describe mental activity in terms of bodily behavior. (4) There are numerous forms of personal experience, of mental activity or conation, of hopes and regrets, of thoughts and memories, which cannot be reduced to the dimension of bodily behavior without doing violence to usage and to facts. "The fact is most of our notions about bodily activities are due to the fact that we have overlooked the inner activities." (5) The numerous bodily feelings or sensations by which we become aware of our bodily movements do not themselves contain any principle of teleological integration, which is essential for the understanding of activity as well as for the production of much of it. The purposive factor which seems to be present must be understood in other terms than any that can be derived from the consciousness of bodily movements. In short, we do not find the idea of bodily activity sufficiently rich in categories to account for the wealth of human strivings and aspirations directed to ideal ends.

c. Omission of criticism of the view according to which the soul is a vital process.

In addition to the energetic and behavioristic conceptions of mental activity, there is a third one according to which mental activity is explained in terms of some kind of vital process which need not be conscious. This type of view might be called the vitalistic or Schopenhauerian theory. Space and time preclude a discus-

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(1) Problems of the Self, page 74.
(2) Development and Purpose, page 26.
(3) The Secret of Personality, page 77.
(4) These reasons supplement our criticism of James' view, above, pages 80-3.
(5) C. H. Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 96.

sion of it according to my original intention. In the classification of theories in Part I above, several examples of this theory were noted. (1) A. Drews is perhaps the most striking contemporary representative of it. The promise that a criticism of this theory would yield new principles, important for the progress of our argument, is very small, and is, therefore, passed by.

d. Brief summary of the two views of mental activity examined.

The two theories of activity which have been examined both fail to provide a place for that conscious, purposive trend which is certainly characteristic of our personal experiences. That is, an important reason for rejecting them is that they do not take account of all the facts which seem relevant. A second important reason is that they all seem to evade the issue by talking about activity in the object rather than in the subject of experience, and so are not sufficiently concerned with the explanation of the inner teleological unity which is present in some kinds of activity at least.

It is possible to bring a third charge against all three theories, namely, that physical movement, bodily behavior, or vital process are not understood until we comprehend subjective or personal activity, and that the former types are grasped by a subtraction of attributes from the latter; while the latter, considered from the genetic point of view, is not built up by adding something to the former types, as things first known, or as units of personal life. This assertion must be passed by without evidence for lack of time and space. Other objections that have been considered will not be summarized here. Neither will an attempt be made to point out in what ways a modified behaviorism may aid in the study of personality. It is recognized that some of the above objections cannot be directed against certain expositions of behaviorism which are not exclusive or which recognize the value of other methods. Having made these explanations, we shall turn at once to the important and positive endeavor to understand activity from the subjective side of experience. Our primary interest will be in this activity, even if it may be regularly connected with various objective processes.

3. The nature of activity, determined by a study of its implications.

We have now presented reasons for attacking the problem of personality from the standpoint of the concept of activity, and also for rejecting two proposed definitions of that concept. The problem which now lies before us is the presentation of a constructive account of it. Our method of procedure will be to set forth in order the implications of any concrete experience of activity from which we may start, and from which we should never wander far. We must find the meaning of activity in every-day experience, if a study of it is to be the foundation of every-day personality. We must reject from the first any suggestion that activity is something beyond or anterior to experience which explains the latter. The execution of our program will be systematic and progressive so far as possible, and will conduct us, we believe, to the very heart of personality.

a. Introduction to the positive exposition of the concept of activity:

1'. General statement of the problem,

While psychological evidence will be drawn upon freely in our study of activity, (2) we shall put in a place of subordinate interest such psychological questions as: What are the actual experiences,

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(1) See above, pages 4-5, 10.

(2) And James' account of the experience of activity will be a useful mine. See above, pages 46-9, 57.

and of our attitude in solving it.

if any, which are properly classed as activities? How may we describe them? and, What is the genesis of the concept of activity in our individual history? etc. Our point of view is primarily metaphysical, in that we are interested in the discovery and systematic organization of the principles involved in activity. We shall ask such questions as: How is activity possible? What are its conditions and implications? How do we know it? Are activity-experiences themselves real, or are they appearances, perhaps deceptive, of something else? Above all, what exactly is the relation of the concept of activity to personality?

The complexity of the original experience of activity makes necessary some abstract steps in our exposition.

The metaphysical category of activity is no doubt derived from an original experience of activity which is to be found in general in a felt tendency toward a goal that is valued. This experience is one of the most complex that human beings have, and probably forms the basis for the explanation of simpler kinds of activity, if they exist. We do not demand a simple experience to start with, for we have already examined two failures resulting from the attempt to describe personal or mental activity in terms of concepts that are too poor in implications. We shall not attempt, for example, to understand personal activity by adding something to bodily behavior, for activity is probably a unity in itself, and not composed of parts, although it may be possible to understand the simpler bodily behavior by subtracting from that complex process or fact which we call activity of the personal kind. Its complexity is perhaps one reason for the meager study of it, for it has been assumed sometimes that activity could not be a real fact unless it were an elementary content of consciousness.

If, then, activity is a complex fact involving several implications, as we believe it is, its full meaning, and likewise the full significance of personality, will appear only at the end of the logical development of our argument. Consequently, the intermediate steps sometimes will be unavoidably abstract. Our study of personality will consist, then, in a progressive explication and synthesis of factors involved in a typical activity. The epistemological problem will receive brief consideration at the conclusion of our exposition.

2'. Preliminary analysis of a sample activity.

It is essential to the whole plan of the following argument to maintain as close contact as possible with concrete cases of activity, even if the samples of it selected for study may be quite commonplace. We have learned from James the importance of this empirical attitude in the study of activity. (1) Let us make a rough, preliminary analysis of such a sample; we cannot say that it is typical for we do not yet know what is typical. Suppose that I am walking along a street and espy some apples in a shop window. Suppose that, being somewhat hungry, I find myself wanting to purchase some of them to eat. I recall that I possess the requisite money; I decide to enter the store, and buy some of them; and I carry out my decision.

The main features of the sample activity.

Now, what are the outstanding features of this instance of activity? (2) In general, this experience belongs under the conative type of psychological facts. There is present a psycho-physical

(1) See above, pages 47-8, 86-7.

(2) Compare James' general description of activity, above, page 49.

situation which I set about to change as the result of a desire appearing in my consciousness. Its appearance carries with it a more or less clear sense of a proximate and very possible goal, and my immediate problem is whether to consent to realize it promptly. Having sized up the situation and resolved to satisfy my desire, I find that the requisite movements of my body come about as a matter of habit so long as I meet no unusual problem.

The series of actions which leads to the achievement of this purpose gains its significance, indeed its existence, from that in which it culminates. That series possesses for me an intrinsic sense of direction which, I believe, is the heart of the experience of activity. That developing and teleological trend is the constant or immanent principle around which the various phases of my behavior are organized, and in that sense these phases are peripheral or instrumental. My resolution to purchase the fruit brought into existence the actions constituting my excursion into the shop. The central feature of this total train of experience seems to be a unique trend conditioned by the maintenance within it of a conscious goal. The whole situation is exceedingly complicated, for there is present here (a) a transition (b) in a certain felt direction (c) in the conscious life (d) of a concrete individual (e) which possesses a measure of stability amid its developing experience, and (f) which guides its actions with some reference to its past. This summary suggests some of the implications of activity to which we must now turn our attention.

3'. Question as to the order of studying the various aspects of activity;

Change and consciousness rejected as starting points.

The immediate question which arises concerns what is the best order of studying the numerous aspects and implications of activity. The idea of change furnishes one possible avenue of approach, for it is "evident" (1) that change is present in activity. F. H. Bradley puts this implication first, for he says that, "In all activity something clearly becomes something else." (2) And Stout explains that, "Throughout this work, whenever the word activity is used, the reference is to a process in time, if and so far as the process possesses a certain characteristic." (1) Following James, we might define activity, in most general terms, as change: the bare fact of something going on somewhere in consciousness or the organism. (3) This usage, however, only makes for confusion and redundancy, for change or process serve perfectly well to include the facts in question, and there is no justification for multiplying terms to name the same fact. For this simple reason, therefore, we cannot identify activity with mere change.

The objections to starting our study of activity from the concept or implication of change are not at all serious, but there are several minor ones which confirm the judgment that there is a better way. It may be true that all activity is a species of change, but probably the converse is not true; so that, beginning with change, we should have to deal first with a general and abstract concept, and then exhibit its relation to activity, a process which would involve unnecessary metaphysical complications. It is probable that change is to be understood as an idea derived by a subtraction from

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(1) G. F. Stout, Analytical Psychology, vol. I, page 144.
(2) Appearance and Reality, page 63.
(3) See above, page 49.

or simplication of mental activity, by a trimming down of the latter more concrete and complete fact. In view of this possibility, I think there is a more profitable mode of attacking our problem. We wish to find some marks of activity which will distinguish it from mere process or change, from the aimless movements produced by mechanical forces.

This better way is not the way of consciousness, although it seems evident, in this case also, that mental activity involves consciousness, and that the latter is one of the modes in which a living individual, sensitive of its surroundings and aware of its proper desires, manifests itself. But, the concept of consciousness also involves well-known difficulties which need not be introduced here.

The first implication of mental and personal activity which will be developed at length is that of purpose, for purpose is "most unmistakably attached to the behavior of man." (1) All three American philosophers whose theories have been reviewed assign the idea of purpose to an important place in the concept of the self; indeed, that idea has recurred frequently in our study of them. (2)

b. THE FIRST IMPLICATION OF ACTIVITY: PURPOSE, and its relation to personality.

1'. It is agreed that activity involves a sense of direction.

There is general agreement among those who discuss mental activity to the effect that it is meaningless in concrete human experience without the presence of direction in some sense. Let us note some examples of this opinion. S. Alexander affirms that, "The consciousness of activity must be found in some change of direction of the mental process itself." (3) For G. F. Stout the crux of the concept of activity is an "experienced transition," (4) and for W. H. Winch it is a "felt tendency." (5) G. A. Coe holds a similar view: "Mental reaction is a response <u>toward</u> something as well as <u>to</u> something, and this 'toward' reveals the nature of the reactor." (6) P. Natorp, in his exposition of the will, thinks that direction of some sort is present. (7) J. Laird asserts, "Without the concept of direction, activity would be meaningless." (8) R. B. Perry also points out that the differentia of life are to be found "in its direction <u>toward something</u>." (9) Our first task is to give a definite interpretation to the "direction" which is so commonly regarded as present whenever an individual has the experience of activity.

It may be thought that, by considering direction and purpose first, we are beginning at the wrong end of our study. Why not

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(1) R. B. Perry, Monist, vol. XXVII, page 371.

(2) See above: W. James, pages 52-54, 58, 85-86; R. B. Perry, pages 94-97; B. P. Bowne, pages 135-137, 152; general, pages 171, bottom, 172.

(3) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 217.

(4) Analytic Psychology, vol. I, page 159. See also, Mind, N. S., vol. X, 462.

(5) Jour. of Philos., Psych., and Scientific Meth., VI, 477.

(6) Psychology of Religion, page 29.

(7) Grundlinien einer Theorie der Willensbildung, Archiv für sys. Philos, Hefte 2 und 3; reviewed in Psychological Review, vol. III, pages 460-2.

(8) Problems of the Self, page 106.

(9) Monist, vol. XXVII, pages 358-9.

Reasons for beginning with the sense of direction and purpose.

consider first the desiring actor who senses the direction and who seeks ends? In reply one may say that (a) not only is purposiveness itself one of the chief factors both in activity and in personality, but also (b) that we come upon an important revelation of the nature of the desirer himself in the course of our understanding of the ends toward which his acts are directed. This is an assumption of psychoanalysis, and it is valid in the examination of the average person. But also, (c) the study of purpose before the implication of an actor or agent will make our argument more progressive, for the examination of the latter will bring us one step nearer to the study of the reality of personality with which we shall conclude our main discussion.

a'. Criticism of two mistaken interpretations of direction.

There is some disagreement with respect to the precise meaning of the direction present in the experience of activity. Two views which appear to be mistaken may be briefly considered.

1". Direction in a physical or spatial sense.

It is evident at once that the physicist cannot throw any light upon the meaning of direction in mental activity. It is true that in physical science both motion and force involve direction, (1) but this physical conception obviously lacks some important characteristics that mark direction in experienced activity. First, mechanical direction is not sensed by the moving thing itself. Secondly, a physical motion has direction only as it is determined by an observer with reference to its place in a relative system of points which he constructs. In fact, the whole discussion of our objections to the energetic view may be recalled here. (2) As J. Ward points out, "We might as well say that the moon lights the sun as suppose that physical action throws any new light on mental activity." (3) The idea of physical direction offers nothing to illuminate our problem.

2". Alexander's cerebral theory of mental direction.

a". Statement of it.

In spite of these condemning objections, S. Alexander makes the direction of mental activity "definite and explicit" by reference to the brain. (4) He thinks that the best metaphorical term by which to describe mental activity is <u>movement</u>, and that movements differing in direction, are present in willing, inferring, perceiving, etc. (5) "Always I am conscious of moving from one point to another, which either may or may not be in the same direction." (5) He says that he makes "clearer to myself" the idea of mental activity "by locating it in time or space in a picture of my brain. . . In all my thoughts . . . I verify the description that they strike along the brain." (6) Further, he affirms that, "It is only as thus understood in connection with the bodily organism that I can say my mental activity is a movement with direction...My mental activity is always characterized by what, on the analogy of local signs, I must call signs of direction." (6) "Now what makes one thought-process different from another is, I find, nothing but this difference of mental direction." (6) In the face of criticism of his view, he tries to explain it more exactly by

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(1) See for example, B. Snow, Notes on Physics, pages 13, 62.
(2) See above, pages 194-9.
(3) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 228.
(4) Ibid., page 220.
(5) Ibid., page 219.
(6) Ibid., page 220.

asserting, "When I say that I feel mental activity occurring in connection with movement in my brain, I mean only that it occurs in that portion of space, and is experienced by me as occurring in my brain." (1)

b". Inconsistencies in his theory.

Several facts may now be cited in support of the opinion that Alexander's attempt to picture the direction of mental activity in terms of cerebral movement befogs rather than clarifies its meaning. His view comes as a surprise after he has confessed that one "error" which he had "learned to avoid" is that the bodily behavior which may accompany thinking is mental activity itself. (2) His exposition is at once incomplete and confusing for the following reasons:

(a) The brain processes of which he speaks must be presentations, but he has admitted that it is "impossible" to find "activity . . . . in changing presentations," and that it can be found only in the transitions among them. (2) He thinks that this latter principle condemns F. H. Bradley's view of activity as the expansion of an idea against another idea. His argument is inconsistent, then, for, while he asserts at first that activity cannot be found in a series of presentations without an experience of transition among them, he later seems to assert that it can be so presented.

(b) He states that the connection of mental activity with his organism gives it direction, (3) and is thereby qualified by signs of direction. But he adds (4) that when he is aware of activity, this activity is consciousness. If he means the latter statement, he should not say that he feels his thought occurring in his brain or body. (3) Again, what these "signs of direction" are, and how processes in the brain become cues to the directions of mental activities, are questions which he leaves quite unanswered. Further, these signs cannot be sensations, for they would be condemned by point (a) above. But if they are "unique" transitions in consciousness itself, the reference to the brain is superfluous and misleading. When he says that mental activity "is a movement" occurring in time and space, he has dropped his metaphorical language, and direction has become literally spatial.

(c) He bases this cerebral reference upon the facts of experience. (5) He states that he experiences mental activity as occurring in that portion of space which he has learned by reflection, and not "direct inspection," to be his brain. In "locating my mental activity in my brain, I am using my acquired knowledge of brain, and not direct inspection." (6) Yet he declares that, "my mental activity . . is experienced by me as occurring in my brain." (7)

These statements do not seem to be mutually consistent. If direction is essential to mental activity, as we agree it is, and if Alexander is right in thinking that reference to the brain is essential in the determination of the meaning of direction, then, according to his view that knowledge of the brain is acquired, mental activity would be impossible until we had gained that knowledge. It seems contrary to fact, however, to suppose that a child, for example, can find no sense in the direction of his activities be-

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 249.
(2) Ibid., page 216.
(3) Ibid., page 220.
(4) Ibid., page 221.
(5) Ibid., pages 249-50.
(6) Ibid., page 250.
(7) Ibid., page 249.

fore he knows about his brain. I am unable to verify in my experience the hypothesis that I refer every transition in my thoughts to cerebral movements or processes. On the contrary, I find that I very rarely do so; and when I do, this reference is not made at the time of the mental activity concerned, but at another time, and as part of another activity whose direction is determined in a very different way.

In Alexander's cerebral theory of mental direction we have before us another failure in elucidating it due to the misguided and doomed endeavor to clarify mental activity by means of physical analogies. Perhaps Alexander's method of directing his thoughts by the aid of changes in the position of his eyes (1) is an individual pecularity, acquired as a help in association or imagination.

b'. Adoption of a teleological interpretation of direction in activity.

I shall adopt and defend a teleological interpretation of the "direction" of mental activity, because this interpretation seems essential and necessary so far as personal experience is concerned. This view may be stated briefly by saying that the direction of mental activity is determined by its purposive reference, a reference which is more or less clearly present in consciousness, whether as a goal of action or as an object of cognitive interest. If this teleological reference turns out to be essential to mental activity, then experienced transitions without a modicum of meaning cannot be called active; they will have to be designated as bare change or process. G. F. Stout accepts a teleological view of conation: "Any specific activity must be thought of in relation to some result which it either maintains in existence or tends to bring into existence. This result is called the <u>end</u> to which it is directed." (2) A careful examination of this purposive reference in activity will bring before us one of the most important of the factors in the concept of personality, namely, purposive activity. It is to be regretted that the development of a genuinely functional psychology as described by G. A. Coe (3) is not at hand to aid in the exposition of the purposive features of personality.

c'. Two dangers to be avoided in this exposition:

In this exposition two dangers need to be guarded against. In the first place, we have found reason to believe that the endeavor to explain or express the purposive reference in activity in spatial or physical metaphors would prove vain. The direction of activity has no intelligible resemblance to the falling of a row of dominoes or to the movement of a train or to the course of a nervous impulse.

1". Spatial metaphors.

2". Intellectualism.

Secondly, if we distinguish clearly between the immediate experience of activity and the reflective knowledge of it, we shall avoid the improper intellectualism of G. F. Stout's account of it when he maintains that "sufficient" factors are present "to constitute . . mental activity or conation" when "there is the knowledge or thought of a certain actual situation, and of a possible alteration in it; and the alteration is not only thought of but also wanted." (4) This account narrows down conscious activity too near to the point of identifying it with voluntary action, and tends to exclude possible simpler types, where there is merely con-

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 216.

(2) Analytical Psychology, vol. I, page 126.

(3) Psychology of Religion.

(4) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II, Part I, page 1.

scious wanting or striving, without a clear conception of the end sought or without a reflective consideration of the stages of its attainment. It should be noted, however, that the measure of knowledge present is, of course, a question of definition and degree. In the species of activity called personal, the intellective element probably cannot be entirely excluded at any time, although its relative importance may vary greatly.

2'. The distinction between the objective and subjective points of view in the study of purpose.

In the examination of the teleological factor in activity and personality it is important, in the interests of clearness, to distinguish several points of view from which it may be studied. It is evident that at the moment when an action is performed, that which is in prospect has a quite different appearance from the standpoint of the actor himself than it has from the point of view of the observer who is trying to describe it. "The vital processes of the plant and the deliberate plans of man are alike purposive; but in the former we have no evidence of the presence of an idea guiding the series of movements which takes place, whereas, in our own experience we have an immediate consciousness of such an idea." (1) The first fundamental distinction to be noted is that between what we may call the objective and the subjective standpoints, or, as F. C. S. Schiller would say, between the point of view of the "spectator" and of the "purposing agent."

a'. Description and illustration of purpose from the objective standpoint.

From the objective point of view, the idea of purpose is "regulative," in the sense that it serves as a useful methodological or metaphysical principle. To the seeker after knowledge it is of instrumental value in the ordering of certain facts which come before him for synthesis. One simple type of this use is found in the relation between means and end; as, for example, between the falling of rain and a good harvest, between an axe and the preparation of lumber, and between the antlers of a stag and defense. These forms of objective purpose, where we do not suppose there is any foresight or conscious anticipation of the end upon the part of the entities themselves, are familiar and common. From this objective standpoint, a machine is purposive in the sense that it is constructed for and serves some useful and practical end, but the purpose lies outside of the machine itself. In this type of purpose the end is present only in the mind of the investigator, and not in the subjects under investigation.

1". Unconscious purpose.

From the standpoint of these subjects, such purposes may be said to be unconscious. Perhaps the only intelligible meaning of unconscious purpose is to be found in purpose considered in this objective way: methodological purpose is conscious as an explanatory category in the intellectual life of the scientist, but it is not consciously present in the processes to which he refers it in a regulative way. The end which an individual's behavior sometimes serves may be quite without meaning or significance in his own experience; as, for example, in the case of actions which are for the good of the species alone. The latter type is illustrated by the behavior of those salmon who kill themselves in leaping water-falls under the impelling influence of instinctive tendencies which on the whole are of benefit to their species. Wherever, then, the behavior of an individual organism or the movements of a machine are regarded by an observer as determining some valuable result,

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(1) W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 413-14.

the result may be spoken of as an end or purpose in this objective sense; for the purpose is purely methodological, and not immanent or in any way anticipated or experienced by the individual being. In our investigation of activity, we are primarily interested in ends, considered from the subjective standpoint, which are consciously sought.

2". Criticism of purpose as a systematic unity.

The interpretation of "purpose as systematic unity" (1) would belong in the objective type, if any one ever actually put it forward. (2) From this point of view, purpose would be equivalent to the Absolute Individual as described by B. Bosanquet. (3) The latter, however, explicitly states that purpose can never be identified with the whole of a world. (4) Although, therefore, Perry's criticism is directed against an unreal opponent, his discussion illustrates another objective type of purpose, and also helps to clear our way by warning us as to what purpose is not.

The usage referred to robs the term, purpose, of a significant and necessary meaning, without bringing any logical gains. It attaches a static completeness to the meaning of the concept which is foreign to its real nature. It is essential to the idea of purpose that it be progressively realized or developed. It is properly applied to the historical and finite endeavors of human beings, and not to the Absolute conceived as a perfected and systematic whole. Real purposes live where there are unfinished progressions, where time is required for their development, and where change, improvement, realization, progress toward perfection, or perhaps toward failure, may be present. An important source of the value of absolute idealism to its exponent lies in the fact that it is the achievement of long intellectual strain and strife on his part, and its attainment well illustrates that most lofty of human purposes, the quest for complete unification of experience. But to extend the idea of purpose from finite strivings to the systematic totality of things is unwarranted and confusing. In order to understand the human purposes just referred to the subjective standpoint must be adopted.

b'. Description of purpose from the subjective standpoint,

1". as compared with objective purpose.

From the objective standpoint purpose is primarily a methodological or epistemological principle of regulative value. Whether it is also "constitutive" does not concern us here. There is one place, however, where it is undoubtedly constitutive, namely, in human activity and personality. But to appreciate its meaning here the subjective standpoint must be adopted. By the latter is meant the standpoint of the one who himself is actively and consciously seeking after ends. It means the point of view of the living, finite individual who experiences in advance, to some extent, that progressive linkage of his own experiences which leads to the achievement of an esteemed end.

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(1) See article bearing this title by R. B. Perry, in Monist, vol. XXVII, pages 352-375.

(2) An approximation to this view is found in the article on "Purpose" by R. Latta, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. XVII, pages 17-33.

(3) See The Principle of Individuality and Value, Lecture II.

(4) Ibid., page 391.

The two points of view in teleology stand in notable contrast to one another. From the objective or descriptive standpoint, purpose is methodological, regulative, and static; from the subjective or experiential standpoint, purpose is immanent, constitutive, and dynamic. In the one case, purpose is a post mortem interpretation; in the other, it is a prophetic insight. In the first case, the end is unconscious in the sense mentioned above; in the other it is foreseen, consciously anticipated in some measure, or vaguely sought.

We are interested now in considering only the latter kind of purpose, and it is from this immanent and personal type that all forms of objective purpose derive their meaning. This interest represents an attempt to explain experience and the movement of things in terms of the conscious rather than the unconscious. F. C. S. Schiller reminds us that, "It seems obvious to remark that unless 'you' were an actively purposing spirit, you could never regard any connexion of things as teleological." (1) Let us, then, turn to the study of purpose from the subjective standpoint, with a view to isolating those forms which are important in activity and personality.

2". General description of purpose from the subjective or experiential standpoint.

Although a description of immanent purpose must remain incomplete until we develop some other implications of activity, we may note some of its chief marks. An experience or activity is not purposive unless it is in some measure consciously forward-looking. An experience is purposive from this point of view when its stages are in part determined by a more or less clear awareness of what is going to come out of it, when the end or direction of the experience-trend is present with some degree of explicitness in the consciousness of the actor. We have all had experiences of this kind,--of seeking, striving, undertaking, intending, endeavoring, giving up, attending, persevering, trying, resolving, making an effort, getting ready, attempting, starting to work, taking up a task, meeting and overcoming obstacles, making progress in executing our plans, solving problems, etc., etc. (2) In purposive activity the end-situation, whether near or far in time, reacts upon the initial situation, and upon the intermediate ones, if they are present. We should not say that purpose is present in the sense we are considering if our satisfaction in a present state had come to pass without our having sought it, or without our having any forebodings of its coming. Such an experience would be one of the graces, one of the benevolent surprises of our natural existence, and the processes leading up to this enjoyable result could be regarded as purposive only in the objective sense. It is quite possible, therefore, for an individual to make use of the objective standpoint in the ordering of his own past experiences, if he finds any occasion or value in this regulative exercise. Lovers adopt this point of view in expressing the belief that they were made for each other, when they have no evidence that they were preparing for their life together before they met.

Perry's definition of purpose.

In addition to our earlier exposition of Perry's view of purpose (3), we may note here his definition of it, for it is as good as any: "I submitted a provisional definition in agreement with

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(1) Studies in Humanism, page 231.
(2) Compare James' account, above, page 49.
(3) See above, pages 94-7.

verbal usage, according to which purpose consists in the determination of an action by its agreement with the agent's expectation." (1) He observes further, that if a dog hides when his master takes down a whip, "he acts not because of what is or has been, but because of what may be by virtue of his action, or what would be without his action." (2) Again, he says, "The differential factor which constitutes a purposive aspect" is to be found in the fact that "the act is construed by the agent in terms of something ulterior and non-existential." (2)

c'. The interrelations of the objective and the subjective standpoints in the study of purpose.

The consideration of purpose from the objective standpoint, as a supplement to the subjective standpoint, is not at all rare within the conscious life of an individual. What is rare is the objective consideration of a purpose within human experience which has not been preceded by an immediate and immanent experience of that purpose itself. What is frequent in our experience is the objective consideration, in the light of memory, of various purposive cycles or systems which are past. The subjective standpoint means the living through of a purposive experience, while the objective refers to its later interpretation. In the one case the purpose is actual; in the other it is retrospective. When a purposive train of experience is a matter of anticipation or of future realization, we may call it prospective; it would be a species of the objective type, the meaning of which is always based, of course, upon the other type.

It is interesting to note that the objective end of a given series of experiences may be different from the subjective one. For example, the immanent or subjective goal of the experience of hunger is securing food in order to eat and enjoy it, while its objective end is the maintenance of physical life. Other instinctive experiences could be used to illustrate this same point. On the other hand, the same fact of purposive experience may be considered either from the objective or from the subjective standpoint: namely, as it has occurred or will occur, as contrasted with its actual occurrence, in the individual's experience.

Purpose and personality.

As we shall see, it is in the objective criticism of our purposes, in their conscious approval or disapproval, and in the control of our subsequent actions in accordance with this criticism and this approval, that personality manifests itself most clearly. This passage from the subjective to the objective point of view is made possible, in the first instance, by the originally dynamic and intelligent character of human mature experience; and it is in the return to the subjective realization of prospective purposes which we have approved in objective criticism that we find personality in its most perfect form, in the form of rational self-determination. In the latter case that purpose of an individual which at first may be merely regulative or prospective has become constitutive of his nature through his own choice and will.

The distinctions which have so far been made in the study of teleological standpoints and kinds of purpose may be summarized in the following table of classification:

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(1) Philosophical Review, vol. XXVI, page 477, Sept., 1917.
(2) The Monist, vol. XXVII, page 360.

d'. Summary classification of standpoints in teleology, with corresponding types and examples of purpose.

Standpoint	Corresponding purpose	Examples
1. Objective:	a. Methodological or regulative:	Means--end. Systematic totality.
	b. Prospective or possible:	Wishes or hopes.
2. Subjective:	a. Actual or immanent in the individual's consciousness:	Buying of fruit according to one's intention. (1)
3. Objective-subjective:	a. Prospective become actual:	Realized wish.
	b. Actual become retrospective:	Remembered achievement.

3'. General survey of the types of purpose considered from the subjective point of view.

Now it is important for the progress of our argument to comprehend purpose more fully from the subjective or experiential standpoint, from the standpoint of one's own purposive actions as he lives them out in daily life. We shall need to be careful to exclude the objective point of view only when precise distinctions are required. The latter kind of purposes can do us no harm, now that we understand their nature. The combination of both standpoints is sometimes useful in discussion, as the above table indicates.

We may start from the fact, exhibited above (2), that human beings are fundamentally active, they they are gifted by nature with most varied and abundant conative tendencies, notably the instincts. From the objective standpoint all conative tendencies probably are purposive. The question is whether they are also purposive from the other point of view, that is whether the goal of any one of them, or its progress towards some valued conclusion, is consciously present in some measure to the owner. There is no doubt that the end is clearly present in that highly developed kind of human action called volition. "We are accustomed to accept as the type of purposive action our own most decidedly volitional efforts, in which we deliberately choose, and self-consciously strive, to bring about some state of affairs that we clearly foresee and desire." (3)

a'. Distinction between implicit and explicit purpose.

To restrict purposive activity to the volitional type, however, is too narrow a usage, because there are other kinds of action where purpose is present, although not so clearly, and also because we are interested in establishing a continuity between the simpler and the higher forms of purposive activity. There are lower forms of activity in which a full anticipation or conception of the end is not essential. In order to avoid confusion, it is profitable to introduce here the idea of grades of clearness with which the end of a given action or a series of actions is foreseen at its initiation. Volitional activity represents the type of greatest clearness. At the opposite extreme would stand an activity where there is no consciousness of the goal or aim, but only bare feeling of transition or tendency, although this is certainly a very rare kind of experience for us adult human beings. In order to describe this lower limit we should have to adopt the objective standpoint, and call the purpose in this case, whenever it is present at all, implicit. It would be implicit in the sense that, from the objective standpoint, whether of the experient himself or of an observer, the facts of the ex-

(1) See above, page 213, bottom, and 214.
(2) See above, pages 188-193.
(3) W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, page 356.

perienced transition might be ordered under the concept of purpose, or be regarded as contributing to some valuable end. (1)

Since our standpoint is primarily subjective, we are interested much less in implicit purpose than in ends which are to some extent explicit, in purpose which is immanent in experience, and not merely methodological. Let us examine some of the varieties of explicit purpose. Among them we may discover those purposes which especially belong to personal activity.

b'. Varieties of explicit purpose:

Three stages or grades may be roughly distinguished in the explicitness of purposes: (a) vague or obscure purposes, (b) confused purposes, or those possessing an intermediate degree of clearness, and (c) clear purposes. The lowest stage of purpose in human experience must be described as a kind of restlessness in the presence of an apprehended situation, an undefined craving for something different, an indefinite but nevertheless actual want to alter experience in some respect, where there is a very obscure anticipation of some change in the given state of affairs. Provided we recognize that the purpose is vague, it seems fair to say that it is present in such experiences, even if there is no conceived course of action present. It is well to remember that these obscure purposes are in part the raw material out of which the intelligent self weaves for itself an integrated personality, and also that these purposes may be of great significance in effecting the course of experience, for, as M. Maeterlinck observes, "It happily so comes to pass that the more clear ideas we possess, the more do we learn to respect those that as yet are still vague." (2)

1". Vague purposes,--described and illustrated.

Let us note some examples of obscure purposes. "To take a trivial but instructive instance: you cough in order to clear your throat; or, experiencing a slight irritation in your throat, you put out your hand, take up a glass of water, and drink, in order to allay it. How very sketchy and ill-defined mwy be your thought of the end of your action!" (3) Another instance from developed experience where the end, though present, is obscure, is seen in the effort to recall a forgotten name. In that case, while one cannot definitely say what one is seeking, yet one is able to reject wrong goals when they present themselves--wrong in the sense of being unsatisfying or annoying. Here the end is present in the form of a vague or general feeling, not exant enough to permit a definition of itself, but not so implicit or indefinite but what it can function as a touchstone to eliminate false definitions. Sometimes, again, after one has committed a sin of etiquette or morals, and tries to go about his business, he experiences a lingering feeling of annoyance, an uneasy sense of wanting a change in his experience. It is perfectly possible, therefore, for general and obscure purposes to be present in the emotional life of adult persons.

Habit and purpose.

A vague or marginal awareness of end may be present often in perfected habit, although the end may have been very clear at the beginning of the learning process. The purposive history and character of habit is seen when its regular development fails to meet an unusual situation. In this case one rediscovers that the habit is

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(1) Compare W. H. Winch, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, vol. VI, page 477.

(2) Wisdom and Destiny, page 79.

(3) W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, page 358.

useful in serving a different purpose than the extraordinary need which faces him. For example, if one discovers, after washing his hands and face, that his towel is out of its customary place, he may find a train of thought interrupted in order that he may search for a towel for necessary purposes. When, then, a habitual action meets obstacles, its general direction is brought into consciousness. To what extent the end of a habit is ordinarily present in consciousness must be left here undetermined. It seems certain, however, that habitual actions are originally purposive, however vague their ends may be when they are well established.

Purpose in impulsive and instinctive action.

The best examples of vague purposes may be found in the functioning of instincts. Probably the beginning of purposive experience is connected with the operation and development of instincts. W. McDougall declares that, "The persistent striving towards its end, which characterises mental process and distinguishes instinctive behavior most clearly from mere reflex action, implies some such mode of experience as we call conative." (1) "Awareness of the end towards which it tends" is essential to an instinct, and even "in the case of the higher animals some prevision of the immediate end, however vague, probably accompanies an instinctive action that has often been repeated." (2)

These vague purposes may turn out to have a significance which one does not at first suspect. C. S. Peirce suggests that "a general idea, living and conscious now, is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious." Because many of our original tendencies point to ends of which we only gradually become clearly conscious, selection needs to be made, he says, and thus there is room for self-determination. Sometimes we do not discover clearly the purpose until the presence of a sense of fulfilment or failure brings to light the end towards which we have been more or less unconsciously tending. (3) L. T. Hobhouse describes the situation well: "Where intelligence arises within the sphere of instinct, it probably takes short views at the outset, and aims at near results, which will relieve the tension and so satisfy. From these it advances step by step till it grasps the end of the instinct, which then becomes suffused with purpose." (4)

Between the vague purposes which have just been described and illustrated, and the clear ends to be discussed in a moment, there exists a motley group of confused purposes, or purposes possessing intermediate grades of explicitness in intelligent consciousness. The stages and varieties of these purposes in individual experience, as contrasted with their extremes, will not be carefully delimited or specified, because the notation of the fact of their existence is sufficient for the present argument. A few examples, however, may be mentioned.

A confused purpose is often present when one tries to relate a general moral ideal to particular and momentary problems of life, or, vice versa, when one seeks to understand the wider bearings of specific acts. The ends subserved by instinctive actions in their

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(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, page 28.
(2) Ibid., page 31. (3) The Monist, vol. II, page 256.
(4) Development and Purpose, pages 57-8.

early functioning, the uncertain goals which affect us in the midst of conflicting desires, the first stages of our efforts at moral self-criticism,--these and numerous other situations often generate in consciousness purposes having many varieties of indefiniteness in meaning.

2". Confused purposes, or purposes of an intermediate degree of explicitness.

Illustrations of confused goals are expecially abundant in the development of our instinctive life. The end, however, is genuinely present, for, as Perry suggests, we cannot explain fear or hope "without admitting it to be the fear or the hope of something, which something is not upon the plane of past or present existence as ordinarily conceived." (1) There is a vast region of vague endeavor "when we seek something less clearly defined or feel ourselves drawn to a course of action whose value we recognise but dimly, looking to future experience to reveal more fully both the way to the end and the mode in which our nature will find satisfaction in it. These vaguer impulses are not separated from conscious life, though consciousness hardly penetrates to their further issues, but they may function without a clear idea of the end they subserve, almost in the way in which the instincts work which protect and preserve our organic life." (2) Evidently, then, purposes are present in our activities with endless degrees of clearness.

3". Clear purposes, e.g., those present in voluntary action.

The upper extreme of explicitness is illustrated by any voluntary action of a developed intelligent man. In this type of activity the end is clearly present in consciousness. In this case he has a clear conception of some plan of action and of the means for its fulfilment. An end which is vaguely present in one activity-series may become, as a result of reflection, clearly present in a later repetition of that series when the latter has become better organized. An important means of developing personality is this process of clarifying and controlling ends which are vaguely or confusedly present to begin with.

4". Unfolding purpose.

A person develops in the midst of the unfolding and fulfilment of his purposes; unfolding purpose may be added as another species of the explicit type. Within a complex activity-series all of the above stages of clearness may be present; that is to say, the true or satisfying end of a train of experience may become fully explicit only at a relatively late stage or at the conclusion of a long series of actions. (3) This conscious unfoldment corresponds to what has been called the "progressive adjustment" of a growing organism. The steps in such an activity-series are likely to be very loosely bound together when considered as a whole, and the course of its development may be very crooked. This unfolding type occupies, in other words, comparatively long periods of human life; many men require a long time in order to discover their vocations.

5". Purposes distinguished according to the length of time required for their realization:

The last paragraph suggests another distinction among human purposes, namely, according to the time required for their realization. Some ends are but a few seconds' distant from the present instant; others may require hours or days for their achievement; and still others, many years. Hence, there are proximate, intermediate, and ulterior purposes, as determined by the time occupied in their

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(1) The Monist, vol. XXVII, page 360.

(2) W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 423.

(3) Compare, R. Latta, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, pages 18-9.

fulfilment. Let us note some examples of these.

a". Proximate purposes, described and illustrated:

"Problem-ideas";

One of the best-known cases of proximate purpose is to be found in the "Aufgabe," "problem-idea," or purpose in the experiments of H. J. Watt (1), and others, especially N. Ach (2). The latter pointed out differences in reaction time according to whether the subject's attention was fixed on the expected stimulus or on the intended action. The idea of the anticipated result, which he found to modify one's time of reaction, is an interesting and clear case of proximate purpose.

"Conscious attitudes";

Proximate purposes are the most common of all, for they are constantly with us in our waking life. They are illustrated by the multitude of "conscious attitudes" which have been brought to light in recent psychology. These attitudes are interesting because they are not only conscious, and involve the whole self, but they are definitely forward-looking, for in them one prepares himself for the experience that is immediately to follow. A host of these attitudes have been mentioned of late under various names: such as "conscious attitudes," "Bewusstseinlagen," "marbs," "kulps," and "sets." In "sets" there is said to be a kind of "preparatory adjustment" for changes shortly to come about; they are illustrated by readiness, hesitancy, doubt, confusion, expectation, alertness, watchfulness, etc.

Attention.

Probably the most common of all is the attentive attitude in perception. The sensitive organism of a man that is awake is constantly keyed up in some degree in expectation of events about to take place; he is ever ready for clear perceptions of surrounding objects with reference to which he may be obliged to modify his actions. The mental activity present in particular cognitive acts is an expression of the general interest in the multiplication of objects of perception. (3)

Proximate purpose is not only present in the pulses of our perceptive life, but in the activities of our thought life. It is illustrated in the frequent experiences of intending to say something before we say it, and of maintaining the advance guard of thought when speaking. The thought comes first, and the words follow as an expression of it. In thinking, too, the conclusion comes before our evidence for it, and we are continually anticipating ourselves. Then, there is a countless multitude of brief excursions in thought and action designed to satisfy transient wants and relieve vague organic pressures or impulses.

These numerous examples of proximate purpose have been presented in order to indicate how thoroughly purposive our whole waking life is. In the illustrations cited the time-span is very brief. It may be so short that the activity is called a conscious attitude--a facing of the future, rather than an actual seeking after something absent that is ideally anticipated--a state of preparedness or readiness for what may come. These instances also exhibit how thoroughly active the human individual is, and his activity is essentially purposive. Starting with these proximate purposes, we may say that the time required for the attainment of the experiences we seek varies within a period containing many scores of years.

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(1) Exper. Beiträge zu einer Theorie d. Denkens, Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, vol. IV, 1905.

(2) Über die Willenstätigkeit and das Denken.

(3) See G. A. Coe, Psychology of Religion, page 40.

b". Intermediate purposes.

Some ends require a few minutes or a few hours for their attainment. These may be designated, intermediate purposes. The duty of the day's work which lies before one each morning is an example of this type. Other examples of such familiar experiences need not be mentioned.

c". Ulterior purposes.

Finally, then, there are ulterior purposes which may require long periods or a lifetime for achievement: e. g., the acquisition of an education or of professional skill, the execution of a literary or commercial scheme, the multifarious kinds of human vocations, etc.

For the fulfilment of ulterior purposes, the realization of proximate and intermediate stages is regularly presupposed. Here appears the idea of lesser purposes existing with a larger purpose,

6". Compound purposes;

that is, of compound, in contrast with simple, purposes. If one adopts a plan of life which requires many years for its completion, he cannot realize it in general, but the intermediate steps must be composed of shorter cycles of activity. A compound plan may possess varying degrees of organization or unity. Here we return to the idea of purpose as a system, but the system here is a very different one than the static and completed kind which was referred to above. (1)

They presuppose the idea of activity-cycles.

The idea of compound purpose cannot be made plain without introducing the concept of purposive or conative cycle, which will be expanded below. (2) It seems possible to fix the time limits of a purposive activity within which the various experiences involved in it are linked and unified by reason of the end to which they lead. This whole may be called a conative or activity-cycle. It is a very important conception which is too frequently overlooked in the discussion of personality and activity. In developed personality these cycles are compounded in various ways by reference to more remote purposes to which they lead; in other words, a person is able to direct his activities in such a way that many of them will contribute to the achievement of a common end, which, therefore, is at once ulterior and compound. These larger purposes of life will possess intrinsic value, while their elements will have instrumental value.

7". Personality in relation to the several kinds of purpose.

The opportunity for the development of personality appears when purposes gain in experience some measure of explicitness and when their achievement takes more than a moment of time. Ends that are sought with conscious intention by consciously devised means--here is the field where personality appears and unfolds, for it is the sphere of evaluation and of self-determination in the light of evaluation. One phase, then, in the development of personality lies in the clarification of implicit, vague, and confused purposes, and in the adoption of ends of an intermediate or remote kind, especially when these have been carefully evaluated and approved, anterior to their realization. In this realization a person himself, according to the idea of unfolding purpose or "flying goal," may come better to define and understand his own nature and destiny. Another phase in the development of personality consists in the completion of well organized cycles of purposive activity.

8". Summary classification of subjective purposes.

The distinctions which have been made in the above discussion of the varieties of explicit purposes, considered from the subjective point of view, may be summarized in the following table of classifications made according to several principles or standpoints.

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(1) See above, page 220.
(2) See below, page 228.

Since these purposes are intimately associated with conations and values, and since the latter have not been systematically worked out as yet in any degree, this classification is necessarily incomplete.

Classification of explicit purposes from the subjective standpoint.

A. According to the degree of conscious explicitness:
   1. In a multiplicity of distinct activities:
      a. Vague or obscure; as in impulse.
      b. Confused, i. e., possessing an intermediate degree of explicitness or clearness.
      *c. Clear; as in voluntary action.
   *2. Within a series of activities: the unfolding purpose or "flying goal."

B. According to the temporal distance of the achievement of the end:
   1. Proximate; e. g., set, conscious attitudes.
   *2. Intermediate; e. g., a day's work, or task.
   *3. Ulterior or remote; e. g., a man's vocation.

C. According to the number of conative cycles present:
   1. Simple; e. g., a specific instinct, a so-called "impulsive" action.
   *2. Compound; e. g., eating a meal, sight-seeing trip, getting an education.

D. According to the character of the evaluation:
   *1. Approved.
   2. Disapproved.

Those types above which are marked by an asterisk are the most important purposes which are characteristic of personal experience or personality-activities. All the other kinds of purpose, except the last, are the materials out of which the self-conscious person works out his own plan of life; the last is the refuse which accumulates in the course of soul-making, and with which he refuses to identify himself. The lower forms of purposive activity are important because of the natural impelling force of many of them. The person makes himself by taking hold of his elemental and original tendencies and strivings, by criticizing and interpreting them, and finally by controlling and utilizing them in self-approved plans of action,--in short, by the definition and realization of ends.

4'. The direction of activity is found in its purposive trend.

We have found good reasons, therefore, for interpreting the direction of activity in terms of its purposive trend. Where this teleological factor is lacking in experience, we do not have activity, but bare change or process. Whether simple or compound activities come into question, each derives its trend and unity from the end which is to be realized. (1)

a'. Time and purposive activity.

The direction, then, of a typical activity does not admit of spatial determination, nor can the concept of time alone suffice, for the mere succession of experiences is not activity. In the commonplace personal activity which we are studying, it is contrary to fact to suppose that a person orders or unifies his various activities by reference to the abstract idea of time; it is always a concrete purpose which performs this function. The attempt to interpret activity-direction in temporal terms alone means only a restatement of our problem in a more general form, for may it not be that the concept of time itself originates in the sense of incompleted pur-

(1) Compare W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 444-5; 450.

poses which is so universal in human experience? Is it not from unrealized ends that the future gains its significance? We seem to become most vividly conscious of the passage of time when our purposes are thwarted, and when we are aware most clearly of the intermediate steps which are required for their fulfilment. Miss M. W. Calkins asserts that, "Every moment is what it is by virtue of its relations to the irrevocable and the unattained. Thus the temporal is essentially the incomplete." (1) In psychology it is well known that we least notice the passage of time when all goes well and when we are absorbed in the successful realization of our purposes. Bowne's striking exposition of the relation of time to personality may be recalled here. (2)

b'. Signs of direction.

The question, How do we become aware of this direction? or What are the "signs of direction?" cannot be much more fully answered here than by saying that they consist in whatever marks for us the fulfilment of or progress toward an end we are interested in. These marks vary indefinitely according to the multiplicity of human purposes, but most, if not all, of them may be subsumed under the idea of the increasing satisfaction or value which appears as one approaches a goal. This satisfaction is illustrated in the pragmatic verification of ideas; (3) the latter, acting as leadings, are in reality kinds of purposes. So far as I know no system of satisfactions, taken as indications of the progress of purposive activity, has been worked out, and it is certainly a very delicate and comprehensive problem, because of the variety and frequent indefiniteness of these satisfactions. Sometimes the real value which we attach to the attainment of a purpose is shown most clearly in a negative way, namely, by the kind of dissatisfaction present when our progress is blocked in some way. Dissatisfactions are good indicators, when translated into positive terms, of the directions of our mental activities. (4)

Summary of the discussion of direction.

It seems, then, that the direction of any mental activity is determined by the anticipations of possible experiences of achievement, and that the line of its operation is marked by the variations in one's satisfactions. If, for example, I set out to make a speech and do it in a praiseworthy manner, I may say that I am elated; but this does not mean primarily that I am high or low, east or west, nor does it mean primarily that I have various organic and kinaesthetic sensations; but it does mean preeminently that I am satisfied because I have attained that which I set out to get. In short, that to which activity points, its direction, is found in the achievement of its original and inner meaning. And for this determination we need two points, and not three as in the determination of physical motion. The point of origin is found in the presence of a purpose, however vague or clear, and the point of conclusion is found in the attainment of this purpose.

In discussions of personality, one often meets such phrases as "the meaning of personal life." (5) The actual presence in one's

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(1) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3rd edition, pages 440-1.
(2) See above, page 142. (3) See above, pages 15-16.
(4) See below, pages 253-55.
(5) See book with this title by N. Smyth.

5'. The meaning of life for personality is seen in purposive activity.

experience of the throbs of purposive activity or conative cycles is life in the highest form which we human beings know. These activities represent a more explicit, conscious, and full development of that blind seeking of the sensitive organism which is found in lower forms of life, as well as of that behavior directed towards the maintenance and development of the vital system, which constitutes the distinguishing mark of life from the biological standpoint. "In conscious as in other vital activities", says W. R. Sorley, "we must look to the end in order to understand them; and in the organisms which are conscious, unlike other organisms, the activity may be the realization of an idea or purpose which as a mental fact preceded and anticipated the result." (1) So far, then, as personal experience goes, life means precisely the purposive activities which we are studying. But the term, activity, is adequate to cover the facts in question; so that confusion may be avoided by reserving the term, life, for use in connection with the biological study of "living matter," or of organic processes. Beyond that lower limit of conscious activities, where anticipation is no longer present, we should not speak of activity, but of vital process or life; for while purpose is present, it is probably of the objective type, as defined above. (2) In the felt tendency towards a vaguely present end the life process blossoms forth into conscious activity.

6'. The meaning of consciousness is seen in purposive activity.

The meaning of consciousness, too, is to be found in purposive activity. It is more proper to speak of conscious activity, or of the conscious subject, than of the activity of consciousness, for the latter phrase suggests that we have hypostatized consciousness and assigned to it the rôle of an agent. Consciousness is one of the characteristics of all activity; it is unique and strictly indefinable. We may speak of it in terms of such synonyms as awareness or sensitivity, but we cannot define it in a direct or logical way. We all know, however, what it is, and we know what it means to say that a man is unconscious. As Miss M. F. Washburn points out, "Consciousness is that which is present when we are awake or dreaming, and which is absent when we are dreamlessly asleep." (3) She suggests that our inability to define consciousness should not trouble us, for behavior involves spatial movement, and we should meet serious difficulties in defining space.

The meaning of consciousness, then, is to be found by reference to one of the familiar aspects of any one of our concrete activities. Taken apart from the other aspects it is an abstraction. (4) It may be regarded as an expression of a common property of all our activities, but should not be taken as existing in and for itself in some pure form, for that supposition would constitute a fallacy of abstraction. And because activity has other distinguishable aspects than consciousness, the identification of it with mental activity (5) cannot be recommended. We cannot make consciousness the distinguishing mark of activity, either, because there are probably low forms of sensitive or conscious life which are not

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(1) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 412.
(2) See above, pages 219-20.
(3) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 17.
(4) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principles, page 22.
(5) As is done by S. Alexander, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 221.

properly called active, as we are defining that term. One may heartily agree, however, with the suggestion that the "selective or teleological character" of consciousness be adopted as "the fundamental and differentiating trait of conscious behavior." (1) J. E. Creighton states that, "To live as conscious beings means to have purposes, to will certain results, and employ ourselves in such a way as to bring about their attainment." (2) Purposive activity is the concrete fact of which consciousness is one property.

7'. Conclusion with reference to purpose, the first implication of activity.

The discussion of purpose, the first implication of activity, may now be summarily concluded. We assumed at the outset, upon the basis of much definite evidence, that the human mind is fundamentally and, we believe, constantly active. Whether there are experiences of human beings which cannot be called active may be left open, for if there are such, they are most likely not classifiable as personal, and, therefore, do not concern us. We may express the conviction, however, that there are none such. G. F. Stout has labored in his Analytical Psychology to establish this view, and A. Aliotta maintains that, "undoubtedly the human mind is an activity in its every moment." (3) J. Ward's definition of psychology supports the same theory. (4)

a'. All personal experience, and perhaps all human experience, is active.

b'. All personal activity, probably all activity, is purposive.

But not only is all personal experience fundamentally active, but it is also always purposive; and it is probable that all activity is purposive. If satisfactions ever exist in human experience without dependence upon any subjective purpose in the present or past history of an individual, (5) they cannot be called personal, but must either be assigned to a sub-personal stage of mental life, or their concrete existence called in question. All personal experience is active, and, by implication, purposive. Many advocates of this view, that activity is always a tendency to an end, could be cited. (6) L. T. Hobhouse puts the point most succinctly: "Rational purpose is, and will always in the end be, recognised as the distinctive feature of the activity of mind." (7) G. F. Stout asserts that, "Our existence as conscious beings is essentially an activity, and activity is a process which by its very nature is directed towards an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from this end." (8)

c'. Denial of pure activity.

According to this view, pure activity, in the sense of action merely being or taking place, of action which has no meaning or teleological reference, is not actual in human experience at the personal level. In concrete experience an individual subject is always purposive at the same time that he is active; or, more exactly, a real person acts purposively. (9)

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(1) B. H. Bode, page 240 of his essay on "The Pragmatic Attitude" in Creative Intelligence, edited by J. Dewey.

(2) Introductory Logic, page 404.

(3) Idealistic Reaction against Science, page 185.

(4) Psychological Principles, page 28. (5) Compare above, page 221.

(6) For examples, see, G. A. Coe, Psychology of Religion, page 35; R. Latta, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc., N. S., vol. VIII, page 20; E. Boutroux, Science and Religion, page 289; T. Loveday, Mind, N. S., vol. 10, page 469.

(7) Development and Purpose, page xxviii.

(8) International Journal of Ethics, Oct., 1894, page 119.

(9) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principles, pages 266-7, note 2.

d'. Criteria of purpose and activity.

It is proposed, then, that the term, activity, be restricted to that circle of mental processes where purpose is present in the subjective sense described above. (1) Accordingly, no experience may be called active unless there is present to some conscious extent an anticipation of what is going to be, or of what is wanted. The criterion of purpose is to be found in the presence or absence of determination of an action by its "prospective sequel." Our study of the first implication of activity warrants us in defining activity as any experiential change or series of changes which is consciously adapted to accomplishing some end, the end being present to the actor or agent himself, and not merely to an observer.

e'. Personality and purpose.

Finally, then, so far as a person is fundamentally an active being, we are warranted in asserting that he is also a fundamentally purposive being. We have indicated already (2) the general nature of the purposes which belong to the personal level of experience: they must have, as a rule, a degree of clearness, of remoteness, of approval, etc. The importance of their organization into comprehensive cycles or systems will be pointed out below. (3) Certainly in a study of human purposes we find a marvelous revelation of human nature. As J. Laird says, "To strive persistently for an end, with various modifications as circumstances dictate, is a fundamental characteristic of the self. We find ourselves in the fulfilment of our aims." (4) The unique activity of human persons has a colossal significance for the total spiritual life of man. The first implication of concrete activity is purpose, and a primary mark of personal experience is its purposiveness.

c. THE SECOND IMPLICATION OF ACTIVITY: AGENCY.

The beginning of the third or constructive part of this investigation consisted in the presentation of evidence for the general proposition that personality is in some sense dynamic or active, (5) and it was proposed to study personality from the standpoint of activity, and to develop the latter concept by setting forth its aspects or implications. We have found that, at the human and personal level, activity always implies some measure of purposiveness, but if we stopped here, we should fall into the phenomenalistic error of supposing that activity is a presentation or phenomenon, and nothing else. An exposition and defense of the second implication of activity, namely, agency, will save us from this mistake.

1'. Importance of studying this implication.

a'. This study helps in avoiding the phenomenalistic error.

It is no doubt true that any particular activity has a phenomenal or presentational aspect, (6) and it has proved easy to suppose that this aspect exhausted its nature, as reference to a few great names will indicate. J. F. Herbart attempted to explain activity in terms of the combination of ideas, and David Hume had plenty of ideas in succession, but no active principle of union. F. H. Bradley, too, presents an incomplete view of activity when he defines it as the expansion of an idea against a limit, and when he speaks of the will as "the self-realization of an idea with which the self is identified." (7) In this interpretation the will and activity are lost in

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(1) See above, page 220, bottom, and 221.
(2) See above, page 229. (3) See below, pages 255-7; 302-3; (313-16.)
(4) Problems of the Self, page 242.
(5) See above, pages 188-92. (6) See below, pages 258-9; 284-6.
(7) Mind, N. S., vol. XI, pages 437-69.

abstraction, for an idea apart from a subject or active thinker which posits it must be regarded as an abstraction. (1) Our criticism of the endeavor to explain mental activity in terms of bodily behavior (2) brought to light generally applicable objections to regarding activity as phenomenal, at least in its actual entirety.

The aversion to the second implication of activity and the desire for a purely objective or presentational explanation of it are no doubt reasons for the backwardness and the "scandal" (3) in the philosophy of activity. The phenomenalizing habit in dealing with the subjective or agency-aspect of activity is illustrated well by Miss M. F. Washburn's easy dismissal, as a peculiarity of introspective interpretation, of N. Ach's finding that the experience of purpose contains, as one factor, a unique activity of the self which cannot be resolved into the usual elements of the structural psychologist; her reason for rejecting this view is that he offers "no suggestion as to the possible psychophysical basis of this activity of the self." (4) Obviously it does not follow from her reasoning that there is no self present in activity. She treats E. Meumann's results in the same peremptory way.

1". Criticism of this misconception points to an agent as ground of activity.

If, however, purposive activity is not to be dissolved completely into a realm of abstractions or phenomena, it must have a ground that is not identical with a succession of phenomena. To make activity possible something relatively permanent is apparently needed. When F. H. Bradley states that activity is "self-caused" change, (5) the adjective he must use indicates the presence of something more than bare change. To designate the ground of activity which we are seeking we shall use, for general reference, the word, agency; and, agent or actor in connection with individual activities; the phrase, active subject, will be treated as synonomous with agent. B. P. Bowne's discussion of agency (6) constitutes a striking statement of some of the problems in question, and may be recalled here as the starting point of the following exposition. We shall offer first some reasons for supposing that agency is an implication of activity, and then consider its meaning and function.

b'. Importance of the distinction between agency and activity in the study of personality.

We began with the assumption that purposive activity is a fact of human experience, and to explain this fact and make it possible, it seems necessary to postulate an actor or agent. To find the actor in personal activity will be to come upon another central factor in the concept of personality. The distinction between agent and activity is an important one in the clarification and exposition of the idea of personality, for it is likely that much of the confusion in modern thought with regard to personality is due to the confusion between these terms. In agency we come upon an abiding factor which is essential to personality.

2'. Some reasons for postulating the agent or actor in activity.

A number of reasons will be presented now in answer to the question, Why does activity require an actor? The first reason for positing an agent as one of the fundamental conditions or implications of activity is to be found in the necessity of saving the fact

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(1) As G. D. Hicks has shown; compare Proceedings of the Aris. Soc., N. S. vol. VIII, "Subject and Object," etc., pages 160-214.
(3) F. H. Bradley. (2) See above, pages 200-10.
(4) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 160.
(5) Appearance and Reality, page 64.
(6) See above, page 146, bottom, page 147, top.

a'. To save the dissolution of activity into mere change.

of activity from dissolution into a process of change that is bare and unperceived, for the proposition seems fairly well established that if change is to appear at all, it must do so in the experience of one who does not change in the same way or rate as that which he experiences. Activity, however, is not thus dissolved away, but is a fact of daily experience, and we may conclude that every activity of adult human beings requires an agent. Although activity has certain mutable aspects, (1) the existence of these depends upon an agent which abides through them and sustains them.

b'. The fact of purpose requires a purposer.

In the second place, the fact of purpose requires a purposer. Evidence has been presented (2) to show that human activities are intrinsically purposive. But how does a future event, or "prospective sequel," condition or effect a present action? The answer is, Only upon the basis of an agent who, both in anticipation and in realization, unites his present state with a future one, and who knows the one as the initiation and the other as the conclusion of an activity which is unified by an identical purpose which he maintains through the whole. That is, a genuine purpose does not subsist in some transcendent world, but exists for some subject, however the latter may be described. A desirer, a seeker after ends, one who anticipates, is a necessary condition of the efficacy of purposes in directing human actions. R. B. Perry recognizes this factor in purposive activity when he defines purpose as "the determination of an action by its agreement with the agent's expectation." (3) An abiding agent is needed for the execution of Perry's program of analysis, and also for the verification of ideas in the pragmatic sense. (4) Pragmatic verification is impossible without an active and interested subject who carries through the "validating" process, and recognizes the attainment of the truth-value he seeks.

The necessity of an agent in purposing can be indicated in various other ways. The fact that many desires and plans can be realized only in the course of days or months presupposes an agent who continues to cherish them amid the vicissitudes of his life. A veritable and fateful purpose simply would cease to exist if anywhere, in the process of realization, a conscious subject should no longer maintain an interest in it. Neither ends nor interests are actual, save as they are live issues for real actors. "A transition that begins with, and comes out of, the thing itself is the process," says F. H. Bradley (5), "where we feel that it is active." In other words, if there are such experiences as conative cycles, unified by purpose and leading to actual achievements, it is essential to postulate agents who "see them through."

The need of an actor is especially evident in the selection and adjustment of means to ends. An agent is needed as the one who foresees ends, who devises appropriate means for their realization, and who beholds the achievement of the ends by the means adopted.

Again, it seems to be a plain matter of daily experience that one is not lost in the manifold mental processes entailed in the performance of his duties and the satisfaction of his interests. A

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(1) See above, pages 213-14. (2) See above, pages 220-233.
(3) See above, pages 95-6.
(4) See above, pages 15-16.
(5) Appearance and Reality, page 64.

permanent and active subject is manifest whenever one can say, "I have done what I intended, and am satisfied." By the postulation of such an agent, interests, and mental processes in general, are saved from being abstractions.

Finally, in the clearest cases of purposing or choosing ends, there is present an element of assent or adoption, a kind of willing or consenting to the projection of the plans in question. It seems, therefore, that the achievement of ends as experienced by human beings is meaningless apart from one who is conscious both of their initiation and of their fulfilment. But here we come upon an agent who is not merely a process, but who abides through a series of changes; who, indeed, desires so to abide in order to behold the conclusion of his esteemed work.

c'. An agent is required to account for the actual unity among the purposes and active tendencies of an individual.

In the third place, an agent is required to explain the unity found among the multifarious purposes and active tendencies of any individual. To feel varying desires at different times is a familiar experience, and at any time it is always possible for one to say truly that he has them. Now, how account for the fact that they do not exist separately, as independent conscious entities? This fact of common ownership among the desires and purposes of a human individual can be explained only by supposing that an agent or active subject possesses them, or acts in various ways in accordance with them. His ends and wants may lack moral organization, but they do not lack his ownership. The unity present may be imperfect, but the ordinary unity of consciousness (1) points to a single subject or actor.

d'. The need of an agent in moral action.

When my native tendencies become organized, the presence of an active subject becomes more evident. In cases of voluntary decision, moral conduct, and deliberate action, an agent who shall make the choice, feel the sense of duty, and assume responsibility for his action, is requisite. A moral act clearly must be grounded in an intelligent and responsible agent. This moral agent cannot be regarded as the organism for the same reasons that we cannot explain mental activity in terms of bodily behavior. (2) A moral act is more than bodily behavior, for it presupposes a conscious motive and an approval upon the part of the actor. It may involve a rational judgment, but this, apart from the agent, is an abstraction. Our discussion of purpose a page or two back has prepared us for the recognition that an agent is indispensable in moral conduct.

e'. The efficacy of activity.

A very impressive reason for postulating an agent in human activities is to be found in the efficacy of the latter. A familiar maxim declares that, "Where there is a will, there is a way." It may be said more truly that, where there is a way, there is a will; where there are novelties and transformations which disrupt the smooth course of experience and which are not explicable in mechanical or causal terms, there is an agent; there exists an interested subject who, dissatisfied with his present experience, modifies it to suit remote ends. In this argument we are carrying out Bowne's suggestion that, "We may trace the deed to the doer." (3)

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(1) See below, pages 310-12.

(2) See above, pages 200-11.

(3) Metaphysics, page 428. See above, page 146, bottom, page 147, top.

The creation of one world of experience after another, the constructions of the human imagination, the rational systems and practical schemes of human life confirm the postulate of an agent effectively at work amid his developing experiences, transforming them so that they may fit unexpected contingencies and contribute to long-range goals. (1)

f'. Psychological evidence for the active subject.

There is a large group of psychologists who believe that a subject of experience, especially of activity-experiences, is always present. N. Ach, for example, thinks that one of the factors in the adoption of a purpose is an immediate and irreducible activity of the ego, which is accompanied by the consciousness (Bewusstheit) of "I will" or "I really will." (2) E. Meumann asserts that in voluntary resolve, an inner assent to the end of the action must be present; this assent, he thinks, is unique, and is symptomatic of "an elementary active reaction of the Ego." (3)

Ach

Meumann

Sorley

The views of the English thinkers, W. R. Sorley and J. Ward, may be noted. The former asserts that, "None of the qualities, ideas, or actions of the self have any real existence except as qualities, ideas, or actions of the individual subject. It is the centre to which they are all related and without which they would not be." (4) J. Ward defines psychology in terms of individual experience, in which attention or an active subject is always present; he says that, "The subject is first and always that which lives, which thinks and feels and acts, which attends, and is pleased or pained by its sensations and movements." (5)

Ward

Calkins

The American psychologist, Miss M. W. Calkins, advocates a self-psychology which supports the metaphysical need of an agent in human activity. She reiterated recently that, "It has over and over again been shown not only that all psychic phenomena may be described as experiences of a self, but that many of them are inadequately and equivocally described without this reference to conscious self or selves." (6) In another place (7) she has pointed out how an Ich-psychologie reveals an active and personal self standing in relation to other selves.

Summary

These views of contemporary psychologists confirm the requirement of an agent or active subject in the activity-experiences of human beings, who may be distinguished with profit from the mental processes or objective phenomena apprehended by him. In predominantly cognitive experiences this subject may be called the knower, and in primarily conative experiences, the doer, but in both cases the subject is intrinsically active, and is properly designated an agent. The review of reasons for postulating an agent in activity may be concluded by noting the following interesting confession of

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(1) See James' description of how the self modifies experience, page 72, top.

(2) From Messer's review in Kantstudien, vol. XV, pages 509 ff., of Ach's Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament, Leipzig, 1910.

(3) This summary is taken from M. F. Washburn's review of Meumann, Intelligenz und Wille, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1913.

(4) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 439-40.

(5) Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind, Mind, O. S., vol. XII, 1887, page 169. See also, Psychological Principles.

(6) Psychological Bulletin, vol. 16, 1919, "The Self in Recent Psychology," page 116.

(7) Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie.

Carveth Read: "I should be glad to hear its (Aristotelian Society's) opinions upon the good old-fashioned doctrine that all activity is activity of the soul: a belief which, for my own part, I can neither verify nor relinquish." (1)

g'. A note on terminology: agent, subject.

The agent, then, is the one who acts, who strives, who carries out plans; he is the actor that is implied in all activity. He is likewise the knower in cognition, and the one who is affected in emotion. While in philosophical usage, the term, subject, has primarily an epistemological and affective reference, no special preference need be expressed for either subject or agent, since in knowing there is always some activity, and therefore, agency; while in the activity of the ordinary intelligent person, there is always an intellectual factor. Both intellect and will, however, are only aspects of the unitary and individual activity which presupposes, whenever it exists, an agent. What is important is to bear in mind that the subject of activity, however one names it, is dynamic; this character is emphasized by our term, agency, and by J. Ward's term, "attention." The latter explains that, "instead of a congeries of faculties, we have assumed a single subjective activity, and have proposed to call this attention. . Attention . . has invariably an active sense." (2) The so-called pure subject, then, is an abstraction which means simply the agent considered as a condition of an act of knowing without regard to other mental factors present. J. Ward also affirms that, "The so-called operations and states of consciousness are not mere modes in vacuo: they imply an active and affectible subject." (3)

3'. Problem of knowing what the agent is.

a'. The agent apart from his concrete activities is an abstraction.

We have seen, then, that demands press upon us from many sources to the effect that we postulate "one who" acts, strives, thinks, purposes, etc. The question now arises with regard to who or what this one might be? If we are called upon to point him out so that he may be seen and examined, we must reply that the agent cannot be directly known, for the simple reason that he is the knower in any act of knowing which is aimed at comprehending his nature. However, he may be known indirectly, or, in other words, may be thought of or conceived. This conceptual construction is based upon our knowledge of what the agent does; we shall return to this point in a moment. (4)

At the outset of the discussion of the problem of knowing what the agent is, it is important to understand what kind of an answer is possible to such a question as was propounded at the beginning of the last paragraph. When one says that the agent is the one who acts, intends, perseveres, or resolves, it is clear that the agent is a conception or abstraction which undoubtedly is formulated upon the basis of many specific activity-experiences. But the agent, when studied in connection with such experiences, is no more or less abstract than certain other implicated factors, such as consciousness, change, or achievement.

1". Distinction between conceptual and real agency.

In contrast to the conceptual agent, the real agent may be distinguished. The latter is the agent at work in any particular concrete activity; it is the active subject inextricably interwoven in the living unity of the actual act which he is performing. But when

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 243.

(2) Psychological Principles, pages 60, 61. (3) Ibid., page 24.

(4) Compare S. Hodgson, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. I, page 220.

we attempt to think of the agent, apart from his concrete activity, as the one who acts or the one who experiences, we have set up an abstraction, for the agent never exists, save as a concept, in such a detached way. The demand that we present the agent as an object for inspection apart from its acts is a reflection of a mistaken commonsense or mechanical point of view, according to which one is expected to be able to cut up a personal activity into parts for exhibition, and still have living and real activity. The actual fact is activity, which has several implications which may be considered in abstraction; one of these is agency.

b'. The agent cannot be found among apprehended objects for this apprehension depends upon his activities.

But is not an abstract idea of the agent capable of leading us right up to the real agent, so that we may view him as he is? This is impossible in the nature of the case, for the agent with which I may identify myself at this moment is not anything which can be exhibited as a presentation or mental process, such as a group of kinaesthetic sensations, for any of these would presuppose for its existence exactly the agent with which it is identified. In general, then, it may be said that the threat of a vicious circle keeps us from expecting to find the agent among objects the apprehension of which at any moment depends upon his activities.

c'. The agent and experience.

A closer consideration of the relation of the agent to experience will lead us to a better understanding of the sense in which an agent may be known. It has become evident that the agent cannot be regarded as a phenomenon, and nevertheless that he is more than a conception. In general, the agent is not anything which can be experienced, where this passive phrase refers to any object apprehended by an experiencing subject. The reason for this assertion follows immediately from the fact that the agent is precisely the active subject who experiences, who is the unitary and dynamic center of all such psychical matters of fact (1) as volitions, emotions, decisions, perceptions, judgments, intentions, etc.,(2) which fill out for us human beings the universe of discourse called by the general name of experience.

In our criticism of James' theory of the self we found pure experience to be a barren abstraction, and we also learned that actual experience at the level of the human adult involves an active subject or agent. (3) In short, the real meaning of activity can be found neither in neutral experience without a subject nor in bare agency apart from the concrete activities in which it is operative. It is in the particular pulses of conscious life, in the specific acts of human individuals, which constitute experience and which presuppose a subject, that we shall find real agency.

1". The immediate experience or feeling of agency.

Now the experiences or conscious acts just referred to are complex, and in each several aspects may be distinguished, among them the subject or agent. In these experiences or Erlebnisse, as the Germans so well call them (4), the agent is immanent. He can directly appreciate his real meaning only by the kind of intuition of actual acting which was described above. (5) He can know himself mediately, however, in memory, where he recalls how he acted in some

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(1) Compare A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, page 23.
(2) See others above, page 221.
(3) See above, pages 68-72; compare E. N. Merrington, The Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter I.
(4) Compare J. Laird, Problems of the Self, page 13.
(5) See above, pages 181-2.

concrete way. Out of these intuitions and memories the active subject may build a conception of himself as actor.

These speculative and epistemological difficulties with reference to agency are foreign to my ordinary experiences, where I am at work, now in this direction and now in that, and where I am continually demonstrating my capacity to do things. But my agency is of such a unitary character that I am unable to get out of myself when I am doing one thing so as to do another thing at the same time. But in doing any particular deed the fact that I am doing it is a matter of immediate experience, which I do not doubt at the moment, for its reality and living actuality are beyond question. When I reflect upon this experience, my reflection is a new activity, which again is so present and immediate to me that it is meaningless to me to suggest its unreality. Activities, as they are performed by the agent, are perfectly transparent to him, for they are his very own. I am unable to improve upon my previous description of the subject's immanence in or intuition of his own activities. (1)

The observations of F. C. S. Schiller may be noted here with profit. He declares that (2), "A philosophy which refuses to enter into the feelings of the agent must in the end pronounce the whole conception of agency an unmeaning mystery. Now this external way of conceiving agency from the standpoint of a bystander was Hume's fundamental trick." Schiller recommends that we take the standpoint, not of the spectator, but of the "purposing agent." He believes in "our immediate experience of agency." To "enter into the feelings of the agent," or more exactly, to have agency-feelings, means to act as an agent, to do a deed, to achieve a purpose; for to have the feelings of an agent or to perform activities is always a concrete experience.

d'. To know what agency means, do something for a purpose and then recall how you felt in that activity.

Therefore, to one who would know what agency means, we can only say, act, and having acted, stop to consider that your activity implies, among other factors, an abiding agent. To such an enquirer we would say, follow this simple formula: do something for a purpose, and then recall how you felt in that particular activity. Such concrete acts are real samples of personal life. In them the agent is, not the end, not the presentations involved, not the experience as a whole, but the conscious subject who does the deed, who entertains the end and sees it through, for whom the presentations occurring in its achievement exist. (3) It is the agent, too, who, at the end of the individual activity, is interested in noting the stages or aspects of it, and in doing so, institutes another activity in which the same agent acts. He recognizes the fact of his continuity or permanence in his very endeavor to understand a previous activity of his own. After all there is no serious difficulty or obstacle in the way of one's considering what his activities have meant to him as he realized them. One must remember, however, that the agent which is referred to past activities is a conceptual one, and that the real agent is always present and immanent in an experiential whole.

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(1) See above, pages 181-2. (2) Humanism, page 230.

(3) See below, 252-3; 258-9, on the empirical phases of personality.

e'. Restatement of the fundamental difficulty involved in attempting to know the meaning of the agent.

The fundamental difficulty in knowing the agent may be restated in the following form. In any particular case of a typical activity an immanent agent is implied who is interested in a purpose, for example, of taking a walk for exercise, and who carries out his intention. If, in the midst of the realization of this particular purpose, one should stop to ask concerning the nature of the agent that is carrying it out, would one learn what agency means? Yes, he would learn this much about it, namely, that he is an agent interested in this practical goal of maintaining health by exercise; but then his knowledge would be retrospective and conceptual, for the real agent has stepped one step forward in order to maintain and develop this new interest and new activity which is directed to ascertaining the nature of agency by studying a particular activity.

In practice, however, one has no difficulty in identifying the one who chooses to take a walk with the one who is interested in studying the nature of agency. Perhaps the identity is not absolute, but a recognized continuity is present. The demand for a real and objective knowledge of the agent is based upon a condition which would destroy agency itself as a unitary and continuous being, for this demand means nothing else than that the same agent act in two different ways at the same time, which is impossible; for then we should have two active subjects, and not one real agent become known by another. The unity of the agent must be maintained. (1)

In conception, however, we can refer not merely two acts, but any number, to the same agent. But in this reference the agent is an abstract one, for we do not suppose that the same human agent can perform many acts at once. There is nothing in experience, however, which prevents me from affirming that all of my past acts were performed by the very agent which now makes this affirmation, and I may notice that this affirmation is just another peculiar way in which I act. The conclusion of the matter is that the agent in a present activity-experience cannot be apprehended by itself, and the demand that the possibility of such knowledge be explained would, if satisfied, do violence to the individuality and the internal consistency of any agent or activity; for it is clear that if one acts so as to gain one end, he is acting with reference to that end and not to another. The adoption of another end, be it the endeavor to understand agency, does not take him into the nature of the agent in the first activity, for that activity has been supplanted by the second, unless it be possible for one to act in two ways at the same time, but this seems impossible for human beings. (2) J. Ward points out that, "Instead, therefore, of the position that feeling and attention as such are known by being made objects of reflexion, it would seem we can only maintain that in this way we know *of* them by their effects, by certain changes *i. e.* which they bring about in the character and succession of our presentations." He adds that while we cannot say we know them, neither can we say we are ignorant of them. (3)

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(1) See below, pages 244-5.

(2) Several reasons why this one limitation in our knowledge does not trouble us, and further points bearing on the knowledge of agency, will be presented below, pages 353-8.

(3) Psychological Principles, page 58.

f'. Correlation of the discussion of knowing an agent with the problem of knowing a person.

Since the agent has, as we shall see below (1), a certain permanence in the midst of his activities, it will serve as the abiding center of personal activity. Hence, what has been said about knowing an agent will apply to knowing a person, so far as a person is an active subject of experience. But just as activity is more than agency, so personality will probably turn out to be more than a conscious subject. (2) Likewise, just as we distinguished between the conceptual and the real agent, we must make a distinction between personality as a concept and personality as that which thinks, feels, and wills. Failure to take account of this difference has not infrequently led to confusion in historical conceptions of personality. It might be possible to classify modern views of personality according to whether their respective exponents suppose that the soul, self, or personality is something which we can know directly, or whether it is something we can know only indirectly by studying and describing its activities. Personality, like agency, is much more than a concept; this more is to be found in concrete and purposive activities. These activities can be lived, and in living them, one <u>is</u> a person. They can also be remembered and thought about, and, as a result, may be built into a conception of personality that is a matter of knowledge.

4'. General nature of the agent.

Only a brief exposition of the general nature of the agent is needful here in addition to the incidental references to some of his characters in the last main section, and in addition to the fuller discussion below of the same points in connection with personality. The main characteristics to be noted are the permanence and the unity of the agent.

a'. The permanence of the agent.

1". The problem stated in the form of an example.

Since the developing instinctive and habitual behavior of a person undoubtedly exists in time, the question arises concerning whether or not the personal agent or subject is in time. Constant reference to some specific activities will help quickly to give an answer to this question. In my childhood a variety of instincts functioned in connection with what I have come to call my body, and gradually I have formed habits of skill in play and work. Some day I may notice the fact that I have responded in similar instinctive ways on several occasions, for example, in fear and flight. I may lack the philosophic interest in asserting that I was the actor in the manifold activities of my life, although that statement would be perfectly possible for me to make if my attention were called to the mode of expression suggested. But I may remember on the occasion of a fire that I was once before afraid of a fire. Or, my parents may have induced me to take piano lessons, and I may remember very well that I practiced or failed to practice on many days. I who play the piano today played it yesterday and the day before; indeed, I may say that I have spent many years in learning to play it, and it is I who can play the piano now as a result.

2". In what sense I remember myself.

Now am I, the agent who play the piano today, the same or different than I who played the piano yesterday? It is clear that I cannot assert that I who played yesterday is a thing of the past for the evident reason that it is I who make the affirmation in the present. I recall that I have acted in many ways by remembering the effects or the feelings of my action and not by becoming another agent.

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(1) See below, pages 242-4.
(2) Compare below, pages 284-6.

3". The meaning of the permanence of the agent in activities.

My history or personal biography becomes possible if we may conceive of a single agent acting in various ways or directions at different times, but it is rendered impossible if we suppose that a different agent is present in each activity. In this case there would be lacking an inner connection or real ground, and a series would become possible only if some other permanent agent connected the activities in question into a history; but in that case permanent agency would be a fact just the same. If, therefore, there are such things as biographies, there are permanent agents. We may speak of them as permanent only from the standpoint of, or in contrast with, the temporal succession of the effects of their activities upon their own course of experience and upon that of others. From the point of view of agency itself, it would be better to say that agents are identical. The fact, however, is plain, however it is labeled.

4". The identity of the individual agent.

It is not meaningless, then, to declare that I played the piano yesterday, for the same agent who acts in piano-playing may care also for philosophy and history. I learn to construct a temporal system in which I fix numerous historical facts. This system itself is a product of my activity, and the same active subject which builds it may be interested also in locating the remembered effects of his multifarious activities in this system. I am in time only in this restricted or borrowed sense, namely, that I experience various objects in a certain sequence, the object and not the agent being in the sequence, for it is the agent which experiences the sequence, and builds it upon the basis of his own identical or abiding existence.

5". S. Alexander on identity.

S. Alexander expresses the identity of the agency by saying that mental activities are single in source but different in direction. "It is not the quality of consciousness that differs, but its coefficient of direction."(1) In commenting on this view, J. Ward says, "I agree that the conscious or mental activity is in itself one and the same, working only in different 'directions.'" (2)

6". Summary of the permanence of the agent.

The agent, then, is permanent, not as enduring in time, but as acting now in this way and now in that. Since an individual agent of the human sort seems able to act only in one direction "at a time," the agent himself constructs the abstract concept of time so as to correlate his various activities. To assert that the agent is permanent means to deny that he exists in some real time apart from that which appears as a result of his activities. The term, identical, is preferable to the word, permanent, as applied to agency. I may speak of the plurality if my activities, but this is a conceptual construction; for in fact they existed one by one. The same agent, however, operated in all; so that I speak of the identity or singleness of my agency.

If it should be asked whether activities are temporal, the reply would be that they both are and are not according to whether one considers the phenomenal or presentational effects of them in his experience, or whether he considers the agency involved in them. The agent strictly is not in time, although certain of his activities are; indeed, it may be that it is from these activities, with

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 221.

(2) Ibid., page 226.

their stress and strain, their sense of success and defeat, that the idea of time originally is derived. I do not remember my agency as something that was and now is not, for then memory itself would be cut off; I remember myself by considering the effects of my activities; this recollection, however, would be impossible without the presupposition of the identical agent. (1) Memories exist because the same agent reacts to different objects. We shall return to the problems of memory (2) and of identity below. (3)

b'. The unity of the agent.

The problem of time would be set in a less misleading context if one asked how the idea of succession in one's activities arises instead of how one's activities may be connected, for the original fact is a unitary activity, and not a series. The agent constitutes this unity, and so we have to consider in what sense the agent is unitary.

1". A unitary agent required to make activity possible.

The necessity for what J. Ward calls "the central unity of the subject," (4) has become evident from the discussion of the problem of knowing agency. Either the agent in any activity is single or it is not. We have no way of deciding this question save by consulting concrete experiences or activities. Now in them the assertion that the subject performs the whole of an activity is perfectly intelligible. But how an activity is possible save as one agent "sees it through" is quite unintelligible, for we have no experience in normal life of the active subject or agent transferring its burden of work either within one activity cycle or within a series. In short, activity as actually present in human experience is impossible without a unitary agent which grounds it. The impossibility of splitting the agent in the endeavor to know it has been suggested. (5) We infer, too, that the active subject is unitary because it is the organizer of a unitary experience. Those who deny this unitary character of the agent in human activity must present some evidence from experience which has not yet turned up.

2". Non-spatial or simple character of the agent.

Those who speak of the agent as complex introduce into their discussion, usually, spatial metaphors which are not permissible, save as they are recognized as such. Instead of declaring that the agent possesses various powers of acting, we may avoid spatial figures by affirming that one and the same agent acts now in one way and now in another, the mode being determined by the concrete situation, especially by the teleological factor present. But, as Bowne very well suggests, we know of no way of tracing these different forms of activity into the subject so as to discover its inner constitution; we can only lay down the laws of the subject's activities. (6) The demand that we thus trace the deeds into the doer arises from the inveterate habit, of many thinkers, of expecting and insisting upon spatial representations of their conceptions. The ultimate agent, so far as we human beings are concerned, is that subjective aspect of any concrete activity which we have tried to

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(1) Bowne's illuminating discussion of the temporal status of personality ought to be recalled here; see above, pages 141-3.
(2) See below, pages 262-71. (3) See below, pages 320-29.
(4) Psychological Principles, page 72.
(5) See above, page 241. (6) See above, pages 146-7.

describe on the preceding pages. This aspect is to be understood in terms of generalizations based upon the observation of many specific activities, and not by setting up some substance behind or below the agent which supports it, for the agent is himself the doer so far as we can know. The conceptual generalization may take the form of statement, that the agent has the power to act in numerous ways, but this assertion must not be taken to mean anything else than an expression of the fact that the agent in question has historically acted in various ways and knows it, and also of the fact that the agent knows no reason why he may not continue to act in definite ways in order to carry out the desires of which he becomes aware from time to time.

The simplicity of the agent.

If we wish to emphasize the point of the last paragraph, namely, that the agent cannot be explained by or thought of as being composed of parts or elements, we may speak of the simplicity of the agent. This characteristic will not add anything to our positive description of him, but will merely indicate the denial that the agent is composed of elements or parts of any kind. (1) It will serve to emphasize in another way that the agent in any activity is single and unitary. We speak of the agent acting upon his environment and not of moving among the objects of his experience.

c'. Agency and personality.

Bowne declared that, "The soul is a proper agent acting out of itself." (2) This statement may be expanded so as to epitomize the results that we have obtained thus far: a person is a proper agent who acts purposively out of himself. When a person comes to himself, he is already a purposive actor, being one of the original facts of reality. This definition of personality, the quality of being a person, is not sufficient, of course, to cover the facts, but it is fundamental. In the expression of purpose and agency we have made important forward steps in our problem of gradually constructing a conception of personality by setting forth the implications of activity.

d. THE THIRD IMPLICATION OF ACTIVITY: INDIVIDUALITY.

1'. The concept of individuality applied to an activity emphasizes its concreteness.

a'. Need of a concrete study of activity.

We have found that the abstract character of the agent and his central position in any cognitive act prevent us from knowing him in the ordinary way of knowing objects of perception. One may say that the agent is "that which" acts in this way or that, meaning thereby himself taken in general as the active subject of his particular activities, but, apart from such concrete activities, "that which acts," or the agent, is clearly an abstraction. (3) It has been indicated already (4), however, that the agent may be suffused with all the warmth of reality and of the affective life if he is considered in the act of actually doing something definite. While, therefore, the agent is an abstraction in himself, he may understand himself in his real efficacy in realizing or experiencing the effects achieved in his concrete activities. This distinction between the conceptual and the acting agent is easily made and grasped, and it is to the latter that we now turn,--to the agent at work in a specific constellation of experience. Since the idea of concrete activity has proved to be so important in the understanding of personality, we must examine its significance more carefully. We shall do so by setting

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(1) See, B. P. Bowne, above, page 144.
(2) Metaphysics, page 300. See above, page 146, middle.
(3) See above, page 238. (4) See above, pages 239-40.

forth the meaning of the individuality of activity. This conception is the third implication of activity which will be expounded. And in the study of the concrete workings of the agent, we shall learn more about his meaning, for after all it is in his acts that we find what he is.

2'. Preliminary definition of the individuality of activity and an indication of its importance.

By the individuality of activity is meant the concrete unity of an actual act or activity-experience as determined by the particular constellation of mental facts present in the realization of a definite purpose. One's biography is a long succession of such individual acts, grounded upon an identical and unitary agent, and involving all manner of combinations of conscious processes. Out of these individual acts, too, one builds the general concept of activity which gives his life significance beyond that single act to which one is confined in the present moment. This idea of individuality is intended to prevent actual activities, which we shall call acts, from losing their essentially systematic and unified character by being reduced to some kind of phenomenal or other series or compound. This idea, also, will serve as a constant warning against falling into too abstract an account of activity, and will emphasize the concrete and purposive character of activity. In the elucidation of this concept we shall be examining the person at his real work in the world.

3'. The individuality of an act emphasizes at once its complexity and its wholeness.

Now the individuality of an act brings out the fact that it is at once a complexity and a wholeness. These points will be considered in order. The complexity of acts which the idea of individuality implies is manifested in a very great variety of ways. G. F. Stout, in his psychological analysis of conation, emphasizes the fact that this experience is complex. He himself thinks, indeed, that there is an original conative element which can be distinguished from the other features of the complex; this unique element he calls "felt tendency." He points out, however, that it does not exist apart from other processes. It exists as a part of a little system of experience of varying comprehensiveness. Such a system we have designated the individuality of activity. The agent and the purpose are presupposed; their relations will be more clearly seen from a study of individuality. We can distinguish in an activity, the agent or that which acts, the end for which the agent acts, and finally the performance of the act itself, and it is in the latter individual aspect that we have before us activity in its concreteness and actuality. It goes without saying that amid the exigencies of daily life, there are all degrees of perfection with which the individuality of an act is realized.

a'. The complexity of activity.

b'. The wholeness of activity.

The statement that activity is complex rests upon the results of analysis. This analysis needs to be supplemented by a synthesis. The latter will be an interpretation or recognition of the concrete wholeness of certain typical or fully developed acts. This recognition is of great importance in the understanding of personality. The purposive activities of the human individual are not merely complexities, but usually they are complexities that are in a measure orderly. They have individualities of their own. T. Loveday observes that, "Every conation involves some progression of feelings and ideas; it cannot therefore be any one of them," but must be taken as a whole. (1) It is probable that this active individuality is a key to the understanding of individuality in general or as used in

(1) Mind, N. S., vol. X, page 461.

other connections. (1) Just as the biologist speaks of the parts of the organism cooperating in the interest of the organism as a whole, we may expect to find that various mental processes develop themselves in the interest of a conscious and teleological whole.

1". Danger of the "elementalist" fallacy, viz., overlooking the wholeness of an act by preoccupation with its parts.

It is seldom in psychological literature that this idea of the individuality of acts has received recognition; indeed, only occasionally does one meet a hint that its existence is suspected. There is a fairly clear recognition of the concept in Miss M. F. Washburn's book on Movement and Mental Imagery and in R. B. Perry's article on "Docility and Purposiveness".(2)The idea in question certainly needs to be worked out more carefully.

The neglect of it is to be explained in part by the preoccupation of psychologists with the elements of consciousness, or the units of behavior, without regard to their actual and conscious wholeness. This oversight is due to what W. E. Ritter calls the "elementalist's" fallacy, namely, the mistake of losing the whole of a fact by preoccupation with its parts or phases. This fallacy is illustrated in biology by the attempt to get a real live organism out of a combination of cellular elements. It is the fallacy of the structuralists in psychology, when they attempt to explain various complex phases of the mental life in terms of the composition of so-called mental elements. Until one has found the idea of active individuality, the idea of a mental series unified by a purposive bond, he will not have found the key to the understanding of personal life, nor, indeed, of mental life in general. It is to be hoped that the development of a functional psychology as outlined by G. A. Coe (3) will overcome this deficiency by providing those definite teleological principles which give concrete personal acts and series of acts their intimate unity. If one is really to understand a personal act, he must not stop to introspect at any point he pleases in the midst of its development, for in that case he is likely to lose the significance of the act as a whole, and may find only bodily sensations, as James did. (4) One need not deny the existence of the bodily feelings which he finds, but one should point out that the activity which James sought has vanished, andanother which he does not suspect has taken its place, namely, the psychological interest which leads him to introspect.

The striking feature of human activity, however, is the peculiar order of its development. Whatever elements the analytical psychologist may find in the complex activity-situation, such as motor sensations, desire, ideas, feelings, visual sensations, etc.,--and usually most of these are present,--the significant thing about it is its "constellation," a useful phrase borrowed from the biological writings of W. E. Ritter. An actual act is characterized by a combination of factors or features which is so intimate that we seem justified in applying to it the term, individuality. If the constellation is overlooked in the process of analysis, the most important part of the experience has been lost. James loses it when he turns quickly upon himself and finds only bodily feelings; his psy-

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(1) See below, pages 309-10; 318.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, pages 1-20.
(3) Psychology of Religion.
(4) See above, pages 201-2.

chological vision is too short-sighted in this case.

2". Unity of an act exhibited when it meets obstacles in its development.

A simple method of demonstrating the unity of an act consists in considering the experiences of the agent when he meets obstacles in the achievement or realization of an act other than the easy-going hindrance introduced by a subject interested in psychological observation. The fact that various factors belong together in an activity-whole or chain is seen in the violent remonstrances that are frequently offered when a particular activity-cycle is hindered in its progress. The displeasure of the agent indicates by contrast the worth he attaches to the individuality and integrity of the act in question. The strong feelings which are sometimes aroused when an act is obstructed would not appear if the end sought did not have an immanent and inherent connection with the stages already passed through. The reasons for suicide sometimes illustrate the fact that the suiciding person would rather not possess a part of a series of activities if he cannot have the whole. The inhibition of a purpose in the midst of its realization exhibits the value which is attached to it, and shows also how intimately the parts of the whole are bound together.

4'. Statement of thesis with reference to individuality of activity.

The thesis, now, may be laid down that personal life in the concrete consists of a continuous development of one individual act after another, of one active or conative cycle after another. These individual acts or cycles exhibit, of course, the most varying degrees of completeness, and blend or overlap in varying measures, but all alike, in any particular person's life, are grounded in a permanent or identical agent. The thesis means to emphasize the view that these individual cycles make up the totality of personal experience. Some of them are short, and some are very long, but the latter are constituted of many shorter ones. Here we meet the idea of compound cycles of activity. These correspond exactly with the idea of compound purpose elaborated above. (1) The determination of an individual act must be teleological. Hence, the complexity of the mental factors involved in it will vary greatly according to the character of the purpose present. Some acts will be very simple, as in perception; others will be very complex. Only the general principles involved in the individuality of activity can be considered here; the details must be left to the functional psychologist.

5'. The nature of the individuality of acts.

a'. General description of the individuality of activity.

Let us turn, then, to a general description or exposition of this concept. In general, it means the unique way in which mental processes are actually bound together for the sake of an end which they subserve. The most perfect and unambiguous example of such an individual act is found in a typical voluntary action. Description is difficult, although identification is comparatively easy. It might be said that the individuality of an act consists in its peculiar form, but this term has the value only of metaphorical suggestion; it is a synonym for individuality that is somewhat of an aid in understanding the latter. The intellectual phases of active individuality have been worked out to some extent by G. F. Stout in his Analytical Psychology under the heading of "Noetic Synthesis." He makes valuable and suggestive use of the idea of form. He believes that the form of a mental whole, a melody, for example, or any typical whole of conscious states, is relatively independent of its constituents. In case of an act, we may say that its form is

(1) See above, page 228.

more fundamental or important than the particular contents involved in it. That which constitutes conation, says J. Royce (1), is a "significant series of states in their wholeness . . . in so far as these embody the fulfilment of aims."

1". Examples of individuality in acts.

An act, especially of the unambiguous volitional kind, is properly described as individual because its various aspects or phases get their significance from the purposive whole. It possesses a peculiar unity in the midst of its complexity. The system may be very poor in content and of short duration, and yet it is a system to some extent. J. Dewey pointed out many years ago that stimulus and response in a reflex arc are teleological distinctions.(2) He observed that, "The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of function or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an end." (3) "It is only the assumed common reference to an inclusive end which marks each member off as stimulus and response" and "apart from such reference we have only antecedent and consequent." (4) If the phases of a reflex action thus form an objective teleological unity, how much more unified may we expect to find those activities of the adult person where the end is in some measure consciously anticipated?

J. Dewey

W. Wundt

The voluntary act best exhibits the individuality of activity. Consider, for example, W. Wundt's description of it: "At the moment when the volitional act begins, the feelings of resolution give place to the specific feeling of activity, which has its sensation substratum, in the case of external volitional acts, in the sensations of tension accompanying the movement. . . As a total feeling, this feeling of activity is a rising and falling temporal process extending through the whole act and finally passing into the widely differing feelings, such as those of fulfilment, satisfaction, or disappointment, or into the feelings and emotions connected with the special result of the act." (5) L. T. Hobhouse thus concludes his excellent description of the purposive individuality of activity: "In the purpose it is an organization of elements of thought and feeling, of physical acts and of external things that constitutes the efficacy of the action." (6)

L. T. Hobhouse.

Miss Washburn on "movement-systems."

Miss Washburn makes wide use of the idea of "movement-systems" in her study of behavior. She says, "Let us use the term movement system to indicate a combination of movements so linked together that the stimulus furnished by the actual performance of certain movements is required to bring about other movements." (7) The writing of a word is an example of an irreversible movement-system of this sort. To this account we should have to add that the writing of a word at all is due to some interest of the moment which sustains the behavior by reason of a kind of general influence running through the whole. The interesting feature about "problem-

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(1) Mind, N. S., vol. VI, page 394.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. III, 1896, pages 357-70.
(3) Ibid., page 365. (4) Ibid., page 366.
(5) Outlines of Psychology, 1902, page 210.
(6) Development and Purpose, page 320.
(7) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 10.

ideas" or purposes is that they bring together movements, feelings, perceptions, etc., which are not habitually connected, and which, sometimes, have no other connection than the purposive trend that conditions them.

H. Driesch's "second criterion of acting."

The conative cycle which we are considering , primarily from the introspective standpoint, is well described, in its more objective features, by H. Driesch (1), under the heading of "the second criterion of acting: individuality of correspondence. Action always is a reaction corresponding to an individualised stimulus. I need only remind you that the sight of a specific person or a specific house may influence your behavior in a specific manner." (2) "It is the totality in its specificity, both of the stimulus and of the effect, that comes into account in acting, and nothing else. But what is the meaning of this totality? The totalities of stimulus and effect have a 'meaning.'" (3) Since there is nothing like this meaning in inorganic nature, he concludes that it constitutes a new and independent proof of the autonomy of vital phenomena. He illustrates (4) what he means by a totality "built up of singularities;" he says, "The artist, a painter, for example, bears within himself the complete totality of what he is to perform, and what afterwards is to be carried out by single acts of movement of his hand. In the same way the single phrases of a conversation, in spite of their consisting of single elements, form a totality that 'means' something." What Driesch emphasizes here is the peculiar way in which the intelligent human being can bring about a combination of bodily reactions to varying and contingent features in the environment in order that he may attain some goal, and the stages in its achievement possess an individuality determined at once by the nature of the goal and the contingencies of experience which arise in its attainment.

b'. The typical stages of a typical individual activity.

Personal life is a series of acts each of which possesses some individuality. Because of the contingencies of mental existence this individuality is not always easily determined, but in the typical act of the normal adult human person, several stages in the whole may be distinguished. These are variously described, but the essential ones seem to be the following:

1". Preliminary description of these stages.

(a) The initial or optative period, the stage of desiring, purposing, etc. This stage has been appropriately called "preparatory set." (5) In this period the actor prepares to seek for or accept some imminent change in his experience. (6)

(b) The intermediate or realizing period, in which the consciousness of the end or change sought sinks into the background,and attention is directed to the means, and to the sensory or affective marks, of its attainment. (7)

(c) The final or concluding period, the period of achievement, or of disappointment, marked by the presence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. (8)

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(1) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, vol. I, page 66 ff.
(2) Ibid., page 66. (3) Ibid., page 71.
(4) Ibid., page 72, note 1.
(5) M. A. May, The Mechanism of Controlled Association.
(6) See below, pages 251-2.
(7) See below, pages 252-3.
(8) See below, pages 253-5.

The expansion of a present experience into a fuller and more concrete meaning is essential to the typical conative cycle or individual act. The expansion is not merely of an idea, as F. H. Bradley suggests, but of the active self, in search of some end. A series of such acts, each with these states, is well illustrated by one's efforts to solve a mechanical puzzle. All but the last ends with a sense of failure of the attempt made.

Perry on the stages of a complete action.

Several other endeavors to describe the stages of a typical act may be compared with the above. Perry mentions four which will be seen to be readily reducible to the three mentioned. He says that the following "different phases" are "involved in complete action. . (a) The phase of desire, a felt lack, the sting of present dissatisfaction. . . (b) The vision of the ideal. . . (c) The outcome of action, the satisfaction, the achievement, the thing done. . . (d) This fourth factor is movement from desire to attainment, the effort, the change, the deed, the performing of the act." (1)

Stout on the stages of mental activity.

One of the most comprehensive endeavors to describe the stages of the average mental activity has been made by G. F. Stout. In his Analytical Psychology (2) he says, "Our whole mental existence, from its earliest and simplest beginning to its most complex maturity, depends upon a perpetual cycle of changes involving (a) mental change; (b) innervation of muscles; (c) muscular contraction and bodily movement; consequent mental change. This process, in so far as it has its starting point and terminal point in the current of consciousness, is mental activity. . . In its most complex development, it takes the form of self-conscious and deliberate volition, in which the starting point is the idea of an end to be attained, and the desire to attain it; and the goal is the realization of this by the production of a long series of changes in the external world. In its earliest and simplest form it consists of those simple reactions which, without being determined by any definite idea of an end to be realized, tend on the whole to the maintenance of immediate pleasure and the avoidance of immediate pain." J. Royce thus summarizes Stout's view: "'Activity,' empirically speaking, does normally pass through stages, very much such as our author so well defines--stages of vagueness, of growing differentiation, of a more definite apperception of our systems of means and ends, and, finally, of the dying away of each particular striving in the attainment of its ends." (3)

2". The initial or optative stage.

In each one of the stages of an activity which is complete and quite complex a different factor is important, but that which gives the whole its unity is the teleological factor which marks the initial or optative stage. "The end is the realisation of something somehow present from the beginning." (4) This influence of a general purpose upon an act needs to be more strongly accentuated than it is in the psychology of activity.

a". The purpose posited in this stage gives unity to the individual act.

R. B. Perry speaks clearly of "the dominance of the general motor set over the subordinate reflexes which are assimilated to it," and explains further the importance of this initial attitude in determining the total action. He offers several illustrations of how a dominant propensity effects the course of a complex act or action-series. "It is essential that the action should be thus determined

1'''. Perry on the dominant propensity of an action.

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(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 332. (2) Pages 152-3.
(3) Mind, N. S., vol. VI, page 393.
(4) W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 415.

by its relation of prospective congruence with a controlling propensity which is both prior and more general;" (1) he adds, "that the higher propensity should be alive, or actually at work in the organism." (2) That which above all gives individuality to behavior or activity is the presence of an inner teleological trend or reference, which marks and characterizes the first stage of a typical and complete activity.

2"'. Miss Washburn on the persistence of the influence of a purpose-idea.

Miss M. F. Washburn calls attention to the persistence of the influence of purpose in her attempt to give a physiological explanation of the idea of purpose or "problem-idea." (3) A good illustration of such persistence is seen when one adds a column of figures. The achievement of this task cannot be explained by habit, she says, but only by the influence of the resolution to add which was formed at the outset. (4) But whatever the physiological explanation may be, it seems fair to say that a psychical influence persists through an individual act and gives meaning and unity to the complex whole. (5)

May on "preparatory set."

"The nature of preparatory set," which marks the first stage of an activity, has been well described, from the introspective standpoint, by M. A. May, who says that, "Most of the subjects described or referred to two general processes in the fore-period: (a) A process of understanding the task, or of knowing what to do; (b) A process of getting set or ready to do it. The first of these processes corresponds roughly to Ach's 'idea of end' (Zielvorstellung), and the second to his 'determining tendencies.'" (6)

3". The intermediate stage of activity.

Such diversified experiences may enter into the attainment of our purposes that a general description of the intermediate stage of activity is very difficult to carry out, for it really would involve writing a treatise on psychology. This stage consists of a varying group of presentations and representations, and of a constant and ever shifting interplay of mental processes. The character of their blending varies indefinitely (7), but regularly gives quality and color to the whole. (8) Among these processes appear notably the

a". Importance of bodily sensations in activity.

various bodily feelings which mark the progress or efficacy of activity which involves bodily behavior. Since the attainment of most ends does involve actions, the kinaesthetic and other "internal" sensations, such as the "resident" and "remote" sensations, may play a very intimate and important part in the development of our activities. But this importance should not be so exaggerated as to blind us to the fact that, after all, these various kinaesthetic sensations are subordinate to the general trend of the whole act as determined

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(1) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 12. (2) Ibid., page 13.

(3) Movement and Mental Imagery, pages 153-5.

(4) Ibid. In this connection see also: Ladd and Woodworth, Elements of Physiological Psychology, page 551; J. Peterson, Completeness of Response, Psychological Review, vol. XXIII.

(5) An excellent discussion of the conscious phases of an individual system may be found in R. Latta's article on "Purpose", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, pages 27-33.

(6) The Mechanism of Controlled Association, page 32; see also, pages 2, 25, etc.

(7) See F. Paulhan, L'activité mentale et les éléments de l'esprit.

(8) See, for example, discussion of value below, pages 298-9.

by its teleological factor. They may constitute an important means, but seldom do they constitute the end, of our activities. They are so frequently and regularly present, however, that they have been mistaken for the activities themselves.

b". Activity and external perceptions.

So far as our mental activities involve bodily behavior, and, therefore, adjustments to our environment, perceptions occasioned by the latter may also play a significant, although usually a subordinate part in the intermediate stage of an act. This importance is due to the fact that our interests are intimately concerned with a physical world. In the realization of most of our purposes, indeed, contact with the order of physical nature is present, and in consequence the development of an act will bring "external" perceptions in its train. But in other cases, such as the effort to recall a forgotten name, various reenforcing processes of consciousness may make up the intermediate stage, and mark the direction and progress of the activity. (1) In cases where an activity involves the devising of means, the end in view may sink quite into the background.

c". Modification of purpose in the course of its realization.

The progress of an activity may itself sometimes seriously affect the purpose of the whole, or may bring about the abandonment of it. A very common result of the evolution of a series of activities is the clarification of the end sought. The purposive system of human acts is not always, nor, indeed, often, fixed from the beginning, but depends in part upon the contingencies of its realization. In this respect human activity stands in contrast to the reflexes of certain animals where fractional behavior appears to be impossible, as, for example, in the case of an ant-eater who cannot consume his meal until he has scratched in the dirt. But even such series illustrate in a striking way the individual and teleological character or internal linkage of the whole. (2)

4". The third stage of activity: achievement and its marks.

Efficacy as a test of activity. (Stout)

One of the most interesting phases of the activity cycle is to be found in the conscious marks which attend its culmination, whether or not the latter be satisfying. It is characteristic of an activity experience to be efficacious in bringing about the end which unifies the activity. G. F. Stout describes this efficacy as follows: "If the change which is wanted takes place in consequence of its being wanted, the activity is so far successful; otherwise it is unsuccessful. . . Plainly no finite process can claim to be called an activity unless it counts as a factor in determining other processes; and yet I have asserted that there may be mental activity which fails in attaining its end." Such activities "are not absolutely inefficient but only unsuccessful. A conative process which is unsuccessful is inefficient in producing that particular result which we call its fulfilment. But it is not absolutely inefficient; it counts in some way as a factor in determining the course of events. . . Its specific character in this respect is marked by the distinction between <u>success</u> and <u>failure.</u> This distinction applies only to conative process; and it presupposes what we cannot describe otherwise than as a <u>tendency</u> towards the production of a certain result. The tendency may be present both when the result is actually produced and when it is not. It is equally involved in success and failure; it is presupposed in the

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(1) See, <u>e</u>. <u>g</u>., S. Alexander, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., vol. VIII, page 218.

(2) See, T. G. Brown, "On the Question of Fractional Activity," Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B, 1913, vol. 87, pages 132-144.

possibility of distinguishing between success and failure." (1)

The marks of efficacy:

In typical acts at the personal level of human experience the efficacy just referred to is a function of the activity cycle itself, however many results it may entail in the brain and the rest of the universe. Sometimes this efficacy is the function of a judgment, but usually it is marked by certain affective factors, which may be called, in general, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. These will be considered briefly.

a". Satisfaction or success.

The satisfactions which mark successful activities are so multiform that no attempt can be made here to classify then. A few examples of them may be mentioned. If I stop at a store to buy some apples, the end of the conative cycle is marked by the more or less faint feelings of possession which go with the perceptions connected with my reception of the bag of fruit from the dealer. If one is seeking to remember a name, the mark of success is found in the feeling of familiarity and of attainment which accompanies its clear appearance in consciousness. In the mechanical puzzle, the satisfaction at the end is based upon the presence of certain visual perceptions of form which indicate the particular physical combinations one has sought, and a peculiar feeling of triumph characterizes those perceptions.

b". Dissatisfaction or failure.

The attempt to act often results in the encountering of obstacles and the sense of failure. But we must avoid supposing that unsuccessful activity is not activity at all. On the contrary, as Miss M. F. Washburn points out, "The 'feeling of effort,' the form in which the activity attitude reveals itself most clearly to introspection, is connected, not with smooth and easy thinking, but with interruptions and obstacles to the course of thought." (2)

1"'. Failure may reveal most clearly the purpose of an activity.

We have proposed already (3) that, as a matter of fact, the very intense feelings which are present in an unsuccessful or obstructed activity often reveal most clearly the end sought and its value. In other words, our feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction constitute important negative evidence bearing on the character of the ends we seek. The amount of the displeasure accompanying the obstruction of an activity shows by contrast the value of the cycle itself if it could be perfected. The experience of activity appears most vividly in consciousness when, amid embarrassments and difficulties, I have to devise means for achieving the end for which so far I have striven unsuccessfully, or when I have to enter into intimate cooperation with a natural world which is not at once tractable to my wishes. This vividness and intensity is a revelation of the worth which I attach to the goal I seek. The direction of mental activity is felt when an obstacle is raised against its advance. In short, it is when something inhibits what we desire, that we feel most active.

2"'. Detailed description is not attempted.

We cannot present here a detailed description of the various kinds of dissatisfaction, of disappointments and annoyances, of failures and pains which characterize "unsuccessful" activities. Since the obstacles to the attainment of one's purposes may appear at any stage in the development of an activity, we find in fact activities of all degrees of completeness. An incomplete act often means the inauguration of another one, with different means, for the attainment

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(1) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II, part I, pages 1-3.
(2) Movement and Mental Imagery, pages 161-2.
(3) See above, page 248.

of the purpose of the original one. But an activity may end with the recognition of its faliure.

In the examination of the various stages of an act we have found everywhere the importance of the teleological principle which unifies the whole. While the purpose gives unity to it, other factors may contribute very much to the individual quality or form of it, especially the mode of satisfaction which marks the final stage. When one finds himself in a state of unrest with no clear idea of what he wants, he may act with a view to defining what he wants, and this act may be followed by another one in which he seeks that which he has defined.

c'. Compound cycles of activity.

But this is only one of the countless ways in which individual acts are correlated into larger units which may be called, for convenience of reference, compound cycles. Not only the various stages of individual acts, but also these acts themselves blend and overlap in a countless variety of ways and with all degrees of complexity. The difficulty of defining the delicate variations in the phases and correlations of the pulses of our active life has been a reason, no doubt, for the neglect and oversight of that important implication of an activity which we have called its individuality. James, in many eloquent paragraphs, has called attention to our tendency to fix upon the "substantive" parts of the stream of consciousness, and to pass by the "transitive ones," largely, perhaps, because we lack names for the latter. (1)

1". The countless modes of blending in the stages of activities and in the combinations of individual acts into compound cycles.

The attainment of our more remote ends may involve a multitude of intermediate or subsidiary purposes. It is seldom that the realization of a great purpose consists solely in one momentary and momentous act. Its attainment usually results from many contributory or subordinate acts which point in the general direction of the end. Indeed, the consummation itself may be only one of these subordinate acts, as, for example, writing the last sentence in a book. Further, our personal life is characterized by the periodic recurrence of larger cycles or series ofactivities. Problems or trains of thought involving many acts may be alternately taken up and laid down, and may be resumed several times before they are finally completed. In the intervals, other cycles of acts which belong together may be performed. Thus, individual acts form in actual life all manner of unions for a purpose.

2". An illustration of a compound cycle.

The idea of activities being compounded into cycles dominated by a general end may be illustrated by the attempt to solve a mechanical puzzle for the purpose of studying the psychological laws of learning. The main cycle begins with stating the problem, namely, of understanding learning, and ends either with an inference or conclusion which is satisfactory, or with a reassertion of the problem. The intermediate stages of the series or compound are filled out by many individual acts which are subordinate to the end of solving the puzzle. These acts consist of the control of manual movements so as to meet the contingencies which develop as the subject tries to find the solution. Each of the attempts, save the last, ends with dissatisfaction, and leads to renewed effort. The finally successful act is another individual one which may bring to consciousness the purpose of the whole experiment. This purpose, after its conception,

(1) See, for example, The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 243-4.

may have remained in the margin of consciousness, or may have been suppressed momentarily by monor purposes subordinate to it. Then, by a review of his trials and errors and final success, the investigator draws a conclusion which is satisfying, and the whole compound cycle comes to an end. Now if one should stop to introspect at any particular stage in the experiment, he might find, indeed, only kinaesthetic sensations; but he would lose the meaning of the whole if he did not look beyond them, for certainly the significance of the total cycle could not be found in any number of bodily sensations.

3". The striking and important character of compound cycles of activities.

In the case of the solution of the mechanical puzzle, there is present the general problem of solving it for a certain purpose. Now psychologists have been so engrossed in the study of structural elements of consciousness, or of phases of bodily behavior, that they have generally neglected this striking way in which a long series of acts in our human personal experience may come into existence for the sake of a general goal which, most of the time, hovers dimly in the background and the real meaning of which cannot be found in any one of the acts in the series, taken by itself. The physical counterpart of this process may be found probably in the progressive integration of the nervous system in learning, but the mental side needs to be more generally recognized and emphasized.

In these cycles the fundamentally purposive character of the activities involved comes out with new clearness. The beginning is for the sake of an end, and the beginning, once initiated, may bring in its train many experiences which gain their significance, and usually their existence, from their part in the larger cycle to which they belong. It is in these cycles, especially of the longer types, that the activity of persons manifests itself most clearly. But in every case, these large cycles seem to be composed of simpler ones, of particular acts which in themselves possess some measure of individuality.

4". The difficulty of marking the transitions from one activity-cycle to another.

Difficulties of description are met when one attempts to mark the transitions from one act to another, and to delimit one act from its temporal neighbors. The most obvious way to mark off conative systems would seem, at first thought, to be to arrange the cognitive objects and the various sensations connected with them. This method proves futile, however, because it misses the teleological factors which distinguish and correlate activities.

A special difficulty lies in describing the transition from one activity-cycle to another. J. Ward observes that, "Attention does not move by hops from one definite spot to another, but as Wundt himself allows, by alternate diffusion and concentration, like the foot of a snail, which never leaves the surface it is traversing." (1) But however psychologists may come to describe the unnamed intervals in the progression of purposes and meanings in the life of a human individual, the abiding and active subject grounds them all. We are so absorbed in the world of objects which are involved in our human interests that it is hard to become introspective enough to note the rise and fall, the expansions and transitions, the delicate differences of satisfaction and disappointment, which after all are such important marks of personal progress and of biographical uniqueness. It is not essential to the course of our argument to undertake

(1) Psychological Principles, page 20.

a description of these "transitive" states to which attention has been called, but whatever may be their nature, they will be very subordinate to the pulses of individual acts in the life of a person.

6'. Summary of and corollaries from the study of the individuality of activity.

a'. Meaning of the individuality of acts.

Various reasons have been presented for asserting that the typical act of a person possesses the individuality defined above. (1) This concept calls attention to the unity of the purposive act, and reminds us that a personal act cannot be understood as any composition of mental elements; but is, in varying degrees, a system: a self-realizing, purposive, efficacious whole. Its efficacy is a function of itself, and is determined by the fact that the initial stage of the act brings changes in the experience of the subject which are either satisfying or dissatisfying. The wholeness of the act is due to the fact that the changes brought about are wanted, or, in the case of the highest mental development, are deliberately approved at some time or other. The concept of individuality, as applied to acts, also emphasizes their uniqueness, namely, the fact that each may play a part in the development of a personal biography which no other act can play. In this way the idea of active individuality helps us to avoid the dangers of an abstract description of activity. After all, however, the most important feature of the individuality of an act consists in the unity which it possesses and which is derived from the end sought. And it is of such ultimate units of human experience as individual acts, thus described, that personal life is made up.

b'. The relation of individual acts and of compound activity-cycles to personal life.

Further, the concept of individuality, as applied to personal activities, calls attention to the infinite peculiarities which acts may have by reason of the countless combination of mental processes which they may contain. It also enables us to understand the development of personal experience as a series of acts which may be teleologically organized into compound cycles of varying length, and, perhaps also, of periodic recurrence. The concept of compound cycles of individual acts is fundamental to the understanding of the realization of those larger or more remote purposes which are present in personal experience. Indeed, personal life is constituted, on the whole, of many of these compound and frequently periodic cycles of activities. Sometimes our acts come and go with little reference to each other, but, as a rule, the individual acts of a person have reference to a general purpose beyond the momentary ends of each, and this common reference serves to combine them into a significant series.

The study of the individuality of acts has brought out the driving or pulling force which belongs to a purpose. The idea of an end, when qualified by affective worth, (2) becomes a powerful factor in determining action, but this manner of speaking must not be taken too abstractly. R. B. Perry points out that, "In the case of one's own agency, the prospective sequel does account for the act," and hence we call the act purposive. "We are forced to recognise the essentially dynamic character of purpose." (3)

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(1) See above, page 246.
(2) See below, pages 298-9.
(3) The Monist, vol. XXVII, page 362.

c'. Corollaries:

1". Reconciliation of activity and passivity.

Our study of the individuality of activity enables us to set forth several corollaries which throw light upon a number of important problems connected with the nature of personal activity. In the first place, in the concrete or whole act, to which this idea calls attention, we find the possibility of a reconciliation of the concepts of activity and passivity. F. H. Bradley maintains that activity is a contradiction because we can never have activity without passivity, and yet, to have them together, is inconsistent. (1)

On the contrary, the fact seems to be that each of these terms calls attention to factors which exist in harmonious union in the individual act of finite persons. Both seem to be present in all of our ordinary acts. In the case of live and conscious human beings, absolute passivity, if it ever is present, is certainly exceedingly rare. G. F. Stout labors at length to prove that we are never entirely passive in our experience. (2) He holds that it is an empty concept that can never be applied without remainder to any of our psychoses. He thinks that to be mentally alive and to be awake is to be mentally active. Even in the case of reverie, there is not complete inactivity, and between the most intense activity and that which appears to be most obviously passive, as recovery from swooning, there is, he says, no apparent break.

But in all ordinary experience I am both passive and active. Even in the midst of acting I am passive in the sense that the content and the order of many of the elements which enter into the mental constellation of the individual act are determined for me by the nature of the world in which I exist. Or, as Stout expresses the idea, we are passive when we are externally determined. (3) To assert that I am passive means that I am constantly in intercourse with a world which I accept for what it is and do not create entirely out of myself. As Stout says, "We can in every case distinguish between determination from within and determination from without." (3) If I perform the act, for example, of going into a shop and buying a book, I find that its consummation, although a free choice of my own, yet brings into my experience various factors, such as kinaesthetic sensations, which are not present as conscious elements in my initial purpose, and I explain their presence by reference to a world which cooperates with me in attaining my ends, but which I discover rather than create. My passivity, then, is an expression of my limitations as a finite being in a vast universe which has structure of its own and of which I must take recognizance in the realization of my interests and the control of my activities. Without the recognition of this meaning of passivity my finite existence would become unintelligible to me.

There are, then, certain aspects of an individual act,--these are to be found most often in its intermediate stage,--which are determined for me and which I must accept. In that sense I am passive with reference to them. However, I am only relatively passive, and never entirely so, for I would not respond at all to the stimuli presented by my environment if I were not to some extent awake. These facts suggest that perhaps passivity gets its significance from

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(1) Appearance and Reality, page 65.
(2) Analytical Psychology, pages 147 ff., 170 ff., etc.
(3) Ibid., page 147.

activity. It is unnecessary to point out that I cannot become entirely passive by any effort on my part, for that effort itself is a testimony to my essentially active nature. Without this active and responsive nature, my environment would not effect me as it does; so that my relative passivity is itself dependent upon my activity.

2". Subordinate place of bodily feelings.

In the second place, the conception of the individuality of activity, according to which personal activity enters in the development of a conscious purpose, implies that bodily feelings occupy a subordinate place in the activity-series. The active subject, and the purposes he seeks to realize, must be thought of as constituting the points of reference in the activity-system at the personal level of experience. The subordinate and peripheral position of bodily feelings results from the fact not only that they are phenomenal, but also that they gain their value from the part they play in the development of the agent's desires. H. W. Carr asserts that, "The purpose is what it is by reason of its connection with the train of thought pure and simple, however the existence of that train of thought may be imagined to be conditioned by a series of nerve changes," (1) and, we may add, however much the purpose may involve bodily feelings. In other words, these bodily facts are neither independently conditioned nor independently valuable, but the significant part they may play in any activity is determined or conditioned by the purposing and active subject.

This corollary is confirmed by N. Ach's penetrating analysis of the act of will and his conclusion (2) that neither sensations nor feelings constitute the peculiar and essential characteristic of the act of will. (3) An illustration of the subordinate place of bodily feelings in personal activity is suggested by Perry (4) where he refers to Socrates' distinction, recorded in Plato's Phaedo, between being in prison because of his bones and muscles and because of his purpose of "enduring any punishment which the law inflicts;" the latter, and not the former, being the real reason for his acting as he did. Further, there are rather common experiences, such as in mathematical calculation, literary composition, or philosophical reflection, where the dominating purposes of the subjects have no reference to their bodily conditions, and where the quantity of their bodily behavior is quite insignificant and out of proportion to the intensity of their mental activity. If this corollary is correct, then the attempt to explain "the feeling of activity" as nothing "but a complex of sensations coming from the muscles" (5) seems very uncritical and incomplete indeed. According to the definition of an act put forward by J. M. Baldwin and G. F. Stout (6) kinaesthetic sensations are not essential to an act, for they say that "an act is a deed performed with some foresight and deliberation, whether carried out in muscular movement or not."

Although bodily states or feelings are either subordinate or

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. I, p. 198.

(2) Messer's review of N. Ach's Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament, in Kantstudien, vol. XV, pages 509 ff.

(3) On reasons for not identifying mental activity with bodily behavior, see above, pages 200-211.

(4) Monist, vol. XXVII, page 356.

(5) W. B. Pillsbury, Attention, page 59.

(6) Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, article, "Act."

a". An estimate of the significance of bodily states in activity.

non-essential in the structure of personal activity, they often and usually do play a part that is not unimportant. We have been interested only in rejecting the view that would make bodily behavior the essence of personal activity; and we have sought to defend its psychical character. Even if the hypothesis of Miss M. F. Washburn, that movements always accompany consciousness, were proved, it would not follow that kinaesthetic sensations are necessarily the central feature of mental activity.

The bodily states do perform a significant service in those cases where the agent interacts with the physical universe, for it is only through his body that this interaction can be achieved. My bodily feelings do belong, as S. Alexander suggests, "to a spatially preferred external thing." They have a consistent and useful place in the activity-system which has been set forth. The progress and culmination of an activity-cycle or series often are marked by the appearance of various bodily sensations. Sometimes we are so absorbed in the presentations which result from our bodily movements that the end of our activity sinks into the background. Frequently we are not satisfied that we have attained our purposes until we have experienced various kinaesthetic sensations, which mean for us a successful adjustment to our environment. But even in this case the meaning and the success is something in addition to the sensations involved. But while the act cannot be constituted of bodily feelings, the latter may frequently help us to complete it and to enter into its total individuality. If we wish to distinguish between our interests and the objects to which they refer, we shall have no difficulty in distinguishing between our acts and the bodily and other phenomena which may be involved in them. On the other hand, if our bodily states are regarded as constituting an essential part of our interests, then the way is opened to including, as constituents of our interests, many other physical things, to which there is no definite limit. A very satisfactory meaning of the relation of the body and the self seems to be found in the teleological system of an individual act, where experienced bodily movements and other perceptions of the physical world, are organized by the active self according to its spiritual ends.

3". The denial of pure activity.

Our study of the agent and the activity-cycle also points to the conclusion that activity in and for itself, bare or pure activity, is a fiction. To deny that there is pure activity means the refusal to believe that activity, except in abstraction, has existence apart from a concrete or individual whole of experience, in which there are other phases than those commonly called will. The real fact is that there are agents who act in definite ways and with reference to specific ends, and in consequence experience certain constellations of mental processes. Even if structural psychologists find a distinct and primitive feeling of activity, tendency, or transition, it would be an abstraction, of the same kind as sensation or idea, apart from an individual and active whole including other elements. Such an abstraction, however, may be very useful, of course, for purposes of scientific analysis and description.

What really exist, then, are individual and concrete activities; each is a variety in unity, and among its aspects one may find, perhaps, an elemental will-element. E. F. Buchner holds this view, for he thinks that volition must be appraised among "primitive" processes, although it is never given as a pure process, but always ex-

ists in constant relation with other contents of consciousness. (1) James Ward asserts that empirical psychology "will have to recognize that unanalyzable element I mean by attention or psychical activity." (2) J. Royce, too, defends the unique character of activity: "By the term 'activity' I regard our ethical common sense as meaning precisely the very fact that our present will, as the will of an individual, is unique. By our activity, then, I mean just the unique significance of the present expression of our will." (3)

Yet activity or will is unique.

4". Confirmation of the active subject of experience.

The complete activity-cycle, as it has been described, involves a temporal process, the transitions of which must be experienced as a condition of there being a series with direction at all, as T. H. Green long ago pointed out. This need, together with the fact that we do experience transitions or feel tendencies, confirms the existence of the agent which we considered as the second implication of activity. (4) The conative cycle could not be made intelligible apart from the experient who sees through to the end its various phases, and finds in the final phase that which he sought in the initial one. It is the active subject which realizes the transitions in the activity-experience without itself being a mere transition, or without disappearing in any step of the process. Besides, the agent is required to select that prospective direction which gives promise of being most "successful" in meeting his enduring or developing preferences. Underlying and supporting the individual activity as a whole is the subject which acts. But since the agent is the condition for the succession which is present in the development of an individual act of a complete type, the agent cannot itself be a member of the series, but must itself be permanent and an abiding ground of each act and series of acts. The meaning of this permanence will come before our attention below. (5)

5". Other methods of classifying activities.

The study of the individuality of activity suggests several methods of classifying activity: for example, (a) according to the peculiar congeries of processes which constitute the whole of individual acts. It might be possible to define various types of activities in terms of the variations in their affective and sensory accompaniments. There might be two main groups of form-qualities determined by the affective marks of successful or unsuccessful conclusions.

(b) If one activity were carried out for the sake of a larger whole or a remote purpose, the former would have instrumental and the latter intrinsic value; and we might classify activities according to this principle, which arises in the compounding of activities with reference to distant ends.

(c) An imperfect and overlapping mode of classification might be based upon the distinction between relative passivity and unre-

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(1) Volition as a Scientific Datum, Psychological Review, vol. VII, pages 494-507.

(2) Mind, O. S., vol. XII, page 570; see also Ibid., page 569; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 227; H. Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, vol. I, page 63.

(3) The World and the Individual vol. I, page 468.

(4) See above, pages 233-45.

(5) See below, pages 320-9, especially 328-9.

served activity; that is, according to whether activities were determined primarily from within or from without the agent himself. J. Laird's proposal for the classification of mental processes may be recalled here. (1) He suggests two main classes of mental facts: (a') the dynamic, including conation or endeavor, and (b') the adynamic, which has two subdivisions: (a") feeling, which is essentially passive, and (b") cognition, in which the subject is affected by the object. It is certain that we are active in a less degree in those experiences in which knowing or feeling predominate than in those in which volition predominates.

6". The individuality of activity presupposes some order in the universe.

The realization of such individual acts as have been described presupposes and requires a certain amount of order in the universe as well as within an individual act itself. It will be important to consider this phase of a personal act below in connection with the relation of intelligence to personality. (2)

7". Activity involves change, but is more than change.

It has become evident, too, that activity involves change, but that it is more than change. Indeed, change, apart from such concrete pulses of activity as have been reviewed, is apparently an abstraction obtained by subtracting certain elements, such as purpose, affection, etc., from an individual act, and leaving only the bare principle of their successive connection without regard to the conditioning agent. Change can be understood if one starts from a concrete personal act, but the concept of change itself throws no light whatever upon the act. It is in the cycles of personal activity that we learn the meaningof the abstract idea of change.

8". Other problems suggested.

In addition to the above corollaries, several other phases of personal activity have come to light in the study of its individuality which need careful consideration. The bearing of the latter concept upon the problem of personality has been indicated already. (3) The place of intelligence in personal activity has been mentioned also. Another factor to be noted is that various native dispositions and learned tendencies usually enter into our activities; we shall include both of these under memory, taken in a wide sense, as the fourth implication of activity, which we shall examine next. After this examination we shall summarize our study of activity, and indicate its relation to the problem of personality. There will remain for separate discussion an important phase of activity, namely, its value aspect.

e. THE FOURTH IMPLICATION OF ACTIVITY: MEMORY (and disposition).

So far as an activity-system involves complicated bodily behavior, it is well known that the latter is made possible by a long history of learning and practice during which numerous reflexes and habits have been coordinated. From the physiological standpoint, therefore, "the individual history is one of the most important features concerned in the characteristics of acting," according to H. Driesch, (4) In fact for him, "the historical basis of reacting," is "the first criterion of acting." (4) Speaking of the organism, he says further, "The specificity of every one of its actions depends on the specificity of all stimuli relating to sensation and movement which have encountered it in the past and on all the specific effects of those stimuli." (5) The organism is quite

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(1) Problems of the Self, chapter II, especially page 35.
(2) See below, pages 278-94. (3) See above, page 257.
(4) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, vol. I, page 59.
(5) Ibid., page 60.

1'. Importance of the "historical basis" of behavior in biological science, (disposition),

unlike a machine in that it has the ability of "changing the form of its combined specificities" by profiting from its past; so that the behavior of any animal depends not only upon the particular stimuli which are presented, but also upon the effects of its past stimuli and actions. (1) The sensitive and living organism profits by "experience." "That which acts in action is, as we know, determined in its potential specificity by its individual history." (2) When it is asserted that "memory is found in all organic life," (3) the meaning is that living matter is so changed by any process which goes on in it that a repetition is either facilitated or inhibited according to circumstances.

and in conscious life, (memory).

So far as consciousness and personality depend for their expression upon bodily behavior, this historical, physiological basis holds good for human action. The effects of past behavior and activity hpon human beings are reflected in consciousness in another form which is of great importance for personality, namely, memory. Memory plays its important part not only in the development of a purpose through an individual cycle, but especially through compound cycles of activity; our plans and wishes of the moment are due in large part to past plans and wishes that we have entertained and developed. We must now consider,in some detail, these and other points in connection with memory. The "historical basis of action," which is so important from the biological and psychological standpoint, becomes, in the form of memory-consciousness, an important factor in the concept of personality, considered from the metaphysical point of view.

Since one cannot be aware, in any one moment of consciousness, of all of the effects of his past experiences, we must distinguish two ways in which the past effects the present, namely, through character or disposition and through memory. The word, <u>disposition</u>, will represent those effects of our past experience which are not consciously present, but which, nevertheless, are influential in our present conduct. We shall consider memory and character or disposition in this order.

2'. Why memory is important in activity and in personality.

a'. Importance of memory in an individual act;

There are several reasons for assigning an important place to memory-consciousness in the concept of activity, as well as of personality, and also for regarding memory as one of the implications or conditions of a personal activity. In the first place, the achievement of a purpose is an achievement because of the memory factor. This statement need not be taken to mean, in the strict psychological sense, that an act of recognition follows every other act, but it does emphasize the fact that in an individual act the end is present from the beginning with varying degrees of consciousness or influence, and that without this continuity the unity of the act would disappear. That which is a purpose at the initiation of an act becomes a memory at its conclusion. These are two phases of a concrete whole, and it is essential that we do not separate memory from the individual activity as some kind of independent faculty. The memory factor is especially likely to appear when one's activity is obstructed, and one has to take a new attitude or devise new means to carry out his original plan, which he remembers.

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(1) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pages 54, 60.
(2) Ibid., page 72.
(3) W. Ostwald, Individuality and Immortality, page 10.

b'. and especially in compound cycles of activity.

The most important part that memory plays is seen in the correlation of acts, that is, in the constitution of compound cycles of activity. In adult experience, that which we seek at any moment is,in considerable measure, an outgrowth of previous desires which we have sought, and which we continue consciously to pursue with a measure of perseverance. By acts of memory we learn what purposes already have proved successful, and, in the light of these, we make further plans for the future. This reference to the past is essential in all enlightened self-determination. By recalling how our activities turned out in the past, and having learned from this retrospection what our real purposes are, we are prepared more intelligently to foresee the future and to construct our plans. The following proportion is probably true on the whole: the more clearly we understand our past acts, the more definitely we foresee and control our future activities. From a review of our historical activities we learn to distinguish between good and evil, and thus are better able to posit purposes which will turn out happily.

And when, finally, we reach the ends we sought, their significance depends, in large part, upon that act of recognition by which we see ourselves as either successful or failing in the light of our remembrance of what we set out to seek. Many of our activities are regarded as valuable, not because of their intrinsic qualities, but because we acknowledge them as fulfilments of remote past ends. It should be noted especially that in those compound activity-cycles which are so important in personal life, the individual acts which enter into the whole must be attached to it by frequent recall of the larger goal to which each contributes its small share. In other words, when one achieves a proximate and instrumental purpose, its meaning becomes clear when he connects its conclusion with that anterior purpose for the attainment of which it was initiated.

Hence, it is in those compound cycles of activities which are so common in personal life, that memory is a function of fundamental importance in their coordination and teleological continuity. Certainly long-maturing plans could not be carried out without memory, and it is just such plans which enrich and distinguish personal life. As W. Ostwald states, "the essential difference between men and animals is the difference in their memory development; man's culture is higher because of his memory." (1) The interpretation of one's past enters especially into those transitional acts in which one attempts to understand the teleological connection between two compound cycles, one just finished, and another about to being. Memory thus enters into both the original formulation and into the development and achievement of the purposes of a person.

G. T. Ladd declares that, without the memory of a self, however incomplete and imperfect it may be, that is, without the recognition that I have a past, there could not be any "unity either to thought or action which is worthy of being considered of the personal type." (2) Further, he states that, "Memory that is capable of being explained by the passive processes of association, however elaborate, can never give to a conscious life the unity characteristic of a Self. For such an achievement recognition and self-appropriation are essential." (2) James, in his appropriative theory of personal identity,

(1) Individuality and Immortality, pages 7-8.
(2) The Secret of Personality, page 56.

has expressed, in a striking way, the need of recognizing the practically universal presence of a general or specific memory-factor in personal experience. (1) So important does Richet think that memory is for personality that he really identifies the two. (2)

c'. The importance of the memory function in the organization of our interests and purposes.

So far as we attempt to organize our purposes and interests, it is clear that memory is a very important factor. It makes possible a common wealth of interests apart from which the life of the self is very poor indeed, as J. Royce eloquently points out.(3) He suggests that memory gives to the self a solidarity, just as a long history gives a community a certain stability and coherence.

The value of the memory-function in the organization and clarification of our purposes cannot easily be over-estimated. The memory-synthesis of a person's interests becomes the center of operations for his future activities. The part of memory is clearly seen, too, in very important decisions, in sudden conversions of purpose, and in the conscious birth of new moral ideals which stand out in contrast to the imperfect ones that are being abandoned. Such experiences do not weaken, but, by contrast, strengthen the sense of the historical continuity of our personal lives. For example, our sins are awful, just because they are our sins, and in any effort to condemn them, we acknowledge them as our very own. These acts, then, called recollective or memory acts, are of fundamental importance, both in the fulfilment of our purposes, and in their unification.

d'. The significante of forgetting in personal activities.

The significant part played by forgetting in the development of personality is too often overlooked. Much is said of memory in that connection, but quite too little, of forgetting. The latter permits of the concentration of our attention upon the achievement of specific purposes, and thus gives point to our unfolding experience. The very narrowness of our span of memory often requires us, in the progress of our activities, to recall the various interests which are involved in them and which are momentarily forgotten, and thus forgetting aids negatively in the development of a historical unity in our experience.

Since we forget easily, and therefore learn that permanent knowledge can be gained only in the course of time, the fact of forgetting forces us to choose wisely that to which we shall devote our energy, lest we waste it, and thus makes for a more careful selection of values, especially of the cognitive type. Again, the rapidity with which we forget is a kind of negative condition for the constant alertness of the intelligent man in his attention to perceived objects in the interest of maintaining or regaining the immediate clearness which retrospection cannot furnish and which may be necessary for successful adjustment to his surroundings.

Further, our inability to recall, all at once, our multiform interests, instincts, and desires, gives occasion, to the intelligent person, for deliberation, and for a comparison of his interests. A chief reason for the impulsive character of the actions of primitive men is to be found in the absence of deliberation in the light of memory. It is interesting to note the findings of experimental psychologists, that, after a score or more of trials, a normal man requires a longer time to get out of a maze than a rat, the former be-

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(1) See above, pages 36-7, also 57-8; compare Bowne's view of memory and personality, above, page 140. (2) See above, page 6.
(3) See below, page 266.

ing delayed by his reflections upon the situation.

A striking statement of the contrasting importance of memory and forgetting for personality is found in an article by L. Dugas in which he says: "Memory expresses an organization, forgetting a disorganization of the self. Memory moves itself as a single mass; it is the personality, rich at once in all its treasures, as forgetting is the personality cut up and ruined. . . Never does memory resolve itself into atomic dust; it is always as a synthetic character. Memory and forgetting are always together symptomatic of the entire self, or at least of one of the aspects of the self; that is why personality alone explains the particularities of memory and of forgetting. Memory is in a sense personality: forgetting is the loss of personality; and the study of memory and fogetting, therefore, is important in studying the evolution of personality. (1)

e'. Royce on the place of memory in personality.

One of the most eloquent accounts of the place of memory in personality is the following one by J. Royce: (2) "Each one of us knows that he just now, at this instant, cannot find more than a mere fragment of himself present. The self comes down to us from its own past. It needs and is a history. Each of us can see that his own idea of himself as this person is inseparably bound up with his view of his own former life, of the plans that he formed, of the fortunes that fashioned him, and of the accomplishments which in turn he has fashioned for himself. A self is, by its very essence, a being with a past. . .

"But nevertheless, if considered simply in this passing moment of my life, I am hardly a self at all. I am just a flash of consciousness,--the mere gesticulation of a self,--not a coherent personality. Yet memory links me with my own past,-- and not, in the same way, with the past of any one else. This joining of the present to the past reveals a more or less steady tendency,--a sense about the whole process of my remembered life. . . My individual life, my own more or less well-sundered stream of tendency, not only is shut off at each present moment by various barriers from the lives of other selves,--but also constitutes an intelligible sequence in itself, so that, as I look back, I can say: 'What I yesterday intended to pursue, that I am to-day still pursuing.' 'My present carries farther the plan of my past.' Thus, then, I am one more or less coherent plan expressed in a life. 'The child is father to the man.' My days are 'bound each to each by mutual piety.'

"Since I am this self, not only by reason of what now sunders me from the inner lives of other selves, but by reason of what links me, in significant fashion, to the remembered experiences, deeds, plans, and interests of my former conscious life, I need a somewhat extended and remembered past to furnish the opportunity for my self to find, when it looks back, a long process that possesses sense and coherence. In brief, my idea of myself is an interpretation of my past,--linked also with an interpretation of my hopes and intentions as to my future."

3'. The problem of dispositions.

It is well known that when a human self comes to self-consciousness, he finds himself to be the possessor of varied emotions, desires, and tendencies to action, which he calls original or innate because he cannot explain their total characters by any acts of his

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(1) Revue Philosophique, vol. II, pages 357-8.
(2) The Problem of Christianity, vol. II, pages 40-42.

own. He regards them as gifts of nature, and calls them his native dispositions, temperament, or talents. Then, too, in the course of experience he develops certain tendencies to act which are relatively permanent, and this group he calls his character. Since all these facts are the result of either individual or racial history, we might call them all memory, used in a wide sense; or if the latter is used in a narrow sense, as is preferable, we may apply the term, disposition, to the general class of facts which, though a part of one's history, and effective in his present acting, are not a part of his conscious memory. We have noted above (1) how Perry makes the concept of disposition a corner-stone in his view of personality.

a'. The kind of knowledge we can expect to have regarding them.

The main problem suggested by this preliminary characterization concerns what kind of knowledge we may expect to obtain regarding our dispositions. In the first place, since, by hypothesis, we have no knowledge of them until they begin to operate in or to influence our activities, we must conclude that, in the nature of the case, any knowledge we have of them before that time is indirect, and cannot be based upon individual memory. This indirect knowledge must be based upon the experience and study of those aspects of our own activities which we do not regard as due to our own choice, or it must be based upon what additional information we can gain from the observation of the behavior of other men and of animals.

In other words, what we call dispositions will be inferred from an examination of our activities at a stage of self-consciousness, namely, when we discover that we are naturally active beings and are endowed with tendencies to act in various ways, and when, also, we acknowledge that we are not responsible for these tendencies, however great may be our duty to control them in the light of accepted ends. This discovery rests upon our recollection that, as a matter of history, we have been able to perform a variety of acts; it is confirmed by the belief, based also upon recollection, that there is nothing in our present nature which will prevent our acting in certain ways in the future under appropriate circumstances.

b'. Definition of disposition.

The contemplated acts in the latter case must be called merely possibilities, so far as present experience or achievement goes. Disposition, then, is an inclusive name for those activities which, by virtue of our intelligent and imaginative natures, we may expect ourselves to perform in the future in view of what we have already done. In order to express the fact of this belief in what we might do under the proper historical conditions, we say that, at the present time, we have various capacities or dispositions. Such an expression is a corollary of the fact that our finite activities must take the form of a consecutive series of single acts, or, in other words, of the fact that we can act in only one way at a time. F. H. Bradley describes disposition in the following terms: "The soul at present is such that it is part of those conditions, which, given the rest, would produce certain psychical events. And hence the soul is the real possibility of these events, just as objects in the dark are the possibility of color." (2) He adds that a disposition means "the probable course of psychical events." (3)

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(1) See above, pages 92-4.
(2) Appearance and Reality, page 312.
(3) Ibid., page 313.

c'. Criticism of the idea of unconscious soul substance as an explanation of disposition.

The latter statement is a cautious one, for naturally we should like to know about the ground of this possibility. But at this point the ways divide in personality-theory. One road that has been traveled frequently is to trace the possibilities of future activity into various qualities in a substantial soul,--perhaps by the route of subconsciousness, regarded as the margin of consciousness,--and the result is the well-known doctrine of soul-faculties, which H. Lotze well called a tautology. (1) Since this subterraneous soul is not conscious--for it must explain that which is not momentarily conscious--we find that we have upon our hands, besides the conscious self, another self which must be described as a non-conscious something, usually a substance of some sort. To speak of it as conscious contradicts the hypothesis in question, and robs the soul-substance of the function which it is supposed to perform. It might be described as material without such a contradiction. The real problem, however, which it presents is not to name it, but to give it consistent and intelligible meaning.

1". It is an inference or hypothesis which does not explain,

Only a few critical objections need be raised here against this antiquated view of soul-substance, in addition to those that James and Bowne put forward. (2) First, this substance, as conceived with a view to explaining active dispositions, is inferential; its mediate or indirect derivation needs to be noted. It is an hypothesis resulting from the felt necessity of explaining certain tendencies to action which we cannot refer to our own choice of the moment. The obvious difficulty with the hypothesis is that we have no way of verifying it except by a study of the various activities of our experience. In these experiences we can distinguish the subject from the objective phases of the activity. That subject is the agent which acts, and which is one aspect of our immediate experience. If this unconscious soul is identical with this agent, we have gained nothing in explanation. It cannot be thus identical, however, for it is not conscious by assumption, while the agent is the subject of conscious experience. The soul, as interpreted here, does not, therefore, explain why the agent is such as it is. Consequently it must be something different from the agent, and then the question is, How relate the agent to it? This can be done only by another interpretation of the agent.

2". and which demands the impossible: namely, an agent stepping out of himself.

In this interpretation insurmountable obstacles present themselves; especially this obstacle: that if those activities, of a so-called original or dispositional sort which a particular agent now carries out in the course of his experience, are to be explained by potentialities lying in some kind of soul-substratum which, by hypothesis, is not a part of this agent's experience, then somewhere and somehow this soul must be identified with or made a part of the agent himself. In other words, if this type of hypothesis is to explain what it is intended to explain, the agent must be able to get out of himself and tell of his origin. But in the human and sane world the active subject of experience does not and cannot step outside of his experience and become the subject of some other experience, and certainly no subject of an unconscious something is better prepared to perform this impossible function. The demand

(1) Medicinische Psychologie, section 135.
(2) See above, pages 40-42; 124, 139.

cannot, in the nature of the case, be carried out; further reasons for this statement were suggested above in the discussion of the problem of knowing the agent. (1) The subject of experience may distinguish himself from the objects with which he deals, and in conception he may simplify his knowledge of his own functions, but deny himself he cannot, for in the very effort to do so, he reaffirms himself. In elaborating such an hypothesis as the one in question, the subject is demonstrating, as in other cases of thinking, his self-identical egency.

3". Lotze's view of the doctrine of a soul substratum.

H. Lotze has some interesting words of advice to those who persist in positing a real kernel of being back of the mind: "One will never get behind being or existence to find out how they are made; but this question would have weight for us only if our problem of knowledge consisted in creating the world. But what we have to understand is only the present, and there at any rate we recognize that all being is a marvel whose eternal and existential operation we must presuppose, whose origin, on the contrary, can be recognized indeed as a fact, but never can the riddle of the manner of its proceeding be dissolved." (2)

He declares again: "What we are we know well, and of the qualitative character of our spiritual existence nothing escapes us as entirely incomprehensible; but how, in general, all this can be,--this foundation of our own existence,--is inscrutable to us, as is also every other case of being. But if we seek to lead back the whole content of our developed soul-life to a primitive quality in which the reality of the soul consists, before it began its development by taking its first step in interaction with the outside world, then, of course, this original nature lies outside of all possible self-knowledge." (3)

d'. Dispositions interpreted in terms of nervous structures.

In contemporary psychology and philosophy of mind there is a general tendency to try to explain those actions which show the effect of heredity or learning by reference to structures or modifications in the nervous system. Upon this hypothesis, mental activities modify nervous structure in some way so as to effect the course of future mental processes, and in this way the character of the nervous system is said to be an important condition for many activities, if not for all. One must be careful not to assert that dispositions exist as changes in nervous structure, for obviously changes do not have the requisite persistence.

This theory is very different from the one examined a page back. It does not necessarily require us to identify mental activity with nervous process, but may mean that nervous processes bring changes in mental activities, and vice versa. From this standpoint, then, a disposition would mean some structure or functioning of the nervous system which had been found to effect the course of mental activity, the assumption being that this structure owed its peculiar character to previous behavior or activity upon the part of the individual or of his ancestors. So long as the mental subject is not identified with the nervous structures themselves, nor with bodily behavior, and also so long as the mode of knowing nervous structures is set in a critical context, this view of disposition has promise

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(1) See above, pages 238-42.
(2) Medicinische Psychologie, section 133.
(3) Ibid., section 134.

of helping us to understand the development and conditions of mental life. The effects of historical action, then, according to this theory, are retained, not entirely as facts of memory, but as modifications in the structure of the nervous system.

The danger in the use of this hypothesis is that one will overlook the activity of the self in deriving the knowledge of the nervous system and that one will be tempted to identify mental process with nervous process. But the theory need not mean such identification, and if the proper existence of the active self be explicitly recognized, the doctrine in question may be, indeed, a valuable contribution to our knowledge of how a self acts upon the physical universe. The theory emphasizes the probability that the spontaneous centers of experience called human persons have a ground in the universe, but is in no way an explanation of their origin. It merely helps us to understand how, once they are given, they may interact with the world.

e'. Useful meanings of dispositions.

There are, then, two useful meanings of the term, disposition. (a) In the first place, it may be the name for those nervous structures which an active agent learns, as the result of painstaking investigation, to regard as standing in a constant relation to himself so far as he endeavors to act upon the world.

(b) Secondly, the more accurate meaning of disposition, and also the more important one, is that it summarizes the ways in which we expect to act in the future. This summary is based upon our knowledge that, first, we have historically acted in certain ways, and, secondly, that there is nothing in our own nature that will hinder us from acting in similar ways in the future under appropriate conditions. The idea of disposition expresses the fact that at present these conditions are not actual.

But the content of these dispositions, the kinds of acts to which they refer, are derived in every case from a consideration of actual and concrete activities that have been matters of experience. Hence, the conceptual effort which has gone into their formulation is a strong testimony to the work of memory in understanding ourselves. The idea of disposition is useful in making it easy for us, when we are considering our plans for the future, to summarize how we have actually acted in the past. Character commonly stands for tendencies to action which have been acquired in the course of experience, and may be briefly defined as one's "habitual attitude toward the values of life." (1)

4'. Importance of memory must not be exaggerated, but may be summarized.

Although memory, including disposition, is a chief implication of activity, its importance must not be exaggerated. The outstanding characteristic of activity is its forward look rather than its backward look. Human activities are primarily prospective in direction, and only secondarily retrospective. Memories are important and indispensable aids in the determination of our future activities and in marking the results of our activities. Memory plays in fact a function analogous to the rudder on a ship: it is a means of guiding and stabilizing actions. Because it is concerned with activities that have been tried out, it enables us better to predict and plan for imminent ones. It helps us to define and organize our purposes. As a matter of fact we do not often make absolutely new beginnings, but we are constantly developing and enlarging the purposes and de-

(1) G. A. Wilson.

sires which, by past experience, we have found feasible and satisfying. It enables one to retain the various steps in a very compound activity-cycle. Memory serves, then, as both a steadying and an illuminating factor in personal life. Sometimes it is the name for the persistence of our purposes, and sometimes it is itself a genuine act by which one defines the relation of himself to his past activities. The fertility of human association immensely enlarges the field within which persons conduct themselves, but their conduct is ever directed to what is to be.

f. Summary of the account of activity.

The study of memory concludes our examination of the implications of activity. Not all of them have been set forth. The concepts of value and of intelligence might be included as aspects of purpose, but these and other factors important in personality will be discussed below. It is time to summarize our exposition of activity, and indicate its relation, so far as its meaning has been developed, to the concept of personality.

1'. Concluding definition of activity.

The term activity is applied in general to any experience or system of experiences which is individualized by the fact that in it a conscious agent seeks to realize some more or less clear purpose which has grown out of his past experience. The four chief implications of this conception of activity are: purpose, agency, individuality in form or occurrence, and memory. Any such particular system may be called an act, or an activity. We shall see that two further specifications are required: the purpose always has value for the subject, and activity in its personal form always contains a rational or intelligent factor. These specifications are, however, involved in the implication of purpose which we have included in our definition. Activity is a concrete fact or actuality whenever one can say that in his conscious and individual life, he experiences a transition in a certain felt and valuable direction, at the same time that he maintains, by reason of his history and memory, a measure of stability amid his developing experiences. In other words, activity is present whenever an agent or subject with a memory attempts to realize, through changes in his experience, some end which he esteems, and anticipates more or less clearly.

2'. The four aspects of an act, in summary.

A particular and complete act of a human person has the following four distinguishable aspects: (a) It is marked by the positing of an end that is to be sought. This may be called, in ethical language, the motive, for it represents that for which the agent seeks because of its value to himself. But this end may be much more indefinite than is required for an ethical act. The word, purpose, is a more exact term. The starting point of an act, then, is a being, conscious and alive, who is prepared for some imminent change in his experience.

(b) In the endeavor to realize the end or purpose, the most varied mental processes may occur, notably the feeling of transition, but also other feelings, sensations, strains, etc. They all get their meaning, and often their existence, from that in prospect to which they point. I have called this experience-train, unified by its prospective goal, and possessed of the most varied form-qualities, the individuality of activity. It is in this phase that presentations, for example, bodily feelings, may play an important part. It is recognized, of course, that changes or consequences in the environment are usually essential conditions for the achievement of the end, but do not constitute the principle of the activity itself, and

are not necessary to its existence.

(c) Finally, there is the achievement with its various signs of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The marks of achievement, whether or success or failure, are not to be found in consequences in the environment, although they may be involved, but in the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Memory plays an especially important part in determining what an achievement is, and also in linking up acts in series by reference to a common purpose which persists through them.

(d) None of these aspects are intelligible without the agent which is the abiding ground of the act as a whole. He is the fundamental condition and the unifying principle.

Imperfect forms of activity.

There are, of course, countless imperfect acts where one or more of the phases mentioned is either in the margin of consciousness or absent altogether, but it is often absent because it has once been there. There are acts where one phase is more important than another; in moral resolution, for example, the purpose stands out clearly. Then there are activities where the beginning and end are unimportant as compared with the intermediate stage where the devising of means occupies attention. Then, again, memory may be fundamental or predominant, as where a man discovers that he has loved a girl only when she accepts a rival suitor.

4. The concept of activity as related to that of personality.

Now, the activity which has been expounded exhibits the concrete person at work, for the person is the agent who acts in countless ways and according to certain purposes. If words are used carefully, as we shall try to use them, personality should mean the general or conceptual qualities that pertain to being a person, while a person is an individual example of personality. In contemporary usage, however, personality is also used in the latter concrete sense, and this usage is accepted here with reluctance. When, then, reference is made to the general character or a concrete person or a personality the phrase, concept of personality, or personality without an article, may be used sometimes. The above study of activity has brought forth some of the fundamental factors in the concept of personality, although several others have still to be examined. The features thus far developed may now be brought together before we proceed to the exposition of the remaining ones.

a. Use of terms: personality and person.

b. Summary description of the factors in the concept of personality so far developed.

1! Agency.

In activity in its more developed or typical forms we have seen the person at work in the concrete. A person is from the first an actor. Agency is the central feature in the concept of personality. We have explained at length the meaning of agency. (1) We have seen, among other things, that the agent is an abstraction apart from the concrete activity-experience, but so also is personality.

In view of the relation of the agent to his acts, it seems impossible to ascribe activity to the pure subject, if the latter is thought of as existing apart from concrete acts, for in a particular activity there are various objective and phenomenal factors present, as I have tried to show in the study of the individuality of activity. (2) These objective factors consist of all that goes to make up what has been called the empirical or psychological self, namely, that totality of interests, desires, cognitions, volitions, etc.,

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(1) See above, pages 233-245.

(2) See above, especially pages 258-9.

which one regards as intimately his own, though distinguishable from the subject for whom they are. (1)

According to our view, then, concrete activity has both a subjective and objective phase or aspect, and it is the latter, including such facts as were mentioned in the last paragraph, which comes into consideration in what is called self-consciousness. We may study these objective phases of activity for themselves, in which case they will be as abstract as the active subject, but in our study we may note that they are dependent upon our subjective selves. As H. W. Carr observes, "I may attribute activity to the self-conscious subject of experience, the psychological subject, and in the sense that all experience, and activity as experience, is the experience of a self-conscious subject, I must do so." (2) The relation between the subject and the empirical self represents what J. Ward would call a duality in unity, or "unity in duality." The distinction between the two aspects of the unitary person, including at once active subject and empirical self, is made, however, only in epistemological criticism, although it is perfectly intelligible in every-day experience apart from this criticism.

The real person, then, is not a bare agent or subject which exists apart from his concrete acts. The true meaning of personality is to be found in the latter: in his individual acts and their correlations. In these individual activities, agency is indissolubly wedded to purpose, for as Perry points out, "Persons do things for reasons." (3) J. Ward well says that, "Persons literally work or strive (operari), things are only metaphorically said to do so; persons are not inert, merely passive or indifferent; they are active, interested, and directive." (4) It is only in the interest of metaphysical analysis that we distinguish the agent from the other implications of concrete activity; and having done so, we must regard him as the fundamental or grounding feature in the concept of personality.

2'. Purposiveness.

It is clear, too, that there must be included in the concept of personality not only agency, but purposiveness. This, like agency, is an abstraction apart from the individual and particular act. But here again such abstractions are legitimate in a philosophical analysis of the concept of personality, provided we recognize their abstract character. A person ever acts with reference to what will be in his experience. Very far-reaching consequences in the universe may proceed from the individual act of a person, but these are not constituents of it unless they are conscious or meaningful aspects of the experiential whole of the act, and even in that case the personal feature of them is not their content, but the meaning or the valuing itself considered from the point of view of the acting subject.

We have considered already at length in what precise ways purpose is a fundamental feature of personality. (5) The importance

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(1) The question concerning the relations of the objective and subjective phases of personality will recur below; see pages 283-9.

(2) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S. vol. I, p. 194.

(3) See his exposition of personal idealism, The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 207. (4) Psychological Principles, p. 406.

(5) See especially above, pages 215-233.

of purpose in personal activities is exceedingly great. In a genuine sense, a person is what he seeks or what he wants to be. (1) His purposes, his desires, his interests, considered as distinct from the external objects connected with them, are an important factor in the concept of his nature. C. S. Peirce declares that, "This reference to the future is an essential element of personality." (2)

3'. Memory. A person develops with the increase in the articulateness both of the purposive aspect of his activities, and also of his evaluation of them. (3) This articulateness increases only in the light of his personal history. It takes time for one to learn what his wants are, and to properly evaluate them. In other words, wherever purposive activity has attained some measure of intelligible clearness and intelligent correlation, we must introduce the idea of memory, or,more generally, of "historical basis," to account for these factors. Memory is another important implication of activity, and factor in personality. Whether a man's life as a whole is a success or failure, his consciousness of this fact requires a large and significant memory-factor, by which he is reminded of what he is as compared with what he intended to become, but even such a judgment of a man's success or failure is not without reference to his future. It shouldbe especially noted, however, that memory does not explain the fact of agency but presupposes it, and is a name for the fact that the agent in his activities may take account of his own past.

H. Bergson declares: "To touch the reality of spirit we must place ourselves at the point where an individual consciousness, continuing and retaining a past in a present enriched by it, thus escapes the law of necessity, the law which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in a present which merely repeats it in another form, and that all things shall ever be flowing away. When we pass from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit." (4) We have explained carefully how large a part memory plays in the activities and development of a person. (5)

4'. Individuality. In order to connect the positing and the achievement of a particular purpose, the further concept of individuality is required. This concept is the principle of order in the complex phases of activity, and calls attention to the fact that although there may be countless forms or qualities in the activity-cycles of a person, each activity is, nevertheless, a unity of meaning. (6) When we speak of the individuality of personality something quite different is usually meant, as explained below (7), but the more complex concept of individuality as applied to a person as a whole finds its prototype in the concrete act.

a'. Personality and body. We have seen that bodily feelings and sensations may play a part in determining the individuality of an activity. (8) Bodily factors have an important but subordinate place in our description of activity in so far as bodily situations are regarded as essential for the attainment of certain of our purposes or ends, but in explaining the achievement of some of or ends, no bodily sensations are essential. In any case, however, the subject of the experiences,

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(1) See further below, page 308.
(2) Monist, vol. II, page 526. (3) See below, pages 302-5* 308.
(4) Matter and Memory, page 313. (5) See above, pages 262-271.
(6) See the whole account of active individuality above, pages 245-262. (7) See below, pages 317-20.
(8) See above, page 259.

the positor and maintainer of the purpose, is judge of the achievement, and the one who attains cannot be identified in any way with corporeal features, as we have tried to show. (1) Even where we seek bodily satisfactions, much more is presupposed and involved than the body, both in the seeking and in the satisfaction, however much bodily feelings may be involved. The latter are always subservient to the active and conscious agent, with his interests, purposes, and memories. The central and determining dimension of personal experience is to be found, then, in subjective activity, to which all other factors in the experience are subordinate.

c. Is there activity without personality?

It should be noted, however, that while every person is an actor, not all acts are personal. While the actual person is an immediate experience of the kind of concrete activity, yet not all activities are to be referred to agents that are personal, unless we introduce the concept of degrees of personality suggested by E. S. Brightman, and made use of by Miss M. W. Calkins in her "personalistic conception of nature." (2) The chief difficulty in working with this idea lies in so determining or defining the lower limit of personal activity that one does not lose the significance of the latter concept. That Miss Calkins comes near to doing this in her attempt to extend the idea of person to the inorganic world shows that the difficulty referred to is a real one. The problem of determining various degrees of personal activities would admit of easier solution, for certainly such activities may differ in the clearness with which the agents grasp their purposes, and in the intensity with which they work them out.

In those low forms of activity, however, where the goals have never been other than very proximate and vague, or have never been intelligently approved and compared with other possibilities, the activities may fairly be said to be below the level of personal activity. Personal activity is present only when a measure of clearness, of approval, and of organization among our purposes has been developed. The two latter points will be expanded more fully below under the headings of value and unity in connection with personality. (3) So far as purpose alone goes, the criterion of personal purposes must be found in the presence or absence of at least an intermediate degree of clearness and of a period of realization which is sometimes at least of intermediate length. A corollary of this criterion is the requirement that a personal activity shall involve a degree of conscious memory.

1'. Yes, in the case of selves that have not yet become persons.

Before the stages referred to in this criterion are reached, there may be vague and proximate purposes which presuppose an agent, but this agent cannot properly be regarded as a personal one. The various activity-experiences at this low level may be correlated under the concept of self, but not of personality. A person is a self which has reached a certain measure of development as determined by the purposive criterion just mentioned, and by other criteria to be developed below. (3) Not all selves then are persons, while all persons are selves. A person is a developed self, and a self is the promise of a personality. "The task of man is to become a person-

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(1) See above, pages 200-211.

(2) Philosophical Review, 1919, vol. XXVIII; see especially pages 139 ff., where she speaks of selves of different levels.

(3) See below, especially pages 293-4; 308; 315-16; 336; 351.

ality." (1)

d. Summary: The actual person is primarily a purposive actor.

The actual person is primarily a purposive actor, and his concrete significance can be grasped only by those who have had the experience. Since the person himself, however, possesses memory and rational capacities, we must go beyond the actual person and form a concept of personality, according to which a person is to be defined in part as a being capable of many purposive activities, or, in other words, which is prepared by its history and intelligent self-consciousness to act in the future with reference to a diverse system of ends. Our study of the activity-system has proved to be the key to the understanding of personality, and that is a sufficient justification for its lengthy examination. In a particular activity-system, possessed of a unique individuality, performed by a conscious agent in the light of his own past and his contemplated future, in the light of memory and valued ends,--in such an individual system we have personality at work in the concrete, and those who have such experiences appreciate the meaning of personal activity, which is the basic feature of personality.

e. The triadic movement within personal experience.

If we take the point of view of being in the midst of one of the active cycles of personal experience, then for the agent himself, part of the cycle will be past and part of it will be future; the first will be a matter of memory, and the second, of anticipation. As the cycle completes itself memory more and more takes the place of anticipation, and the achievement makes the whole a matter of history. Personal experience seems to be constituted of such individual cycles of activity; some brief and imperfect, some long; some successful and some failing; some clearly outlined, others vaguely defined. In some, attention is fixed constantly on the goal; in some, on the means, and in some, on the past. These cycles succeed or overlap one another, blend and are compounded, in all manner of ways. Nevertheless, the isolation of individual acts in the stream of experience appears to be the most concrete and fruitful method of ordering experience if one is seeking to understand the personal aspect of it as distinguished from the apprehended environmental objects.

1'. Summary description of the individuality of activity.

2'. Description of the triadic movement which distinguishes personal activity.

In the outstanding features of developed individual activity as described above there is present what may be called, in metaphorical language, the fundamental triadic movement within personality or personal experience, namely, the achievement of ends that are remembered (initially purposed), the whole cycle being grounded in the abiding agent, apart from which it is unintelligible. Here is the essence of personality: a conscious being which acts with reference to remembered or persistent ends; an agent which conceives purposes, works them out in the course of experience, and does so in the light of his own past. Here is permanence amid progression, development out of what has been, and yet an ever-present forward-look.

This is the great triad of personal experience: purpose, activity, memory. These are not parts of a compound, but are intimately unified aspects of a single significant whole of experience in which a conscious subject seeks an end and knows when he has achieved it because he remembers that it was he who sought it or its kind at the beginning. Since we have used activity to include all these aspects, it is more in keeping with our usage to refer to the basic dialectic of personal activity as purpose, realization, and memory. In the repetition and blending of such cycles, involving phenomenal contents having infinitely varied qualities, with purposes and memories reach-

(1) H. Dreyer, Personalismus und Realismus, page 71.

ing far into the future and the past, consists the development of personality in the concrete. When this movement, rich as it is already in the light of previous analysis, is thought of as further illuminated by intelligence, permeated with the values of feeling, and determined out of its own free nature, it will represent still more perfectly personality in its most typical and highly developed forms. To some of these supplementary concepts we must turn presently before attacking the problem of the reality of personality.

a'. Examples of personalistic dialectic.

This triadic movement may be otherwise named the dialectic of personal activity, or personalistic dialectic. Its clearest examples exist in those moral experiences where a person suddenly becomes aware of his obligation to perform a particular act and resolves at once to do it and carries out his resolution, and in the end he has a satisfying consciousness of having done his duty. It is illustrated in religious conversion, where one is presented with a new ideal of life, accepts it, meets difficulties in its fulfilment, but overcomes, and in the end has an experience of elation and triumph which is in part derived from his remembrance of his original resolution and his previous sinful behavior. The dialectic may be illustrated in simple perception: for example, I want to know the time of day; I look at the clock, find out what I desire, and then resume my work. Here is an original sense of incompleteness and a direction of experience looking to its removal, simple bodily behavior, and the appearance of a satisfaction with the conclusion of it. Again, I cannot see an object plainly; I move and strain my eyes; finally it becomes clear, and I am satisfied. But it is unnecessary to multiply examples of man's most familiar type of experience.

b'. Compared with Hegelian dialectic.

In some such personal movement as has just been described the dialectical movement of Hegel must be expressed apparently if it is to have concrete meaning for us human beings. Unlike the conceptual and universal dialectic of the latter, the personalistic dialectic is confined within a whole of finite activity-experience, which is so different from Hegel's representation of the development of concepts in the world at large that a comparison is likely to result in deepening difficulties rather than in deepened insights. However, if one does not press the comparison too far, he may get perhaps a new view of the fundamentally important triadic movement within personal experience by making a brief and superficial comparison of the two doctrines.

In every case of a highly developed and complete activity at the personal level of experience, the active and conscious subject which originally exists (thesis:agent) begins with some sense of incompleteness (negation), and accordingly posits a goal (antithesis: purpose) which promises to remove it; he may end either with an experience of satisfaction or completeness (synthesis:achievement), and the positing of a new purpose, or with a feeling of dissatisfaction and the consequence of either abandoning or reasserting his original goal. The achievement of a compound purpose sometimes represents a very comprehensive synthesis in the sense that many subordinate or instrumental ends have had to be realized before its full and ideal meaning could become reality in the experience of the agent who first posited it.

In the personalistic development which we have been describing it is the presence of a purpose--namely, of an experience which an agent wants but which at the same time the agent does not have--which explains that inner and ideal disagreement or incompleteness which is so regularly present in personal activities. Such incompleteness--not properly called a contradiction--is required as an essential factor of a complex typical activity because of the purposive character of the latter, and this incompleteness, arising from the presence of purpose, alone makes intelligible the historical and self-perfecting activities of human persons. The overcoming of deficiencies in experience by acts of self-determination--the temporal development of purposive activities--an agent's expectation of being something in a moment which he is not now--the making real of that which at first is only ideal--these are the most real and fundamental facts in personal experience.

C. PERSONALITY AND INTELLIGENCE.

1. Transitional remarks and introduction.

The results of our study of personalistic dialectic have forced upon us the consideration, next, of the rational or intelligent factor in the concept of personality. The approach to this concept by way of an examination of concrete activity has been an aid in freeing us from the perils of intellectualism, although at the beginning of that study we recognized that much abstraction was inevitable in the course of a logical treatment, one by one, of the implications of so complex a fact as personal activity. This abstractness has been overcome in part by maintaining the standpoint of particular acts, and in part also by the summary of the preceding pages; it may be overcome further, and we may reach a still more concrete view of personality, by the consideration of several other aspects of the complex activity-experience. So far as possible our intention has been to begin with personal experience in the concrete and to proceed by setting forth its implications rather than by analyzing it into parts. That is, we started with the original whole, and then tried to exhibit its various aspects. This method of procedure has involved some repetition because the whole concept of personality must reappear again and again, but this method has the great advantage of warding off much abstraction, and of preventing us from supposing that personality is some kind of composition, for example, of intellect, feeling, and will. It keeps before our minds, too, the original unity of personal experience. But since our primary aim is to understand personality in its chief aspects, we have no objection to the use of abstract terms and argument, after we have sufficiently recognized the fact of this use.

a. Importance of recognizing the necessarily abstract character of our exposition of the concept of personality, even when our starting point is the concrete act.

b. The next phases of personality to be discussed may be regarded as implications of purpose.

For this understanding further specifications and distinctions are needed. The program immediately ahead of us may be understood by considering what the fact of purpose involves when it is present as a dynamic factor in a concrete activity. Such a purpose may be abstracted from its active whole and be properly designated an idea, but it is actually more than an idea in the usual logical sense, for it is something which, as we may say, appeals to the subject as a significant end, and because of this significance, he may choose to realize it in action.

In other words, the purpose present in personal activity seems inseparably linked with what have been called rational, emotional, and volitional phases of mind. These various concepts need now to be considered in connection with personal activity and the concept of personality, and we shall do so under the following headings: Personality and Intelligence; Personality and Value; Personality and Self-determination. The conclusion of these discussions will find us ready to examine the meaning of the identity and unity of personality, before taking up the question of its reality.

c. And first we shall consider the ancient idea that the soul is distinguished by reason or intelligence.

From the days of Plato reason has been put forward as the chief and divinest aspect of the soul. (1) Such assertions should be made with circumspection lest one imply by them that the concrete person has been dissected into parts and that one of these has been made the ruler over a little colony of faculties, as a charioteer may drive his horses. (2) A person is from the first a unity in which various aspects may be distinguished but from which they cannot be separated, save as concepts. Now when Bowne asserts that personality is intelligence (3), this statement is not inconsistent with the affirmation that personality is also will, for each assertion is meant to emphasize one important aspect of personal experience and not to exhaust the latter. We shall consider briefly now the intelligence-phase of personality.

d. General meaning of intelligence.

By intelligence will be meant, in general, the "power to know" or to introduce order into experience; the power to discriminate, to perceive details, to relate, to build concepts. It includes the cognitive character of consciousness to which James refers. (4) These capacities are plainly discernible in a typical activity-cycle, and are very intimately involved in the purposive and individual aspects of personal activity. The latter ideas will furnish a starting point for the study of the intelligent or rational factor in the concept of personality.

2. Intelligence in relation to the purposive aspect of personality.

General: How purpose involves intelligence.

In the first place, it should be noted that intelligence is one of the fundamental implications or conditions of purposive activity, for if a purpose is to mean anything more than a vague or undefined craving, and if it is to refer to a time more distant than the next moment of experience, free ideas are required for the forming of the purpose, discrimination for its realization, and rational ordering for its comparison and organization with others. It is characteristic of the rational phase of mind to deal symbolically with absent things and to differentiate meanings and to correlate objective facts. Hence when activity comes to be self-directed with reference to ends remote from the momentary impulse, the work of intelligence becomes manifest. L. T. Hobhouse points out that, "With the formation of Purpose we cross the bridge which leads from the action of blind (though felt and conscious) impulse and enter the kingdom of Intelligence proper, and though the basis of the feeling which underlies the Purpose may be wholly instinctive, yet the purposive act will be justly ascribed to the conscious intelligence of the individual." (5)

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(1) For examples of intellectualistic views of the soul, see page 6 above, in the classification of theories.
(2) Plato. (3) See above, pages 132, top, 133.
(4) See above, pages 25, 57.
(5) Development and Purpose, pages 173-4.

In other words, in order to make clear plans for the future and in order to provide means that are efficacious, in an orderly universe, for their realization, what is called intelligence is indispensable. H. Bergson has made familiar the idea of intellect being the instrument of action; it is an instrument in the sense, not of being something apart from action, but of being an integral and essential aspect of all phases of personal activity. W. Caldwell states that, "It is equally certain that there is thought in action--so long, that is to say, as action is regarded as action and not as impulse." (1) The two most important forms which intelligence takes in our personal activities are (a) apprehension and definition of ends that are valuable, and (b) discrimination in the means of their attainment upon the basis of our understanding of ourselves and the universe. Let us consider more fully these two forms of intelligence. The functions of intelligence are so well known that it is difficult to avoid trite remarks.

a. The function of intelligence in the definition of ends.

When we consider the work of intelligence in the definition of our ends, we note that, as our individual experience develops, the original unrest and unguided behavior with its near-lying objects give way to a more and more explicit plurality of purposes that are more and more distant so far as their realization is concerned, so that the present situation comes to be distinguished clearly from the future or ideal one. Our first criterion of personality was the guidance of conduct by ends that are not at all times momentary. The definition of these more remote ends is one of the important offices of intelligence in the economy of personal life, and with it is intimately associated the imaginative function. Indeed, we may say that personality is first present in a genuine form when we endeavor to define, to order, and to evaluate our desires and purposes, but these processes require some measure of judgment, ideation, deliberation, synthesis, and other intellective factors.

It is in those acts which are directed to the definition or clarification of our purposes that the intelligent aspect of personality is seen in one important form. These acts themselves must, of course, be included in the general class of personal activities, although they are of a different species than those acts which, for example, are directed to the means of realizing a purpose that is already clearly apprehended. When a man pursues knowledge for its own sake, we do not come upon a kind of personal life that cannot be included under the form of personal activity, but we have only a difference in the content of the purpose. The attainment of such knowledge, however, depends upon very intense activities and interests. Definition of human values may become one of the driving motives of a person's activities, but under these circumstances he does not cease to be active; he has become active only with reference to a different end. Intelligence, then, is a necessary condition for the definition of a man's goal whether he aims to write books on science or to sell merchandise or to raise corn. The work of intelligence in this connection is so obvious as to need little comment.

In the elaboration and coordination of our moral, religious, aesthetical, and philosophical ideals the work of active intelligence or of intelligent personality is manifested in its highest forms.

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(1) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 96.

b. The work of intelligence in the coordination of ideals.

The various conative tendencies of the human individual need to be organized with reference to one another and to their total significance, as well as with reference to the demands of society. That is, intelligence must cooperate if our native tendencies to action are to be fruitful in attaining ends that are likely to be genuinely satisfying. The ideas, ideals, or rules of conduct which arise from the criticism of ourselves in the light of social demands become the permanent points of reference for the determination of our life as a whole. "It is characteristic of human conduct that it is guided by 'ideas.'" (1)

R. B. Perry gives an excellent description (2) of the intelligent factor in the determination of conduct. He thinks that a disposition is not sufficient to explain the moral activity of Socrates. "What is necessary is that Socrates should mean to submit to law, or that he should think his act to be a case of submitting to the law. The link between the rule and the disposition is an act of interpretation or judgment. In other words, one is said to be governed by a purpose M, when M is some generalized form of action, and when one is disposed consistently to perform what one believes. . . to be a case of M. This then appears to be what is meant by purpose when purposiveness is imputed to the rational or reflective procedure of man."

c. The office of intelligence in the realization of our purposes:

The function of intelligence is also very important in the realization of our purposes, for this depends upon acquaintance with the natural and social world in which we act, and it is the special business of intelligence to differentiate and coordinate the objects of our experience as we encounter them in our individual activities. "All experience," says B. H. Bode, "is a kind of intelligence, a control of present behavior with reference to future adjustment." (3) And since we finite beings stand in inevitable interaction with the universe in which we find ourselves, the work of intelligence in understanding these interrelations is obviously an important condition for the successful attainment of all those of our ends which depend upon coordination of objective things.

Namely, in effectively adjusting our activities to an orderly universe.

In other words, it is in the achievement of a person's ends in an orderly universe that the need clearly appears of ordering intelligently the steps in his cycles of activity and also the objects involved in them. This work of discovering the systematic relations of things is the outstanding characteristic of those personal acts which are primarily of the intelligent type, as contrasted, for example, with the aesthetic type. The greater our knowledge of things, the greater becomes the universe of which we may take account in our activities and in the attainment of the ends we esteem. Our personalities grow with the increase of our intelligent understanding of the nature of our interaction with the world. This understanding makes possible growing wisdom in the selection of the ends which will prove to be practicable in realization, for selection really presupposes system in things, and intelligence takes account of this system in constructing designs or plans of action.

3. All personal activities are intelligent.

If certain principles of order and free ideas are involved in the positing and the realization of human purposes, and if purposiveness is a mark of all personal activity, it follows that all per-

(1) R. B. Perry, Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 17.
(2) Monist, vol. XXVII, page 357.
(3) J. Dewey, editor, Creative Intelligence, page 249.

a. Meaning of intelligent acts.

sonal activities are intelligent. But intelligence must not be thought of as some kind of condition or faculty external or anterior to personal activity. Apart from its immanent existence in particular activities, it is an abstraction; its real meaning is to be grasped only in the concrete experience of personal acts. Although all such acts are intelligent, the amount of orderliness involved in them varies much, but even where it is greatest, namely, in those acts which may be called predominantly acts of intelligence or of knowledge, the latter conform to the type of activity already described. Intellect does not exist apart from personal acts. (1) An intelligent act would be distinguished from a voluntary one, not absolutely, but only relatively; the difference would be merely one of emphasis among factors, and not one of fundamental difference of factors.

b. Description of the intelligent aspect of personal activity.

We may say that intelligence is especially emphatic and dominant in those acts where our interest is directed to the differentiation and the ordering of the phases of our experience, intelligence being the concept to cover particular acts of this sort, which have also the other aspects of activity. It might be more exact to say that intelligence is an abstract term used to refer to all modes of ordering present in individual acts. It is notably manifest in those activities which are directed at the analysis and synthesis of facts or purposes. But all personal activities are intelligent in the sense that clear ideas are required in some measure both for the positing and the realization in an orderly way of their purposes. In short, so far as a particular act, by reason of its purposive, individuality, or memory aspects, has clear outlines and represents a system of distinguishable and orderly phases, it is intelligent. Since thought itself must be regarded as a kind of activity, we may say that there is a special group of human purposes which are directed to the understanding of reality. It seems certain that all thinking is a form of activity, but it is doubtful whether, as the pragmatists hold, it is also a form of action. "Theory does indeed belong to practice," says B. Bosanquet. "It is a form of conation." (2)

4. Intelligence in relation to the active subject.

The ideality of one's future plans presupposes a subject which is a thinking or intelligent one, but it should be noted that this subject is not different from the agent or active subject which we have already examined. Acts of knowing are as concrete as other kinds of activity, and have similar implications. If one wishes, for epistemological purposes, to neglect these implications, he may call the agent which in general conditions acts of knowing the pure ego or epistemological subject, but he has not brought to light any new factor in personal activity; he has only described the agent in a more abstract way. He has considered the agent as merely the subject for whom objects of knowledge are, without regard to the factors of attending, purposing, valuing, and the like, which are usually present in the concrete act in which the agent is actually operative. In short, the pure ego of epistemology is the active subject treated abstractly as a condition of knowledge. The abstraction itself is an interesting variety of activity of the predominantly intelligent type. In the history of any intelligent

a. The pure ego or epistemological subject is an abstraction.

b. It is the active subject considered as a condition of knowledge.

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(1) See below, pages 289-91; 337-8.

(2) Page 9 of his Inaugural Lecture at Saint Andrews upon the Practical Value of Moral Philosophy, quoted by W. Caldwell, Pragmatism and Idealism, page 96, note 1.

person, then, it is the same subject which is active, whether his activities are directed to the attainment of knowledge or to the production of practical values.

The formal ego regarded as "the logical unity of consciousness" gets its original meaning from the active unity of personal experience. Until this ego has been reclothed with the concrete factors of interest, etc., of which the epistemologists have stripped it, it can under no circumstances be identified with personality. (1) It is altogether too empty and abstract for such purposes. (2) But the subject in the theory of knowledge may be identified with the agent which acts in various human experiences, and thus be brought back to the realm of concrete personality and real existence. J. Lindsay has written an article to show that the formal ego has no "place in actual experience where form and content are indissolubly united." (3)

5. Personality in relation to the objects of its knowledge.

a. Statement of the problem.

When it is said that the real person cannot be identified with the pure subject or formal ego of epistemology, because the latter is an abstraction, it should be noted that the object is also an abstraction. How objects may be thought of as existing does not concern us here, but if it is true that both subject and object are abstractions and not ontological distinctions, then we have to ask concerning the relation of personality to its objects of cognition. (4) W. Mitchell says, "To have an object-experience is also to have a subject-experience; it is this which differentiates the object as we think it from our thinking it, our interest in it, and our dealing with it. These are our subject-experience." (5) Hence, we should try to understand the relation of the subject-experience to its objects, and we may expect to find this meaning in concrete experience where a particular active subject is acting in an environment of particular objects.

b. Distinction between two meanings of object.

But if the active subject does not exist apart from an object, the question clearly arises as to whether or not we should include in the active person the objects which he knows or is interested in? We make a negative answer, with the qualifications to be noted in a moment, and avoid reducing personality to mere subjectivity by making an important distinction between two meanings of the very ambiguous term, object. This view of the self will be seen to stand in contrast with that which issues from R. B. Perry's epistemological monism, for according to the latter, personality tends to be dissolved into the same "stuff as things." (6)

Now, the word, object, may refer, on the one hand, to the physical things or to the logical and mathematical entities which we know, but there are good reasons for refusing to assert that the self is to be understood either as a physical thing (7), or as a logical entity. (8) On the other hand, mental processes may also become

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(1) See references to transcendental theories of personality, above pages 7-8, in the classification of views.

(2) Compare James' objections to the emptiness of the transcendental ego, above pages 42-3.

(3) The Formal Ego, Philosophical Review, vol. XXVIII, page 72.

(4) Compare Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Part I, chapter III: How Does the Mind Get Objects?

(5) Structure and Growth of Mind, page 58.

(6) See our criticism of his immanent conception of consciousness, above pages 110, 116-119, 89 ff.

(7) See above, energetic view of activity, pages 194-199.

(8) Compare criticism of Perry, above pages 87-8, 105-7, 116-19.

objects of knowledge, and it is these which may become aspects of the self or personality. The most general and satisfactory way of making these distinctions clear is to adopt the general points made by K. Dunlap. In every experience we can distinguish, he says , three aspects: besides the subject of experience, there is the experiencing, and also that which is experienced. (1) The two latter aspects we regard as objective, though both are not objects of an attentive subject at the same time, but may be so only successively. Hence, in retrospection, the phases of an individual act, except the agent, may become objects of knowledge. There are, then, two great classes of objects: psychical facts, and the objects with reference to which an agent acts, notably physical and logical entities. Hereafter, when fine distinctions are required, the word, object, will be used in the latter sense; and confusion would be avoided if the term, contents of consciousness, were also restricted to the latter signification. The two sorts of objects may be called respectively internal objects and external objects.

c. The concrete person is an agent plus his mental processes, as distinguished from other objects.

The concrete person does not include the object in the latter sense, but is an act which is constituted by an active agent plus the mental processes involved in this act. In most general terms, then, a person is the subject of experience having certain experiences, exclusive of objects in the physical or logical sense. The process of experience is always one aspect merely of a concrete activity which involves an agent; so that the two fundamental phases of human experiences are personal acts and that objective world to which these acts are related.

D. H. Parker (2) suggests that the self is "in contact with content," and both together he proposes to call mind or consciousness. Contact is a valuable term if it is not taken to imply a realistic sense, for it is as a result of my active contact with a world which I do not entirely create, however much its order in my knowledge and its value are determined by me, that leads me to make the distinction between my activities and the objects upon which I act, but with which I do not identify myself in reflection. If the above conception of a personal act is correct, then psychology deals with abstractions when it is concerned with mental processes alone, for the unifying and active agent, which together with them constitutes the real person, has been overlooked. This fact furnishes a solid foundation for the development of a self-psychology like that of Miss M. W. Calkins (3) and of a functional psychology such as is advocated by G. A. Coe. (4)

1'. In other words, a person is a unity of the subject of experience and the empirical ego: definition of the latter.

The totality of mental processes which one experiences has been called the empirical ego. It is frequently unclear, however, whether or not this term includes both the active subject of experiences and his proper psychical processes, such as feelings, interests, cognitive acts, volitions, etc., all of which we have called his internal objects, and which constitute the phenomena studied by the introspective psychologist. We shall adopt reluctantly the usage which, on the whole, prevails, and take the empir-

(1) Psychological Review, vol. XXI, pages 62-69.
(2) Self and Nature, page 25.
(3) Compare her First Book in Psychology.
(4) Compare the first part of his Psychology of Religion.

ical ego to mean all of the abstract psychical processes owned by a particular active subject. It is recognized that this use of empirical is inexact and misleading, for it is uncertain whether or not the agent is to be regarded as an aspect of personal experience, an uncertainty which is probably due to the common neglect of the active subject of experience. From this customary terminology it follows that the empirical ego and the subject of experience are alike abstractions, and that it is in their unity that personal life consists. James called the empirical ego the "Me," (1) but this is not the concrete person, and is an abstraction. In order to recognize the abstract character of the empirical ego, we may speak of the experiential unity, in the concrete acts of human persons, of this agent and the empirical ego as above described.

It was precisely the empirical ego,--the mental processes, functions, or phenomena that belong to any subject,--which we tried, in our account of the individuality of activity, to set forth in a general way as an important aspect of a concrete act. We thus avoid the fallacy of abstraction which arises from attempting to identify the self either with the bare subject of experience or with the empirical ego considered apart from such subject. From this point of view, the person is the active subject plus his experiencings.

It is, however, only in rare moments of introspection that the experiential person as thus described is not acting with reference to external objects, of physical or logical kinds, with a view to knowing them or to adjusting his actions to them. But when a person comes to define carefully his selfhood, he ought not to include in it the external objects which he knows by means of his intelligent acts.

2'. The subject and the empirical ego are alike abstractions.

In this way we avoid two abstractions, the pure subject of experience, and the empirical ego considered without reference to the former. These two extremes have been well distinguished by E. C. Wilm: "There is the empirical self, the content or object side of consciousness, composed of so-called states or processes of consciousness, like perceptions, memories, emotions, and conative experiences, and the subject, the transcendental self in the Kantian terminology, aware of these experiences, to whom these experiences in some sense belong." (2) From the standpoint of this investigation the genuine person consists neither in the subject-self nor in the empirical self, but in the indissoluble unity of these two in concrete activity. In such active cycles as described in the last main chapter all of the processes mentioned by E. C. Wilm may have a place on occasion, but in addition to them there is the agent or active subject which is the indispensable ground of them all.

a'. Note on Kant's Paralogisms.

The peculiar difficulty in knowing the agent which already has been pointed out (3) explains perhaps why some thinkers, especially psychologists, treat the self as purely phenomenal or empirical, in the sense just designated. In this treatment they seem to have the support of Kant, for in his "paralogisms" (4) he points out that the

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(1) See above, pages 33-36.
(2) Article, "Selfhood," in, Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. E. Creighton, page 279.
(3) See above, pages 238-42; compare below also, pp. 353-357.
(4) Critique of Pure Reason, (Müller translation) pages 278-327.

self is known only as an object of thought, and declares that when one tries to apprehend it directly as it is in itself, he falls into a fallacy. This mistake arises from the demand of reason to know what the empirical self, which is manifest in internal sense and which grows in the course of experience, is in its completed form. To suppose that such knowledge is possible is to commit a fallacy, according to Kant, for this completed self is a thing-in-itself, and is not experienced; a paralogism arises from drawing a conclusion concerning the noumenal self upon the basis of what one knows of the self as experienced. If, however, we maintain the point of view of the individual act, where the active subject and the empirical ego are only distinguishable phases of an experiential whole, we shall not only avoid both the abstractions of a transcendental ego and of a phenomenal self without any abiding ground, but also we shall be using experience in a definite snese. Without the empirical ego the agent would be empty, and without the agent the empirical ego would be groundless. To the one is to be referred the unity and permanence of concrete acts, and to the other their empirical and qualitative richness.

d. Personality is to be distinguished from its objects.

1'. A person may deal with objects without identifying himself with them.

A more complete discussion of the relation between the empirical and the subjective egos will be presented below under the topic of the unity of personality (1), but in connection with the intelligent feature of personality it should be noted that the person, in his thinking and practice, may deal with many varied phases of the universe, both near and remote, without identifying himself with them. When James speaks of extending the empirical self so as to include friends, country, bank account, etc., (2) he is certainly using terms in a very loose way, for such an unbridled extension is possible when the distinction between the two kinds of objects to which reference has been made is overlooked. Personality is no doubt successively in "contact" or interaction with a vast world of objects, but it is not characteristic of the average person to identify himself with them, however much he may be interested in them.

In other words, a person may always be in contact with objects, including his own body, without feeling the necessity of identifying his activities with these objects. Perry recognizes the distinction between the contents of consciousness and action in the beginning of his exposition of consciousness. (3) James declares that "the most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology" is the belief in the distinction of "the mental state as an inward activity or passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal. (4) The meaning of personality is to be found in activities and not in the objects, although it is no doubt perfectly true that both exist in a common world of experience. When one does not distinguish his personal activities from the world of objects which he experiences, this means that he is living in a world of primitive experience which has not yet become articulate. When the distinction in question arises, the only legitimate meaning of pure activity will be personal activity, and this point indicates that this activity is inseparably connected with various objects of experience. D. H. Parker says that

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(1) See below, page 317.
(2) See The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 291-3.
(3) See above, pages 89-90.
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 185; see above, page 28, bottom.

2'. Parker's account of the relation of the self to the content or objects of experience.

he has always meant to himself "certain instincts, purposes, choices; certain satisfactions and dissatisfactions; and certain opinions, thoughts, memories. Let us call all these activities." (1) These activities he considers to be the essential part of the self; the self or person in this sense is a narrower term than mind, which includes at once the active self and the contents or objects of its experience. This use of terms certainly gives promise of making for clearness in our thinking about personality.

Parker has some further striking and succinct remarks on the relation of a self to his object, which we may summarize as follows: (2) The self is in constant contact with things which are no part of it; our activities never exist apart from these things. With them the self makes a whole from which are excluded all things it cannot at the moment find. This whole I call the mind or consciousness. It is made up of content and myself. The self is only a part of this whole, and it is improper to say it is the whole. Everything in this whole which is not self is content. This distinction is not always recognized because I never find myself without some contact with content, that is, because of the close connection between the two parts of the mind. I never find any content separate from the self. These are illuminating suggestions.

3'. Further examples of the distinction between the person and his objects.

There are numerous cognitive experiences in which the distinction we are trying to make is easily slurred over. D. H. Parker points out further that images, for example, often seem to be myself. They are in such inseparable connection with oneself and his activities that they are often identified with them, although in careful reflection, one can easily distinguish himself and his interests even from the imaginative worlds which he may create. Then, too, thoughts and memories are interwoven with the pictures of their objects; pleasures and pain are penetrated with organic pressures and changes. Strivings are always inwrought with strains, and desires often go with images of objects involved in their satisfaction. Other things often associated with the self are articular and muscular strains, beatings of the heart, tensions in the forehead and throat, etc. (3) The self, however, is not content, but is the active agent which interacts with objects. Most of the examples in this paragraph are taken from Parker's first chapter.

It hardly seems necessary to insist at such length upon the importance of distinguishing the person as an experiencing agent from the objects which he may know or with which he may interact or which may be involved in the realization of his purposes. I may experience blue objects, but I never say that I myself am blue or yellow or black, except in a figurative sense. G. Kafka asserts that, "The content of sensations and ideas can never form a predicate of the ego; the ego, therefore, is not red, sharp, hard, sweet, or square, but it <u>is</u> cheerful, satisfied, strained, and the like, and, above all, it wills." (4) I may wish for a lot of money, but the money is not a part of myself, but only the wishing for it. I may propose to take a sight-seeing tour, but I do not identify myself with the objects in which I become interested in fulfilling my purpose, however important a part they may play in bringing me the satisfaction I seek. That satisfaction may be

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(1) Self and Nature, page 31. (2) Ibid., pages 4-5.

(3) Compare, for example, James' description of the spiritual self, above page 35.

(4) Archiv fürdie gesamte Psychologie, vol. XIX, 1910, page 110.

distinguished from the objects with which it is concerned if I make any distinctions in my experience at all. In thinking I may distinguish the aspects, "It is I who think" and "I am thinking," from "I think something." The two former are essential to my personal activity. The perceiver and the perceiving, not the perceived, belong to the personal act. The actor and the acting, not the objects effected, constitute personality. The latter are experienced. The acting is the process of experiencing. The agent is neither a process nor an object of apprehension, but is the immanent subject of experience, abstract enough indeed taken by itself, yet essential to all experience on the personal level.

4'. But objects are not passively impressed upon the person but actively constructed by him.

Now most of our activities involve relations to the sensory world. It has been said that in sensation the self is passive. Sensations are identified with impressions which we receive. Shall we then say that in sensation personality is passive? We hold that personality is throughout active in some measure, and that in the case of sensation the supposed passivity is fictitious, and the reasons for this affirmation are as follows:

a'. Personality is active even in sensory experience.

(a) First, since we have long ago abandoned physical or spatial metaphors, we cannot think of sensations in the old-fashioned way as impressions in any physical sense. Sensations appear in experience because there is something to react to the objects presented and to receive the impressions. As J. Ward observes, the subject must have a degree of activity in order to be "active enough at least to 'receive impressions!'" (1) The conscious and waking person is constantly and actively ready to take cognizance of objects acting upon him, and without his active cooperation these objects would mean nothing to him.

1". Sensations are abstractions of a dangerous sort.

(b) But the doctrine that the mind is passive in sensation rests upon the assumption that sensations themselves occur in a pure state, which as a matter of fact is a dangerous abstraction. They never so occur in normal adult experience. They are always aspects of an active experience; indeed, declares S. Alexander, (2) "It is not strained to speak of a sensory action or an act of sensation." Again he says, "I find in a sensation nothing but mental activity directed upon what is called the content of the sensation, which content is nowhere found except in the external object." (3)

2". Macintosh on the activity of the self in sensation.

D. C. Macintosh asserts that, "What we are concerned to maintain here is that in sensation, as truly as in memory, there is a creative activity of spirit--or of whatever we may choose to call the psychical subject. Upon occasion of certain stimulations, sense-qualities--particular colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and the like--are creatively produced by each psychical subject for itself, and in many cases located with more or less accuracy in or upon the very object in the environment from which the stimulation proceeded." (4) He concludes that, "What we here suggest is that it is possible to interpret consciousness, in sensation everywhere and always, as well as in its other forms, as being a productive activity, and that of a unique--but not indefinable--sort." (5) He also points out that sensing is

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(1) Psychological Principles, page 49.

(2) Proceedings of the Aris. Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 215.

(3) Ibid., page 221. An excellent destructive criticism of the doctrine of pure sensations is found at the beginning of Coe's Psychology of Religion. (4) The Problem of Knowledge, page 313.

(5) Prob. of Knowl., page 315; for a long defense of the active nature of sensation, as well as of consciousness as a whole, see Ibid., pages 312-19.

"relatively static, as compared with the various 'thinking' activities." (1)

3". Perry on the active character of cognitive response.

R. B. Perry gives an excellent account of a simple cognitive experience which fits in very well with our present conception of the mental subject as fundamentally active. He explains: "To make the matter clearer it is necessary to introduce the case of simple awareness or cognitive response. In this case the endeavor is that the stimulus should more effectively stimulate. The organism responds by a better adjustment to the action of the stimulus, by turning the head, focusing, cutting off inhibiting or disturbing stimuli; in short, by looking, listening, touching, sniffing and the like. This attentive set is like any other except in that it usually accompanies the others and facilitates them. But it is quite capable of absorbing the energies of the organism for a time. Then when it comes to rest, one can be said to have one's curiosity satisfied, and to have learned how to 'see' what one was trying to see. The attentive act is an anticipation of future stimulation, and whatever excites it is object of consciousness in the sense just described." (2)

4". Views of others.

G. A. Coe also suggests that the desire to multiply objects is one of the general purposes of the human mind. (3) W. Caldwell, too, maintains that, "There is certainly purpose in the attention that is involved even in the simplest piece of perception, the selection of what interests and affects us out of the total field of vision or experience." (4) The perceptual world, he says, is not given, but "constructed by our activity." B. P. Bowne holds also to the view that the mind is fundamentally active in all knowing. (5)

b'. Concluding remarks on the activity of personality in cognition.

The interest which accompanies perception is one phase of that general interest which we have in adjusting ourselves to the universe by means of understanding its nature. When we pass from the guidance of activity by perception to its guidance by ideation, the intelligent phase of personality becomes still more important.

Hence, even in cognitive experience which appears to be passive, it turns out that we are passive only in a very relative sense, and that fundamentally we are active in them all. We may agree with G. F. Stout that a purely passive consciousness does not exist. (6) Even reverie, he thinks, involves an active element (7); we are active in the sense that we "hug our present enjoyment," and resist interruptions. It is by means of his own activities that the individual person comes to know his world, and in this endeavor his activities are predominantly intelligent.

6. Mistaken character of the question as to the primacy of the intellect or the will.

In view of these observations it appears that the whole question of whether the will or the intellect is primary in personality is a wholly mistaken one. J. Laird (8) has demonstrated at length the mutual irreducibility of will, feeling, and reason. He maintains that there is no primacy of practical or speculative reason, and that the whole terminology in this controversy is misleading. There is a de-

(1) The Problem of Knowledge, page 319.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 17.
(3) Psychology of Religion, page 40.
(4) Pragmatism and Idealism, pages 95-6.
(5) See especially Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 50-57.
(6) Analytical Psychology, vol. I, page 168. (7) Ibid., p. 170 ff.
(8) Problems of the Self.

sire to do what we believe to be right, and this is operative in moral choice; and there is a desire to believe only what is seen to be coherent, and this is operative in speculation; but in both cases the ultimate fact is a personal activity which involves at once an intelligent and a volitional phase. To separate them would mean to irreparably split personality. W. Caldwell maintains that, "It is the fact of action that unites or brings together what we call 'desire' and what we call 'thought.'. . It is in conscious action that our desires and our thoughts do come together." (1)

a. Usefulness of intellect, will, and feeling in psychological description, but personality cannot be identified with any one.

It undoubtedly is true that the ideas of intellect, will, and feeling also, are valuable principles for purposes of psychological classification or description, but one approaches the problem of personality in a mistaken and unprofitable way if he attempts, first, to prove that one of these is a fundamental principle or essence of which the others are species or manifestations, and then, to show that his favorite principle is identical with personality. This identification would rest upon the hypostatization of a psychological class, and one should scarcely expect to grasp the meaning of real personality with such an hypostatized abstraction. This is a common mistake into which defenders of objectivistic or phenomenalistic theories fall. (2)

J. Ward points out that "intellect without synthetic activity is a nonentity." (3) G. Kafka, in criticizing H. Münsterberg's attempt to identify the ego with the will, maintains that the will-experiences cannot be so distinguished from other kinds of psychic phenomena that we are warranted in making them the subject over against which the other psychical phenomena may be set, for these so-called will-experiences have the same relation to the ego as the others, although their special characteristics as a class of facts may be granted. He says that, "It is one and the same ego which experiences sensations and ideas, and their relations, on the one hand, and the feelings and will-acts on the other." (4)

b. Will, intellect, and feeling are abstract aspects of concrete personal activity,

In other words, will, intellect, and feeling are alike abstract qualities or aspects of the concrete personal act. The living personality is wider than intellect, as H. Bergson has so strongly emphasized, and it is also wider than either will or feeling. James suggests that, "If we postulate the fact of thinking at all, I believe that we must postulate its dynamic power as well." (5) In another place (6) he says that knowing is a function of our active life. In other words, if we begin with personal activity as we know it in every-day life, we find that we can distinguish in it an intellectual or intelligent aspect, and perhaps also a will and a feeling aspect; these are not parts, however, but aspects of a single living and progressive whole. They are abstractions when taken apart from this concrete whole.

It is true, however, that in any particular activity one of these aspects may play a more important part than another. H. W. Carr suggests that, "A train of thought is the evolution of a meaning or

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(1) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 100.
(2) See above, pages 6-7.
(3) Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, page 242.
(4) Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, vol. XIX, pages 109-10.
(5) The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 571.
(6) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 75.

But in any individual act one may be more important than the others.

purpose according as the emphasis is laid on intellect or will." (1) In our scientific or philosophical endeavors, the rational aspect of personality predominates, but these endeavors are nevertheless essentially active and interested. In the performance of various daily duties there are cases where the will aspect predominates, but in these cases the intellective factor is never absent. In great joy and sorrow and in intense aesthetic delights feeling may be the ruling factor, but these experiences probably would not exist apart from the presence of some thought and will.

In short, in any individual life or act, the knower who knows is identical with the agent who acts, and these are one with the subject who feels. The most fruitful line of division in the study of personality lies between the active subject and his various experiences, rather than among cognition, volition, and affection. If these reasonings are valid, it is as mistaken to say that personality is intellect merely, as it is to assert that it is only will or feeling, for I am unable to find that in human experience at the personal level these ever occur singly.

Upon the basis of a careful psychological description of will, intellect, and feeling, one might, with some profit perhaps, classify personal activities according to the predominance of one of these factors over the others in individual acts. After such a classification had been carried out, one might infer that one group of personal activities is more important than another, but such an inference would be of value only if it rested upon: (a) a complete classification; (b) a recognition of the abstract character of the division; and (c) the discovery of an explicit definition of importance or standpoint adopted which (d) would be applicable to all classes.

7. Personality in relation to the categories or explanatory principles of knowledge.

Will, intellect, and feeling are useful categories or principles for the ordering of our knowledge of the empirical ego, but call for circumspection when used as metaphysical principles. These distinctions and their coordination are the work of the thinking and active person himself. No doubt he may learn about his own nature by the consideration of the ways in which he acts, but his activities, as matters of immediate experience, contain within themselves the categories which he must employ if he is to reach a conceptual formulation of his own nature. The point that needs to be emphasized here is that it is in one's personal activity that he finds the real meaning of those principles which he may be interested in abstracting from them for the purposes of a systematic and comprehensive understanding of himself, and it is probable that this idea applies also to most if not all of the fundamental categories with which he interprets the physical world. The various epistemological categories are an expression of the cognitive interests of human beings and are themselves achievements resulting from intelligent acts; they are derived by the agent himself working intelligently upon his own activities in the endeavor to understand their immanent principles. (2)

a. The origin and meaning of categories used in explaining personality are found in concrete personal acts.

1'. Why they cannot be found elsewhere.

We are obliged to conclude that the principles present in particular acts are the only available keys to personality, and some of the reasons, in summary, are as follows: In the first place, any

(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. I, page 198.

(2) See further discussion of these points in connection with personalistic method, above, pages 176-78; and below in connection with the reality of personality, pages 341-50.

principles of order present in the knowledge of the world of nature, such as time, identity, energy, continuity, causality, or purpose, which may be useful in understanding personality, derive their only intelligible meaning from personal activity itself from which they have been abstracted. Secondly, anything else except a person himself lacks a sufficiently rich individuality so as to be able to furnish enough principles of interpretation, in an intimate and unique correlation, for personal activity. G. T. Ladd explains this point by asserting that "everything is known by the Self, only as having some of the qualities in lower degree which every Self knows itself to have." (1)

b. The philosophical interpretation of personality consists in developing the principles immanent in it.

The work of intelligence in the interpretation of personal activity does not consist, therefore, in introducing principles from without, save those derived from social intercourse, but in the endeavor to develop more clearly and explicitly the principles which are already present in it in an implicit way. This work and this development will not lead to something different from activity, but only to higher forms of activity. These acts of the developed intelligent person will be higher in the sense of representing a clearer integration of individual acts and of compound cycles. That is, the agent will comprehend what he does more clearly, and will be able to achieve more significant and remote ends because of his wider and more explicit knowledge of his own past, of the world in which he lives, and of his purposes for the future. Memory will come to play a larger part; his activities will form themselves into larger and better organized systems, and the rational connections of the various stages in the realization of his ends will be more intimately and consciously bound together. And this whole intelligent development of self-consciousness proceeds from within. As B. H. Bode says, "The process of intelligence is something that goes on, not in our minds, but in thinking: it is not photographic but creative." (2) In short, out of his own activity-experiences, the agent develops various forms of rational interpretation of himself which add significance to his own life.

c. Personality and relations.

It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider the deduction or evolution of the categories of philosophical explanation from personal activity. One of the most important functions of personal activity, as indicated above (3), is its work of understanding its world, of developing systematic conceptions of it. The human person is notably an organizer of experience, who, by his activity, develops a comprehension of the relation of things, and of his place in the world.

8. The importance of intelligence in the development of personality.

From the study above (3) of the relation of intelligence to purpose in personal activity, it is clear that the function of intelligence in the development of personal consciousness is very great. G. T. Ladd maintains that "It would seem that in order to be Anybody,--in other words, any sort of a Person,--so much development of the knowledge of things and of the knowledge of oneself, as has been described in the preceding chapters, is a minimum requirement. The hu-

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(1) Some evidence in support of these propositions was offered in the criticism of the energetic and behavioristic theories of activity; see above, especially pages 81-2, 196-197, 204-212.

(2) J. Dewey, editor, Creative Intelligence, page 255.

(3) See above, pages 279-81.

man being who would lay reasonable claim to personality, even of the meanest grade, must know, with an indubitable conviction of its certainty, something of himself, something of other selves, and much that concerns his own physical constitution and its physical environment. He must know himself as an intelligent will, capable of producing changes, but only within certain limits, and compelled to suffer changes in his states of feeling and thought by external influences that are not subject to his will. . . The development of personality, then, as involving growth in the knowledge of Self is the achievement of intellect as a capacity and activity of the personal type." (1)

Attainment of knowledge may become an end of human endeavor for its own sake, but more commonly among men its value lies in the fact that we can more perfectly realize our ends the more perfectly we understand ourselves and the universe in which we live. The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake represents one of the highest stages of intelligent activity, which, because of its importance in philosophical speculations, explains, perhaps, why intellect or reason is frequently regarded as the essence of personality. J. H. Fichte maintained that the ego must build a world as a theater for the realization of his purposes; the spirit of this doctrine is illuminating, when it is understood to mean that we must, by our own efforts, understand the world and ourselves before we can fulfil our highest purposes and supreme duties.

The humanistic disciplines deal with the contents of knowledge which, in general, are of prime importance as a basis for the development of personality and self-consciousness. (2) Any knowledge derived from the sciences of psychology, sociology, ethics, history, religion, or any other sources, which throws light upon the nature and ideals of human beings will be of great value to anyone seeking to become as rich a personality as is possible. The reason why this knowledge is of such worth ought to be evident now in view of the significant function of intelligence in the definition and realization of human purposes. Of secondary importance to the humanistic kind of knowledge will be that concerning the world in which men live. "We would know what we want, and we would want and desire what we know we can get--the complete development of our personality." (3) We have found as yet no obstacle to the human individual gaining knowledge of his own activities, (4) although, of course, it should be recognized that the knowledge of any activity is an addition to the activity itself.

9. Concluding remarks on the relation of personality to intelligence.

Personality, then, is rational. All personal acts have an intellective phase; they are intelligent and intelligible. Those activities, if they exist, which are without an intelligent aspect should not be called personal. The idealizing or thinking capacity of the human person is so lively and productive that we must regard it as a very important phase of personality. A person is intelligent so far as his activities involve an orderly understanding of himself and his not-self. But everywhere we must avoid speaking of intelligence as

a. Personality involves rationality.

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(1) The Secret of Personality, pages 114-5.

(2) Compare H. W. Wright, Self-Realization, etc., Part II, chapter VI, The Conditionsof Self-Realization in Human Life. See also, G. S. Shaw, The Ground and Goal of Human Life.

(3) W. Caldwell, Pragmatism and Idealism, page 101.

(4) On problem of self-knowledge, see below, pages 351-8.

if it were an independent entity; it is one aspect of our personal activity, and does not exhaust its meaning, unless we give a very wide interpretation to it, as Bowne sometimes does. (1)

b. Intellectualism and voluntarism.

The claims of intellectualism and voluntarism (2) are equally untenable, for both views rest upon an abstraction which cannot be regarded as representing the real personality. Voluntarism is the product of personal activities involving highly developed rational principles, and intellectualism is a product of personal activities involving volitional phases. The intellectualist is right in thinking that purposive reflection is a mark of genuine personality, but wrong in supposing that it is the only mark. The voluntarist is correct in emphasizing the fact that reflection itself is an act of a mature will, but mistaken in trying to exhaustively express the intelligence-functions of personal activities in terms of will.

c. Importance of intelligence-aspects of personal activity.

The intelligence-aspects of personal activity, then, are very important ones, but not the only ones. Even in the act of knowing itself something else is present beside principles of order: there is always interest of some sort, and an original spontaneity. Intelligent acts are distinguished from other types, for example, practical ones, by a difference in emphasis or degree of orderliness present, and not in fundamental nature. The intelligence-aspect of personality is very important, as we have seen, first, because it is essential in the definition and the achievement of long-term purposes which are characteristic of personality. It is important, too, because it is by acts of the intelligent type that we relate other kinds of activity to the universe as a whole, and to the development of the self in the light of its purposes and nature. But until we decide upon some commonly applicable criterion or standard of reference, it is incorrect to assert that either intellect or will is primary in personality. They are so inextricably interwoven in our activities that we should not have personality without the presence of both.

d. The systems of human knowledge reflect personal interests.

In the systems of knowledge which human personalities have constructed we find a wonderful revelation of their essential interests, and of their creative power. C. C. J. Webb declares that, "We have no conception of knowledge except as a personal activity. . . In attempting to explore the nature of knowledge we are confronted by the fact of personality as the presupposition of that which we are exploring. So . . . progress of knowledge itself must sooner or later bring us face to face with this same fact of personality as the highest form of life." (3)

D. PERSONALITY AND VALUE.

1. Close connection of value and feeling with purpose.

The above study of the concept of personality has indicated that a person is primarily an intelligent agent or actor, with all that this implies. In the definition of the meaning of personal intelligence it was difficult to omit the concept of value, for intelligence is especially manifest in the apprehension and multiplication of values. (4) This difficulty was avoided temporarily by describing

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(1) For an excellent discussion of the place of intelligence in personality, see Bowne, above, pages 132-3.

(2) See further below, pages 300-1; 337-8.

(3) God and Personality, page 24.

(4) Compare L. T. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, page 174.

intelligence, in part, by exhibiting its relation to the purposive aspect of personal activity which had been explained before. Now, however, we must consider for itself the idea of value in its relation to personality. In this study attention will be given to the concept of feeling, which occasionally is made the essence of personality (1), and which includes an important group of psychological facts belonging to the empirical ego.

It has been indicated that the concept of purpose as applied in an activity-cycle of some duration requires free ideas or an intelligent aspect, but it implies more, namely, value, for ends are sought because of their worth. This value or axiological aspect has been referred to already in connection with the several kinds of satisfaction connected with the achievement of ends. (2) The purposes involved in activity-cycles have value in the sense that they give promise of satisfaction. This promise is based, in large part at least, upon the facts, reflected in memory, of valuable past experiences. In other words, the ends sought would not be regarded as valuable unless the success which they promise is related to certain previous experiences of value in connection with situations similar to those which are expected to develop.

Whatever, therefore, the character of the satisfaction or value which is present in a personal experience, it seems to be intimately bound up with the teleological aspect of that experience. This connection is plain in those activities which are directed to relieving a present sense of incompleteness or annoyance. But it is also present in satisfying activities, for, in that case, we desire to continue the enjoyable state of mind, provided it does not conflict with higher values which we seek. The close connection of value with purposive activities was suggested also by the importance of conative satisfactions in the pragmatic theory of truth. (3) Certainly this teleological reference in a present feeling of satisfaction would be manifested if something should interfere with its smooth continuance. (4) If I desire to substitute some higher value for a present one, the teleological element is obvious. In general, then, as A. E. Taylor says, "Only a being whose behaviour is consciously or unconsciously determined by ends or purposes seems capable of finding existence, according as those purposes are advanced or hindered, pleasant or painful, glad or wretched, good or bad." (5) These facts confirm the view that we may find our way into the problem of value from the standpoint of purpose in activity.

a. Personal activity the clue to value.

Those purposes are of value, of course, which are actually realizable in concrete activities, and which do not remain always merely ideas entertained; so that it is in the study of individual and personal activities that we shall expect to understand the real meaning of value. We shall suppose that value is dependent for its existence and meaning upon the personal activity processes with their implications, as already set forth. Activities are quests for ends that are valuable when realized. It is in personality, therefore, that we

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(1) See the emotionalistic type of theory in the classification of views in Part I, above, pages 6-7.

(2) See above, page 230. (3) See above, page 16.

(4) See above, pages 203, 248.

(5) Elements of Metaphysics, page 56.

expect to discover the key to the problem of value, and not vice versa. By adopting this point of approach we run no risk of ending with a one-sided emotionalistic or phenomenalistic theory of personality. (1) Bowne has pointed out that the value of most feelings depends upon the element of personality in them. (2) This does not mean, of course, as James has suggested, that we are animated in seeking values by any love of a pure ego. (3) In a word, value has to be defined with reference to the concrete activities of a self.

2. The fundamental place of feeling in the concept of value.

Now it is probable that the value of a mental activity lies primarily in the feeling or affective aspect which is present in it or which develops in it in the course of its fulfilment. There are many theorists of value who find its ground in feeling. This view has been elaborated thoroughly by J. C. Kreibig, among others. (4)

a. Theories of value in which feeling is fundamental:

If we analyze anything, he says, which signifies worth to us, we shall find that its affective operation (Gefühlswirkung) is the fundamental and distinctive element. That is, "Value in general is a feeling (gefühlsmässige) significance. Feeling is the Wertfundamental," and feeling here includes for him actual pleasure (Lust) as well as the accompanying affective disposition whose presence influences the will. (5)

1'. Kreibig.

Everything felt is value and everything valued is felt. (6) Further, he maintains the important point that the primary subject of value is the individual self which experiences the value-feelings; (7) certain phenomena are preferred or disregarded by the feeling subject, and between these two poles there stands a scale of value. (8) He defends in this sense the subjective character of value.

a'. Development of values according to Kreibig.

Kreibig also points out (9) that values show a many-sided development. One method of treating this development is the temporal one. (a) There are, first, those values which come with the accidental reaction to given contents. These must be regarded as founded in human nature itself. W. K. Wright (10) believes in the "evolution of values from instincts," and maintains that "the great sources of all impulses and desires in man, and hence the roots of value, are to be found in the primary instincts and other innate emotional tendencies." (11) (b) At the stage of reflection, we come to consider values which are connected with our experience of objects which have spatial or temporal distance; and finally, (c) there is the stage of acquired dispositions to unified ways of ordering our activities. (12)

2'. Ehrenfels.

C. von Ehrenfels (13) is not opposed to the feeling theory of value, for he locates it in desire. He maintains that, "Value is a relation between an object and a subject in which the subject either really desires the object or would desire it if he were convinced of its existence." (14) The value of a thing is its "desirousness," and "the amount of value is proportional to the strength of the desire."(15)

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(1) Compare classification of theories, above page 6.
(2) See above, pages 133-34. (3) See above, pages 35-6.
(4) Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Wert-theorie, 1902.
(5) Ibid., pages 3-4; 13. (6) Ibid., page 27.
(7) Ibid., page 5. (8) Ibid., page 5.
(9) Ibid., page 23.
(10) Philosophical Review, vol. XXIV, pages 165-83.
(11) Ibid., pages 166-7.
(12) Psychologische Grundlegung, etc., page 28.
(13) System der Werttheorie, 1897.
(14) Ibid., page 65. (15) Ibid., page 65.

W. M. Urban, too, regards both feeling and conation as the psychological equivalents of value, but these two factors are not to be treated as separate in reality. (1)

b. Value-feeling is only one aspect of the concrete whole of personal activity.

The particular aspect of Kreibig's theory which fits in with our systematic development of the concept of personality is that the feeling element in which he finds the criterion of value is not something which is found as a separate phase of consciousness, for he says that "in any fully developed mental experience, the four fundamental psychical elements are present: presentation, thought, feeling, and will. In some mental experiences perception is so predominant in consciousness that we are inclined to call it pure. Again, the feeling element may preponderate over all others--in which case it may be designated pure feeling. But all four elements in a more or less determinate way are found in all purely psychical phenomena." (2) His general conclusion is that there is "no feeling of value without perception and thought-content, and no perception or thought-content without a feeling of value." This conclusion, he believes, saves his theory from leading to hedonism. (3) Putting the above facts together, he gives his general definition of value: "By value in general we understand the significance which a perceptual or thought-content, with an immediate or associative, an actual or a dispositional feeling, can have for a subject." (4)

1'. Perry's theory of value:

Perry puts forward the view (5) that value is the fulfilment of an interest, where interest includes both liking and disliking, and indicates the consummation of either. Interest may be present either as the feeling factor marking the present possession of objects, or as the desire which characterizes prospective possession. In other words, we may be interested in prolonging the present joy, or in seeking to possess the desired object; and so, he thinks, we may classify values according to whether action is directed towards prolongation or achievement. (6) He suggests, also, that "interest cannot be at the same time cognitive and constitutive of value," but at a later time cognition of values is possible by the observation, comparison, and systematic description of our interests. (7) Originally, however, it is true that "any interest whatsoever in an object is constitutive of value;" (8) in other words, "value is possessed intrinsically by the thought complex object-in-relation-to-interest." (9)

Value is the interest present in a concrete activity.

This view may be restated in classical terminology by saying that there is present, in any value experience as described by Perry, a cognitive, an affective, and an active element, for we must remember that interest is always marked by the presence of behavior of some sort. This behavior, according to Perry, is, as we have already

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(1) Valuation; Its Nature and Laws.
(2) Psychologische Grundlegung, etc., pages 27, 43.
(3) Ibid., page iii. (4) Ibid., page 12.
(5) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, vol. XI, pages 141-62. (6) Ibid., page 151.
(7) Ibid., page 172. (8) Ibid., page 154.
(9) Ibid., page 155. See also a further account of his view above in connection with his theory of the self as "an entity capable of desire," pages 92-95.

explained, (1) teleological; interest has a prospective reference; interested behavior is a function of its sequel as well as of the present environment of the individual. Thus the value-situation which he describes greatly resembles the activity-situation which we have described, but emphasizes the fact that the value of the whole lies primarily and distinctively in an emotional or affective factor.

2'. A general tendency in contemporary value-theory.

Contemporary theory of value, therefore, seems to warrant us in concluding that it is the affective aspect of any individual activity which gives it value. There are, of course, other thinkers than those referred to, who find the criterion of value in the life of feeling. We have noted, for example, how James refers all religious, and probably also all personal values to emotions. (2) The men mentioned, however, are sufficient to indicate a prevailing tendency in value-theory.

3. Summary description of the meaning of value.

Since the purpose of this discussion is not to present a systematic theory of value, we shall be content with only an indication of the general meaning of value. It has been suggested already that in whatever affective or conative terms one may define value, they will always represent phases of individual acts. (3) It will be pointed out in a moment (4) that feeling, for adult human beings, is probably an abstraction apart from experiential and active wholes. (5) Consequently, value must be described from the point of view of such concrete activities as make up the life of a real self or person. (6)

a. General definition of value.

Anything which contributes to the satisfaction of a self or person is a value in the positive sense in which the term is commonly used; while that which brings dissatisfaction is a negative value. In other words, a value is anything which meets or hinders a felt need of a self or person.

b. Indication of main factors in value-experience:

Several of the main factors implied in this general definition of value may be pointed out, especially so that its relation to our exposition of activity will be clear. (a) In the first place, it represents an explicit attachment of the idea of value to those experiences of satisfaction and dissatisfaction which have been noted as marking the final stage in a complete and typical individual act. (7)

1'. Value is a phase of an individual act.

2'. Value is teleological.

(b) Values are essentially teleological. Since it was seen that satisfactions and dissatisfactions are functions of the purposes unifying individual activities, it is evident that a teleological factor, and, therefore, a factor of intelligence, is always an intimate phase of a value-experience. The relation between the value- and the purpose-aspects varies because sometimes a purpose represents an ideal value which one desires to actualize, and sometimes it represents a demand that an actual value be preserved. Upon the basis of these distinctions we might classify activities, as Perry suggests, (8)

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(1) See above, pages 92-95.
(2) See above, pages 55, 58.
(3) See above, page 297.
(4) See next section below, subdivision 4.
(5) Compare criticism of F. H. Bradley's view that immediate feeling is a sample of reality, below,
(6) On the distinction between self and person, see above, pages 275, bottom, 276.
(7) See above, pages 253-257.
(8) See above, page 297.

according to whether they are directed towards the prolongation or to the achievement of values.

The teleological aspect of value may be indicated in another way by saying that, while the idea of felt need which was included in our definition of value may take the form of a very vague desire or goal, yet, whatever its degree of conscious explicitness, it represents that incompleteness which was noted, in the discussion of personalistic dialectic, (1) as a negative sign of the presence of purpose. In short, a purposive factor is always present in a value-experience, whether the former consists in a desire to prolong an actual satisfying experience, to get rid of a dissatisfying one, or to gain a satisfying one that is not present.

3'. A value-experience is distinguished by the presence of affection.

(c) In the third place, so far as any phase of an individual act can be abstracted and made the distinguishing mark of the presence of value, it is the affective or feeling tone of the whole. This affective character probably originates in the emotions associated with many instinctive and native tendencies. (2) Values, however, need not remain attached to these tendencies, but may be developed and transferred to activities that do not directly satisfy inherited cravings; some of the higher forms of religious and aesthetic experiences illustrate this development. (3)

4'. Value presupposes an agent.

(d) Finally, the presence of an agent is clearly manifest in value-experiences, for he is required as the subject which is affected and as the one who seeks to conserve or attain values. Indeed, value in its most unambiguous form is fundamentally an activity in which a subject either likes or dislikes, approves or disapproves.

c. Probably all personal activities have an aspect of value.

Our attempts to define value have shown the need of doing so from the point of view of the individual act as it has been described already. Indeed, our study of value so far has been little more than a review of several phases of personal activity from the point of view of the satisfaction present; we have merely isolated one aspect of an activity which was noted in that intimate blend of aspects called the individuality of an act. So closely connected are the axiological and the teleological aspects of an individual activity that it is hard to separate them, and one may say either that the purpose is sought because it is valued by the subject, (4) or that the agent seeks purposes because he experiences value, or has experienced value, in their realization.

It is probable that every personal activity possesses, as one of its intrinsic features, the quality of value in the sense that has been described, and that this value is felt by the agent in the presence of those ends which he seeks. H. Bergson has presented a description of how any specific feeling "reflects the whole of a personality." (5) Value may be a negligible element in some activities because it, like purpose, has been pushed into the background of consciousness or has been submerged entirely as a result of the forma-

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(1) See above, pages 277-278.

(2) Compare W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, pages 28-29; see whole of chapters II-VI.

(3) See W. K. Wright's article, The Evolution of Values from Instincts, Philosophical Review, XXIV, pages 165-183.

(4) As H. Höffding does, Philosophy of Religion, page 13.

(5) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 25.

tion of habits. (1)

4. The mistaken question as to the primacy of feeling in the self.

In view of the concrete standpoint adopted throughout this investigation, it is unnecessary to offer much evidence for condemning the assertion, sometimes made, that feeling has a primacy in the experience of personality. (2) This hypothesis is due to a failure both in recognizing the abstract character of feeling and in defining the respect in which feeling is primary. The same arguments which above were directed against the supposed primacy of intellect will apply here. (3)

a. Actually feeling is always a phase of a larger whole of experience.

Feeling itself is an abstraction, as has been said. As a matter of actual experience, it exists along with other mental factors, and its real meaning is to be found in an activity-cycle where a person dislikes his present state and seeks to transform it into one that he likes or it is seen in that individual act where he strives to preserve a satisfactory experience already possessed. In such experiences one learns the concrete meaning of feelings, which the psychologist may abstract for purposes of scientific classification. Feeling is no doubt a useful concept as a principle for psychological classification, but this class of mental facts cannot be mistaken for the real person without an inexcusable fallacy of abstraction.

b. "Primacy" is meaningless without a definite criterion, but this is lacking.

Intellect, feeling, and will are actually integral phases of an active whole of experience. Any one of them evidently has a primacy only from some definite point of view, and the question concerning their order is unanswerable until one defines the standard or criterion of primacy. If personality consists chiefly in orderly self-adjustment to a universe, intellect might be said to be primary. If personality consists fundamentally of preferences and satisfactions, then feeling might be basic. If personality consists essentially in the achievement of ends through conduct, then will would be primary. But if feeling, intellect, and will are each fundamental in a different sense, we lack a common criterion by which to compare them and to assert that any one is more primary than another.

c. The unity of intellect, will, and feeling in personal activity.

Consequently, we cannot expect to find the meaning of personality in any one of these three concepts, for each of them is an abstraction from, or a particular aspect of the concrete personal act. Not any one of them can be reduced to the others, but all of them exist together and are unified in individual activity. C. A. Ellwood asserts, "Every complete mental process has three sides or aspects, the volitional, the affective, and the cognitive. In other words, thinking, feeling, and willing are not separate divisions of the mind, but are simply different aspects of its activity." (4) W. Richmond, too, points out that, "The different phases or forms of the personal life are not as a matter of fact separate from one another, like the limbs of a body. They are rather aspects or forms of personal life, the activity of each of which involves the activity of all the others. They are thus, so to say, internal to one another." (5) He maintains, also, that, "Feeling is the background of personality, the element of 'consciousness' that interpenetrates and accompanies all

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(1) Compare Kreibig's view that there are value-dispositions, above, page 296.

(2) Compare emotionalistic theories of personality, above, page 6.

(3) See above, pages 289-90; compare also the discussion of the primacy of will, below, pages 330; 337-8.

(4) Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, page 109.

(5) An Essay on Personality as a Philosophic Principle, page 44.

the different forms of 'self-conscious' life."

1'. The question, Does feeling refer to an object? is a mistaken one.

This finding of the meaning of feeling in the concrete whole of personal activity solves by shelving the problem of whether or not feeling always or ever has an object. When it is said that feeling does not refer to an object (1), feeling is taken in abstraction. It is true, indeed, that if one considers the concept of feeling by itself, reference to an object is not essential, but actually feeling, on the level of personal life, always exists as an integral phase of a mental whole in which there is a reference to an object. J. Ward points out (2) that, "Affection and conation, though distinguishable, are not actually separable; this I admit." Consequently, we do not say that feeling knows an object, any more than we say that intellect feels, or will knows. These statements are all alike abstractions, for the fact is that it is the active subject who feels, knows, and wills.

a'. Feelings are essentially subjective.

The real meaning of denying the objective reference of feeling is seen in J. Royce's statement that, "It is an important feature of the feelings that, when we have once developed our notion of the difference between the self and the world, we refer feelings especially to the self rather than to the world without the self." (3) In other words, feelings are an important part of that empirical self, and the latter together with the active subject constitute the concrete person.

5. Various stages of value.

In the examination of the relation of value to personality, it is essential to distinguish various points of view or stages in its development. In this study the introspective standpoint may well be adopted because of its greater directness and freedom from ambiguity, although we recognize the worth of observing the behavior of others when we wish to learn of their interests.

a. First stage: the experience of value.

(a) In the first place, the experience of value in concrete activities precedes the cognition of or reflection about value. The latter processes are conditioned by an original feeling of value. B. Bosanquet asserts that, "The fundamental fact is that I care for some sort of thing; then you may argue upon the consequences in which that fact involves me. But you cannot by argument undo my first sense of value, nor could you impart it if I did not possess it. If there was no feeling there could be no value." (4) "It is true that before arguing upon questions of value, we must have immediate experience of what is meant by caring for something." (5) He explains carefully, however, that arguments may modify our experience of value. In the first stage of value we have conscious value or value in consciousness, but we do not yet have consciousness of value, that is, a consciousness of the objects and activities with which values are associated.

b. Second stage of value: cognitive or reflective values.

(b) In the first stage of the development of values there are conscious values, and positive values are matters of satisfying experience; in the second stage there is consciousness of or thought about values, and this thought is a kind of activity in which either

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(1) T. Loveday, Theories of Mental Activity, Mind, N. S., vol. X, p. 460.
(2) Proceedings of the Aris. Soc., N. S., vol. VIII, p. 227, note.
(3) Outlines of Psychology, page 167.
(4) The Principle of Individuality and Value, page 294.
(5) Ibid., page 296.

memory or expectation is predominant; for when we think about the meaning of values, the values thought about are either memories or prospects, and not actual. In this thought-activity, value is no doubt actually present, but the actual value is not thought about in the same activity-cycle in which it occurs. The effects which mark its presence may be thought about only in a subsequent act, however soon that may occur. (1) In the second stage, then, we begin to reason about the means of realizing values, to estimate our responsibility in their production, and to judge what it is that is worthful to us.

1'. The occasion for reflection: conflict of values.

The occasion for the first reflection upon our desires and values in all probability arises when conflicts are present among them, and when there is a felt need of selecting one among several possible activities, all of which have prospective value. The conflict is most likely to arise between one older, biological, egoistic instinct and a newer, social, and more altruistic one. The existence of two such main classes of instinctive tendencies has been elaborated in an interesting way by J. Lippert (2), and it accounts for the severe struggles and relative dualism in our human strivings. Further, there is a great prodigality of interests and conative tendencies which cannot all be satisfied at once, and which, therefore, call for selection. It is in the attempt to harmonize and organize these interests that moral values are born, and the "moral economy" consists in this process of organization.

At the second level of the development of values, the meaning of values is clarified because there is a comparison of ends, and a demand for the explicit evaluation and selection of our purposes, so as to remove conflicts among them. The stages of worth are not, of course, clearly marked off from each other, but, on the whole, the ends which are sought in what we may call the second stage possess values that are more or less transient or momentary, because the purposes with which they are associated are proximate or short-range purposes. However, it is in the reflection and comparison of values of short duration that personal values make their appearance.

c. Third stage: personal stage of evaluation.

(c) In the second stage the valuable purposes with reference to which the subject acts are determined by momentary preferences. When these preferences result from approval, based upon consideration of more remote ends or upon a system or scale of such ends, then we reach what may be called the third stage of evaluation, the personal stage. The latter represents an extension of the second stage, in which reflection begins, and may be considered from several standpoints.

1'. Instrumental versus intrinsic values.

In the first place, the stage of personal evaluation is marked by the presence of instrumental as distinguished from intrinsic values; that is, various activities which in themselves may be either pleasant or unpleasant are approved for the sake of more remote ends which they serve, and the values connected with the latter may be called intrinsic.

2'. System of valued ends.

Such preference of remote ends presupposes a system or several systems of ends possessing varying worth. An important characteristic of personal activities is that they depend, in varying degree, upon

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(1) Compare W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 166-67.

(2) Kulturgeschichte, see especially pages 1-28.

the choice of ends which are regarded as valuable because of intelligent comparison of them. These value-judgments themselves are, of course, to be regarded as a peculiar species of personal activity. The systems of ends or sentiments upon which these judgments are based vary in wide limits with respect to their completeness of organization and inclusiveness. This topic will recur below in connection with the unity of personality. (1) The important point to be noted here is that personality involves not only ends that are remote, but ends which are chosen because of their comparatively greater value.

a'. Sorley on the organization of values.

W. R. Sorley points out that, "Each moment even may have its own value. And yet that value is never altogether independent; one moment is not a mere means to the next, but its value is connected systematically or organically with that of other moments in the individual life. . . But it is only a fragmentary value that is realised at any moment; its meaning and worth depend upon the purpose of the individual life to which it belongs." (2) "In a character completely in accordance with the ideal of goodness the whole life would be regulated in this way--unified by the moral ideal to which each particular action would be contributory." (3)

b'. A complete theory of personality requires a complete organization of values.

Thus, while intellectual judgment does not create value feeling, it may condemn or approve it in the light of certain esteemed purposes, and in this way greatly modify its significance by setting it in a system of values. The life of a person is characterized by conscious thought, directed to the correlation of his values and to the control of his activities by reference to his own system or systems of values. A complete theory of personality requires a comprehensive ethics and systematization of values, which, if attained, would include, in an orderly way, all of the higher values of human personality, such as are found especially in the experiences of truth, goodness, and beauty. (4) H. Stuart has considered some of the relations of personality to art. (5) An illuminating discussion of personality in relation to religious value may be found in G. Berguer's La Notion de Valeur; he defends the hypothesis that a third series of value-facts must be put alongside of the psychological and the physical series. In a second volume of his Phänomenologie des Ichs K. Oesterreich promises to discuss "the problem of value and its relation to the problem of the ego."

3'. Importance of social influence in the determination of personal values.

The system of ends with reference to which a person acts develops under the presence of social influences. The measure of harmony which exists in the social group or groups of which I find myself a member depends upon a community of purpose, and the development of my mental life ordinarily proceeds in intimate connection with the purposes and ideals of my social group or groups. We must view "the self in its essential basis of moral solidarity with the natural and social world,

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(1) See below, pages 315-16.

(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 128.

(3) Ibid., page 445. See page 94 above for Perry's account of how personal values arise in the organization of human interests.

(4) J. A. Leighton, International Journal of Ethics, vol. XXI, pages 23-36, "Personality and a Metaphysics of Value," presents a classification of the most important human values.

(5) Art and Personality in Personal Idealism.

and in the special relations with others which forbid its isolation." (1) That system of ends which I consciously value is a product of my interaction with the community even more than it is a result of my reflection upon my own instinctive tendencies and wants. So far as my personal activities depend upon a system of ends of social origin, my personality is a social experience. W. R. Sorley declares that, "Personality has been held to be the bearer of value; but personality itself is a social category: it indicates not merely the individual unity of life and consciousness, but also the social place and function which belong to the person and without which he could not be what he is." (2) We may recall here how James included a social self in his list of empirical ones. (3)

a'. "Capacity for social fellowship" a mark of personality.

The importance of the social conditions of the development of personality is matter of such familiar emphasis in many contemporary works in sociology, as well as in philosophy, that only a brief reference to the fact is necessary. C.H. Cooley, for example, maintains that self and society are "twin-born." (4) W. Richmond, in his Essay on Personality as a Philosophic Principle, carries the social nature to such extravagant limits that the individual person becomes an abstraction, which he himself maintains is the fact. He believes that the "true definition of personality" consists in saying that "personality in the individual is the capacity for society, fellowship, communion," (5) and he asserts that "the actual personal life is the social life." (6) He overdoes a good point, however, when he asserts that "the individual person is an abstraction, not a reality," and that the community is the primary reality. (7) Since this extreme view does not fit in with his total exposition, it may be that this particular statement is exaggerated for the sake of making his point concerning the importance of the social relations of a person in determining what he is.

b'. Relation of individual and social mind.

There is no doubt about the fact that personal development proceeds in a social atmosphere, but this development presupposes a concrete reality such as has been expounded at length, in which sympathy, charity, benevolence, obedience, and the other social virtues center and have their ultimate ground. W. R. Sorley's statement of the case is most acceptable: "The community has not a feeling or apprehension of this value over and above the feelings and apprehension of it which belong to its members. . . The social mind is realised and real in individual minds and nowhere else. But this is only one side of the truth. If society is unreal apart from the individual, it is also the case that each individual mind is dependent upon the minds of others. It is impossible to point to any fragment of the individual's mental content which does not imply, or which is independent of, the intercourse of mind with mind." (8)

c'. Modification of individual desires through social influence.

The contact of a person with others and with social institutions is a powerful factor in his development, expecially because it helps him to define and organize the ends he seeks. In contact with others

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(1) B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 353.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 130.
(3) See above, page 34. (4) Social Organization.
(5) Essay on Personality as a Philosophic Principle, page 21.
(6) Ibid., page 15. (7) Ibid., page 14.
(8) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 129-30.

one learns better what he himself wants. The result of social influences is frequently that our natural instincts and emotions are suppressed or are harnessed up to the quest for ends which are socially valuable. Our original desires may be greatly modified so as to bring harmony with those of our neighbors, or to attain ends which the tradition of the community sanctions. It is in the furnace of this self-criticism, carried on in the light of social demands and of our fundamental and remote life interests, that personal value is forged and shaped. It is this reference to remote and enduring ends which makes our purposes personal.

4'. Not all values are personal.

Personal value is an aspect of intelligent activity; it is the mode of satisfaction which characterizes an activity which is not random or impulsive, but which follows from a more or less critical comparison of ends and their relative significance as well as from a study of the means of attaining them. From this description of personal value it is evident that not all values need be personal, for we should not say that personal value is present in the lower forms of feeling life of infants or animals, although value, regarded as being primarily feeling, may be present in imperfect and fragmentary forms.

d. Fourth stage of value: where values are self-consciously referred to a unified personality.

(d) Perhaps the highest stage in the development of personality exists where all our activities are directed by reference to their significance for the personality as a whole in its self-conscious relation to the universe. Here personality comes to be an end in itself, as Kant said it ought to be. Probably there is no higher stage in the development of the human experience of value than the one just suggested, except where the individual person regards the universe itself as an expression of an infinite value-creating Personality with whom he stands in intimate cooperation.

It should be noted, however, that just as value may be experienced without reflection on its nature, so personal values may exist without the conscious and explicit reference of all the higher values to personality as its source. Just as the act of knowing value is subsequent to the existing value itself, so this highest stage in the development of evaluation, which consists in referring value to personality, is subsequent to the experience of personal value. In other words, while all value may presuppose personality, not all value does so in a self-conscious way.

W. K. Wright (1) points out that the experience of personal values grows out of the instincts of self-abasement and self-assertion with their corresponding emotions of subjection and elation. (2) Wright says "About these as a nucleus, develops in man the self-regarding sentiment and later a fully organized moral self or personality. . . After the self or personality has developed,. . the individual comes to recognize the value of this acquisition and to interpret the significance of all external values as well as the virtues in the light of their significance for the self as a whole." Since personality itself is the source of the chief values of man, it is easy to understand why men may come to regard personality itself as the supreme value to be maintained and preserved in the universe.

B. P. Bowne explains how many, but not all, our values conscious-

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(1) Philosophical Review, vol. XXIV, page 177.

(2) See Wm. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, chapter VII.

ly refer to personality. He observes that "Most of our plans and aims also have their value, not in their inherent power to please us, but in the fact that they are ours. Few of our experiences have value in themselves, as passive gratification of our sensibilities; their value lies rather in the element of personality which we have put into them. . . The same reference to self underlies a great variety of feelings of a less exalted kind. Apart from this self-consciousness, the pains of poverty, of social slights, etc., would be a vanishing quantity. On the other hand, the satisfactions of pride, vanity, and ambition would be nothing without the same reference. (1)

6. The increase of values; as based on man's general instinct of self-betterment.

If the existence of values in a limited measure is a fact of human experience, the demand naturally arises for their increase and completion. If one has a valuable experience, it is essential to that experience itself that one desires its continuance so long as it maintains its value, but if it is inadequate, or if one believes that greater values are possible for him, he naturally and consistently demands a new experience of value. But since values are facts of human experience, and have been so for a very long time, we should expect to find generally in human nature a tendency to self-betterment which will manifest itself in the endeavor to multiply personal values. This logical deduction with reference to the promotion of value is based upon the fact that personality is at once a seeker after ends and the possessor of values. On the whole, there are reasons for postulating that it is a common characteristic of human personality to seek to multiply its own peculiar values.

a. Tendency of value experiences to multiply themselves.

b. Thorndike on the instinct of self-betterment.

This general tendency to seek the better or the good has not been sufficiently emphasized nor studied in psychology. However, its existence is admitted as a psychological fact, which conforms the postulate proposed above. For example, E. L. Thorndike maintains that, "There is but one thing in original human nature that is unreservedly good, and that is the power to make it better. Man is thus eternally altering himself to suit himself. His nature is not right in his own eyes. . . This power, the power of learning or modification in favor of the satisfying, the capacity represented by the law of effects, is the essential principle of reason and right in the world." (2) Instincts represent, in the words of W. E. Hocking, a "kind of judgment of value; a force of estimate." Animals are impelled to valuable ends without conscious foresight, but man has a more or less clear knowledge of the ends he seeks, and a capacity to criticize and transform them.

c. The doctrine of "synderesis" in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

The idea suggested by E. L. Thorndike is very similar to a doctrine of which Thomas Aquinas made much. He teaches that it is characteristic of human beings to control their actions with reference to ends that are good, (3) and which, being good, "cannot be without concomitant delight." (4) Now according to Thomas' doctrine of synderesis, man has an habitual tendency to seek the good. His exposi-

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(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 194-5.
(2) Educational Psychology, vol. III, pages 281-2.
(3) Summa Theologia, Part II, First Number, Question 1, First Article.
(4) Ibid., Question IV, First Article.

tion of this concept is worthy of careful note. (1) Synderesis is a "special natural habit" which belongs to the class of practical principles bestowed on man by nature, and its special function is that "synderesis always incites to good" and "murmurs at evil." "Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power and to synderesis as a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by synderesis." Conscience also is a practical principle or act and is closely allied to synderesis. "Properly speaking conscience dominates an act. But since habit is a principle of action, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit--namely, synderesis, as Jerome calls synderesis conscience. . . Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from our first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called synderesis."

1'. Hocking's exposition of synderesis.

In a lecture on the philosophy of religion (2) W. E. Hocking presented an excellent exposition of this doctrine: "Synderesis is not reason, but it is a habit within reason. It is a tendency. It is a sort of foretaste of happiness and an inkling of what happiness is like. Thomas uses phrases indicating anticipatory images of happiness. Synderesis--this preperception not only of what is good but of what it is to be in possession of the good--is present to us all the time, and might be defined as a sense of one's destiny which is the source of laws and rules. Its presence constitutes obligation. It gives the first principles of morality. It tells us that we should like according to nature. It tells us blessedness ought to be sought. We ought to seek the good and avoid the evil. Conscience is a contact between the synderesis of man and a single act of will, or a proposed act of will. Whenever this continually present judgment of our destiny meets a particular proposition, then there is a judgment of harmony or disharmony that passes between them, and that judgment is conscience."

7. Summary of the relation of value to personality.

At the personal level of activity, ends are chosen by the subject with a measure of self-conscious and deliberate selection. They are selected because the subject expects to secure an increase in value in the course of their realization. For him the value of the ends lies in their possibility or power of satisfying him, the possibilities being serious ones which bear upon his fate. As such, they are more than mere ideas, but purposes in which various feelings or sentiments center. (3) The full significance of these values, however, will appear only in an activity-cycle in which satisfying progress toward or achievement of these treasured goals is made. The attainment of a remote and significant personal purpose may call for the cooperation of a large part of the physical, historical, and social realm, but its real value is to be found in the experience of the person who seeks it.

a. In personal activity the endeavor to realize significant ends is essential.

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(1) See Summa Theologia, Part I, Third Number: Treatise on Man, Question LXXIX: Of the Intellectual Powers; 12th Article: Whether Synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from others? and 13th Article: Whether conscience be a power?

(2) Dec. 13th, 1915.

(3) W. McDougall.

b. All personal activity probably has value.

It is probable that with the exception of a few doubtful cases, all personal activities have a value that is grounded in an affective aspect or feeling tone. This tone is present with all degrees of intensity. It is at a minimum in those acts of a person which are primarily habitual; its intensity is perhaps at a maximum when our instincts most directly function. Also, there is frequently a high degree of intensity present in cases of clearly moral or conscientious acts. W. G. Everett believes that, "The motive of conscious choice properly includes both the idea of an end and the accompanying emotions which are sometimes said to be the real motive or 'moving' element, in conduct. The separation of the two factors, however, is the result of a false abstraction. The ideational and affective elements vary in prominence; now one and now the other occupies the foremost place, but both are always present in the moral act. Even 'blind' passion is never completely blind; its expression follows the path to some perceived end. And, on the other hand, the 'coldest' idea that we entertain kindles feeling enough to secure for it some measure of interest and attention." (1)

c. Conscious evaluation of one's activities a fundamental criterion of personality.

If we ask at what point a self first becomes a person, the reply is that he becomes a person the moment he approves or disapproves of one of his acts. G. A. Coe declares that, "A person is any reactor that approves or disapproves of his own reactions, or that realizes consequences as successes or failures of his own." (2) The concrete person at work is clearly manifested in those of his acts in which he strives to realize ends which he has chosen as a result of careful and self-conscious evaluation. The most important condition for the development of personal life, says G. T. Ladd, is "growth in the knowledge and appreciation of the ideas and sentiments of what has value,--truth, happiness, beauty, and goodness; and all given reality by being expressed in conduct, and by the formation of a character corresponding to these ideas and sentiments of value." (3)

1'. One's personality is found primarily in what he wants.

What one's personality means to himself, therefore, he may find in those purposes which he consciously makes his own. Its meaning for him will be found in what he esteems most highly. Since there are countless ends and combinations of ends which a man may appropriate, it is not surprising that the individual qualities of personal life differ so greatly, nor that there is so great a variety of theories as to the nature of personality. In other words, if I wish to know what is my neighbor's personality or my own, I must determine what he or I most dearly esteems. To know what one's personality is, one must know the ends which one values, and according to which one acts.

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(1) Moral Values, page 346.
(2) The Psychology of Religion, page 30.
(3) The Secret of Personality, pages 92-3.

E. THE UNITY OF PERSONALITY.

1. Personality has unity in several senses which need to be considered.

In spite of a certain multiplicity in the phases of the experience of a person, one of his distinctive features is unity. Several kinds of unity which have already occurred in our investigation need to be brought together now in a more orderly way, and exhibited in relation to the concept of personality. The demand that conflicting desires and tendencies in our conscious life be harmonized is so insistent that it looks as if one of the original tendencies of human nature were a desire for unity, consistency, or agreement of an unspecified kind among the various aspects of our mental life. We must distinguish several senses in which personal experience is a unity.

2. The unity of the act, or conative unity;

a. Description of it: it is teleological.

A fundamental and typical kind of unity was found in the fully developed act of a human being. This unity is a teleological one. It is of a more integrated sort than what is called "unity of consciousness," (1) for in the individual activity, the whole is unified by the purpose to the realization of which the act is directed. It is the unity which makes the individuality of an activity all that it is. (2) This type of unity is concrete, and is easily verifiable in experience. One finds himself desiring something and sets about to get it, and the gaining of his end completes a series of experiences which are rationally organized around the goal he sought. The attainment of the end may involve several subordinate activities, but then these activities are interwoven by the significance which they derive from their reference to an end, and, besides, each of them has its own individuality and teleological unity. The unity of a purposive activity which is smoothly achieved stands in contrast to those experiences which are marked by conflicting impulses and uncertain ends. Not until one purpose dominates others and gets the right of way is the teleological active unity in question present in typical form. This unity of the individual activity may be called conative unity, to distinguish it from other varieties that will be discussed.

b. It is the original and concrete type of all other types of unity.

Now, it is probable that the unity which belongs to an individual act is the most typical and original kind which we experience. Other forms derive their meaning from this concrete prototype of all forms of unity. These derivations are made by a process either of simplification of, or abstraction from, conative unity, or of expansion of it. Within conative unity itself at the personal level there are, as we shall see in a moment, two other kinds of unity; and by the combination of individual activities into larger systems, another more comprehensive kind of unity is reached. Several possible meanings of unity in personal life were described briefly above (3) in the effort to understand in what sense a new realist of Perry's type is warranted in speaking of the unity of the self.

Why there should be any such conative unity as exists we do not know. It has to be taken as a fact of experience as we find it. It is a part of the mystery of reality. But while we are unable to tell

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(1) See below, pages 313-16.

(2) See the discussion of the individuality of activity, above pages 245-262.

(3) See above, pages 109-112.

why it should be at all, we can study it and understand it, and interpret other kinds of unity in terms of it. B. P. Bowne has strongly emphasized the original, experiential, and necessary unity of the mental life. (1) "It is only by means of subjective synthesis, and the conative activity by which it is prompted and sustained, that experience can advance and unfold."

1'. The unity of individual activities varies according to what aspect of them preponderates.

J. Laird points out that several kinds of unity may be derived from this original conative unity by reason of the differences of emphasis among the factors present in the complex whole. "The life of the self is a unity of cognition, feeling, and endeavour. These elements are continuously present; they must exist whenever a self exists; they develop together, and decline together. . . While it is true that the three principal modes of consciousness develop together, and that they imply an interconnected development, it is false that the development of the three is parallel in every respect. . . But just as, at any given moment, one of these elements may preponderate over the other two, so it may show a relatively permanent predominance in a given person." (2) There are, he says, the emotional or mystic types of unity, as well as the intellectual and the energetic ones. That is to say, we might describe the unity of personality in different terms according as we found predominant in a particular activity its affective, its volitional, or its intellectual phase. In the first case, one possibility of unity would be that of love, such as is expressed in the "first commandment" of Jesus of Nazareth. Other possibilities would be the unity of will as expounded by H. Münsterberg (3), or the unity of meaning set forth by J. Royce. (4)

D. H. Parker holds a view of the original unity of the self which resembles that of J. Laird as well as the one mentioned a page back. He believes that, "The unity we find is an interweaving of the activities. It is nothing besides them; it is a growing together of them, an interpenetration of them. Just as color and shape are grown together in a flower, so thought and feeling and striving are grown together in the self. And this interweaving of activities is . . . different from their ideal unity in the direction of them to the same end. The ideal unity is correlated with a real unity, but does not suffice to create it." (5)

3. The unity of consciousness, or psychological unity.

a. Description of it.

If we abstract the teleological principle and any other kind of rational organization which may be present in a moment of personal activity, there is left what has been called the unity of consciousness. It is an abstract unity, it should be noted, for it consists in the property of consciousness which belongs to the whole. It is the "subjective synthesis" which is involved in the existence of a group of mental processes in a single center of sensitive life or awareness. Whether or not there is any kind of rational unity existing in the total experience belonging to a subject at a particular time, there is present a unity based upon the fact that all the aspects of that experience have in common a quality of awareness or consciousness. "At any moment we have a total mental state possessing the characteristic unity of consciousness." (6)

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(1) See above, pages 144-5.
(2) Problems of the Self, pages 215-6.
(3) Eternal Values.
(4) The World and the Individual, e. g., vol. II, pages 300 ff.
(5) Self and Nature, page 26.
(6) J. Royce, Outlines of Psychology, page 100.

b. It is present irrespective of moral or logical conflicts in one's experience.

This psychological unity is present irrespective of the presence or absence of moral or logical conflicts in one's experience. However much the mental processes of a conscious subject may conflict with one another, they are all his because he is aware of them, and this fact is sufficient to constitute the psychological type of unity. Indeed, the very presence of warring instincts and ideals in one's life confirms the fact that they are all his very own. The conflict is conditioned by and emphasizes a community of awareness to which the warring parts belong, for the sense of logical contradiction, of moral antagonism, or of musical discord is possible only as the striving elements exist within a common conscious life. Moral, aesthetic, or rational unity may be absent, but not the unity of consciousness.

c. This unity is constituted by the common property of consciousness which all of one's experiences have.

This unity is difficult to describe in other terms than those already employed. It may be proper, however, to say that the various distinguishable phases of a momentary conscious activity are interdependent. This interdependence is not to be thought of in any mechanical way, but must be understood by reference to one's own experience, where the various aspects of the whole fit together in such a way that a modification of one would bring a modification of the whole. This conscious unity is a kind of "mutual penetration." It emphasizes the fact that psychical events do not occur in isolated or detached ways, but occur together in certain groups called individual centers of experience. Unless our various activities, knowing, judging, perceiving, etc., possessed this common property of consciousness, this intrinsic quality of awareness, they would have no meaning for us; in short, they would be outside of our conscious life. This common quality of consciousness gives to our momentary experiences this very general, obvious, and inferior kind of unity which may be called psychological unity. A personal act has this kind in addition to others.

d. It is a low kind of unity which needs development.

This unity of consciousness is of such a low variety that it is probably present in infants and animals. Hence, the presence of consciousness or awareness in itself is no mark of personality, for the conscious unity must be developed into a teleological one before personality can be said to be present. This is possible because in a personal activity-experience there are other features present beside the quality of consciousness, however much that permeates the whole, for, as J. Ward declares, "The proximate fact for the psychological observer is . . . a unity that is differentiated. But though differentiated, it is not disintegrated. On the contrary, the further the differentiation proceeds, the more apparent becomes the solidarity and consentience, the work of synthesis within the whole." (1)

e. Münsterberg's account of this unity.

One or two other excellent accounts of this familiar kind of unity may be noted. H. Münsterberg defines it thus: "By unity of consciousness we understand only that we possess no content of consciousness which does not belong to its, to our consciousness." (2) "Neither can the consciousness-subject in temporal unity split another consciousness off from itself, nor can the conscious subject exchange itself for another at any time." (3) James' statement that "every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness," (4)

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(1) Psychological Principles, page 410. Compare W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 130.
(2) Grundzüge der Psychologie, page 210. (3) Ibid., page 211.
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 225.

is well known.

f. Brentano's description of the unity of consciousness.

One of the most excellent studies in the unity of mind has been made by F. Brentano. (1) His general position is that "simultaneous psychical activities belong completely to a real unity," (2) as when the fragrance of a rose and the beauty of its color are recognized by the psychologist as distinct sensations and yet as being present at once to the observer. We think these sensations are unlike and discern their difference because they are bound together in a unitary consciousness. He says: "We not only represent the bare likeness between different objects, but we bring them to our thoughts in manifold relations. We order means to ends, and work out complex plans. These orderings and combinations are dissolved into multiplicity, or rather into nothing, when we distribute the members of our thoughts to a number of things. Does not the desire for the means include also the longing for the end and vice versa? All this is so clear that it seems superfluous to speak of it." (3) "The result of our investigation," he concludes, "is that the totality of our psychical states, however complicated they may be, always forms a real unity. This is the well-known fact of the unity of consciousness, which should be designated as one of the most important points in psychology." (4)

g. But psychological unity leads to another kind of unity:

When one tries to explain this unity of consciousness, one has to introduce the idea of a subject or agent. F. Brentano tries to give an account of what he means by the real identity that is present in simultaneous psychical processes, (5) but does not go further than to affirm that, "All psychical phenomena which are found in us at any time belong entirely to a unitary reality." (4) From our metaphysical standpoint, we may, indeed, we must take the next step, the inevitable step, of postulating the agent or subject as the real principle of unity in our experiences.

4. The unity of the active subject or agent: the subjective unity of personality.

a. Description of this unity.

If we not only abstract the teleological principle from the unity of activity, but from the latter abstract also the various conscious processes that are present as phenomena, there is left the subject for whom these phenomena or processes exist at any moment and to whom belongs a unity which may be called the unity of the agent, or the subjective unity of personality. That is, in each center of human experience, there is one and only one subject, for we know of no way in which a person may split himself into two subjects or agents each having the same mental phenomena. We have had occasion already to describe and defend briefly the unity of the agent. (6) This subjective unity is that which results from the subjective reference or possession of all modifications in an individual field of consciousness. This unity seems to rest upon the fact that the subject actually does something in the total experience so as to modify it, which warrants us in referring all processes to him. Brentano suggests (7) that we can imagine the perception of color uniting itself with a perception of tone as little as we can imagine a blind man and a deaf man comparing colors and tones with one another. Again, the judgment of comparison must be an act of a subject which is one because, otherwise, there would be no comparison.

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(1) In his Psychologie.
(2) Ibid., pages 206-13.
(3) Ibid., page 210.
(4) Ibid., page 214.
(5) Ibid., page 211.
(6) See above, pages 244-5.
(7) Psychologie, page 209.

Since the agent himself, apart from his activities, is an abstraction, the unity which he possesses is likewise an abstraction. It is one aspect of the conative unity of the moment, and it is the presence of a single agent in various conscious processes which explains psychological or conscious unity. H. Lotze says, (1) "And so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up, not as a mere collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but as a world in which the individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle. This, then, is what we mean by the unity of consciousness, and it is this that we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming the indivisible soul."

Views of Lotze and others concerning it.

B. P. Bowne's conclusion is that "a rational life by its very nature demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject." (2) However diverse one's mental content, the subject amid this diversity is a unity, a unity in the midst of multiplicity. H. C. Sheldon agrees, too, that, "Real knowledge presupposes a real subject, a psychical agent, unitary and persisting, capable of reacting against impressions and interpreting them." (3)

b. The unitary agent is the ground of both conscious and conative unity.

Thus we return to that activity from which we started, and in which the agent manifests his reality by his acts. And this active, unitary agent is the ground both of conscious unity and conative unity; he is at once the conscious and active subject in every personal act. He is in the midst of matters of experience which he may be said to have; conscious processes exist only as belonging to him; and it is from him that activity emanates. The true ground, then, for the unity of the mental life is to be found in the active subject or agent who unifies the fleeting events of time and the scattered objects of space. (4) The unity of the agent, therefore, means the singleness of subjective reference within a particular group of conscious processes. The latter are kept from falling apart, indeed, from falling out of existence altogether, by the immanent agency of a single subject. This conception enables us to overcome the difficulties of objectivistic or empirical views of the self, (5) and to show how impossible are the collectional theories (6) of personality, such as that of Hume.

5. The unity of a personal system of ends: moral unity.

The variety in personal experience is not to be referred to variety within the agent, for that is a mistaken and abstract way of speaking, but may be found in the empirical self, in the phenomenal phases of individual activities with their multiform cognitive and emotional peculiarities. It is found in the individuality which is the last kind of unity to be described below (7): Each agent is the possessor of or lives himself out within a multitude of experiences, especially such as are called interests, desires, and activities. He acts in numerous purposeful ways, and in so acting, he produces a multiplicity all his own. Just as there is unity within the diversity of an individual act, so there is in the total personality, but to understand this wider unity, we must consider a different kind

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(1) Quoted by W. McDougall, Body and Mind, page 284.
(2) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 27.
(3) System of Christian Doctrine, page 4.
(4) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principles, page 36.
(5) Compare above, pages 6-7.
(6) Compare our classification above, page 7.
(7) See below, pages 317-20.

than we have so far noticed.

a. Description of it.

We may consider the unity of personality also from the standpoint of an expansion of the original type of conative unity, or unity of the individual act, so that the latter comes to occupy a significant place in a larger system of activities. We may call this the moral unity of personality. In most cases this form of unity is less intimate in its internal integration than the unity of the individual act, but it is marked by a much greater comprehensiveness. This unity, which consists of the system of ends, ideals, or rules according to which one regulates his activities, especially compound cycles of his acts, is also of a teleological kind, where the purpose is of the intermediate or remote type.

b. How various aspects of personality already considered point to the need of this moral unity.

On various occasions we have come upon the fact and need of this moral unity of personality. We noted (1) that a person is marked by activities directed to ends which are not momentary, but which involve a series of acts and subordinate ends, so that he develops as a result of criticism and interpretation of his purposes. Without some moral organization of our purposes, we should not be genuine persons, for we should act upon proximate purposes without ulterior connection; and as a result our lives would be made up of sporadic, detached, and impulsive acts. Personality is a stage in the development of the self when he begins to recognize some responsibility for acting with reference to ends that are in a measure remote and that are sanctioned by society. A person, then, is one who can act according to a purpose which belongs to a system of purposes, however small it may be, and which may involve for its realization a cycle of activities. As a result of interpretation of his active tendencies, one learns not to yield to every momentary desire, to choose among several possibilities involving future realization, and thus to postpone the attainment of values in order to increase their totality. In the organization of our purposes and the criticism of our native desires the need for their organization appears, and moral unity is born of this criticism.

1'. Criticism of our native desires leads to their organization and the adoption of remote and compound purposes.

2'. Actual moral unity is seen in activity-cycles.

If we consider, not merely ideal purposes, but actual activities, we see moral unity manifested in what we have called compound cycles of activities, each of which is unified by a single purpose. According to this conception, we saw how a great number of individual acts may be integrated in, and become significant by becoming parts of a series of acts directed to a common general purpose to which they all contribute. Out of such cycles is built personal biography. The conception of activity-cycles keeps us in touch with the concrete progress of men's lives by preventing us from resolving a man's history into a disconnected series of acts such as the psychologist might study, and also by preventing us from losing the actual empirical fulness of a man's living by considering only his purposes as a group of ideal ends constituting a more or less logical system. It is in the actual development of activity-cycles such as we have described (2) that we see moral unity in practice or in the concrete, and that we see personality achieving a character for itself.

We have also seen (3) that in fact the organization of our pur-

(1) See above, pages 228, 233.
(2) See above, especially pages 226-233.
(3) See above, pages 302-5.

3'. The construction of a system of personal values is another aspect of moral unity.

poses means equally the organization of our personal values. It is a mark of the moral man to direct his actions to prospective values which are sought as a result of comparison and voluntary adoption. This moral unity was described above in the discussion of personal values (1), where it was seen that the latter depend upon an approval and a choice based upon the consideration of a group of various possible values. The more moral among us proceed by holding our ideals before us in an objective way, and criticizing and comparing them, and selecting those which give promise of bringing the greatest values in the light of our whole life and its relation to others.

W. G. Everett describes this construction of a system of personal values so well that his remarks deserve extended quotation: "From the dictation of uncriticized desires we must appeal to a more inclusive purpose, to an ideal of spiritual wholeness which comprehends and dominates all the interests of life. To such a unifying principle we must cling in spite of the fact that its very comprehensiveness baffles a too exact formulation. All critics of human conduct have recognized that the demand for detailed principles of organization cannot be pressed beyond a certain point. . . The organized scheme of family and social life provides this guidance for a time, but only for a time. Then each is set at the task for himself, and bidden to struggle forward even at the price of mistakes or failure. Every individual is called upon to effect a unique but harmonious organization of values in a personal life--a creation which partakes of the nature of a work of art. Yet as a work of art, although a free creation, is not lawless but governed in every part by principles of unity and order, so in life the choice of values must be dictated by the meaning of the whole." (2)

Few attain a complete harmonization of all their interests in a supreme conception of what their good is to which all particular activities ought to be subordinated, but multitudes get part way--get far enough to be called persons. They live now within one partial or incomplete system of ends and now within another. These have not attained the complete moral unity which dominates the activities of a great personality. That there are countless varieties and degrees with which moral unity is attained goes without saying.

c. Meaning of a plurality of selves within one personality.

The practical fact is that few men probably develop a single moral purpose which dominates all aspects of their lives. What is most common is for the activities of a man to be directed with reference to several systems of purposes, each more or less consistent within itself. For example, a professional man will organize one group of his activities about the duties of his profession; another, about the interests of his family; another about his recreations; and others about their relations to persons of various positions and characters. The unity in each case is teleological: that is, his activities are fitted to meet the contingencies of the several groups of objects and persons with whom he deals.

The same agent obviously is presupposed in each system of his activities, but the purposes involved in his several systems may be very loosely connected, and sometimes even morally antagonistic. Since a person consists in his various purposive activities, it is clear that he will be relatively different according as he acts with

(1) See above, pages 305-8.
(2) Moral Values, page 220.

reference now to one, and now to another group of his interests. His activities and attitude in his professional office may be different than they are at the theater or in the family circle.

This variation in one's personal attitudes as determined by the partial systems of purposes which guide his conduct from time to time is another way of expressing the fact that each man possesses various selves, as James pointed out. (1) That is to say, the idea of teleological unity within various systems of interests and activity-cycles which a man may possess furnishes a clear method for distinguishing several relatively different selves within a single personal life which has not attained a complete moral unity. It is more accurate, however, to say that the same person acts with reference to several systems of purposes and dispositions than it is to say he has different selves. This idea of a plurality of selves within a single personality warns us against overdoing the idea of the moral unity of personality. The unity in most of us is, from the ideal standpoint, relatively incomplete, and is in the process of constant transformation.

6. The development of unity in personality.

The transition from the original unity of consciousness to the consummate moral unity of a highly developed personality in which all acts are determined by freely approved and adopted ends forming a systematic whole is a very long and difficult one. "The sporadic, excursive, vague, and jerky strivings of the youth develop into the organized passion of the man," (2) only as a result of much effort and training. It is, however, beyond the scope of this investigation to set forth this development towards complete moral unity; it is important here merely to point it out.

Until such a system as referred to is systematically presented, it is almost impossible to say just how much moral unity is required to constitute a person. That a self is present in the unity of consciousness seems certain, but until this unity comes to be rationally and purposively determined to some extent, a personality is not present. The primitive self of the conscious life becomes a personality when a measure of moral unity has been attained--this is the most definite statement that can be made here,--that is, when the self acts with reference to ends which are approved in the course of an interpretative comparison with others. When personality appears because of moral unity, the conscious unity originally present does not disappear, but merely wins a greater internal organization. A person has psychological unity as much as the poorest self, but the moral unity which we cannot describe at length is an achievement of persistent and free activities. It is not a gift of nature, but it is in part a gift of society and in part an achievement of one's own. We shall return to this work of self-creation in another chapter dealing with the question of self-determination. (3) The full meaning of unity cannot be understood until we shall have considered both identity and self-determination. But it is in the differentiation and integration of our purposes and dispositions that the line of personal development lies.

When one speaks of the unity of personality without qualifica-

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(1) See above, pages 33-34.

(2) W. H. Winch, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, vol. VI, pages 479-80.

(3) See below, pages 329-336.

7. Summary of the various kinds of unity possessed by personality.

tion, what is usually intended is this highest kind of moral unity, of which there are many grades between the feeble beginning of the moral life and the more or less completely organized ethical personality. This type of unity is a teleological one, and it reflects or is an extension of the original unity of a personal or individual act. It appears, therefore, that there are, as a matter of fact, several kinds of unity in a personality, and we cannot say what is meant by the unity of personality until we specify our point of view.

There is, first, the active or real unity of a personal act, in which a personality is actual or existent by reason of his acting. This unity is also a purposive one. Within this active unity two other more abstract kinds have been distinguished. The first of these is the conscious or psychological unity, which is the name for the fact that each conscious life represents a unique, existing, and distinct whole which is characterized by the common property of awareness which belongs to all the factors present in a finite center of experience. Next, there is the formal or subjective unity, the unity of the agent in his activity. This unity not only refers to the fact that the same agent grounds all phases of an individual act, but also means the common reference of all mental processes present in a particular field of consciousness to a single subject. Then, there is the moral unity which grows out of the teleological organization of one's ideal activity, and which is a product at once of social influence and self-determination.

Beside all these, which have been described, there is the unity of individuality in a wider sense which we have still to explain. Further, when the subjective unity is considered as persisting through a series of activities, we come upon a distinct kind of personal unity, a kind of unity in succession, which is more properly called the identity of personality, and which will be considered soon under that heading. (1) To however large a system a personal act may belong, it never loses its original unity as an individual act which contains within itself those more abstract forms of unity which we have called the unity of consciousness and the unity of the agent.

8. The individuality of personality.

Let us consider now the individuality of a developed or moral personality as contrasted with the far less comprehensive individuality of a personal act. Individuality is a much more inclusive term than personality, for it applies to many other entities than persons.

a. General distinction between individuality and personality.

It means that which distinguishes one person or thing from another. Individuality and personality are both alike general terms of which there are many instances, but individuality as applied to a person refers to those unique qualities or activities of his which cannot be referred to any other person. One has individuality in the sense that the content of his personal history is nowhere duplicated. It is a "differential" principle among persons; "it is something which specifically characterizes each self. . . Individuality expresses what one uniquely is; personality expresses what one has, a property that one may acquire." (2)

b. Uniqueness of personality.

Miss M. W. Calkins includes uniqueness or incommunicability among the fundamental characters of the self. "Uniqueness is the character by virtue of which the self is 'this' or 'that' and not any one of a group--a reality which cannot be replaced by another how-

(1) See below, pages 320-9.
(2) J. Dewey, Article, Personality, Cyclopedia of Education.

ever like it or qualitatively identical with it." (1) Uniqueness does not mean merely that each person exists in a different historical situation, amid more or less variant social surroundings, etc., and not only that each person involves an agent which is ontologically distinct from every other agent, but it means also that his moral unity, his set or purposes, his historical activity and disposition to action are altogether peculiar to him, so that there is nothing else in the known universe which is identical with or even entirely similar to his particular combination of activities. It means, also, that his personality cannot be classified except by omitting essential features, and could be set forth most adequately only in a complete biography.

c. Description of individuality in terms of activity.

We have spoken of the importance of moral unity in the development of personality. This unity depends at once upon a system of purposes and of corresponding preferences and dispositions. That is, individuality is expressed in a system of moral activity, but each personality-system represents a combination of ends, of memories, of historical activities, of thoughts and feelings, which it seems safe to say cannot be duplicated among all other persons. Individuality represents a more or less ordered whole of ideal purposes and active dispositions which in its particular combination and organization is different from any other that is known. This fact of individuality does not prevent us from describing a person in the general terms of purposive activity-cycles, but it does prevent us from asserting, without good warrant, that two personal cycles are similar. Thus we see that the principle of individuality also finds its explanation in the conception of purposive activity which we adopted as our standpoint for the exposition of personality. My individuality consists in the fact that I have acted, do act, and intend to act in my own peculiar way.

Individuality, then, is to be found in the specific combination of desires and dispositions which are involved in the multiple activities of a single person. Each man as a person possesses a wondrous variety of conative capacities and desires that are assembled in that conception which we call his individual personality. For some studies suggesting the countless modes in which the qualities of men may be combined, one may turn with profit and delight to J. Jastrow's Character and Temperament. The fact of individuality is so well known and so easily verified that no further exposition of it is called for.

d. Individuality is a kind of unity.

The individuality of a person may represent, in spite of its peculiarity, indeed, because of it, such a more or less organized group of ends that we are justified in saying that his life is on the whole a consistent one, and we may properly speak of the individual unity of his life. In that case we should have added another type of unity to those already discussed. Since such an individuality as has been described can belong only to a being who is a person, we may call it personal individuality. It is distinguished from the individuality of lower organisms and inanimate things by moral and religious factors.

e. Sources of individuality.

There are probably three chief general sources (2) of difference or individuality among persons. (a) First may be mentioned the inherited differences of temperament and talent. (b) Then there are

(1) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3rd edition, page 408.
(2) See G. T. Ladd, The Secret of Personality, page 92.

the tendencies and characteristics that are acquired as a result of the historical and social conditions of experience. The activities of one person vary largely from those of another because of difference in environment and history. (c) Finally, there are those purposes and systems of ends which are intelligently adoped and approved as one's own. To these should be added one's own self-identification and self-differentiation from other persons. One resents being identified with or mistaken for another person; one wants to be his own self. The normal person would not surrender his essential personality if he could, but he cannot surrender the peculiar combination of activities which makes up his biography. Many of his particular acts may be similar to those of others, but never the total historical combination of them. One would lose his sanity, not his individuality or his personality, if he tried to identify himself entirely with another.

The various sources of individuality referred to result in the fact that each person finds a different content in his empirical self, and never is tempted to confuse or confound his empirical self with that of another; the reason for this is to be found not merely in the difference of mental content in each empirical self, but in the difference in the immediacy with which his own empirical self and that of another is present to him. In this personal individuality we have an individuality of development, character, and history, which is contrasted with the individuality of a single act, andalso with the ontological separateness which belongs to the agent as the subject of his mental life.

1'. Importance of emotions in individuality.

A peculiar combination, then, of activity cycles and dispositions constitutes the individuality of a person. This description includes the emotional phases of consciousness which are sometimes said to be the chief basis of individuality, as contrasted with thinking, which is said to be more public and universal. The reason for the importance of the emotional aspect of our activities in determining our individuality may lie in this, that since affections are the foundation of my values (1), I find in them that which makes me an individual of independent worth. Some of the objects I love are not esteemed in the same intense way by any one else of whom I know. My system of values distinguishes me from other persons who claim different systems of values.

The individuality of personality has been found in other groups of mental processes than the affective one. Perry inclines to find it in the intellectual life, for he declares that, "The true individualism is this intellectual self-sufficiency, this capacity to do one's own thinking. Its substance is originality. . . This is essentially an individual and not social attribute. Where passion may be social, only an individual can think." (2) On the other hand, Miss Calkins speaks of "the true insight that the will is the principle of individuality, uniqueness." (3) These three different views show clearly the dangers of inconsistency when one talks in terms of one abstract aspect of personality. As a matter of fact all three views probably have a measure of truth in them, for thought, feeling, and will are all aspects of the concrete personal activities which make me what I am.

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(1) See above, pages 296-99.
(2)The Free Man and the Soldier, page 160.
(3) The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3d edition, page 359.

2'. Tagore on the individuality of a human person.

R. Tagore describes in a masterful way the meaning to him of personal individuality: "I am absolutely unique, I am I, I am incomparable. The whole weight of the universe cannot crush out this individuality of mine. I maintain it in spite of the tremendous gravitation of all things. It is small in appearance but great in reality. For it holds its own against the forces that would rob it of its distinction and make it one with the dust." Loss of it means that "the creative joy which was crystallized therein is gone." This individuality "is most valuable because it is not universal. . . The universal is ever seeking its consummation in the unique. And the desire we have to keep our uniqueness intact is really the desire of the universe acting in us. It is our joy of the infinite in us that gives us our joy in ourselves. This separateness of self is considered by man as his most precious possession. It is a constant striving and suffering for us to maintain the separateness of this self of ours. And in fact it is this suffering which measures its value." (1)

F. THE IDENTITY OF PERSONALITY.

1. Sources of the demand for personal identity:

a. So that personal acts may have more than momentary significance.

Besides the ideal unity of the moral life and the concrete, simultaneous unity of the conscious, momentary act, a person possesses another kind of unity of a remarkable character which is commonly called the identity of personality in the midst of its developing cycles of activity. The significance of an act which is not rationally or purposively linked with other acts of the same individual may be very slight indeed. The value of particular acts, whatever their intrinsic importance, is greatly increased by their organization into orderly systems or series which converge in important and distant ends. Indeed, the realization of the higher types of personal purpose requires a continuity in the midst of their realization without which the latter could not be attained. Without this continuity, personality would not exist, and the human being would consist of one isolated and transitory act after another. In order to explain actual personalities as we have found them to exist, we must accept some degree of permanence in the midst of their conative cycles, and need now to try to understand the meaning of this permanence.

b. So that personal values may be attained and preserved.

Perhaps the real source of our demand for identity lies in our appreciation of the need of it as a condition for the realization of ends which we value and for the preservation of values already attained. The fact of this felt need of time for the fulfilment of our purposes has not been sufficiently recognized alongside of the fact of memory as a confirmation of our personal identity. If we should entertain purposes and some one else reap the enjoyments of their realization without our consent, those purposes would have little or no value for us. We consider those purposes to have veritable worth which we expect to realize in the course of our individual history, or which we do or have realized. We require a continuity between the inception and the fulfilment of a given plan of activity. This continuity or identity is a condition of such fulfilment and is manifested in it. But this identity must be more than merely logical. It must have the hardness of life and activity stretching through it.

Here again the concept of purposive activity enables us to understand the source of the demand for identity. Our interests in the

(1) Sadhana, pages 69-70.

future attainment of our ends leads us to consider our identity as much as does the desire to connect our present act with past ones. The relative importance of purposing and remembering in confirming the fact of personal identity varies, of course, according to the age of the person concerned. Those who desire immortality usually wish for a personal immortality, namely, one in which their future life will be rationally and teleologically connected with their present life. We want personal identity, then, because it means the development and attainment of those values which we seek, of those purposes which we hold dear. The conception of personal identity, therefore, has great pragmatic value.

2. Distinction between the experience and the assertion of personal identity.

Now that some of the reasons why we want personal identity when we stop to think about the matter have been presented, we may turn to the conscious assertion of it as a fact in our experience. In the light of the activities which we have already carried out we have no hesitation in asserting, in the course of reflection upon our nature, that identity or continuity is a fact of personal life, whatever may be our specific definition of it. The demand or need of identity is met by the fact of identity as demonstrated by our own conscious histories and memories. I, therefore, may assert that I am one in the midst of the successive activities which I, as their subject, perform. The reality of the self-assertion of identity in the course of experience is one of the cardinal components of James' doctrine of the passing thought. (1) Bowne, too, emphasizes repeatedly the actuality and the great importance of permanence as a feature of personality. (2)

a. The assertion of personal identity in self-conscious reflection.

My identity then may be a matter of my self-consciousness, but my self-conscious assertion that I am one in the midst of my active cycles does not create that identity as a fact; it only brings before my reflective attention that which was there all along in an unrecognized way, for my very assertion presupposes the identity to which it refers. My identity, therefore, is merely an explication of an original aspect of my activities which is not a matter of my creation, but which is a presupposition of my developed activity-experiences which I may bring to light when I think about my nature and its implications.

1'. Identity is an immanent principle of personal activity.

In other words, personal identity may be a principle immanent in my personal activities which makes them possible without my conscious recognition of it as such. From this it follows that identity is not a principle derived from outside of what I call my personality, but is one of the categories which are immanent in my personal experience. As a result of reflection I may become conscious of it, and I may extend it to other facts than personal ones.

b. The experience or fact of identity precedes its conceptual formulation.

It should be noted, however, that I do not often stop to say that I am identical in my various activities. This point was stressed when we gave reasons for denying James' view that every passing thought actually and consciously appropriates its whole past. (3) The demand for an assertion of my personal identity may arise only on some exceptional occasion, such as philosophical criticism, or in acting as a witness in a judicial proceeding where I am asked to testify whether I saw a certain event or not. The common fact is that I want something now, and later I want it still, and finally I get what I want

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(1) See above, pages 36-7; criticism of his appropriative hypothesis, above pages 76-8.

(2) See above, pages 139-43; see also page 172.

(3) See above, pages 76-8.

and I am satisfied, for, I say, I have what I wanted. It is easy to pass from this original experience to the statement that I who have what I want am the same one who once wanted what I have, save that I am now satisfied when I was not before. In other words, the experience of personal continuity precedes the conceptual formulation of it, and is to be distinguished from it. James includes sensible continuity among the characters of the stream of consciousness. (1)

View of D. H. Parker.

This distinction is clearly made by D. H. Parker in the second chapter of his book on The Self and Nature. He asserts that, "Personal identity is, however, no more identical with self-identification than blue is with the concept of blue. The most ordinary experiences give evidence of this. When we waken in the morning we feel ourselves to be the same without any overt assimilation of the new experience to the idea of ourselves; the idea may not arise at all. There are times . . . when the idea of self is in abeyance, as when we work quietly; yet there is a sense of familiarity which pervades all experience, and is the abiding identity within it. Yet when the idea of self is in mind, we cannot apply it to another self; for its root and substance is just oneself and no other. One's sense or feeling of identity with one's past is thus no illusion or empty boast; for it is the having in mind of the real identity, however small, between one's present and one's past. . . According to the view of this chapter, . . the judgment which the self makes about itself is a true judgment." (2) "The abstract concept of identity, like all concepts, is the reflex or representative in the mind of something real in that which the mind knows or reflects upon." (3)

c. Inadequacy of the interpretation of personal identity as logical meaning.

These points bring to light the important distinction between actual identity and conceptual identity, between the fact or experience of identity and the idea of identity which one forms by reflection upon the experience. Only the former is essential to personality, although the latter may mark an important step forward in the development of self-consciousness.

From this distinction it follows that the concept of identity does not exhaust the meaning of personal identity. It is only half true to say that the continuity in personal activities is a logical meaning which results from thinking. In making the latter statement, one must carefully avoid the assumption that ideas or logical meanings somehow hang detached from personal acts of intelligence. The assertion that an identical purpose abides through an activity-series is itself a personal act presupposing a unitary agent. There may be a logical or rational continuity in a compound cycle of activities by reason of the presence of a single purpose; this continuity, however, does not make, but depends upon and presupposes a permanent agent who maintains an interest in the purpose, and this agent cannot be reduced to the ideal or logical meaning which he thinks and according to which he acts from moment to moment. The conceptual identity of a person rests upon, and is an expression of his experience of seeking an end and seeing it through until he realizes it; and to the completed whole he may add the assertion, This is my work which I have done.

So far we have discovered several points of view from which personal identity may be considered. There is, first, the original exper-

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(1) See above, page 24.
(2) The Self and Nature, pages 51-2.
(3) Ibid., page 41.

d. Summary of several kinds of identity so far distinguished.

ience of carrying an end to its consummation, where one attains the values which one is aware of having sought at the beginning of the cycle of activities; this is factual or actual identity. Then, by reason of my interest in the permanence of my personal values, or for other reasons, I may come to reflect on my continuity, and one day assert that I abide and that I know I have experienced before the very purpose which I now seek, and which I expect to continue to seek. I may perform, thus, an act of self-identification in which I judge that I who now perform this act am the very one who has performed many and varied acts in the past. This latter kind of identity is conceptual identity, a conscious and reflective expression of the first and original kind.

3. Reasons for the over-estimated difficulty of the problem.

This account of personal identity would seem to be perfectly intelligible and relatively complete, and yet it is commonly supposed that the meaning of personal identity is very difficult to understand. The source of this over-estimated difficulty may be explained by several mistaken expectations connected with the idea of personal identity. One of these is that one will find in the study of personal identity some kind of agent which exists apart from or outside of concrete activities, and which perhaps exists through some kind of real time. This is one of the prejudices which casts unnecessary difficulty over the problem in question. In answer it is sufficient to point out, first, that the agent, apart from the individual acts which he performs, is a concept or abstraction, and we should have no more interest in the permanence of meaning attached to this than to any other important concept in our system of knowledge. In the second place, it should be noted that the acting agent himself is the ground of time, the support of the temporal series, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an entity which this series in some way carries along upon its back. These erroneous notions of the relation of the agent to his acts and to the temporal series are common reasons for many of the mistaken questions and hypotheses about personal identity. The uselessness, for purposes of explanation, of a substantial substratum of the active subject may be regarded as generally recognized.

a. Mistaken notions of the relation of the agent to his acts and to time.

Again, it may be said that one does not understand personal identity because one does not know why agents abide. This attitude represents a confusion of two problems: namely, of the understanding of the facts of our personal life, and of the comprehension of the creation of agents. We have no compunction against admitting that the positing of agents and the creation of souls is not our business. There is no objection to trying to find out how these things come to be, but failure in this attempt should not blind us to the actual continuity which we experience in our activities. If we begin with our personal experiences, and do not pretend to go beyond them, we find that abiding agents are facts, and that they are essential to the explanation of our activities.

b. Demand for spatial metaphors which cannot be met.

Sometimes thinkers are dissatisfied with the answer they get to the problem of personal identity because they expect the answer to be given in some sort of spatial or mechanical metaphors which will enable them to imagine how personal agents continue to act as they do. All one can say to this view is that it is a mistaken conception. There is no sense in saying that an active subject or agent exists in space, for space itself is a concept which presupposes the organizing work of the subject himself. One may as well expect to find how agents exist in a physical world as to find how a stone seeks after ends which it values.

1'. Personal identity is not found in the body.

It is scarcely necessary to add that the body cannot be regarded as constitutive of personal identity, for the assertion of its permanence presupposes just the fact of identity in a thinking subject which we are in part trying to explain. We can go back further in our search for principles than the body. In solving, for example, a mathematical problem I may maintain my identity in the various steps of the solution without any reference whatever to my body, and it is not at all evident how the body helps me to assert at the end of the problem that I have solved that which was proposed for solution.

D. H. Parker presents various reasons for not finding personal identity in the brain (1), one of which is that "the experience of an individual is not his brain. If the brain has a continuous existence and experience only a fleeting and interrupted one, they cannot be identical." If it is said that identity is not to be found in experience, but in some thing, such as the body, the reply is simply that, "we know nothing of things except as they are given to us in our experience. Hence, if experience is naturally transient, things must be transient also; if there is no identity and permanence in the one, there is none in the other." (2)

4. An attempt to present a concrete description of personal identity.

We shall attempt now to present more fully the concrete or actual meaning of the concept of personal identity which is expressed in my self-conscious assertion that I who now act am the same agent who acted yesterday. The identity in this statement is clearly a conceptual or abstract one, for it applies to the connection between many activities which are not now actual, and cannot be, if it be true that a human person can act in only one way at a time. In the affirmation just mentioned I take advantage of my capacity for conceptual construction, and remind myself that I have been present in all the acts I have performed. This construction is frequently of great significance in binding together long-term purposes and compound conative cycles and memories of acts already performed. The identity, then, between the group of my historical acts as I now experience it is conceptual, and to assert its existence in this conceptual way is the special function of a memory-act.

a. The conceptual character of the identity in my historical acts.

b. Meaning of identity in an individual act: this is more properly called subjective unity.

If we turn from a series of activities to an individual act, can we say that there is identity present in that? Strictly speaking, we should not refer to the identity of an individual act, but of the unity of it, especially of the unitary agency which it implied. The identity of an individual act is only another name for its unitary agency. We have explained already that an individual act centers in a single agent who initiates, grounds, and achieves it. (3) G. E. Moore points out that, "The first meaning, then, which we can give to an assertion of Identity, is that the assertion that a thing is identical with itself is equivalent to the assertion that it is a subject. Identity is not here a relation between two things, nor does it imply any difference." (4) Without a conscious subject which holds together the several aspects of an individual act, it would not occur, or its phases would be only an aggregation of separate events or things. A subjective unity rather than strict identity characterizes an individual act of short duration.

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(1) The Self and Nature, pages 28-9.
(2) Ibid., page 36.
(3) See above, pages 233-45.
(4) Mind, N. S., vol. I, page 121.

c. An example of identity in connection with a short series of acts.

It is when acts begin to blend into one another and to form more or less complex cycles that the problem of personal identity appears in its simplest form. But "the normal human mind," as J. R. Angell points out, "is never a mere string of states of consciousness. It is always a unitary affair in which the past, the present, and even the future are felt to hang together in an intimate personal way." (1) Let us consider a particular case to see how mental states are linked together.

Suppose I perform some complex action, such as throwing a bowling ball. I prepare for the throw by taking in the whole situation in which I find myself; I grasp the ball, adjust my fingers, and feel its weight. I aim carefully, and hurl it with the best of my ability; I watch it roll down the alley and knock down several pins; and I rejoice at my success. Here is a short-term act with all its characteristic accompaniments.

1'. The real question is not what connects but what separates our various activities.

Now, the question which is often asked in the discussion of personal identity is, what connects the beginning with the end of the action? or what binds together the different minor acts within the whole? What joins the picking up of the ball with the resulting satisfaction? This putting of the question tends to warp the issue from the beginning. The more obvious question, from the point of view of the ordinary acting person would be, what separates the activities? or what distinguishes them, since they form an intimate purposive unity? Certainly the actor at the time of performing the action is unaware of any difficulty in getting from one part of the activity-cycle to another. He has no experience of needing to bridge some chasm in the series of his activities. He may have some uncertainty in deciding what purpose will guide him in his next act, but having adopted a particular purpose, he has no problem of getting out of a present act into a new one. He just does the deed that he wants to do. The question, then, of what connects the beginning and the end in acting is asked from the standpoint of the observer and not of the actor himself.

2'. Why the identity cannot be found in the succession of kinaesthetic sensations.

Now, if one should analyze out all the sensations of strain and effort in the whole series of movements, one would no doubt miss the connecting link. Some psychologists go astray by looking too closely at these incidental factors. (2) The clue is to be found in the maintenance of a purposive attitude. The total action gets its tone and its significance from the intention to do one's best, in this case, in knocking down pins. No succession of kinaesthetic sensations can provide this necessary bond of teleological unity. That is, as one proceeds to roll a couple of balls down a bowling alley, his various bodily movements are unified by the single aim of doing his best in knocking down pins. This aim possesses a logical or rational meaning which abides through the whole act. Numerous sensations may function in the fulfilment of the aim but they are too transitory to constitute the abiding or identical factor. But the aim itself presupposes always the interested agent who maintains his attitude of concern with its attainment. We should remember, however, that the purpose itself is only one aspect of a concrete activity from which it can be distinguished only in abstraction. This activity gets its unity from the general purpose which dominates it and not from any sensory phases. The one who starts to perform a task is the one who executes it, if it

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(1) Psychology, 1904, page 382.

(2) Compare our criticism of James' view of the spiritual self, above, pages 201-204.

is executed, for the whole meaning of the act would disappear without this presupposition of an abiding and interested agent. The one who proposes to play the game is the one who plays it, and notes his success or failure in doing so.

3'. The meaning of identity in the concrete example chosen.

Identity in this particular case is the name for the fact that one agent has a variety of specific experiences, such as attitude of playing the game, preparing by picking up a ball, aiming and throwing it at a definite time, feeling various stresses and strains in doing so, and finally having a satisfaction in the result of his total action. We may say with J. Ward that "The first and most fundamental fact yielded by the analysis of this experience we have found to be its reference to a subject or self that has it." (1) There could not be a development of such specific experiences toward a definite end without a single agent who possessed them all.

The identity of this subject means simply that he does as a matter of fact perform various activities which have for him a meaningful connection or development. In the first instance this bond of connection is immediately experienced without reflection upon it. (2) One may say that the subject is permanent amid these mental processes if he speaks with circumspection, but it is easy to turn the activity situation inside out and lose its meaning by looking at it solely from the standpoint of an external observer. To refer to the subject as permanent is a reflection of the objective point of view. It is to apply a category to the agent himself which he applies to certain of his ideas. We may speak, however, of the permanence of the agent, if this is not taken to imply that he exists through some real time, and if it is merely an attempt to indicate that the agent is one and the same amid his varying experiences. D. H. Parker points out that, "A difference in moment does not involve a difference in existence; for the same thing may exist anew at separate moments of time." (3) In short, if the series of mental phenomena present in a cycle of activities is to be known as such at all, the knowing subject cannot itself be a part of a series.

d. Summary of the meaning of identity in a series of personal acts.

Identity, then, in connection with a series of particular personal acts possessing a teleological unity, means, from the standpoint of the actor himself, that he consciously performs these acts, one and all, that he finds some satisfaction which he seeks, or perhaps unexpected dissatisfaction. This persistence in the pursuit of purposes upon the part of a conscious subject who values them is the real and original meaning of identity. The only mystery about it is the mystery of the existence of the agent at all. This identity of the active subject in the midst of a series of activities having a common significance is something which any one can verify in his daily life. Another concept in connection with personality has been illuminated, perhaps, by a study of concrete activity.

e. Laird's account of identity.

J. Laird states that "Our argument has referred only to the identity of that self which can be discovered by introspection. This self, it is plain, consists of experiences, and its identity is of the experiences. We can recognize the identity in one way only, that is to say, by a judgment of comparison. It is necessary to compare the self at some time in the past with the self as it is in the present,

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(1) Psychological Principles, page 361.

(2) Compare our discussion of actual or experiential identity, above, page 321.

(3) The Self and Nature, pages 40-41.

and then we can tell whether and in what respects it is identical. Thus personal identity does not involve any peculiar logical difficulty. We must be identical if we can recognise our identity in judging. We require memory in order to make the comparison implied in any judgment of identity; but memory does not make us identical. It merely supplies part of the evidence for recognising the fact. We must remember the self of the past in order to compare it with the self of the present. Perhaps there is no personality which is incapable of recognising itself in this way." (1)

5. Some notes on historical identity.

Any one who might be interested in making this comparison could do so only because he had reached a developed stage of intelligence, which fact explains why it is customary to speak of identity with reference to remembered activities involving a long period of time. In this case identity is no longer an aspect or implication of a short-term series of activities, but a general term applying to a great many past and complex cycles. Nevertheless, the basic nature of identity is the same, namely, the judgment of the agent that he has performed these many acts which he remembers. Since he may recall these numerous previous activities as his own, without reflecting upon the nature of his identity, we may distinguish this historical identity also from reflective or conceptual identity. Historical identity differs from actual identity because it refers to more distant activities, and it differs from conceptual identity in not being strictly self-conscious. For obvious psychological reasons one's historical identity is likely to have much greater unity and order than his actual life contained. Since one is most likely to remember those activities which most affected his development of value, forgetting and remembrance aid in the development of a system of values.

6. Dispositional identity.

One of the characteristics of a person is that his activities may be modified as the result of past experience. Some of these effects may be consciously present and influential as he goes about performing an act in the present. Most of them, however, are not thus present, and yet we know, on pragmatic grounds, that he is capable of acting with reference to various purposes which conditions in the near future may bring to his consciousness.

When we attempt to define these capacities, or the ground of our possibility of acting, we meet serious difficulties which involve the whole problem of the relation of mind and body, which cannot be further introduced. The question is sometimes restated without solution by saying that each person has a particular disposition, temperament, and character. There is no general term to cover these three factors. Their meaning is well summarized by W. McDougall: "Temperament must be carefully distinguished from disposition and from character. . . The disposition of a person is the sum of all the innate dispositions or instincts with their specific impulses or tendencies of the kind discussed in Chapter II. . . Character, on the other hand, is the sum of acquired tendencies built up on the native basis of dispositions and temperament; it includes our sentiments and our habits in the widest sense of the term." (2) Temperament is one's native susceptibility to emotional experiences. We can do no more here than to recall the discussion of disposition above (3) and point out the worth

(1) Problems of the Self, pages 245-6.
(2) Introduction to Social Psychology, page 120.
(3) See above, pages 266-70.

of reserving the term, dispositional identity, for whatever explanation may be found for those permanent factors outside our conscious life which exercise the most persistent influence upon our activities. This identity, however, in no sense supersedes the original identity of the conscious active person, and its meaning as a principle of explanation will rest upon the kind of identity which we actually experience.

7. In what sense personality is permanent.

A useful distinction may be made between the application of identity and of permanence to a personality. Identity refers to the subjective or agent aspect of a person. Relative permanence, but not identity, may be applied to the phenomenal stages of a person's activities, that is, to his empirical self. While some of the interests of every person are probably short-lived and temporary, he has others which are only slowly modified and developed in the course of his experiences. If his life-activities are thoroughly correlated by reference to well selected and remote purposes, the latter will be tokens of permanent interests, the value of which he repeatedly ratifies. In this sense personality is permanent: namely, in the frequent reaffirmation of certain valuable ends, as well as in the frequent experience of similar values.

a. A person is permanent in the sense of constant reaffirmation of certain purposes and values.

b. Distinction between permanence and identity as applied to personality.

There is, therefore, no contradiction in affirming that a personality is both identical and permanent, for these terms refer to different aspects of his nature. The former concerns the subject or agent, and the latter, the values which he cherishes and the interests which he repeatedly experiences. His total personality does not remain unchanged from day to day. There are frequent and often radical changes in that aspect of a personal life which we have called the empirical self, (1) but on the whole there is a relative permanence of interests, desires, etc. There is identity on the subjective side of personality. The distinctions which we have made in the concrete personal act enable us to assert without contradiction that personality is an identity in the midst of change. (2) Permanence in personality means that the agent acts in ways that are relatively constant, but identity in personality means that the same agent acts in all his activities.

c. The slow inner development of personality.

The development of one's interests and the coordination of his activities ordinarily take place gradually. A personality is a slowly developing organization of activities, or a progressive, purposive growth-from within. The person remembers his past, makes plans for the future, and gradually alters and correlates his activities so as best to promote what he finds most valuable in the course of his experiences. For this reason the subjective identity of the person is intimately bound up with the development and continuity of his empirical phases, and both aspects need to be studied together.

d. The limited permanence of personality.

The importance of the fact of development in personal life warns us against over-estimating the permanence of personality. There are distinct limits to the permanence of many of our interests and tendencies. Moral crises, religious conversion, moral negligence, social calamity, and other experiences may greatly modify the purposes which form so determining a part of our personal lives. Then,

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(1) See above, pages 284-5.

(2) Compare our criticism, above, pages 150-1, that Bowne does not reconcile permanence with activity in his concept of personality.

too, we should note the vague purposes and conflicts in human interests, and the frequent uncertainties concerning what we really want. This limited permanence in personal life does not in any way undermine the fact of personal identity, for even the memory of the purposes which we have abandoned, or of the false ideals which have tempted us only confirms the certainty that these once appealed to our very selves.

D. H. Parker expresses well this fact of identity amid change which characterizes personal experiences: "Permanence and change, adventurous seeking for the new, and the tragic holding on to the old or effort to escape the old; self-making and self-mending--such is the life of the mind. Throughout there is a thread of identity; the old man remains in some respects the same as the child. Yet the amount of this identity varies on different occasions. It is great when a man puts all his emotional energy into some task which requires the use of his whole past experience, the total resources of his memory and learning; then as we say he is most himself; it is little when in a light moment of gaiety he forgets himself feeding on new impressions." (1)

8. Summary of personal identity.

Shall I then say that I am always the same? If I refer to the active subject in my experience, I may reply in the affirmative. If I refer to the marvelous wealth of experiences which come to me in the progressive realization and transformation of my personal interests, I must reply in the negative. One cannot say that personality is either changing or permanent until one defines the aspect of the concrete person about which he is thinking. A person is different on successive occasions in the sense that he actually acts in different ways, but he is the same in the sense that one agent performs all the acts. Since it is inevitable that we must include the most varying interests and purposes in a single personal history, clearly we cannot assert that a person is always the same, if we consider him as a whole. It is the personal agent who is identical, and this identity is an original fact of his experience. When he becomes self-conscious, he may be interested in a reflective assertion of his identity, but this conceptual identity will be merely an expression of his original and actual identity. When the latter experiential form of identity is referred, in memory and reflection, to many past acts of a person, we have what we have called historical identity.

G. PERSONALITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

1. Mode of approach to the problem of self-determination.

a. Transitional remarks.

The discussion of the relation of the idea of self-determination to the concept of personality has been postponed long because it is complex and involves many other factors which needed consideration first, and also because the idea is closely connected with the problem of the reality of personality xx xxxxxxxxxx which we shall consider next. W. G. Everett points out that, "The development of reflection and self-criticism, of self-direction and moral effort on the part of the self, are essential conditions of human freedom, freedom in and through determination by rational insight." (2) With the exception of self-criticism or self-consciousness (3), the conditions to which he refers have been met. The concept of personal individual activity

(1) The Self and Nature, page 50.
(2) Moral Values, page 350. (3) See below, pages 351-3.

will enable us briefly to state the place of self-determination in the concept of personality.

b. Volition becomes important here.

In the study of self-determination the volitional side of certain human activities comes into the foreground of attention. The intelligent phases of personality have been treated in connection with the purposive and orderly character of human activity. (1) The affective factor in personality has been considered in connection with the values which are characteristic of personal activity. (2) A consistent place in the concept of personality must now be found for the volitional facts of psychology.

c. The pulling power of purposes that are valued.

We started our constructive study by pointing out the variability and excessiveness which is manifested in the activities of human beings. "When the self first comes to consciousness, it is a bundle of activities moving swiftly along a definite track." (3) In the course of time, perhaps, the activities of a self become sufficiently organized around various ideals so that he may be called a personality. At this level of development intelligence has already become a dominant factor in activity, and makes possible the choice of one out of several more or less distant purposes. The value attached to these ends acts as a pulling power upon the individual subject, and thus they become "efficient causes" of activity. In this way, as W. G. Everett points out, a union of the final and efficient causes is operative in moral acts, and, we may say, formal teleology becomes dynamic teleology. "Such determination by the attraction of ideas of value which challenge interest and claim obedience, is the one point in the universe where we are able to see clearly the identity of final and efficient causation. We are, then, capable of determination by the ideas of ends which are, at the same time, the driving motives for their own realization. Ideas are efficient forces. In this fact is to be found the true source of our freedom. Intelligence thus contains a genuine element of transcendence, by which we are delivered from subjection to the moment." (4)

d. Need of control arises from the excessiveness of human active tendencies.

A profitable approach to the meaning of self-determination may be found in the need of controlling the abundant and conflicting tendencies and interests of original human nature. If man were prepared by nature to act unequivocally under all circumstances, the need for speaking of freedom and self-determination would be very much less. But his desires and tendencies are often mutually antagonistic, and consequently one tendency must gain right of way before action can follow. In a man's first activities conative unity undoubtedly exists, but not moral unity, for a comprehensive harmony in active tendencies is an achievement which a human being must win gradually. The freedom of man might mean the fact of divergence and lack of moral organization among his inherited interests and conations, a fact which gives him the opportunity, indeed the duty of taking hold of his endowment with a view to unifying and moralizing it. The variability and excessiveness of man's native activities give need and opportunity for control and self-direction.

2. The meaning of self-determination.

In what sense, then, is self-determination said to be present in a personal activity? We may answer by asking another question: Why are these two words combined in this way? In the first place,

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(1) See above, pages 278-282, 292-3.
(2) See above, pages 294-308.
(3) W. G. Everett, Moral Values, page 349. (4) Ibid., page 351.

the self in this phrase is equivalent to the subject or agent in our concept of personal activity, and the meaning of this agency can be expressed only in general or synonomous terms, namely, as the one who acts in any finite field of experience.

a. Ambiguity of "determination."

Secondly, the real problem of interpretation arises from the ambiguous meaning of determination. It can be understood from various standpoints. In the first place, it may refer to the orderly and uniformly conditioned stages in any activity when it becomes a matter of knowledge on the part of an observing scientist or philosopher. From such a point of view any intelligent goal in which one's behavior may culminate may represent only an apparent, regulative, or objective purpose, (1) and one might infer from this interpretation that the activity is due to causes in the strictly scientific or mechanical sense.

1'. From the standpoint of the observer: it is logical order.

Such a deterministic interpretation, however, is inconsistent with our conception of personal activity as a function of the "prospective sequel." In general, the defect in this doctrine is that it over-simplifies the facts in the interest of logical order; it has no place for the retroactive influence of purposes. It actually results in a static conception of human activity, and thereby excludes the very important dynamic agency which is a characteristic of personality. It represents the standpoint of an observer who, from an external point of view, is interested in setting forth in a logical order the changing experiences of someone else, and this point of view is very different from that of the actor himself, who, from the inside, may intelligently and purposively alter the course of his experience with reference to the "prospective sequel." (2)

2'. From the standpoint of the actor: it means purposive initiation of acts.

If we take the standpoint of the actor himself, self-determination will be a very different process than that of an orderly description of phenomena; it will mean for him the purposive initiation of activity. (3) Hence, a satisfactory meaning of self-determination may be said to be that the agent acts intelligently with reference to prospective values or ends which he approves, and in such activity expresses his own nature, in the sense of making manifest to himself and others what he seeks. Self-determination means, in other words, a conscious and deliberate guidance of the successive stages of one's activities so as to attain the most satisfying results in view of the whole situation, past, present, and future, in which one finds himself. Just as spontaneous and impulsive action is characteristic of original human nature, intelligent and controlled activity is a mark of human nature that has become personal. The motive of a personal act has its origin and residence within the conscious self, so that when a person acts according to a motive, his activity is an expression of himself. (4)

b. The meaning of self-determination in personal activity.

A self-determined or free act is neither foreordained nor for-

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(1) See above, pages 219-20.

(2) See W. Fite, "The Agent and the Observer," Philosophical Review, vol. XVII, pages 489-506, for an excellent account of the distinction between the two points of view in question.

(3) Compare here James' excellent description of causation and free will, above, pages 50-2.

(4) See above, pages 134-8, where the important connection of self-determination with purpose in Bowne's theory of the self is explained.

tuitous. Neither is it causally determined in the scientific sense, for the totality of antecedent processes considered in scientific causation does not include the teleological factor which is characteristic of the personal act and apart from which it would be unintelligible. That "final cause" which is the reason for acting in the case of normal persons cannot be overlooked if one desires a complete understanding of them.

J. Ward points out that, "If we ask a man why in a new and strange situation he acts as he does, it will hardly occur to him to explain his conduct by describing to us the immediately preceding situation. The answer he is likely to give, and that we naturally expect, will consist rather in describing the end at which he aims and the value that it has for him, as the reason for his determination." (1) He declares further that, "Efficiency and spontaneity, purpose and worth, these ontological and teleological categories . . . are the categories that in the main define what we mean by an individual or a person." (2)

When the intelligent and conscious subject finds himself in a given situation calling for action, his resulting activity is not a function merely of the present situation, but also of an absent or future one which he expects to develop. He will choose that line of action which gives the promise of bringing greatest satisfaction. His choice of ends and means is a real one, and he exerts genuine control over the ensuing activity. The self is not carried along upon a stream of impulses and tendencies which are separate from it, but so far as these tendencies are operative, they are aspects of a conscious and concrete activity which centers, in experience at the personal level, in an agent who is in control of the course of his actions. The person, by selecting the ends according to which he will act, determines in large part his own history. J. Ward says, in a fine way that, "A man is internally free whenever the ends he pursues have his whole-hearted approval." (3)

c. Self-determination and uniformity.

The teleological self-determination which has been described does not exclude, but rather usually includes a measure of causal determination in the natural-science sense of uniformity of occurrence, for, in the completion of an activity-cycle, various factors, including mental processes and perhaps also physical phenomena, may occur in a regular order as features of the total situation . This factor of order was explicitly incorporated, as a feature of activity, in our discussion of its individuality (4), and it was also definitely recognized in our exposition of the meaning of intelligence in personal activities. (5) Indeed, most of our personal purposes could not be realized without our depending upon some uniformity in the occurrence of mental and physical phenomena concerned, but it by no means follows that our personal activities are exhaustively reducible to these univormities.

In other words, our activities are at once determined by the valuable ends to which they lead and conditioned by the orderly character of the universe in which they are realized. Without the first determination, our actions would be either mechanical or accidental; and without the second condition, their attainment would be entirely problematic and chance. In an experience which is at once orderly and

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(1) The Realm of Ends, page 278. (2) Ibid., page 282.
(3) Psychological Principles, page 405.
(4) See above, especially pages 252-3, 258-9.
(5) See above, pages 279-82.

teleological, personal activity becomes a possibility and a fact. The working out of the relation between these two aspects of purposiveness and uniformity in personal activity would constitute the philosophical side of "teleomechanics," with which W. Stern concludes his system of "critical personalism." (1) Bowne has also described in an excellent way how freedom and order are blended in personal experience. (2)

1'. Conservation of energy and the increase of value.

The idea of the conservation of energy represents a scientific uniformity which has sometimes been used in an attempt to disprove the fact of creative self-determination which appears to be a matter of personal experience. We have said that self-determination means the intelligent maintenance and increase of personal values. The active personality is a source of many significant values, but we should speak of personality as a "storehouse" of values, not of energy. (3) Since mechanical or energetic categories simply do not apply in any intelligible sense, to these valuable personal activities (4), the question of the conservation of energy does not enter at all. Not only the conservation but the production of values is characteristic of the self-determining act of the human person. (5) But since the conscious activities of personality are not physical energies, however much they may involve the expenditure of physical energy in their performance, the principle of the conservation of energy is neither affirmed nor denied, for it is irrelevant. There is no objection to applying the law of the conservation of energy to the bodily expression which may form a part of an individual act, but the latter in its essential constitution simply belongs to a different order of facts than the former.

a'. Differences between motives and forces.

The assertion that the conservation of energy is inapplicable to personal activity is confirmed by J. Ward's eloquent distinction between motives and forces. The characteristic of motives "is not, that like external forces they move or tend to move the subject, but that they are themselves the subject moving or tending to move, or more accurately, acting or tending to act. We say indeed that hunger makes a man eat, but we do not interpret this statement as we should the statement that heat makes a glass crack. In both cases we have a certain situation, but in the one case the active subject changes the situation; in the other the situation changes the passive object.

"Forces, though distinct, combine their effects only because they converge on one body: motives, though distinct, conflict only because they diverge, so to say, from one subject. The forces, that is, are applied to the body, the motives spring from the subject. The body moves in the one path which the forces collectively determine, the subject moves in the one path which it selectively determines. The

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(1) See his Person und Sache. (2) See above, page 133.

(3) In writing the first draft of this paragraph as it remains here, I had forgotten entirely that H. Hüffding has suggested the analogy between the persistence of energy and the conservation of value; see his Philosophy of Religion, pages 216 ff.

(4) See above, pages 194-9.

(5) H. Hüffding makes the "axiom of the conservation of value," described from the point of view of its psychological basis, a central feature of his philosophy of religion; see especially, Philosophy of Religion, pages 215 ff.

magnitude of a force is referred to an objective standard, the strength of a motive depends on its subjective worth: the sufficient reason is in the one case mechanical, in the other it is teleological." (1)

3. Sorley on the limitations of self-determination.

From the discussion of the relation of self-determination to uniformity it follows that a self, in determining or controlling his activities, must take account of his own nature and the structure of the world in which he acts. His self-determination is not absolute, but relative. W. R. Sorley expresses this idea in his inimitable way as follows: "The self is thrown into an environment in which it can live and act only in conformity with natural law. It brings with it mental dispositions and it developes a character which tend to give it a stability of its own. Thus its freedom is limited in two ways. In the first place, it is limited by the physical conditions in the midst of which it is set. . . As mind acts through body, it is in all its activity limited by the laws to which body is subject. . . Nor, in the second place, is freedom in human nature divorced from its own past. It is the means by which character is established, and in which we look to the future to fulfil the promise and correct the errors of the time that has gone before. . . Actions are systematized into the growing character of the self, and thus contribute to the determination of the acts which follow. At the same time the succeeding acts proceed always from the self, not from the particular features which we distinguish as making up its character, nor even from all these features taken together. . . When, if ever, this character is firmly established, the need for repeated conflict in order that the good may be chosen disappears. . . The free man may achieve uniformity through his freedom; upon the unfree man it would have to be imposed." (2) The self selects his own past freely, even when the variety of competing ways is diminished.

4. Degrees of self-determination.

Thus, between the immature self, struggling amid the warring impulses of his nature in an effort to win moral victories, and the organized personality whose activities are freely directed with reference to a single good, there are many degrees of self-determination, and beyond the most perfect human self-determination we may think of the complete self-determination of the Infinite. The degree of self-determination which a person possesses cannot be regarded as a constant function of the intensity of the conflict from which an ethical act emerges, but rather is estimated by reference to the completeness with which the act expresses the organized approval of the agent as he considers it in the light of his whole life. It may be also estimated with reference to the completeness with which a single clear purpose is organized in character as the result of many previous self-determined acts. One's character is an expression of his own past self-determinations and an incarnation of his proper evaluations.

5. Question concerning the primacy of the will in personality.

It is sometimes said that free will is an important, indeed, a primary mark of personality. This is a misleading statement, for, in the first place, will is an abstraction. It is one aspect of the concrete person-in-activity. It may be conceptually distinguished from other aspects of that person, but apart from them it seems to be non-existent. Hence, we should not say that the will, but that the person wills.

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(1) The Realm of Ends, pages 284-5.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 449-52.

The objections to the doctrine of the primacy of will are similar to those offered above in criticism of the primacy of intellect and feeling. (1) To affirm that will is more primary, for example, than intellect, assumes that intellect and will can be ordered with respect to the same criterion of value or the same function in personal life, which plainly is not the case. One cannot say, either, that intellect is more primary than feeling, for feeling does not know, nor does intellect feel. In other words, there is lacking a common basis of comparison which is requisite to determine the question concerning the relative worth of these factors in personal activities.

It follows that the assertion of the primacy of the will is misleading and not well founded. Will is an important feature of personality, but not a primary one, for there is nothing else secondary which can be compared with it. The will is the "whole person active;" the intellect is the whole person knowing; feeling is the whole person evaluating. A. Aliotta believes that,"Concrete thought is an intuitive life at once volition and feeling, and in its full concreteness is no other than the whole mind in action." (2) Only a confusion would result from identifying the meanings of will and activity as we have defined the latter.

6. The freedom of personality.

The so-called "freedom"of personality is only another way of referring to some of the aspects of personality to which we have already given consideration. Freedom is essentially a negative concept, but even as such it may have some value as indicating that personal activity cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, and that this activity is not a movement due to compulsion of a spatially external sort. Freedom, on its negative side, may mean also that the self is not a slave to its lower impulses and desires. D. C. Macintosh expresses this idea by saying that, "What is meant by the assertion of freedom or free agency is that the agent is not necessarily at the mercy absolutely of what was his character at the moment immediately preceding the moment of his activity." (3) The terms, freedom and indeterminism, refer to what the person does not do; but it is in that which he actually does that his fundamental nature is revealed.

The positive significance of the term, freedom, has already been wholly included in the idea of the self-determination, on the part of a person, with reference to ends that are approved by him. Freedom, from this standpoint, means the agent's capacity to act according to purposes which he intelligently chooses and approves. When a thinker makes freedom one of the chief marks of a person, he usually has in mind this intelligent initiative in personal activity. Self-determination, however, is a more accurate and positive term than free will to designate that fundamental feature of personality which is before us, for the former indicates the fact that personality consists in actual purposive activities executed with a measure of self-control. The person and not the will is free. Self-determination is the self-direction of activities; in it the true meaning of the phrase, self-activity, is to be found, for, in the words of R. Tagore, "we gain our freedom when we attain our truest nature." (4) This meaning of

(1) See above, pages 289-91, and 300-301.
(2) Idealistic Reaction against Science, page 411.
(3) Theology as Empirical Science, page 68.
(4) Sadhana, page 74.

self-determination "recognises," as B. Bosanquet says, "the self as operative in its own nature, as creative and originative according to its own law--the only law of creativeness which prevails in the universe. It recognises a necessary act--an act which must be what it is--but not a necessary agent, because nothing but the agent determines the act, and there is no meaning in applying to him any 'must' or 'cannot help it' except in the sense that everything is what it is." (1)

7. Self-determination and personality.

The explication of the idea of self-determination requires one to take account of all the other aspects of personality which have been discussed. This overlapping character of the concept was a good reason for the postponement of its consideration. In this conception and its implications we are approaching still nearer the completion of our description of personality. Activity which has attained the level of self-determination is the most important characteristic of personality. It may be taken without qualification as a criterion of personality.

This criterion is a very ancient one. Thomas Aquinas, for example, adopted it; he asserts that, "Those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will. . . Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will." (2) When we have a deliberating, evaluating intelligence who determines his activities with reference to approved ends, we have personality in its highest form. Self-determination is the "secret of personality" according to G. T. Ladd: "It is the power of self-control, however, in which resides the citadel of personal life and personal development; and it is the doctrine of self-control which furnishes, so far as its possession is possible by finite intellects, the secret of personality." (3)

H. SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY AS SO FAR DEVELOPED.

1. Use of terms.

So far in this investigation we have developed, one at a time, the main features of personality. Now these may be brought together profitably in a summary form. The concept of personality which we are endeavoring to understand means generally the quality or state of being an individual person, and our problem has been to define what this state or property is. It is clear that a person is an individual example of personality, although, in contemporary usage, a personality and person often are used as equivalents. The ontological status of personalities and the method of knowing them are the problems which remain for consideration in two concluding chapters. A personality is a moral achievement of a self, the self being the wider term.

2. Our starting point was the concrete act: the person-in-activity.

We did not attempt to build the concept of personality out of parts, but we began with the concrete act, in its wholeness, of a normal adult human being, and asked, first, What are its implications? and, next, How should it be developed from within so as to be, not merely an act, but a personal act? We found that a typical human activity is an individualized whole, the existence of which involves several distinguishable, but not separable aspects. We discovered

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(1) The Principle of Individuality and Value, pages 354-5.

(2) Summa Theologia, Part II, First Number, Question 1, First Article.

(3) The Secret of Personality, page 58.

that activity is consciously unified by a permeating purpose, and that the latter is sustained by an agent or subject. We noted also that when the agent in his acting is satisfied with having attained the value sought, memory becomes an explicit and important phase of activity. Such a complete and concrete act represents the real person at work.

3. The triadic movement in personal experience.

In the consummation of such an individual pulse of personal life, we have before us a spiritual and triadic cycle or movement which may be regarded as the fundamental mode in which a personality exists. A person exists when a conscious subject or agent acts so as to gain an end which, when attained, is remembered; purpose, active realization, memory--all grounded in a unique and unitary agent--is the typical logic of personal development and experience. Our concrete standpoint exhibited the intimate unity of purpose, activity, and memory, and saved us from regarding them as parts or faculties of which personality might be composed.

4. Intelligence.

But the discovery of this dialectic of personal activity did not exhaust the significance of the personal act; it rather involved other features which needed explication. It became evident that the presence of a purpose with some degree of clearness, which marked a personal activity as distinguished from lower forms of self-experience, implies two other important features of personality, intelligence and value. The positing of a purpose requires not only free ideas and some discrimination, but a measure of knowledge of the total situation to be met and of the means to be adopted. Further, the individual act as a whole, including its phenomenal phases, presents an orderliness of an essentially intelligible sort. In order to explain how the act is possible, we are obliged to assign intelligent capacities to personality, and to regard the act itself as thoroughly intelligible.

5. Value.

But, further, in order to understand why persons seek ends with such universal solicitude as they do, we have had to infer that the ends, when attained, are believed to bring satisfaction or to possess value. This value we have referred to the presence in the individual act of those mental processes which the psychologist isolates and describes as affection or feeling. So general is the human tendency to seek to multiply values, or the good in some form or another, that it must be regarded as an essential mark of personality. A fundamental feature of personality consists in activity which is of value to the actor himself.

6. Self-determination.

We have noticed also, that when a person acts with reference to an end which he fully and freely approves, we can apply the term, self-determination, to this kind of achievement. This concept emphasizes still more clearly the importance of intelligence and purpose, and also brings before our attention two further aspects of the personal act, namely, will and self-consciousness. The latter concept has not been expounded, but will be treated below (1) in connection with the problem of self-knowledge.

7. Intellect, will, and feeling.

We have laid stress in several places upon the view that it is a mistake to suppose that either intellect, will, or feeling has a primacy in personal life, because these are distinctions, made from different standpoints, within an individual whole. To assert, for example, that personality is will is to slur over the all-important factor of intelligence, and yet progress in clear thinking is in no way advanced by identifying will with intelligence. The person is an

(1) See below, pages 351-3.

agent who wills, thinks, and feels, not successively, but all at once, although at any particular stage of activity, one of these moments may preponderate. But in every personal act these three factors mutually penetrate or blend together in varying degrees. If we wish to retain the old terminology, we may say that in an act intellect guides, will executes, and feeling evaluates, but this is so abstract and misleading a mode of expression that it should be used only with the greatest precautions.

The three moments mentioned in the preceding paragraph might be brought together in a less objectionable form in the statement that personality consists in the intelligent acts of an interested agent. This serves very well as a concise definition of the meaning of personality which includes the main conceptual factors. If one realizes how great are the verbal difficulties involved in stating, in a single and well-balanced sentence, those various phases of a person which we have studied in a successive, and, therefore, a relatively abstract way, he will not expect too much of one summary statement of the meaning of personality.

8. Final summary, and definition of personality.

In a fuller way, one may define personality as an agent who intelligently determines his activities with reference to approved and valued ends; this agent is unitary and identical or abiding, and his successive activities constitute an organized teleological system which presupposes, upon the part of the agent, memory, character, and all the richness of the empirical self. The concept of personality, then, means a rational and unitary agent who, acting out of himself in orderly and individual ways with reference to valuable and organized ends which he has learned to approve, abides as the identical and immanent center or subject of a unique empirical self, constituted of a varying wealth of proper psychical facts, and possessing conscious unity and historical continuity. Any human individual or center of finite experience who possesses these marks is a person or a personality.

9. Comparison with the definition of W. Stern.

The nearest approach to or analogue of this definition of personality is found in W. Stern's summary statement in his work, Person und Sache. He says: "A person is such an existent that, in spite of the plurality of his parts, he forms a real unity of a unique kind and value, and as such, in spite of the multiplicity of his particular functions, carries out a unified, purposive self-activity. A person is a whole and something more than his parts. He is quality, not quantity, and has individuality. He is active and spontaneous; and in the realm of persons, there is inner causality. The person is teleological, and has ends and value in and for himself." (1)

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(1) Person und Sache, pages 17-18. "Eine Person ist ein solches Existierendes, das, trotz der Vielheit der Teile, eine reale, eigenartige and eigenwertige Einheit bildet, and als solche, trotz der Vielheit der Teilfunktionen, ein einheitliche, zielstrebige Selbsttätigkeit vollbringt. Die Person ist ein Ganzes. Die Person ist etwas über ihren Teilen. Die Person ist Qualität, die Sache Quantität. Die Person ist aktiv (und spontan.). In der Sphäre der Personen gibt es inner Kausalität (d. h. Wirkung des Ganzen auf Teile). Die Person ist teleologisch. Der Person hat Selbstzweck. Die Person ist für such genommen Wert."

10. The empirical self.

While the personal agent is not himself a presentation, within the individual activity as a whole there are aspects which are presentative or phenomenal. These mark for the agent the progress of his activity, and are the basis for a definition of his nature. These psychical phenomena belonging to the agent make consistent and meaningful the common assertion that a person is a unity in diversity. So far as the order of these presentative factors depends upon other conditions than the agent himself, the latter may be said to be passive with reference to them, but a person is never wholly passive; he is always active in some degree. Out of these presentational aspects of activity the agent may build a conception of an empirical self which will be constituted of all those interests, purposes, desires, conations, etc., which he has learned by experience to value as his own, but which in every case presuppose his agency or subjectivity. The empirical self was included in our summary definition of the concept of personality. This self would not include ordinarily that objective content with which he is in contact or which he knows in cognitive acts, which he does not call his own, but which is an aspect of his total experience. In general, personality is to be identified with the subject of experience together with the various activities which that subject carries out.

a. Ward's definition of a person.

J. Ward's definition of a person may be noted in this connection. "We call human beings persons when they talk intelligibly of Me and Mine; when, that is, they have attained to the consciousness of Self as continuously related to whatever affects them and whatever they can affect. It is not the bare cognition of situations, but the conative attitude towards them, that primarily distinguishes one person from another. . . Here being is always becoming, and development implies progression as well as stability. His personality, then, will not be shewn merely in what a man is but in what he is striving to be. But to be personal, the ideal for which he strives must be his own, must originate in himself--however impersonal its goal may be. These two characteristics, stability as the basis of progression, and originality in shaping its course, seem to be the two essentials of any living personality." (1)

11. The person is not the body.

It is evident that the meaning of personality is not to be expressed in bodily terms, even in view of the fact that it is by means of his body that a person acts and reacts with reference to his environment. One's body no doubt occupies a very "privileged position" in relation to his personality, and the organic and kinaesthetic sensations may be interwoven in most intricate ways with the totality of his individual acts, but to include his body, or any other physical object, in his personality is to confuse the objects in which one is interested with those interests themselves.

12. Personality is spiritual.

A personality may be called a spirit with perfect appropriateness, so that personality,in its higher stages of development, and spirit are practically equivalent. Spirit is especially fitting from our point of view because, while it designates the subject of experience, the customary meaning of it definitely precludes the identification of that subject with anything corporeal. The characteristics of intelligence and appreciation of values, of self-determination and self-consciousness, of memory and moral purpose, which belong to personality, are the chief marks of spiritual being. The claim of personality to spirituality is especially justified because it is the

(1) Psychological Principles, page 464.

source of the highest human values, which fact explains why it is of supreme worth, and ought always to be regarded as an end in itself. This claim is also based upon the fact that personality is an achievement which consists in the unification of its activities with reference to some ideal selfhood or comprehensive plan. Further, the conscious unity of personality is of a unique kind, in no sense composed of parts. The essential meaning, then, of spirituality is to be found in the highest forms of personal activities as they have been described. We have presented in this paragraph an indication of the chief moments connoted by spirituality so as to preclude its identification with anything occult or mysterious.

13. The natural, historical, and creative factors in personality. . .

The various aspects of personal character may be reviewed from the standpoint of their genesis; namely, according to whether or not they are due to conscious self-determination and choice. (a) In the first place, there are activities and features of character which the conscious person has determined or does determine for himself through deliberation and conscious selection. These factors in his own personality which a man brings about by his own efforts we may call the creative ones. In a real, though limited sense, a man creates his own world of experience, and his personality is an artificial or manufactured, and not a natural product. B. Bosanquet asserts that "a true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with pains and labour, not something given to be enjoyed." (1)

(b) In the second group of factors are those not so determined, of which there are two classes, the natural and the historical or social. Here belong all the forces of heredity, environment, and history which go to determine any one's peculiar nature. In these forces we recognize the gifts of nature and society which are integrated in one's total personality. Intercourse in a social community is very important in molding both one's personality and his conception of himself. "The most potent of all means of self-realisation is human society." (2)

While the distinctive features of a man's personality are due to the creative and social influences, yet when he comes to self-consciousness and becomes a self-determining being by taking his destiny more and more into his own hands, he finds himself in possession of a heritage of instincts and emotions, as well as of agency and intelligence, of which he knows he was not the creator, and which he learns is not a gift of society; consequently he seeks their explanation in nature or in God. According to the genetic classification of personality-factors which we have just noted, the two problems of personal life might be what W. Stern calls self-preservation and self-unfoldment. (3)

14. Purposive activity is fundamental in personality.

The point of emphasis in the above study of personality has been that of purposive activity. The idea of such activity is central in the concept of personality. The nature of a person is seen above all in the ends which he approves and according to which he directs his action. The development of personality consists in acting with growing consistency with reference to ends that are more and more clearly conceived and approved, and more and more fully organized both in

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(1) The Principle of Individuality and Value, page 338.
(2) J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, page 256.
(3) Person und Sache, pages 169-70.

conception and character. A person ought not to say, "To thine own self be true," until he has attained for himself a worthy system of ends and active tendencies. The first duty of human beings is to find out what they want, to criticize their desires in the light of their best knowledge, and to act consistently with reference to those that are approved. "It is the essence . . . of personality to realize more and more fully the capacity and harmony of its nature." (1)

15. A study of abnormal persons introduces no new principles of importance in the study of personality in general.

It is probable that a study of persons that are said to be abnormal will not reveal any new principles of which the metaphysician must take account in formulating a general conception of personality. Direct support xxxxxxx for this proposition is to be found in the general results of the investigations of K. Oesterreich as set forth in his Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen. The important difference that abnormal conduct makes for the erratic individual himself and for society should not be assumed to be equally important in determining the basic marks of normal personality, unless good warrant for this assumption is forthcoming. If it is true that the experience of abnormal persons is to be distinguished by either an incompleteness or an exaggeration with respect to some of thefactors which constitute normal persons, we should not expect an analysis of such experience to yield new principles of significance for the interpretation of complete and symmetrical personalities, although these differences, due to incompleteness or exaggeration, may, by contrast, help the philosopher in locating and determining the essential marks of normal personality. Abnormal persons are selves that have broken down in the very act of constituting themselves, and by their deficiencies may indicate to the observer what constitutes genuine personality. We have proposed already a moral explanation of the assertion, sometimes made, that several selves exist within the total life of certain persons or undeveloped personalities. (2) Some reasons have thus been indicated for the neglect of abnormal forms of self-experience in this investigation.

I. THE REALITY OF PERSONALITY.

1. Introduction to the problem of the reality of personality.

Whoever can verify the above description of personality in his own experience, by an act of some kind of intuitive recognition or self-identification to which reference has been made, (3) will acknowledge that he is in possession of a very insistent and important kind of existence of which he would have to take cognizance if he attempted to give a complete account of the real world. This account, if undertaken, would grow out of one of the highest human interests, the interest in truth and its attainment, and would involve numerous cycles, subordinate to the unifying interest mentioned, of intelligent activities such as have furnished all along the concrete material of our exposition. This attainment would represent a rational construction carried out by a particular person, or group of particular persons, of the special kind called metaphysicians, and would be based upon an interpretation of the best samples of reality available to them. Whatever the character or

a. Personal activity is seen in the attempt to solve this problem, and must surely be included in reality.

(1) E. N. Merrington, Problem of Personality, page 206.
(2) See above, page 316.
(3) See above, pages 180-184; below, page 358.

content of a metaphysical system may be, the active work of intelligent persons in building it certainly must not be overlooked, for such a system itself is a product of one of the highest types of personal activity.

b. Why we are justified in not presenting a general metaphysical system: personal activity itself furnishes the criterion of reality.

It is clear, then, that this kind of personal activity, as well as all others, must have a well established place in any metaphysical system. The question which faces us now is, What is the place of personal activity, or the concept of personality, in a theory of reality? An answer to this question would seem to presuppose a general metaphysics, the presentation of which is beyond the scope of this investigation, but as a matter of fact it need not, for, as I believe, the criterion of reality which it is one of the special functions of metaphysics to furnish is derived from no other source than personal activity itself, and reflection upon it. If this belief is justified, our only task is to define in what sense a concrete person is real.

One fundamental justification for this belief lies in the following considerations. The metaphysical criterion which one adopts must result, when applied to personal activity, in the inclusion of the latter among real entities, for it is essential to the ideals of metaphysical speculation to exclude nothing that is actual, least of all such rich and significant facts as personalities. The criterion of reality, then, must make a place for personality.

But when it is considered, first, that the metaphysician obviously cannot go beyond his own experience in his search for a criterion of reality, and, secondly, that his personal activities are the most central and important, as well as the most highly individualized phases of his experience, and yet must be included in reality, the necessity of finding the criterion of reality in personal activity itself becomes evident, and while this interpretation may lead to a general metaphysics, the latter is not an essential presupposition to a definition of the reality of personality. (1)

1'. Failures of attempts to substitute other criteria.

Only the second of the considerations proposed in the last paragraph might be challenged, and the challenge could be based, in the nature of the case, only upon an appeal to some phase of experience which has more marks of reality than personal activity. Such an appeal is unfounded for the following reasons.

a'. For example, immediate feeling.

In the first place, no phase of experience can be found which meets the requirements. If it is said, for example, that immediate feeling is a better test of reality than personal activity, the reasons for objection are the following: If immediate feeling is taken to mean a simpler, less developed, or less individualized experience than personal activity, clearly it cannot, by hypothesis, become a test for the latter without mutilating it, and the metaphysician is not permitted to mutilate experience to make it fit his theories. It may be added that it is very probable that this immediate feeling is an abstraction which a personal thinker makes from his own experience. (2) In any event, it is inadequate as a

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(1) We have presented already some reasons why the explanatory principles of personality must be derived from within personality itself; see above, pages 291-292 and 175-177.

(2) Compare our criticism of James' immediatism, above, pages 65-66.

test when applied to personality.

But if immediate feeling is taken to mean a more highly developed and individualized reality than personal experience, we ask, How has one arrived at such a conception? The reply is, that one has reached it by a high form of personal intelligent activity itself. Hence, one has not escaped from personal activity as a criterion of reality, but only has developed it further.

1". Criticism of F. H. Bradley's treatment of the self.

a". Statement of his argument.

These considerations appear to annul, in part at least, the well known argument of F. H. Bradley to the effect that the human self is a contradiction and an appearance. (1) Let us briefly examine his theory of the self. The question at issue is whether or not a real self exists in human experience; Bradley gives a negative reply. One reason for this answer is that the a priori characters which for him would mark real selfhood--a self-contained, changeless, independent, self-complete, perfectly unified being--are so exalted that they are precluded in advance from existing in finite human experience. The self that is present in that experience is an appearance in the light of this standard; the Absolute alone is real.

Let us inquire how such a conclusion is possible for human beings. The indispensable condition for discovering that my self is unreal seems to be a personal acquaintance with something else more real than that self is. This other magnitude, however, would have to appear somewhere within my experience, else my comparative judgment regarding the different degree of reality possessed by the two factors would not be a function of human intelligence. Bradley himself declares that, "The Reality certainly must appear within my psychical existence." (2)

The further and crucial question, then, is whether that more perfect form of my experience which leads me to declare that the Absolute is real and myself apparent is different from the self. Bradley holds that this superior variety of experience, namely that of "the immediate feeling" of a "finite center of experience," is distinct from the self, for he asserts that, "A self is not the same as such a centre of experience. . . From immediate experience the self emerges, and is set apart by a distinction." (3)

b". The fundamental defect in his argument.

Now we may acknowledge that the distinction between the conceptual self and immediate experience is a possible and useful one, but a fundamental mistake of Bradley lies in supposing that the latter is significant or existent, so far as normal human life is concerned, apart from an active and personal subject. He seems to admit as much when he says that, "It is true that all I experience is my state--so far as I experience it." (4) It is probable that immediate feeling is an abstraction when considered apart from a conscious subject. E. N. Merrington maintains that, "The use of these impersonal concepts is at the basis of his grand mistake in setting up Experience as Reality, while the Subject involved in all experience is shut into the outer darkness of 'appearance.'" (5)

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(1) Appearance and Reality, chapters IX and X.
(2) Ibid., page 259.
(3) Ibid., page 524.
(4) The Problem of Personality, page 42.

But if this immediate experience is abstract and non-existent apart from an experiencing self, the latter certainly cannot be consistently condemned as unreal by comparison with the former. If "the self is the highest form of experience," as Bradley acknowledges that it is, (1) how is it possible to find a higher form by which to condemn the self to appearance? Our fundamental objection, then, to Bradley's course of argument is that the experience which he takes as a sample of reality is itself conditioned by the active subject or self, and cannot, therefore, be used to push the latter into the realm of illusion.

c". The use of the principle of consistency presupposes an active and feeling self.

Only one final point can be noted in connection with Bradley's affirmation that the self is an appearance because it contains distinctions or divisions within itself, and is, therefore, contradictory. Here as above much evidence that could be produced must be omitted. An examination of the presuppositions present in the actual use of the principle of consistency will, I believe, reveal the inherent weakness of his argument as applied to the self. If the self is an appearance, it must of course be an appearance to someone, and at any rate to us who thus philosophize; that is, we must feel the contradictions which are said to be present in the concept of the self. But how can we feel and condemn them unless we already are acquainted with some kind of consistent and harmonious development of experience? In other words, the demand for a consistent reality is not merely an abstract formula, but it is also an expression of one of the deepest factors of the human self, namely, its essential and original unity, its love of harmony, and its capacity to produce it within its experience.

The emotional satisfactions and dissatisfactions present in consistent and contradictory thinking, in addition to the unifying and active work of the self, have not been adequately recognized or treated in logical discussions. A notable attempt to correlate passion and thinking in the pursuit of truth has been made by H. Sturt in his "Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism," the main title of which book is, The Principles of the Understanding. We have seen already that an important service of pragmatism has been to emphasize the importance of concrete and personal satisfactions in the verification of our ideas. (2) In short, the active personality is not only the source of the criterion of consistency, but is also a condition of its application.

d". Summary of the fallacy involved in any attempt to prove the self to be an appearance.

Any doctrine, therefore, that claims to make the self an appearance is likely to suffer from the fundamental circle in reasoning to which attention has been called in the preceding paragraphs. The argument of such an attempt would conform to the following general type: the self is appearance because the conception of it is inconsistent with something else in one's experience which is regarded as more real; but it is precisely the real self which mediates this agreement (or disagreement), and demands it; and that which alone establishes the test of the real cannot itself be treated as unreal without turning topsy-turvy the rational universe, and without ending in violating the principle of consistency which

(1) Appearance and Reality, pages 119-120.
(2) See above, page 16.

was at first adopted as criterion. This statement means that any assertion of reality must rest upon the rational activity of the human thinker, which cannot be denied without affirming it. To prove that a certain conception of the self is inconsistent does not prove unreal that real self which is the source of the demand for a consistent conception of itself and which provides, in some aspects of its experiences, the criterion by which some ideas of itself may be tested and found wanting.

b'. The fundamental reasons for the failure of all such attempts.

What has been said about the denial of the reality of personality by comparison with immediate feeling would apply to other attempts to find the criterion of reality in some phase of experience other than personal activity. The fundamental point is that such criteria either would be abstractions which could not meet the requirement or would be merely varied forms of personal activity itself.

The latter idea may be stated in another form by saying that the thinker who attempts to give personality an inferior grade of reality does so, it must be supposed, upon the ground that he is acquainted with a superior grade, but one may fairly demand that he indicate what this superior grade is if it is not an unrecognized kind or development of that very personal activity which he is subordinating.

It may be concluded that the endeavor to deny the reality of personality assumes and reaffirms that reality, and that we cannot escape the need of interpreting reality in terms of the highest form of experience which we have, namely, personal activities, for it is among these that we find the most exalted and complete forms of experience which human beings have. Personal activity is the one thing from which there is no possibility of escape, for escape itself is a kind of activity. We may, therefore, lay it down as a general rule that it is both futile and presumptuous for the human metaphysician to attempt to find a more perfect criterion of reality than that highest form of experience which he finds in his own personal activities.

In the examination of the theories of James (1) and Perry (2) and of the energetic and behavioristic theories of mental activity (3), there were set forth in detail reasons for the failure to explain personal experience in terms of something other than itself. It goes without saying that reality cannot be found in intellect, will, and feeling, if these are properly regarded as the abstractions that we have tried to show them to be. (4) Our justification, then, for discussing the meaning of the reality of personality apart from a complete metaphysical theory seems to be well supported.

2. The reality of personality found in intelligent activity.

The mark of reality which seems best to meet the facts with respect to personality is a very simple one. The reality of personality consists in that intelligent purposive activity which has been described in detail. A person is real when he acts so as to achieve a purpose.

This is no new criterion of reality, but is familiar to readers of Bowne (5), Ward, and Ladd, and many others. We can accept also

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(1) See above, pages 69-71: criticism of his neutral monism.

(2) See above, pages 106-7, 115-9: criticism of some phases of the neo-realistic theory of consciousness.

(3) See above, pages 194-211.

(4) See above, pages 289-91, 300-1, 334-5.

(5) See above, page 148.

James' two particular statements of how true samples of reality are to be found in personal experience. (1) One cannot sacrifice truth to originality. W. R. Sorley also asserts that, "It is the nature of the self to act." (2) As H. Lotze would say, it is "in the middle point of the workings which it executes or fulfils" that we find the reality of the spirit. (3) J. Ward points out that, "The subject is only as it is active." (4) We do not make any important distinction between the reality, the being, and the existence of personality. J. Ward also affirms that, "It must surely ever remain futile, nay, even foolish, to attempt to explain either receptivity or activity; for what is there in experience more fundamental? And being thus fundamental, the prime staple of all experience, it is absurd to seek to prove them real, since in the first and foremost sense of reailty the real and they are one." (5)

In a typical personal activity, then, presupposing a unitary agent, we find reality in as perfect a form as we human beings can experience it. To point out some features of this criterion of reality would mean to review the main characteristics of personal activity as they have been expounded above, but it may be worth while to do this briefly from the new point of view. In other words, from a study of personal activity we may deduce some of the marks of reality; they are as follows:

3. Some features of the criterion of reality as deduced from personal activity.

a. Dynamic.

(a) This criterion is a dynamic one. Only an agent that acts is real. This fact that an agent is operative or a working principle in the world is the presupposition of a further characteristic, namely, that the agent may also be acted upon. Since we are attempting to present in order some of the marks of the real, we cannot avoid using abstractions. In view of this fact, there is no serious objection to speaking of this first criterion of the real in terms of the volitional.

b. Teleological.

(b) It is also a teleological criterion, for purposive direction, meaning, the realization of ends,--these are characteristic of reality as exemplified in the personal act. In this act, in complete form, the ideal becomes actual, and the reality of the person consists in the realization of the ends which he values. We must find the perfection of personality in the unity of its development and its system of ends, and not in any static completeness, even supposing that to be present. In the real personal act, time is created, but the agent himself is permanent or identical.

c. Axiological.

(c) Closely associated with the latter characteristic is the axiological one. The presence of values is inextricably bound up with the real at the personal level. We may distinguish in thought, if we like, between existence and value, but these two features are inseparable in that which is concretely and personally real. It may be, of course, that there are lower levels of the real, such as physical things, for example, where the axiological mark is absent.

If personal development exhibits an increase in value-experience, the original incompleteness as compared with the later stage must not be mistaken for a contradiction in the essential nature of person-

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(1) See above, pages 27-8.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 442.
(3) Medicinische Psychologie, Section 132.
(4) Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, page 245.
(5) Ibid., page 53.

ality, but should be interpreted rather as a striking expression of what may be called its axiological reason, namely, of that perfectly intelligible movement in personal experience which makes for the maintenance or increase of the good that is appreciated. Since personal life is essentially a development, one does not expect a person to possess at once the total values of his lifetime, for that would contradict the fundamental nature of personal activity. On the contrary, the human person finds his reality in the quest for and development of values. The fact that a person does not now possess all the values he expects some time to possess, in no wise destroys for him the significance of his present values, but even enhances it. The very effort of the agent to overcome his axiological incompleteness is an evidence for and not against his reality, for the real is dynamic and purposive.

d. Intelligent.

(d) A fourth mark of the real as illustrated in personal activity is intelligence or rationality. The following considerations indicate, in part, the importance of intelligence in a real act. The meaning of a typical personal act is not exhausted for the agent himself in its actual or empirical phases, for it is set in a much larger world. This setting consists in its relation both to a more remote purpose or larger system of ends present to the agent, and to the environment which must be met in the achievement of the momentary purpose. Now, a personal act is intelligent in the sense that the agent himself consciously understands some of these wider bearings of it. The act as a whole is intelligible in the sense that its various aspects may be known by the agent when he is interested in reflecting upon its nature.

But we cannot too carefully avoid the mistake of finding the real in the consciousness of these ideal relations alone, for if this consciousness is not an abstract phase of a concrete personal activity, it is itself such an activity. The consciousness of these wider relations does not make the person an adjective of the universe, but an intelligent actor in it. In other words, to say that personal reality is intelligent does not exhaust its meaning, unless the term is used as equivalent to personality itself, but that adjective does emphasize a fundamental feature of it. Unless an act is in some measure articulate in the experience of the agent himself, it is not of a personal kind, and represents a low and obscure form of experience. Reflection upon the nature of a personal act brings to light various factors or immanent principles of which the agent at the moment of acting may not be aware in their entirety, but which may be made explicit. However, not only intelligible relation, but value, permeates the personal act, and it is not reducible to purely intellective terms. In a personal activity developed to a conclusion which is satisfying in the light of its original goal we have in concrete form that mark of consistency or non-contradiction which is sometimes put in the first rank among the criteria of the real.

e. Individual.

(e) A very general and comprehensive characteristic of this criterion is the individuality which it emphasizes. The personal act is a whole unified by a purpose. Its several features cannot be regarded as parts in any mechanical sense, but only as phases or aspects of an original whole. The concept of compound cycles of activity illustrates how the idea of individuality may be greatly extended, but this extension does not introduce us to new principles or criteria of the real. The criterion of individuality leads us to

expect that some of the mentioned marks of the real will overlap, to some extent, for they represent mutually penetrating qualities of a concrete act; the mark of individuality calls attention to this peculiar diversity in unity. Hence, any one of the designated characters of the real, taken by itself, would be insufficient, for our main contention has been precisely that it is only in that marvelously unified whole of the individual personal act that we find reality in the highest form accessible to us human beings.

Consequently, if individuality is taken to include in its meaning the dynamic, teleological, axiological, and intelligible aspects of a concrete activity, there is no objection to finding the real in the individual in this sense. The view that the real is found only in the cosmic individual whole is only a reflection of that individuality of the personal act to which attention has been called and which the metaphysician adopts as a comprehensive criterion of the real, and when this principle, therefore, is used to deny the reality of the human person the philosopher is circling in a world of abstraction.

1'. Personal idealism.

This conception of the criterion of the real is characteristic of personal idealism, which finds the ultimate principles for the explanation of reality and of knowledge in personality as an individual, and in this respect stands in contrast to those who attempt to interpret reality exclusively in terms of reason, will, feeling, imagination, or some other abstraction from the concrete personal act. Personality is a unique source and center of intelligent activities which are its very own, and which the agent knows from within; while he may distinguish phases within his activity, yet reality for him is found, not in any one of the phases or aspects taken by itself, but in the unique and total act.

4. Is personality substantial?

A very ancient question with reference to the soul is whether or not it is a substance or substantial. The answer to this question depends entirely upon what meaning of substance one has in mind. In any case, personal experience itself seems to be the source of the category, and to give to it its original meaning. It may be applied to objective things, and its personal origin forgotten, but whether or not the latter happens, it is personality which explains substance, and not substance which throws light upon personality. We must not expect the substantiality, the permanence, or the identity which we introduce into objects in order to understand them, to help us in explaining ourselves.

a. The origin of the category of substance in the personal act.

The psychological steps in the development of the idea of substance are described very well by J. Ward. (1) "(a) The unity and permanence more or less characteristic of what are entitled to be called things, and (b) this distinction between the things and their properties" are the subjective factors in substance. "The source and paradigm of the first definition is, we believe, to be found in our personality; and here we begin by assimilating the external objects with which we interact to this: we 'personify' them, that is to say. But the second is to be traced immediately to the subsequent objective analysis of these things, as already described: here we end by assimilating ourselves to them as a something which is the support of qualities: that is to say we 'reify' ourselves. Hence the materialism of primitive thought."

(1) Psychological Principles, page 336.

We have long ago abandoned the hope of learning about ourselves by analogies derived from physical things. Thus the origin of the category of substance must be the personal act itself.

b. Question asked concerning substantiality of personality.

If it is true that the genesis of the idea of substance is to be found in personal experience, we shall fall into a circle of reasoning, or lose ourselves in the thin air of abstractions, in attempting to conceive some kind of spiritual substance to which personality is to be referred for explanation. If, however, we avoid this enticing procedure, our sole task will consist in pointing out what there is, if anything, in personal experience which may be designated substantial. Does speaking of a personality as substantial add to our list of its characteristics?

c. The meaning of substance as applied to personality.

The answer probably is negative. The idea of substance merely emphasizes some marks that have been mentioned already, and, in doing so, it may be a term of some use. That to which it especially calls attention is the permanent and unitary characteristic of personality as a reality. To hold, as Bowne does, that personality is a substance in the sense that it acts and is acted upon not only does violence to the usual meaning of substance, but makes it identical with reality, and, therefore, redundant. However, one may very properly speak of personality as a substance in the sense of being an abiding and unitary reality, but since a person as a whole is not always the same, but only the agent is identical and permanent, one strictly ought to speak only of the latter as a substance. In that case, as E. S. Brightman has very well suggested, one might consider the empirical self to be the system of attributes belonging to the substantial agent, provided one did not try to imagine the latter to be some kind of core or substratum in which the attributes inhere. If the reflective self wishes to make use, in this sense, of this category of substance which he creates, no serious objection may be raised. We must remain, however, close to the Kantian view of substance as that which is permanent through change as the primary meaning of that concept when it is used in the interpretation of personality. The substance of a person is found in this, that he self-consciously endures in the midst of his cycles of activity.

d. Substance as a substratum.

1'. Denial of it.

But in any case, if we speak of personality as being substantial, we mean to refer to experiential characteristics, and not to some principle or substratum underlying or supporting it. A frequent and ancient meaning of substance is that of a supporting subject in which attributes or powers inhere. It is unnecessary to examine this erroneous notion after Bowne's destructive criticism of it in his Metaphysics. (1) It is a misleading and awkward expression for the fact that the person is an abiding agent who acts in various directions and may know himself to be the source of his acts. The most important pair of terms in connection with personality is that of agent and his functions, and not substance and its attributes. The two former are names for fundamental distinguishable aspects of every concrete personal act.

J. Ward points out that, "It is not proposed to explain psychical facts by assuming a faculty beyond them. All that is meant

(1) James' statement and criticism of the soul-substance theory may well be recalled at this point; see above, pages 40-42.

is that in every psychical fact there is a subject attending; not that beyond these acts of attending there is a potential attention. The subject is not regarded as merely capable of attention and as attending, when it chances to attend, by means of an appropriate faculty; but it only is an actual subject as it actually attends." (1)

2'. In what sense a person has attributes.

A person may be said to have attributes in the sense that the agent grounding his experience is found, upon analysis, to be the owner or center of a diversified empirical self. The conception of attributes, applied in this way, stresses the fact that a person maintains his essential unity and identity in the midst of multiform activities; this use does not imply the correlation of personality with any transcendent soul-substance. When we refer to the goodness of a man, we do not mean to say that he is some kind of inert substance which has a certain quality, but we intend to express the fact, which we have learned to know, that he has acted and may be expected to act in definite ways under particular circumstances. In the light of remembered history, one may say he has the capacity to act appropriately in diverse situations, but this statement is an ideal expression of the possibility of activity in view of the known past; so that we return here to that idea of permanence, which is the fundamental meaning of substance, and a basic feature of personality.

A. Aliotta declares that "when we speak of the identity of the Ego, we do not mean to reduce the mind to an empty, motionless unity, incapable of variation or development, but merely wish to say that the activity of the Ego in the various phases of its evolution first feels directly and then reflectively recognizes in itself a characteristic and constant physiognomy which justifies it in regarding itself as a substance. Those who dispute the substantiality of the Ego have formed a false concept of substance, one derived from the abstract materialistic conception of the atom, regarded as a thing which is inert and rigid in its absolute identity. If the substantiality of the Ego were of this nature, I should have no hesitation in acknowledging it to be a pure fiction." (2)

e. Elements of truth in substance as applied to personality.

One element of truth in the notion of spiritual substance, that is of substance used in the above defined sense in the interpretation of personality, consists in its emphasis upon personality as a reality which is more permanent than the various mental processes that mark the achievement of individual acts, and which is the ground or foundation of the mental operations themselves. Another element of worth in the idea of substance is that it points out that a person is not the attribute or property of anything else, but is a self-determining center of experience--a unique, individual, self-conscious existent. Whatever the origin of a person may be, whenever he exists, his existence is demonstrated by the fact that he is a persistent and spontaneous actor.

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(1) Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind, Mind, O. S., vol. XII, 1887, page 571.

(2) The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, page 412.

J. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. Problem of self-knowledge stated in terms of the distinction between the actual and the conceptual person.

We have found that a person is an actor, an agent actually, purposively, intelligently at work in his world; we may call such an acting agent an actual person. At any moment a person's interest and activity is absorbed in the performance of a single act, for it is probable that human beings can execute only one act at a time, of a typical or complete form. But we cannot be convinced that the whole meaning of a person is to be found in his momentary act. Surely the span of human attention is too narrow to contain within itself the total significance of an individual personality. We must look beyond the actual person, the actor of the moment. And yet while we try to extend our view of personality beyond this momentary actor, we must not forget that he is the key to all other forms of personality.

a. The actual person.

b. The conceptual person.

A person, then, so long as he exists, is constantly acting, and his history is a series of individual acts. Only one act, however, in his whole biographical series is actual, and all the others must be ideal. But the activities which he knows he has already performed, as well as those he intends to perform in view of his accepted purposes, constitute a system which he understands as his own biography, and which we may call his conceptual or ideal personality. The conception of personality is formed in the same way as other conceptions, save, as already explained above (1), that the elements involved in it are an explication of the immanent principles of one's personal activity itself. This conceptual person is rooted and grounded in the actual person through whose activities it has been constructed gradually.

c. The real person includes both.

Only a very limited phase of the conceptual person is included in the real person as above defined, for while the person acts at the moment with reference to a certain system of ends, and while such an action is an expression of his whole past, yet not all of the active contents of his past nor his prospective purposes are consciously present to him; indeed, only a very meager part of them are so present, however much his momentary act may be an integrated part of his total biography as he reviews it in the course of reflection. So far as the intelligent person builds up a conceptual or ideal self which he regards as his own, he extends his actual self very greatly, and will properly regard his real self as being made up of both his actual and his ideal selves, which, indeed, are only two phases of his complete personal life as he lives it out in an intelligent way. Now, in the effort to define the relation between the actual and the ideal personality of a man, we meet the problem of self-knowledge, the problem of explaining in what sense I know my own personality.

2. The meaning of self-consciousness.

For a person to ask, not only what he is, but how he knows what he is, seems to presuppose a high degree of self-consciousness. We cannot answer intelligently the question concerning the nature of self-knowledge until we define the meaning of self-consciousness in connection with personal life. In order to avoid cumbersome expressions in the following discussion, we shall regard the word self in the phrases, self-knowledge and self-consciousness, as equivalent to personality, and this will be justified, for, when these experiences appear, the primitive self has become sufficient-

a. Self-consciousness involved in self-knowledge.

(1) See above, pages 177-8.

ly developed to be properly called a person. We have considered how Bowne makes self-consciousness one of the central features of his theory of personality. His account may be recalled with profit at this place.(1)

b. The two forms of self-consciousness: personal or self-experience, and self-knowledge.

Self-consciousness may mean one's own awareness either of his actual or of his ideal personality, or both. We shall take it to mean both, and this usage is practically equivalent to that of Bowne. Self-knowledge will refer to one's understanding of his ideal or conceptual personality, but excludes the awareness or the immediate experience which attaches to his actual personality; the latter we shall call personal or self-experience. The reason for excluding this personal experience from self-knowledge takes us into the heart of the problem of knowing what we are, and indicates that it is improper to speak of self-knowledge concerning the actual person.

1'. Description of the lower form of self-consciousness: viz., personal or self-experience.

It has been essential to the argument of this investigation to base all interpretations of personality upon particular activities or concrete acts. In these the individual person or agent is working out his destiny, seeking the ends he values, and adjusting himself to a vast world with which he interacts, and all this is more or less consciously done. Now, since such cycles of activity-experiences constitute the real person, we are fully justified in calling them personal or self-experiences, and since they are also conscious, they are properly called one form of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness, in this lower form, means the conscious experience of a personal agent in the midst of performing such acts as we have described; it means his awareness of the individual activity-situation, of the worthful end he is seeking, and of the stages in its realization. Self-consciousness, in this sense, is a general aspect which we may abstract from every concrete, self-determined activity; it consists in the fact that the subject is aware of the actual motive, initiation, and progress of a concrete act, and approves it. Self-consciousness, considered from this point of view, is really identical with that intuitive or immediate awareness of his activities upon the part of an agent which has been described in connection with personalistic method.(2)

The usage explained in the last paragraph is somewhat misleading. It would make for clearness if we reserved <u>self-consciousness</u> for the higher form of self-knowledge where the subject refers his various activities to a conception of himself which he has constructed, and if we adopted the phrase, <u>self-experience</u>, for the kind of experience here in question, namely, a subject's experience of actually acting with reference to a particular end. Self-experience means the experience of the actual person at work, and precedes that reflective knowledge where he becomes conscious of the fact that he acts in this way and in that. In short, self-experience is merely the name for the concrete activity-experience as we have described it, involving a conscious agent acting teleologically, and nothing further needs to be said about it, save that it is the "raw material," as Bowne said, out of which the agent constructs his conceptual personality.

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(1) See above, pages 126-9; 132-3.
(2) See above, pages 180-2.

2'. Description of the higher form of self-consciousness: viz., self-knowledge.

a! Two varieties: common sense and critical self-knowledge.

It is in connection with the higher form of self-consciousness, namely, self-knowledge, that the epistemological problem of personality appears. The existence of such knowledge, which includes much more than the actual personal experience of the moment, has been suggested on several occasions, especially in connection with the concepts of purposiveness, activity-cycles, and moral values, where an act occupies a significant place in a wide system of ideal ends and memories which the agent owns and esteems. (1) Since we have found that the degree to which purposes are organized varies greatly from person to person, we may distinguish between two chief varieties of self-knowledge: common sense and critical self-knowledge. The first is the ordinary self-knowledge which the man of the street possesses in so far as he knows what his desires are; the second is the reflective self-knowledge of the critical philosopher. These represent two degrees, although important ones, in the organization or unification of an individual's activities.

b'. Self-consciousness a mark of personality.

Since some degree of self-knowledge is characteristic of personality, self-consciousness, in both its lower and higher forms, is a mark of personality. This concept of self-consciousness, however, adds no new moment to the idea of personality as already worked out. The highest forms of self-knowledge were included in above in our study of the organization of personal values. (2)

3. In what sense can we know personality?

a. The problem stated.

Many difficulties and doubts have been associated in the history of thought with that phase of self-consciousness called self-knowledge, for it has been both affirmed and denied that knowledge of personality is possible. We shall now try to explain our reasons for taking a middle position: for affirming it in one sense, and denying it in another.

b. In what sense I cannot know my personality: the momentary acting agent is not an object of knowledge.

The one phase of my personality which cannot become an object of knowledge is the acting agent himself. The reason is that such an act of knowledge, if possible, would itself depend upon the action of the agent himself, and the agent known could no longer be the active agent, unless my real agency divided itself. In that case, however, I should have become two personalities, and have only pushed the problem of personality-knowledge, unsolved, one step further back. The fundamental point is that one activity cannot know itself in its totality, for to know an activity as my activity requires that the agent in the act of knowing should be identical with the agent in the activity known. But since I cannot act in two ways at the same time, this identity is destroyed, if I try to know the agent in a previous act of mine as the real agent distinct from the real agent in the present act of knowing. This argument need not be extended here, for the whole situation has been considered at length before, in connection with the problem of knowing the agent, the second implication of activity. (3)

1'. Reasons why the lack of this particular kind of knowledge does not trouble me.

There are various reasons why this inability to know the agent in the sense explained does not trouble me. (a) In the first place, I am much more interested in maintaining my identity in the series of my activities than in demonstrating the possibility of an illusory knowledge of present agency.

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(1) See above, pages 226, 255-6, 264-8, 278-294, 302-6, 314-15.

(2) See especially pages 314-5, above.

(3) See above, pages 238-242.

(b) I find, after all, that the demand to know present agency is really an artificial one, since agency is an abstraction derived from a concrete activity with the performance of which I am exceedingly familiar, and is a fact which I experience, not that of which I have experience. I know that I continually act in one way or another. How do I know this? First, I know it because of the effects of my acts, because of their efficacy in transforming my experience, or in bringing satisfaction or disappointment. Furthermore, in a present act of recollection or retrospection, I remember the phenomenal phases of an act just finished--the purpose which I sought, the developing stages of its realization, and its total sense of worth to me. Indeed, my personal activity is intelligible to me precisely because I, an identical agent, know that I have acted and can act in various ways, and because I become aware of the consequences of my numerous activities without losing my own permanence in so doing, or without leaving or exhausting myself in a single act.

(c) In the third place, I do have, indeed, an immediate experience, not of my agency by itself, but of consciously and actually acting, (1) and I am as certain of this experience as I am certain of the purposes I carry out and of the values I esteem. My capacity to act in moral ways convinces me beyond doubt of the efficacy of my agency. With this I am content for the simple reason that I have no difficulty in recognizing my various interests, ends, and values as my own, including the interest in knowing the agent. In knowing all these interests as determinants of my activities, I know my fundamental self, and am satisfied. And if I should develop some new interest in an immediate experience of activity, I may know that also, if I choose, in the next act.

(d) Again, the demand that I know my present agency as an object presupposes the instantaneous identification of knowing an activity with realizing it, the momentary equivalent of seeking and knowing that I seek. But since I am one, and cannot act in two ways at the same time, I must choose between a concrete activity directed toward the attainment of a purpose, and my knowledge of such an activity. The choice is determined entirely by the momentary purpose which dominates me. If I wish to know the nature of my activities, then I will proceed in active thought to gain that end, and may therein carry out a cycle of concrete activities. But I may choose, on the other hand, to act with reference to some other end than that of truth-seeking, and in so acting perform another series of concrete activities. But the knowing series is a different one than the second series referred to, let us say, the practical series. If the knowing series is directed to the latter, the content of the attained knowledge of it will lack, to a greater or less extent, the experiential richness of the practical series as it was concretely realized. The variation in richness is due, in large part, to the amount of time that has elapsed. The nearer the act of knowing is to the act that is known, the more perfect is the knowledge. I may know an act immediately preceding my present one with a very high degree of com-

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(1) The great verbal difficulties involved in expressing the facts in the case, to which attention has been called, need to be considered here again; see above, page 177.

pleteness, with the exception, ever to be noted, that the acting agent himself is never past, but always present; I have no desire to leave my agency entirely in the past, unless I wish to get rid of my life altogether. In conclusion, I may say that I may know any act in the next moment, if I choose, by means of another concrete act, and thereby I demonstrate my capacity for permanent existence and self-determination.

(e) The fact that I cannot know the present agent, the agent acting in a momentary way, does not trouble me when I have before me the countless modes in which I, the agent, have acted before, and when I may include, in the next moment, the present act in the accumulated multitude. This very multitude which expresses my personal history would itself lose significance for me if I should surrender or could surrender my own agency.

(f) The demand that the acting subject should become an object of knowledge would, if fulfilled, simply make our language topsy-turvy by confusing the subject and object in a momentary act of knowing, and would lead only to ambiguities and confusions in the use of words and in thinking.

c. In what sense we can know personality.

I can affirm knowledge of my personality in the sense that I have no difficulty in knowing that I have acted in manifold ways in the past, and that I expect in the future to act with reference to certain purposes. I recognize myself as the identical agent which has performed many activity-cycles which I can remember and which I have valued. From this series I learn much about my capacities for activity, and about those of my purposes which experience has clarified. Upon the basis of this knowledge, I build a conception of myself which contains at least these important factors: the capacity to act in various ways which has been learned from past experience, and one or more systems of purposes which I have organized and which I esteem.

1'. The construction of a conceptual personality upon the basis of our concrete acts.

If I am to be more than a single act, I must maintain my identity through a series of acts. These successive acts may differ greatly in their individualities, but all alike are grounded in the same agent, if they belong to one personal history. Out of the numerous activities which I confirm as my own, I build the conceptual personality, which, again, is the product of or grounded in the same agent as performed the original acts out of which it is constructed. We need no demonstration that we are more than the conceptual or ideal selves thus built up, for the very construction of them has grown out of an immediate experience of ourselves as active and interested. A personal agent is the owner and center of an historical wealth of psychical facts which we have called the empirical self. Bowne asserts that, "Actually . . . it is the self that thinks and feels and wills, and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the active and abiding subject of this inner life." (1)

2'. Royce's self-representative system in reference to the self.

One of the most illuminating of modern theories of knowledge bearing upon the self is to be found in J. Royce's "self-representative system." According to this view, while the ideal self is constituted of a series of distinct acts, the whole system may be "precisely represented by a proper fraction of itself." (2)

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(1) Metaphysics, page 330.
(2) The World and the Individual, vol. I, page 509.

Such a portion or fraction would be an individual activity, as above described. Such a personal act makes the whole nature of personality intelligible, and without it, the latter would be meaningless. Royce says, "And, indeed, if the Self is anything final at all, it is certainly in its complete expression (although of course not in our own psychological life from instant to instant) a self-representative system; and its metaphysical fate stands or falls with the possibility of such systems." (1)

He says further, "But, from our point of view, the world of a Self, whatever continuity of internal structure it may in some aspects possess, is in its principal form of expression embodied in a discrete series of acts, of individual expressions, of stages of self-representation and of self-revelation. We cannot here repeat the argument by which this result was reached in the Essay in question. But experience at any moment shows how I am conscious of my own deeds, of my progress, of my acts of attention, and of my approaches to selfhood in any way, in the form of a discrete series, in which one stage or act of life is followed by the next. The principle of my life, as I come to myself, and, knowing what I want, proceed to do it, is a principle winning novelty through Recurrence. Again and again, I proceed, from one act to the next, and so always to new acts. But neither an interpolation of deeds between my own deeds, nor yet a consciousness of unbroken continuity in my own acts, would help me to understand myself." (2)

As the result of an enlarging series of personal acts, I am able to expand the conception of my personality, and I have no practical difficulty in knowing my own personality for the reason that I find nothing in any particular act,--which, as a whole, is a fact of my immediate experience,--and nothing in my activity-cycles, which prevents my understanding one act in the next, if I so desire. In this capacity for the performance of an indefinite number of acts is manifested my personality. Instead of losing myself in an infinite regress, I find myself in an infinite progression, and become thoroughly intelligible to myself; I find myself to be an active, permanent, and free personality.

3'. I experience myself as acting and this makes my personality intelligible to me.

So far as the problem of knowing personality is concerned, the ultimate and satisfying fact is that I experience myself as acting, now in this and now in that direction, and that I may construct as complete a system as I please upon the basis of these acts and their included purposes. The former fact is called self-experience or personal activity, and the latter is called self-knowledge; together they constitute my self-consciousness. The former experience is my actual personality, which gives most of the meaning and significance to my complete self; these two constitute an intimate unity which we have called the real personality. This unity is based upon the fact that I may recognize the purpose which I realize in a momentary act as the living phase of that ideal self which I am seeking gradually to realize as conditions permit.

I recognize my finitude in the double limitations set upon the scope of my activities: first, the limitations set upon me

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(1) The World and the Individual, vol. I, page 513.
(2) Ibid., vol. II, pages 105-6.

by the varying tractability of the world in which I must act; and, secondly, the limitations due to the fact that I am confined, at any instant, to a single act. But in this one act, where I experience activity immediately, where I actually seek an end, my own nature becomes revealed to me. The whole series of activities which constitutes my biography and my conceptual self becomes intelligible to me by reason of this one which is ever present in immediate experience.

4'. Meaning of the immediate experience of activity. Its union with one's ideal personality forms his real personality.

It is clear, therefore, that an adequate knowledge of one's real personality consists of an intimate union of his actual and his ideal personality. Without the significant whole which the ideal personality adds to the actual or momentary personality, the latter would be of only passing worth; without the immediacy and the firmness of the actual personality, the ideal personality would be either altogether impossible, or a system of abstractions. It is obvious, therefore, that the actual and ideal phases must be unified before we attain a full knowledge of our real selves.

One's actual or momentary activity, therefore, plays an important and fundamental part as one phase of self-knowledge. It is an immediate experience in the sense that its basic function, which the subject will not give up, is to achieve an end,--although that end may be an object of knowledge in some other activity,--and not to know itself. In other words, it is immediate only in the sense that the acting subject does not know about himself as he acts, as an object of his present agency, although he ever experiences himself acting. The active subject, then, never becomes an object of its own knowing, save as a concept; but he acts and lives, and having lived, he may assert that he has done so; and out of his multitudinous activities and purposes construct a comprehensive idea of himself which greatly enriches the meaning of his immediate experiences.

The achieving of an end is a living and immediate experience, but not wholly so, for the consciousness of the end and of the stages in its attainment, as well as of the environment, may introduce a measure of mediate or presentative knowledge. In the moment of achievement I can always say that I immediately experience myself acting, or that I act, or that I feel. The fact that I now act in a purposive and intelligent way is my personality, whether or not I add to this actual personality a philosophic conception of it.

5'. The importance of the intellectual phase of personality is seen in the conceptual personality.

Hence, it is out of my personal activity-cycles that I construct, by new acts, a conception of myself as I was and as I expect to be. This total conception contains some measure of internal order, and gives my present conscious act a peculiar stability, which stands in strong contrast to those impulsive deeds of a primitive or undeveloped man which are not determined by having a conscious place in a comprehensive grasp of his own total life. In the development of our argument the intelligent phase of personality has grown to one of primary importance. The extent to which each person becomes an intelligible part of the world in which he acts will be less undetermined so far as this investigation goes. But the great importance of conception, of the intellective factors in personality, increases in proportion as our knowledge of our interests and purposes more and more determines our modes of acting. By means of our rational activities, we de-

velop a self-regarding sentiment which becomes a powerful influence upon all that we do.

4. The final intuition of personality.

There are many degrees of explicitness with which different persons consciously recognize a system of ends, interests, or desires as their own. In the most highly developed stages of self-consciousness or self-knowledge one may be clearly aware, in the course of reflection or deliberation, of the main groups of purposes which dominate his life and according to which he directs his conduct. The highest moment of self-knowledge comes when one self-consciously owns such a conceptual, purposive system, and recognizes himself as the real abiding actor, the real desirer, who gives to the system such unity, value, and realization as it may possess; and in that moment, too, comprehends his momentary activity as an integral phase of a unique developing whole, called his ideal personality, which is rooted and grounded in the actual and living deed. This act of self-recognition or self-identification, where my ideal and actual selves blend in a whole which constitutes my real personality, is a kind of intuitive insight or comprehension in which I behold the whole meaning of my existence so far as that is possible at a single glance of finite intelligence.

K. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

1. Some general results of the above investigation.

In the preceding examination of self-consciousness and self-knowledge the concept of activity again has provided a suggestive and profitable point of view. Indeed, that idea has been the unifying principle of the third constructive and systematic part of this investigation. Some of its general results and the relation of the theories of personality presented in it to the classification of the first part and to the views of American thinkers of the second part need finally to be outlined.

a. Classification of theories of personality.

In the first part of the inquiry the chief types of personality-theory were classified according to the principle of immanence in experience. Representative views were arranged according to whether or not in them personality was regarded as immanent in or transcending experience, or both. One result was the demonstration of the great variety of opinions that are held concerning the nature of personality.

b. Importance of studying method in connection with a metaphysics of personality.

A more significant result emerging from this classification was the clear indication of the importance of considering the problem of method in connection with a metaphysics of personality, and this question has been one of constant concern in the development of the argument. Three American thinkers were reviewed and criticized primarily from the point of view of the philosophic methods employed, and serious defects were found, especially in the theory of R. B. Perry, but also in that of Wm. James. At the beginning of the positive argument some of the general requirements and characteristics of a proper personalistic method were noted. The rest of the third part consisted of an endeavor to apply this method in determining the nature of personality from the point of view of concrete human activity, and that part was concluded, as it was begun, by a discussion of the problem of self-knowledge. In a word, in the investigation as a whole

strong emphasis has been put upon the importance of studying method as a condition for the understanding of personality, and it represents one illustrative attempt to define and apply a personalistic method.

c. Systematic history of three American theories of personality.

In the second part of the investigation a systematic and relatively complete history of three American theories of personality was presented. The views of W. James, R. B. Perry, and B. P. Bowne were selected because each represented well a general and characteristic metaphysical standpoint. One result of this review was the confirmation of the importance of personalistic methodology, and another was the discovery that activity, in some sense, is a fundamental factor in the concept of personality. A very general deficiency, however, in the determination of the meaning of activity became evident.

d. A systematic study of personality, unified by the concept of activity.

The idea of activity was adopted, with a full statement of the reasons for doing so, as the unifying principle in the whole constructive exposition of the third part of the investigation. The latter represents an endeavor to set forth systematically a comprehensive theory of personality from the point of view of the experience of activity. The idea of activity proved to be a valuable principle or standpoint for both the organization and the interpretation of the important phases of personality, especially of its purposiveness, rationality, unity, individuality, identity, and self-consciousness. An endeavor was made to clarify the nature of the unity of personality by distinguishing and describing at least five meanings of that term, and also several ways in which personality might be said to be permanent were pointed out.

e. Presentation of a theory of activity.

The largest chapter of the investigation dealt with the relation of activity to personality, and incidentally a theory of activity was worked out in an effort to meet the contemporary need of a more definite and thorough explication of that concept. From a strictly concrete point of view, the implications or the conditions of activity were explained. Special emphasis was laid upon the necessary place in activity of purposes of several kinds.

f. Personalistic dialectic.

As a result of the study of these implications, we were able to express the inner development of a typical and complete personal act in the form of a personalistic movement or dialectic of the form: purpose, realization or activity, and memory--all grounded in the agent. Actual personal life consists in such cycles, possessing many varied degrees of completeness and individuality.

g. Criteria of the real as deduced from the personal act.

Reasons were presented for supposing that personal activity might be taken as a genuine sample of reality. Upon the basis of this supposition, the criteria of the real were deduced from the completed analysis of the personal act. The presence of value was included as one of these marks.

2. The resulting theory of personality in relation to

The total view of personality resulting from the above investigation is based upon a conception of experience which stands in contrast to James' doctrine of pure experience, but agrees with his statement when he describes consciousness as personal and finds the "fons et origo" of reality in personal experience.

other views studied.

We have defended the opinion that the idea of pure experience, when treated otherwise than as an abstraction, does violence to the personal character of the activity-experiences of adult human beings; these are not neutral, but presuppose an immanent and conscious agent or subject.

a. Comparison with the historical conceptions reviewed.

The theory presented, however, being fundamentally activistic, appears to be thoroughly harmonious with the pragmatic attitude and presuppositions. The factors of purpose and value which are fundamental fit in well with the pragmatic method and its emphasis upon conative satisfactions in the verification of ideas.

1'. James.

The several phases of the empirical self of which James made so much have been fully incorporated in the above interpretation of personality, but the point has been added that this empirical self, so far as it is phenomenal, requires for its existence an active subject who owns or grounds it. We have learned from James the importance of studying experiences in the concrete, and agree with him and Bowne in rejecting the old doctrine of soul-substance. As James stresses knowledge of acquaintance or immediate experience in connection with the apprehension of dynamic reality, so we have included intuition as one phase of our personalistic method.

2'. Perry.

The constructive theory of personality presented stands in opposition to every endeavor, such as that of Perry, to explain the self or personal activity as a complex of simpler elements or parts, or to reach the truth about personality by the exclusive use of the analytical method. The unity of the personal act has been insisted upon repeatedly. The difficulties of attaining a thoroughly behavioristic account of activity have seemed to be insurmountable, and while we agree with Perry that purpose is essential in human acting, unlike him, we feel the necessity and value of a free use of the method of introspection and of the development of the principles of personality from within.

3'. Bowne.

The conception of personality offered above stands in closest connection with Bowne's theory. It has consisted primarily of a development of the idea of activity which he made fundamental in his conception but which he did not treat adequately. We have indicated how the agent in personal activity is identical or abiding, while the empirical self which any agent owns may undergo development, and in this way we have reconciled the ideas of change and identity within the totality of the personal life. In the exposition of Bowne's view the harmonious relation of these concepts did not always clearly appear. We have laid a little less emphasis than Bowne upon the rational phases of personality, and greater stress upon the significance of value in personal activity. There are many other similarities between the two views, especially with respect to the factors of self-consciousness and the reality of personality.

b. Classification of the above theory of personality.

The theory of personality resulting from the above investigation belongs in the class of immanent theories of the objectivistic-subjectivistic species, (1) where personalistic theories of the self in general belong. The study of the agent and of dispositions, as well as of self-knowledge, led to the rejection of any transcen-

(1) See above, page 8.

dent element in personality. Personality is always a matter of experience, and even the active subject which grounds personal experience enters integrally into or is immanent in the latter. The inclusion in the total personality of what has been defined as the empirical self introduces a factor that is objective in the sense that the complete person is constituted of certain psychical facts which can be distinguished from the subject.

The investigation has shown the difficulty and fallacy of explaining and classifying personality exclusively in terms of intellect, feeling, or will. The general reason for this conclusion is that each of the psychical processes referred to enters into the constitution of every complete personal act.

It has been impossible also to explain the full meaning of personality interms of the subject, considered, for example, as the pure or epistemological ego, for that concept is too empty to account for the empirical richness of personal experience. Personality, rather, has been found to consist in concrete acts involving at once an active subject and an empirical self as above described; both of the latter are abstractions, however, apart from the actual wholeness or individuality of personal acts.

The marvelous wealth of personal experience explains in part the great variety of theories of personality which have been put forward. The bibliography which follows confirms the fact of this variety, which was made manifest in the classification of the first part, and also demonstrates the widespread interest, in contemporary thought, in determining the nature of personality.

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Notes

*One asterisk before a following reference indicates that it has been read in an amount varying from a small significant section up to half of the whole.

**Two asterisks before a reference means that it has been read either in entirety or in greater part.

Underlining is used to mark books and articles which have proved to be of the greatest value in understanding the nature of personality.

The chronological order is adopted in arranging writings in those cases where more than one book or article of an author is mentioned.

The period covered by the following bibliography is primarily the last fifty years. The aim has been to include the chief writings of this period which throw light upon the problem of personality or some important phase of it. This purpose has not been realized fully, especially in connection with books of the last half dozen years when the war has interfered with the preparation and delivery of general book catalogs and indices. No attempt has been made to include the titles of all relevant books written before about 1870, but reference is made only to those works of the greatest philosophers which bear most directly and significantly upon the problem of personality.

Several special bibliographies dealing with important phases of personality are presented after the general one by means of reference to the numbers used in the latter.

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1. ABNORMAL PHASES OF PERSONALITY.

40	416	662	833	1047	1225	1367
92	437	692	856	1094	1234	1371
101	503	711	857	1099	1236	1389
102	522	712	859	1122	1248	1419
135	523	713	875	1123	1259	1535
138	550	755	890	1124	1269	1572
173	553	760	920	1147	1270	1655
200	569	783	921	1152	1274	1656
217	571	784	965	1156	1282	1682
325	586	793	1008	1215	1337	
359	589	794	1011	1222	1351	
365	642	810	1033	1224	1353	

2. ACTIVITY AND PERSONALITY.

12 212 556 893 1074 1309 1488
21 215 557 897 1086 1319 1497
22 224 558 911 1096 1322 1529
75 246 583 917 1118 1323 1576
77 248 609 918 1132 1329 1587
94 274 648 925 1136 1352 1596
95 333 649 930 1145 1354 1612
114 366 652 947 1148 1368 1614
119 373 664 957 1160 1369 1615
123 378 671 977 1185 1383 1620
125 379 724 991 1186 1398 1626
148 387 726 993 1190 1413 1629
154 406 727 1031 1206 1414 1630
158 418 739 1048 1208 1446 1639
176 426 743 1055 1213 1446b 1640
182 428 830 1057 1247 1450 1644
194 443 846 1059 1251 1457 1671
195 471 850 1060 1264 1465 1678
196 485 866 1069 1264a 1484 1685
197 547 880 1073 1302 1486 1693
1694
1700
1713

3. AESTHETICS AND PERSONALITY.

108 621 646 1076 1289 1386 1500
273 624 825 1086 1338 1440 1699

4. ANTHROPOLOGY AND PERSONALITY.

7 86 218 506 907 1376 1606
8 90 289 529 1032 1377 1632
33 149 424 860 1078 1461
85 174 454 906 1305 1550

5. BIOLOGICAL PHASES OF PERSONALITY.

100 327 604 767 918 1105 1462
119 405 605 777 928 1167 1533
120 406 688 878 985 1271 1534
170 477 765 890 1044 1297
299 599 766 917 1061

6. BODY AND PERSONALITY.

10	244	412	561	803	1010	1429
15	253	414	609	812	1189	1495
35	278	425	640	857	1221	1498
43	323	442	648	900	1223	1504
112	327	455	654	946	1254	1506
115	335	456	681	954	1275	1536
136	348	512	684	991	1342	1565
235	409	555	719	1009	1347	1577
					1381	1624

7. ETHICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY.

14	376	660	908	1174	1407	1578
73	391	665	919	1204	1416	1601
74	394	673	961	1235	1417	1602
87	464	678	988	1237	1446	1617
128	485	685	989	1244	1456	1619
130	494	770	996	1300	1463	1620
134	510	791	998	1313	1472	1648
142	516	820	1004	1322	1476	1651
164	560	825	1037	1324	1483	1652
180	563	831	1112	1330	1499	1696
191	572	847	1113	1345	1505	1697
307	574	852	1142	1359	1516	1704
329	591	884	1143	1382	1539	
331	612	889	1149	1391	1551	
361	635		1166	1396	1556	

8. HISTORY OF PERSONALITY.

4	187	349	458	608	748	815
8	199	351	475	613	752	816
19	204	358	479	615	756	817
39	206	360	485	616	758	821
47	213	361	490	632	764	831
48	218	364	519	633	770	836
49	221	366	535	635	776	855
55	228	393	536	637	779	857
56	230	399	543	647	786	860
68	236	404	576	661	788	861
78	241	414	577	674	789	870
103	296	420	579	691	790	880
105	298	431	590	699	791	924
125	324	441	604	706	798	925
149	338	445	607	717	799	926

(Continued on page 441)

8. History of Personality, continued.

927	1022	1214	1303	1415	1507	1606
928	1029	1217	1304	1417	1512	1635
929	1039	1221	1305	1420	1527	1646
939	1065	1226	1315	1426	1528	1649
941	1078	1227	1328	1435	1529	1672
946	1079	1230	1330	1437	1538	1679
957	1078	1235	1344	1447	1554	1684
964	1084	1258	1350	1448	1557	1709
967	1117	1260	1359	1457	1567	1710
969	1121	1267	1363	1460	1579	1714
977	1189	1268	1368	1461	1585	
983	1191	1291	1372	1471	1597	
984	1210	1298	1391	1474	1599	
1021	1211	1299	1410	1481	1604	

9. INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY.

44	279	408	728	968	1231	1563
45	332	469	839	1018	1239	1541
75	354	496	877	1105	1310	1554
143	378	517	879	1106	1400	1591
166	382	587	881	1119	1462	1628
167	386	652	933	1133	1464	1687
168	407	687	944	1198	1466	

10. METHODOLOGY AND PERSONALITY.

98	306	380	746	1017	1205	1446b
104	313	428	747	1019	1279	1458
118	341	449	751	1096	1332	1473
152	343	495	857	1100	1358	1490
162	344	532	858	1131	1388	1647
198	345	545	923	1169	1408	1650
210	356	721	942	1172	1427	
292	375	738	1016	1173	1446a	

11. PERSONALISM (i. e., the central place of personality in the interpretation of reality, knowledge, etc.)

13	83	225	328	480	677	774
23	107	245	364	493	689	775
28	117	257	386	500	690	786
31	125	258	400	501	691	791
33	145	267	403	502	699	795
36	161	269	439	542	704	799
37	175	276	453	556	716	846
43	182	308	466	576	730	853
50	185	322	468	609	736	867
67	223	323	469	659	768	880
81						

(Continued on page 442)

11. Personalism, continued.

887	966	1120	1264	1322	1455	1579
888	1001	1123	1264a	1350	1465	1615
911	1021	1146	1265	1352	1467	1618
915	1023	1188	1279	1354	1479	1633
925	1030	1227	1280	1406	1500	1637
926	1050	1228	1286	1407	1501	1689
929	1072	1243	1296	1425	1502	1690
943	1087	1262	1307	1434	1514	
957	1093	1263	1318	1446	1552	

12. PSYCHOLOGY AND PERSONALITY.

25	265	548	782	1029	1257	1549
42	266	585	792	1031	1267	1563
72	290	593	815	1048	1268	1585
164	346	610	837	1071	1302	1589
179	360	611	842	1089	1348	1611
202	363	620	843	1090	1366	1613
203	366	635	844	1091	1369	1616
206	418	639	850	1096	1375	1618
221	419	644	857	1100	1398	1627
247	427	645	882	1123	1413	1639
249	433	656	910	1125	1420	1651
250	436	657	911	1140	1447	1683
251	443	668	924	1148	1467	1693
252	446	672	945	1160	1484	1694
253	447	680	975	1196	1487	1701
254	482	698	976	1200	1503	1702
255	503	730	980	1205	1520	1707
256	504	731	981	1207	1540	1715
259	513	735	997	1216	1542	
261	525	759	1005	1220	1543	
262	534	764	1012	1252	1546	
264	544	781	1023		1548	

13. RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY.

3	155	237	336	410	533	596
29	183	242	347	422	534	605
49	184	243	353	423	536	607
50	186	293	360	459	537	611
56	188	294	369	462	554	615
64	201	296	392	463	565	629
124	205	297	393	466	566	631
126	224	309	398	492	567	636
132	227	318	399	521	568	651
133	230	323	402	529	572	667

(Continued on page 443)

13. Religious and Theological Aspects of Personality, continued.

668	814	970	1083	1232	1341	1518
676	818	974	1085	1240	1343	1529
693	825	975	1087	1243	1345	1544
695	848	998	1092	1249	1359	1565
696	914	999	1099	1261	1409	1568
702	915	1002	1116	1294	1410	1600
705	916	1003	1127	1301	1421	1604
706	927	1014	1138	1303	1444	1606
710	937	1023	1141	1307	1446	1633
714	939	1025	1180	1313	1449	1634
715	943	1038	1191	1320	1469	1637
716	948	1041	1197	1323	1479	1638
717	949	1043	1199	1325	1492	1641
791	958	1049	1202	1326	1493	1642
804	964	1065	1229	1335	1494	1670
813	969	1068	1230	1340	1507	1685

14. VALUE (in general) AND PERSONALITY.

124	438	676	1015	1179	1405
146	440	824	1093	1180	1446
166	541	886	1129	1181	1570
167	564	968	1137	1328	1700

15. VOLITIONAL ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY.

5	213	544	773	956	1195	1446
6	222	546	776	1010	1270	1452
19	238	560	791	1019	1295	1513
26	320	562	823	1027	1312	1526
91	372	573	841	1066	1350	1569
116	374	600	857	1070	1368	1671
129	378	627	863	1088	1382	1680
163	430	658	894	1101	1403	1698
192	486	709	913	1104	1415	1714

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